Pars 3, Cap. 8
Breviloquium · Pars III: De corruptela peccati
Capitulum VIII. De origine peccatorum actualium.
Postquam dictum est de traductione peccati originalis, dicenda sunt aliqua de origine peccati actualis. — De ortu igitur peccati actualis haec tenenda sunt in summa, quod actuale peccatum originem trahit a libera voluntate uniuscuiusque per suggestionem, delectationem, consensum et operationem, secundum illud Iacobi primo7: Unusquisque tentatur, a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus; deinde concupiscentia, cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum vero, cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. — Si autem suggestio et delectatio sistat citra consensum, est peccatum veniale. — Si vero consequatur consensus et opus in his quae divina lege prohibita sunt, peccatum est mortale consummatum. — Quod si medio modo fit, ut consensus sit sine opere, aut quia vult in opus procedere, sed non potest; tunc voluntas reputatur pro facto, nec minus culpabilis est, quam si in ipso facto deprehenderetur; aut quia non vult in opus procedere, sed vult interius voluptari in delectatione, et tunc manducat mulier, sed non vir; et licet peccatum non sit plene consummatum, est tamen inter mortalia computandum, quia, muliere manducante, totus homo damnari meretur; quod maxime intelligi habet in peccatis carnalibus1.
Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est. Cum peccatum dicat recessum voluntatis a primo principio, in quantum voluntas nata est agi ab ipso, secundum ipsum et propter ipsum; omne peccatum est inordinatio mentis sive voluntatis, circa quam nata sunt esse virtus et vitium2. Peccatum igitur actuale est actualis inordinatio voluntatis. Inordinatio autem ista aut est tanta, quod ordinem iustitiae exterminat; et hoc modo dicitur mortale peccatum, quia natum est auferre vitam3, separando ipsam a Deo, per quem vivificatur anima iusta; aut tam modica est, quod ordinem illum non perimit, sed in aliquo perturbat; et tunc dicitur veniale peccatum; quia de ipso cito adipisci possumus veniam, pro eo quod per ipsum gratia non tollitur, nec incurritur inimicitia divina. Est autem ordo iustitiae, ut bonum incommutabile praeferatur bono commutabili, ut bonum honestum praeferatur utili, et voluntas Dei praeferatur voluntati propriae, ut iudicium rectae rationis praesit sensualitati. Et quoniam lex Dei istum ordinem praecipit et vetat oppositum; quando bonum commutabile praefertur aeterno, et bonum utile praefertur honesto, et voluntas nostra praefertur divinae voluntati, et sensualis appetitus praefertur rationi rectae: tunc committitur peccatum mortale; de quo dicit Ambrosius4, quod est « praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum ». Hoc autem committitur, sive omittatur quod lex divina praecipit, sive fiat id quod prohibet; ex quo oritur duplex genus peccati, delictum scilicet et commissum5.
Quando vero bonum commutabile plus debito diligitur, sed non praefertur incommutabili; et utilitas non praefertur honestati; et voluntas nostra plus debito amatur, ita tamen quod non praefertur divinae; et caro concupiscit, nec tamen praefertur iudicio rationis rectae: tunc non est mortale, sed veniale, quia, licet hoc sit praeter legem, non tamen directe est contra legem6. Sensualis autem appetitus non praefertur rationi rectae, nisi quando ratio ei consentit; et ideo peccatum mortale non committitur citra consensum.
Si tamen sensualitas inordinate moveatur, cum illa inordinatio ad malum inclinet, licet ratio non consentiat; peccatum est aliquod, quia aliquo modo laedit ordinem iustitiae. — Et quia in statu innocentiae non movebatur sensualitas nisi secundum rationis motum; ideo, stante homine, non poterat ibi esse veniale peccatum. — Nunc autem quia rationi repugnat sensualitas, velimus nolimus; ideo necesse habemus committere aliquod veniale peccatum per primos motus; qui, etsi particulariter et singillatim possint declinari, omnes tamen nullo modo possunt caveri; quia sic sunt peccata, quod sunt etiam poenae peccati: et ideo merito dicuntur venialia, quia hoc ipso digna sunt venia7.
Verum quia ratio his consentire non compellitur, si post sensum delectationis consentiatur in opus; tunc est plenus consensus, ac per hoc peccatum consummatum, quia venit usque ad virum, id est usque ad supremam partem rationis, ex qua pendet plenitudo consensus.
Quia vero non solum in opus, verum etiam in delectationem est consensus, in quo inferior portio sequitur sensualitatem: ideo, si in delectatione sensuali ratio sensualitati succumbat, mulier serpenti obedit8, ac per hoc fit subversio recti ordinis, et ita subversio iustitiae; propter quod committitur peccatum mortale, licet minus grave; quod non solum imputatur mulieri, sed etiam viro, a quo mulier debuit compesci et cohiberi, ne obtemperaret serpenti. — Et sic patet, quod in perpetratione omnis peccati actualis fit aliqualis imitatio primi peccati, secundum explanationem Doctoris praecipui, scilicet Augustini, duodecimo de Trinitate9.
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Chapter VIII. On the origin of actual sins.
After what has been said about the transmission of original sin, some things must be said about the origin of actual sin. — Concerning the rise, therefore, of actual sin, these things are to be held in summary: that actual sin draws its origin from the free will of each one, through suggestion, delight, consent and operation, according to that word of James, chapter one7: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, begets death. — But if suggestion and delight stop short of consent, the sin is venial. — If, however, consent and the deed follow in those things which are forbidden by the divine law, the sin is mortal and consummated. — But if it comes about in a middle way, so that the consent is without the deed — either because he wills to proceed to the deed but cannot, and then the will is reckoned for the fact, and he is no less culpable than if he were caught in the very act; or because he does not will to proceed to the deed, but wills inwardly to take pleasure in the delight, and then the woman eats but not the man — then, although the sin be not fully consummated, it is nevertheless to be counted among mortal sins, because, when the woman eats, the whole man deserves to be damned; which is to be understood chiefly in carnal sins1.
Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this. Since sin means a withdrawal of the will from the first principle, inasmuch as the will is born to be moved by it, according to it and for the sake of it; every sin is a disorder of mind or of will, about which virtue and vice are apt to be2. Actual sin, therefore, is an actual disorder of the will. But that disorder is either so great that it exterminates the order of justice — and in this way it is called mortal sin, because it is apt to take away life3, by separating it from God, through whom the just soul is quickened; or it is so slight that it does not destroy that order, but disturbs it in something — and then it is called venial sin, because from it we can quickly obtain pardon, for the reason that through it grace is not taken away, nor is enmity with God incurred. Now the order of justice is that the unchangeable good be preferred to the changeable good, that the honorable good be preferred to the useful, and that the will of God be preferred to one's own will, and that the judgment of right reason preside over sensuality. And since the law of God commands this order and forbids its opposite: when the changeable good is preferred to the eternal, and the useful good is preferred to the honorable, and our own will is preferred to the divine will, and the sensual appetite is preferred to right reason — then mortal sin is committed; of which Ambrose says4 that it is « the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments ». And this is committed either when what the divine law commands is omitted, or when what it forbids is done; from which arises a twofold kind of sin, namely offence of omission and offence of commission5.
But when the changeable good is loved more than it ought to be, yet is not preferred to the unchangeable; and usefulness is not preferred to honorableness; and our own will is loved more than it ought to be, yet in such a way that it is not preferred to the divine; and the flesh lusts, yet is not preferred to the judgment of right reason: then it is not mortal, but venial, because, although this be beside the law, it is nevertheless not directly against the law6. But the sensual appetite is not preferred to right reason except when reason consents to it; and therefore mortal sin is not committed short of consent.
If, however, sensuality be moved inordinately, since that disorder inclines toward evil, even though reason does not consent, there is some sin, because in some manner it wounds the order of justice. — And because in the state of innocence sensuality was not moved except according to the motion of reason, therefore, while man stood, there could be no venial sin in him. — But now, because sensuality resists reason whether we will or not, therefore we must needs commit some venial sin through the first motions; which, although singly and one by one they can be avoided, yet all of them can in no way be guarded against; because they are sins in such a way that they are also punishments of sin: and therefore they are rightly called venial, because by that very fact they are worthy of pardon7.
But because reason is not compelled to consent to these, if after the feeling of delight consent be given to the deed, then there is full consent, and thereby consummated sin, because it has come all the way to the man — that is, to the supreme part of reason, on which the fullness of consent depends.
But because consent is given not only to the deed but also to the delight, in which the lower portion follows sensuality: therefore, if in sensual delight reason succumbs to sensuality, the woman obeys the serpent8, and thereby there comes about a subversion of right order, and so a subversion of justice; on account of which mortal sin is committed, though less grave — which is imputed not only to the woman, but also to the man, by whom the woman ought to have been checked and restrained, lest she obey the serpent. — And thus it is clear that in the perpetration of every actual sin there comes about some imitation of the first sin, according to the explanation of the pre-eminent Doctor, namely Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity9.
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- 7Vers. 14. seq.: Unusquisque vero tentatur etc.Verse 14 seq.: Unusquisque vero tentatur ["But each one is tempted"] etc.
- 1Vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4. seqq., et Comment. p. II. per totam. — Post muliere manducante H I addunt et viro non prohibente, quae lectio concordat verbis Magistri, loc. cit. c. 12: Si vero diu in delectatione cogitationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, mortale est, et pro eo damnabitur simul vir et mulier, id est totus homo, quia et tunc vir non, sicut debuit, mulierem cohibuit, unde potest dici consensisse.See II Sent., the letter of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 4 seqq., and the Commentary, p. II, throughout. — After muliere manducante, H I add et viro non prohibente ["and the man not forbidding it"], which reading agrees with the words of the Master, loc. cit., c. 12: "But if he be held long in the delight of the thought, even though the will to carry it through be lacking, it is mortal, and for it man and woman together — that is, the whole man — will be damned, because then too the man did not, as he ought, restrain the woman, whence he can be said to have consented."
- 2Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.) docet, quod circa idem nata sunt fieri contraria, sive quod idem est contrariorum susceptivum. — Pro esse E fieri.Cf. II Sent., d. 41, a. 2, q. 2. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites, and Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7), teaches that contraries are apt to come about concerning the same thing, or that the same thing is receptive of contraries. — For esse E has fieri.
- 3A B supplent ab anima, T animae, F vero mox pro ipsam substituit animam. Post a Deo A prosequitur: et a gratia, per quam vivificatur etc. (cfr. tom. II. pag. 633, nota 5.). Inferius post sed Vat., 1 et 3 addunt tantum.A B supply ab anima, T animae; F, moreover, shortly after substitutes animam for ipsam. After a Deo, A continues: et a gratia, per quam vivificatur ["and from the grace by which it is quickened"] etc. (cf. tom. II, p. 633, note 5). Below, after sed, the Vatican edition and editions 1 and 3 add tantum.
- 4Libr. de Paradiso, c. 8. n. 39. Pro mandatorum textus originalis praeceptorum, Vat. praeceptorum vel mandatorum. — Superius post sensualitati edd. cum multis codd., refragantibus antiquioribus, addunt humanae.The book On Paradise, c. 8, n. 39. For mandatorum the original text has praeceptorum, the Vatican edition praeceptorum vel mandatorum. — Above, after sensualitati, the editions, together with many codices, the more ancient ones opposing, add humanae.
- 5Cfr. tom. II. pag. 976, nota 8, in qua afferuntur verba August. ex Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 112. m. 2, qui etiam dicit, quod haec divisio per oppositionem correspondeat verbo Ps. 36, 27: Declina a malo et fac bonum.Cf. tom. II, p. 976, note 8, in which the words of Augustine are adduced from Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 112, m. 2, who also says that this division corresponds by opposition to the word of Ps. 36:27: "Turn away from evil and do good."
- 6Vide II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1.See II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, q. 1.
- 7Cfr. II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 4. et d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Superius pro declinari S vitari, D H T vitari vel declinari.Cf. II Sent., d. 21, dub. 4, and d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — Above, for declinari S has vitari, D H T vitari vel declinari.
- 8Edd., excepta 2, obtemperat. Superius post non solum plures codd. addunt consensus, et pro in delectatione sensuali non pauci codd. et 2 in delectationem sensualem.The editions, except 2, have obtemperat. Above, after non solum, several codices add consensus; and for in delectatione sensuali not a few codices and 2 have in delectationem sensualem.
- 9Cap. 12. n. 17. seq.Chapter 12, n. 17 seq. ---