Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus

p. 799

Quaestio IV. Utrum sit connexio in vitiis et peccatis.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum sit connexio in vitiis et peccatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ecclesiastis nono¹: Qui in uno peccaverit multa bona perdet; sed hoc non esset, nisi plura mala concomitarentur unum malum perpetratum: ergo videtur, quod necessarium sit ponere connexionem vitiorum.

2. Item, Iacobi secundo²: Qui in uno offendit factus est reus omnium; sed nemo iudicatur omnium mandatorum divinorum reus, nisi qui peccat contra omnia mandata: ergo qui peccat contra unum peccat contra cetera: videtur ergo, quod vitia sint connexa.

3. Item, sicut vitium non expellitur nisi per introductionem virtutis sibi oppositae, sic nec virtus nisi per introductionem vitii; sed cum quis committit unum peccatum, ceterae virtutes amittuntur: ergo cum quis unum peccatum committit, cetera peccata introducuntur: ergo sicut est connexio ex parte virtutum, ita videtur esse ex parte vitiorum.

4. Item, sicut per infusionem gratiae unius tota imago reformatur, sic per perpetrationem unius peccati tota imago deformatur; sed ad reformationem imaginis secundum totum necessario requiritur universitas virtutum³: ergo similiter ad deformationem totius imaginis concurrit universitas vitiorum: ergo sicut gratiam imaginem reformantem consequuntur omnes virtutes, sic culpam, quae imaginem deformat⁴, consequuntur omnia vitia.

5. Item, sicut originaliter omnes virtutes na- p. 800 scuntur a gratia et imperantur a caritate, sic omnia vitia nascuntur a concupiscentia et imperantur a superbia, quae est omnium vitiorum regina⁵: ergo sicut ponitur connexio in virtutibus propter unitatem originis et radicis, sic videtur similiter, quod poni debeat ex parte vitiorum; quoniam ubicumque reperitur talis causa, ibi debet reperiri talis effectus.

6. Item, virtus et vitium sunt opposita immediata circa suum susceptibile — non est enim dare medium, quia aut homo est Dei amicus, aut Dei inimicus⁶ — ergo cum abest virtus, necesse est, inesse vitium sibi oppositum; sed cum virtus abest, universaliter abest: ergo cum vitium inest, universaliter inest: ergo et vitia connexionem habent, sicut et virtutes gratuitae.

Sed contra:

1. Secundum diversitatem vitiorum est diversitas poenarum⁷: ergo si esset connexio in vitiis, ut qui haberet unum vitium haberet omnia; tunc qui haberet unum peccatum sustineret omnem poenam; quod manifeste est contra divinam iustitiam.

2. Item, vitia et peccata sunt ab opere nostro; sed non est connexio in operibus vitiorum exterius perpetratis: ergo nec connexio est in vitiis interius derelictis.

3. Item, nullus peccat aliquo genere peccati nisi volens⁸; sed multi sunt, qui committunt aliquod vitium, et tamen omnino detestantur aliquod peccati genus, sicut multi peccatis spiritualibus impliciti omnino detestantur carnalia: ergo vitia non sunt connexa.

4. Item, vitia ad invicem opponuntur, sicut avaritia prodigalitati, et audacia pusillanimitati; sed « duo opposita non possunt simul esse in eodem »⁹: ergo impossibile est, vitia et peccata habere connexionem.

Conclusio. Vitia et peccata non habent connexionem; tamen dici potest, quod ex parte aversionis aliquo modo connectantur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum ad peccatum duo concurrant, videlicet aversio et conversio¹⁰; dupliciter contingit comparare vitia et peccata ad invicem: vel in quantum avertunt ab uno Bono incommutabili, vel in quantum convertunt ad bona commutabilia. — Si igitur loquamur de vitiis, secundum quod avertunt ab uno Bono incommutabili; sic privant hominem gratia et ceteris virtutibus gratuitis et faciunt hominem dignum privari gloria et praemio correspondente omnibus bonis meritis; et hoc quidem ita fit per unum vitium, sicut per cetera. (Conclusio 1.) Et quantum ad hoc vitia et peccata habent connexionem quandam, pro eo quod ab uno avertunt, et omnibus vitiis unus et idem Deus offenditur.

Si vero loquamur de vitiis quantum ad conversionem; sic per conversiones ad diversa bona commutabilia diversae oriuntur in nobis pronitates et vitia, per quae obligamur ad diversa poenarum supplicia. (Conclusio 2.) Et hoc modo in vitiis non est connexio, quia pro quolibet punietur homo speciali poena sibi debita; nec etiam possunt esse connexa propter repugnantiam pronitatum; nec habent causam, propter quam connectantur, quia ex diversis operibus oriuntur et ad diversos fines tendunt. Quoniam ergo vitia ex parte conversionis sumunt originem et distinctionem, et ex hac parte connexionem non habent, licet aliquo modo in aversione conveniant; (Conclusio 3.) simpliciter concedendum est, quod vitia et peccata non sunt connexa¹¹, sicut ostendunt rationes ad partem istam.

Ad oppositum:

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Ecclesiastis et auctoritate Iacobi, quod qui peccat in uno perdit multa bona, et etiam fit reus quantum ad omnia; dicendum, (Ratio 1.) quod hoc non dicitur, quia propter unum vitium incurrat aliquis aliorum vitiorum pronitates et defectibilitates necessario et immediate; sed hoc dicitur, quia qui peccat uno peccato caritatem perdit, in qua est plenitudo meritorum et impletio mandatorum¹². — (Ratio 2.) Aut certe dicitur, quod perdit multa bona et fit reus quantum ad omnia, pro eo quod privatur omnibus virtutibus gratuitis. — (Ratio 3.) Vel tertio modo, quia perdit omnia merita, quae prius habebat; efficiuntur enim ex uno peccato mortali omnia inutilia ad gloriam p. 801 assequendam¹³. — (Ratio 4.) Vel quarto modo dicitur multa bona perdere et omnium reus esse, quia merito unius peccati perdit aeterna praemia, quae omnibus virtutibus et meritis erant reddenda: hoc autem non est propter ipsorum vitiorum connexionem, sed magis propter connexionem virtutum et dotum sive praemiorum eis correspondentium; ob quam connexionem, si quis uno ipsorum bonorum privatur, necesse est, quod privetur et ceteris. Hoc autem non sufficit ad faciendam connexionem in vitiis, quia, sicut supra dictum est, vitia non tantum consistunt in aversione a Deo, sed etiam in conversione ad bonum commutabile.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus non expellitur nisi per introductionem vitii sibi oppositi, sicut nec vitium nisi per introductionem virtutis; dicendum, (Ratio 1.) quod non est simile: quia plura exiguntur ad construendum quam destruendum¹⁴, et plura sunt necessaria ad hoc, quod homo placeat Deo, quam ad hoc, quod displiceat, et per hoc etiam plura sunt necessaria ad rectificandum quam ad obliquandum. (Notandum.) Et ideo, quamvis obliquatio vitii non habeat excludi nisi per habitum directe sibi oppositum, tamen rectitudo virtutis potest auferri non solum per vitium sibi oppositum, sed etiam per unum¹⁵ oppositum alii virtuti; unde infidelitas, quae opponitur fidei, excludit caritatem. Et ideo non est simile hinc et inde. — (Ratio 2.) Praeterea, quia virtutes connexae sunt, ideo vitium, quod tollit unam, per consequens tollit reliquam; vitia vero, quia connexa non sunt, ideo auferri non possunt, nisi unumquodque expellatur per virtutem directe sibi oppositam.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum deformat totam imaginem, sicut gratia reformat; dicendum, (Duplex deformatio.) quod imago dupliciter dicitur deformari: aut propter absentiam luminis gratiae, aut propter deordinationem in actibus illarum virium, in quibus imago attenditur. Primo quidem modo deformari habet tota imago per unum peccatum et vitium; secundo modo non, quia quodlibet vitium non respicit singularum potentiarum actus. Gratia vero, quando reformat animam, utroque modo reformat, et venustando faciem ipsius animae et rectificando quamlibet potentiam respectu operationis suae¹⁶. Et ideo, quamvis in gratiae informatione concurrant ceterae virtutes, non tamen sic in deformatione unius peccati singula vitia comitantur.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia vitia nascuntur a concupiscentia et imperantur a superbia, sicut virtutes a caritate et gratia; dicendum, quod non est simile: tum quia concupiscentia non est causa sufficiens respectu vitiorum, sed solum disponens¹⁷; (Notandum.) tum etiam quia, cum concupiscentia ramificetur respectu diversorum concupiscibilium, ad diversos fines inspicit et frequenter ad contraria tendit; unde est ibi dispersio potius quam connexio. Gratia autem est sufficiens origo virtutum, et caritas movet et inclinat omnes ad finem unum¹⁸. Et propterea non sic connectuntur vitia, ut virtutes gratuitae, tum ex defectu principii, tum etiam ex defectu vinculi unitivi.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus et vitium sunt opposita immediate; dicendum, (Distinctio.) quod de virtute et vitio contingit loqui dupliciter: vel in generali, vel in speciali. Si loquamur in generali, sic immediate opponuntur circa suum susceptibile; si vero in speciali, sic non immediate opponuntur, pro eo quod non est necessarium, aliquem habere continentiam gratuitam, aut esse luxuriosum¹⁹; sic et de aliis vitiis et virtutibus est intelligendum. Et ideo, quamvis, absente virtute, necessario insit vitium, non tamen sequitur, quod absente omni virtute gratuita, propter hoc insint omnia vitia. — Et si tu obiicias, quod sicut se habet vitium respectu virtutis, ita se habet species huius vitii respectu virtutis sibi oppositae: dicendum, quod non est simile: (Notandum.) quia omnes virtutes gratuitae uniri²⁰ habent in uno formali, ratione cuius omnia vitia sibi opponuntur et cum nullo stare possunt; sed cum distinguuntur in species, hoc est ratione habituum specialium, ratione quorum non quaelibet virtus opponitur cuilibet vitio, sed sibi opposito. Et ideo alius modus est comparandi vitium ad virtutem gratuitam in generali, et alius in speciali; et propterea ratio illa non cogit²¹.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether there is a connection among the vices and sins.

Fourthly it is asked, whether there is a connection among the vices and sins. And that there is, it seems.

1. Ecclesiastes the ninth¹: He who sins in one will lose many good things; but this would not be, unless many evils accompanied one evil committed: therefore it seems that it is necessary to posit a connection of the vices.

2. Likewise, James the second²: He who offends in one is made guilty of all; but no one is judged guilty of all the divine commandments, except him who sins against all the commandments: therefore he who sins against one sins against the rest: it seems therefore that the vices are connected.

3. Likewise, just as a vice is not expelled except by the introduction of the virtue opposed to it, so neither is a virtue except by the introduction of a vice; but when someone commits one sin, the other virtues are lost: therefore when someone commits one sin, the other sins are introduced: therefore just as there is a connection on the side of the virtues, so it seems there is on the side of the vices.

4. Likewise, just as by the infusion of one grace the whole image is reformed, so by the perpetration of one sin the whole image is deformed; but for the reformation of the image according to the whole there is necessarily required the totality of the virtues³: therefore likewise to the deformation of the whole image there concurs the totality of the vices: therefore just as all the virtues follow upon the grace that reforms the image, so all the vices follow upon the fault that deforms the image⁴.

5. Likewise, just as originally all the virtues are p. 800 born from grace and are commanded by charity, so all the vices are born from concupiscence and are commanded by pride, which is the queen of all the vices⁵: therefore just as a connection is posited among the virtues on account of the unity of origin and root, so likewise it seems that it ought to be posited on the side of the vices; since wherever such a cause is found, there such an effect ought to be found.

6. Likewise, virtue and vice are immediate opposites concerning their subject — for there is no giving a middle, since a man is either God's friend or God's enemy⁶ — therefore when virtue is absent, vice opposed to it must be present; but when virtue is absent, it is absent universally: therefore when vice is present, it is present universally: therefore the vices too have a connection, just as the gratuitous virtues do.

On the contrary:

1. According to the diversity of vices there is a diversity of punishments⁷: therefore if there were a connection among the vices, such that he who had one vice would have all; then he who had one sin would undergo every punishment; which is manifestly against the divine justice.

2. Likewise, the vices and sins are from our work; but there is no connection in the works of the vices outwardly perpetrated: therefore neither is there a connection in the vices inwardly left behind.

3. Likewise, no one sins by any kind of sin except willingly⁸; but there are many who commit some vice, and yet utterly detest some kind of sin, as many entangled in spiritual sins utterly detest the carnal ones: therefore the vices are not connected.

4. Likewise, the vices are mutually opposed, as avarice to prodigality, and audacity to faint-heartedness; but « two opposites cannot be at the same time in the same thing »⁹: therefore it is impossible for the vices and sins to have a connection.

Conclusion. The vices and sins do not have a connection; yet it can be said that on the side of aversion they are in some way connected.

I respond: It must be said that, since to a sin two things concur, namely aversion and conversion¹⁰, it happens in two ways to compare the vices and sins to one another: either insofar as they turn away from the one unchangeable Good, or insofar as they turn toward changeable goods. — If therefore we speak of the vices according as they turn away from the one unchangeable Good, then they deprive a man of grace and of the other gratuitous virtues and make a man deserving to be deprived of glory and of the reward corresponding to all good merits; and this indeed comes about through one vice just as through the rest. (Conclusion 1.) And as to this the vices and sins have a certain connection, for the reason that they turn away from one, and by all vices one and the same God is offended.

But if we speak of the vices as to conversion, then by conversions to diverse changeable goods there arise in us diverse proclivities and vices, by which we are bound to diverse penal sufferings. (Conclusion 2.) And in this way there is no connection among the vices, because for each one a man will be punished by a special punishment due to him; nor moreover can they be connected on account of the repugnance of the proclivities; nor do they have a cause on account of which they should be connected, because they arise from diverse works and tend to diverse ends. Since therefore the vices take their origin and distinction on the side of conversion, and on this side do not have a connection, although in some way they agree in aversion; (Conclusion 3.) it must be conceded without qualification that the vices and sins are not connected¹¹, as the reasons for this side show.

To the opposite:

To 1, 2. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of Ecclesiastes and the authority of James — that he who sins in one loses many good things, and even becomes guilty as to all — it must be said (Reason 1.) that this is not said because, on account of one vice, someone incurs the proclivities and defectibilities of the other vices necessarily and immediately; but this is said because he who sins by one sin loses charity, in which is the fullness of merits and the fulfillment of the commandments¹². — (Reason 2.) Or certainly it is said that he loses many good things and becomes guilty as to all, for the reason that he is deprived of all the gratuitous virtues. — (Reason 3.) Or in a third way, because he loses all the merits which he previously had; for by one mortal sin all things become useless for attaining p. 801 glory¹³. — (Reason 4.) Or in a fourth way he is said to lose many good things and to be guilty of all, because by the desert of one sin he loses the eternal rewards which were to be rendered to all the virtues and merits: but this is not on account of the connection of the vices themselves, but rather on account of the connection of the virtues and gifts or rewards corresponding to them; on account of which connection, if anyone is deprived of one of those goods, he must necessarily be deprived of the rest also. But this does not suffice to make a connection among the vices, because, as was said above, the vices consist not only in aversion from God, but also in conversion to a changeable good.

To 3. To that which is objected — that a virtue is not expelled except by the introduction of the vice opposed to it, just as neither is a vice except by the introduction of a virtue — it must be said (Reason 1.) that it is not alike: because more is required for building up than for destroying¹⁴, and more things are necessary for a man to please God than for him to displease, and through this too more things are necessary for setting straight than for bending awry. (Note.) And therefore, although the bending-awry of a vice cannot be excluded except by a habit directly opposed to it, nevertheless the rectitude of a virtue can be taken away not only by the vice opposed to it, but also by one¹⁵ opposed to another virtue; whence unbelief, which is opposed to faith, excludes charity. And therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other. — (Reason 2.) Moreover, because the virtues are connected, therefore a vice which removes one consequently removes the remaining one; but the vices, because they are not connected, cannot be removed except by each one being expelled by the virtue directly opposed to it.

To 4. To that which is objected — that a sin deforms the whole image, just as grace reforms it — it must be said (Twofold deformation.) that the image is said to be deformed in two ways: either on account of the absence of the light of grace, or on account of the disordering in the acts of those powers in which the image is regarded. In the first way indeed the whole image is deformed by one sin and vice; in the second way not, because not every vice regards the acts of the several powers. But grace, when it reforms the soul, reforms it in both ways, both by beautifying the face of the soul itself and by setting straight every power with respect to its operation¹⁶. And therefore, although in the informing by grace the other virtues concur, nevertheless the several vices do not in this way accompany the deformation by one sin.

To 5. To that which is objected — that all the vices are born from concupiscence and are commanded by pride, just as the virtues from charity and grace — it must be said that it is not alike: both because concupiscence is not a sufficient cause with respect to the vices, but only a disposing one¹⁷; (Note.) and also because, since concupiscence branches out with respect to diverse objects of desire, it looks toward diverse ends and frequently tends to contraries; whence there is there a dispersion rather than a connection. But grace is a sufficient origin of the virtues, and charity moves and inclines them all to one end¹⁸. And therefore the vices are not connected as the gratuitous virtues are, both from the defect of principle and also from the defect of a uniting bond.

To 6. To that which is objected — that virtue and vice are immediate opposites — it must be said (Distinction.) that of virtue and vice it happens to speak in two ways: either in general, or in particular. If we speak in general, then they are immediately opposed concerning their subject; but if in particular, then they are not immediately opposed, for the reason that it is not necessary that someone have gratuitous continence, or be lustful¹⁹; and so it is to be understood concerning the other vices and virtues. And therefore, although, virtue being absent, vice is necessarily present, it does not however follow that, every gratuitous virtue being absent, on account of this all the vices are present. — And if you object that, as a vice stands with respect to virtue, so a species of this vice stands with respect to the virtue opposed to it: it must be said that it is not alike: (Note.) because all the gratuitous virtues are²⁰ to be united in one formal element, by reason of which all vices are opposed to it and can stand with none; but when they are distinguished into species, this is by reason of special habits, by reason of which not just any virtue is opposed to just any vice, but to the one opposed to it. And therefore there is one mode of comparing vice to gratuitous virtue in general, and another in particular; and therefore that reasoning does not compel²¹.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 18. — Paulo inferius pro concomitarentur non pauci codd. communicarentur.
Verse 18. — A little below, for concomitarentur not a few codices read communicarentur.
Vers. 10.
Verse 10.
Vide supra q. 1. — August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 9: Virtus vero, quo una ingressa fuerit, quoniam secum ceteras ducit, profecto vitia cedent omnia, quaecumque inerant. — Subinde post esse edd. repetunt connexio.
See above q. 1. — Augustine, Letter 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 9: But virtue, wherever it has once entered, since it draws the rest along with it, will assuredly cause all the vices, whatever were present, to depart. — Thereafter, after esse the editions repeat connexio.
Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 2. ad 2. — August., de Duabus Animabus c. 6. n. 6: Referamus nunc considerationem ad virtutem, cuius intelligibili luce splendere animum convenientissime dicimus. Porro ab hac luce virtutis defectus quidam non pertinens animum [quantum ad esse naturale], sed obscurans, vitium vocatur. De hac definitione vitii sive peccati cfr. tom. II. pag. 838, nota 9. in fine. — Paulo inferius pro quae imaginem deformat cod. Z imaginem deformantem.
Cf. above d. 33, q. 2, to 2. — Augustine, On the Two Souls c. 6, n. 6: Let us now refer the consideration to virtue, by whose intelligible light we most fittingly say that the soul shines. Now a certain defect away from this light of virtue, not destroying the soul [as to its natural being], but darkening it, is called vice. Concerning this definition of vice or sin cf. tom. II, p. 838, note 9, at the end. — A little below, for quae imaginem deformat codex Z reads imaginem deformantem.
Gregor., XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 87: Ipsa namque vitiorum regina superbia, cum devictum plene cor ceperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis quasi quibusdam suis ducibus devastandum tradit. — De connexione virtutum cfr. supra q. 1, de caritate vide infra q. 6.
Gregory, Morals bk. XXXI, c. 45, n. 87: For pride, the very queen of the vices, when it has fully captured a heart it has subdued, presently hands it over to the seven principal vices, as to certain captains of its own, to be laid waste. — On the connection of the virtues cf. above, q. 1; on charity see below, q. 6.
Matth. 12, 30: Qui non est mecum contra me est etc. Cfr. ibid. 6, 24.
Matthew 12:30: He who is not with me is against me, etc. Cf. ibid. 6:24.
Cfr. Luc. 12, 47. seq.
Cf. Luke 12:47 ff.
Vide supra pag. 265, nota 7. et pag. 657, nota 4. — Paulo post pro impliciti edd. implicati, et pro omnino codd. GKZ omnia.
See above, p. 265, note 7, and p. 657, note 4. — A little after, for impliciti the editions read implicati, and for omnino the codices GKZ read omnia.
Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 85, nota 10. — Non pauci codd. omittunt in eodem.
According to Aristotle, on whom see above, p. 85, note 10. — Not a few codices omit in eodem ("in the same thing").
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2. et ibid. pag. 839, nota 4. in fine.
Cf. Sentences bk. II, d. 42, a. 3, q. 2, and ibid. p. 839, note 4, at the end.
Vide August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 8. seq., ubi Stoicorum sententiam de connexione peccatorum refellit. — Aliquanto superius pro et vitia edd. in vitia. In fine corp. pro connexa permulti codd. annexa.
See Augustine, Letter 167 (formerly 29), c. 2, n. 8 ff., where he refutes the opinion of the Stoics concerning the connection of sins. — Somewhat above, for et vitia the editions read in vitia. At the end of the body, for connexa very many codices read annexa.
Respicitur illud Rom. 13, 8: Qui enim diligit proximum Legem implevit, et v. 10: Plenitudo ergo Legis est dilectio. — Explicatio locorum praenotatorum, quae hic exhibetur, est secundum August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 5. n. 16. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum hunc primum simulque et tertium seq. explicandi modum sic innuit: Vere qui in uno offendit est transgressor totius Legis, quia qui peccat contra auctorem Legis facit, quem in sua Lege negligit, et contra caritatem, quae est causa et mater totius Legis. Hanc sententiam ex simili videamus. Si quis me offenderet, omnes fratres et amicos meos in me offenderet et quodam modo contra omnes peccaret. Sic qui unum mandatum negligit cetera, quae completa videbantur adiuvare, sibi inutilia reddit. — Edd. addunt Christi.
There is regard to that of Rom. 13:8: For he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law, and v. 10: Love therefore is the fullness of the Law. — The explanation of the passages noted above, which is here presented, is according to Augustine, Letter 167 (formerly 29), c. 5, n. 16. The Ordinary Gloss, in Strabo, intimates this first and at the same time the third following manner of explaining thus: Truly he who offends in one is a transgressor of the whole Law, because he who sins acts against the author of the Law, whom he neglects in his Law, and against charity, which is the cause and mother of the whole Law. Let us see this opinion from a likeness. If someone were to offend me, he would offend all my brothers and friends in me, and in a certain way would sin against all. So he who neglects one commandment renders the rest, which seemed completed, to be of help, useless to himself. — The editions add Christi ("of Christ").
Hieronym., Comment. in Eccl. 9, 18: Quia vero in Hebraeo potest legi: Et qui peccat unum perdet bonitatem multam, etiam sic sentiendum est, quod propter unum peccatum multae iustitiae retro pereant, et invicem se virtutes sequi, et qui unam habuerit, habere omnes, et qui in uno peccaverit, cum omnibus vitiis subiacere (Iac. 2, 10.). — Quartus modus datur in V. Decret. Gregor. lit. 41. ubi c. 9. haec regula proponitur: Committens unum peccatum reus est omnium quoad vitam aeternam. — Paulo ante pro ex uno codd. WX pro uno.
Jerome, Commentary on Ecclesiastes 9, 18: But because in the Hebrew it can be read: And he who sins in one shall lose much goodness, it must also be understood thus, that on account of one sin many righteous deeds perish backward, and that the virtues follow one another in turn, and that he who has had one has all, and that he who has sinned in one lies under all the vices (James 2, 10). — The fourth mode is given in the Fifth Book of the Decretals of Gregory, title 41, where in c. 9 this rule is set forth: He who commits one sin is guilty of all as to eternal life. — A little before, for ex uno codices WX read pro uno.
Cfr. verba Aristot., supra pag. 189, nota 2. allata.
Cf. the words of Aristotle adduced above, p. 189, note 2.
Edd. cum pluribus codd. vitium. Paulo superius pro rectitudo virtutis cod. Q rectificatio ipsius virtutis. Inferius pro reliquam, cui voci codd. BCDMNO praefigunt et, Vat. reliqua.
The editions, with several codices, read vitium ("vice"). A little above, for rectitudo virtutis codex Q reads rectificatio ipsius virtutis. Below, for reliquam — to which word codices BCDMNO prefix et — the Vatican edition reads reliqua.
Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. — Faciei animae est secundum Gregor. ipsa mens; cfr. tom. II, pag. 641, nota 1. — Subinde pro in gratiae informatione [Vat. reformatione] codd. BCD in genere in informatione, cod. A in genere gratiae informatione, plures codd. in genere informatione, edd. ut supra.
Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, in the body. — "The face of the soul" is, according to Gregory, the mind itself; cf. tom. II, p. 641, note 1. — Thereupon, for in gratiae informatione [the Vatican: reformatione] codices BCD read in genere in informatione, codex A in genere gratiae informatione, several codices in genere informatione, the editions as above.
in genere. In fine arg. pro comitantur plures codd. commutantur, pauci committuntur, codd. SVZ concomitantur. Circa initium solut. pro luminis gratiae cod. B ipsius gratiae.
in general. At the end of the argument, for comitantur several codices read commutantur, a few committuntur, codices SVZ concomitantur. About the beginning of the solution, for luminis gratiae codex B reads ipsius gratiae.
Vide II. Sent. d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. seq.; Breviloq. p. III. c. 8, nec non Speculum animae, ubi etiam ramificatio vitiorum perhibetur. — Superius pro omnia cod. X singula. Mox pro inspicit cod. K bene respicit, edd. inspicit vel inducit.
See Sentences bk. II, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1 ff.; Breviloquium pt. III, c. 8, and also the Mirror of the Soul, where also the branching-out of the vices is set forth. — Above, for omnia codex X reads singula. Presently, for inspicit codex K reads bene respicit, the editions inspicit vel inducit.
Ut ostenditur infra q. 6.
As is shown below, q. 6.
Cod. X uniri, plures alii codd. naturam, edd. convenientiam; nostra lectio sumta est e codd. AKMPRSZ (aa a secunda manu) bb.
Codex X reads uniri ("to be united"), several other codices naturam ("a nature"), the editions convenientiam ("an agreement"); our reading is taken from codices AKMPRSZ (aa at second hand) bb.
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion on the preceding question.

← Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 3 Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 5→