Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15
Quaestio II. Utrum possibile sit Deo satisfacere de uno peccato sine alio.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit Deo satisfacere de uno peccato sine alio. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primae ad Timotheum quarto1: Pietas valet ad omnia; Glossa: «Summa christianae disciplinae in pietate et misericordia est, quam qui sequitur, etiam si lubricum carnis patiatur, sine dubio vapulabit, non tamen peribit»; et constat, quod intelligit de lubrico mortali, quia, si de veniali, etiam sine illa non periret: ergo etc.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia satisfactio respondet transgressioni ex opposito: ergo cum possibile sit transgredi successive, primo uno modo, deinde alio; videtur similiter, quod et satisfacere2 primo de uno peccato, deinde de alio.
3. Item, alii peccato alia debetur poena et alia
satisfactio, unde et alia imponitur; esto ergo, quod pro aliquo peccato imponatur poena debita; si exsequatur illam, amplius non potest nec debet exigi ab eo aliquid1b; sed potest exsequi committendo culpam aliam: ergo etc.
4. Item, plus desiderat Deus, satisfactionem sibi fieri a peccatore, quam aliquis creditor solutionem a debitore; sed creditor, qui multum desiderat solutionem, recipit solutionem de uno sine alio: ergo et Deus satisfactionem de uno peccato sine alio.
5. Item, homo potest satisfacere de uno veniali, committendo etiam aliud: ergo pari ratione de mortali; aut quare non?
Contra: 1. Isaiae quinquagesimo octavo2b: Ecce ad lites et contentiones ieiunatis; et post: Nunquid tale est ieiunium, quod elegi? quasi dicat: Non. Ergo non placet Deo pro peccato ieiunium, quando ieiunando committuntur peccata.
2. Item, Gregorius in homilia3b: «Qui sic alia plangit, ut alia committat, poenitentiam agere aut ignorat, aut dissimulat».
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia in hoc peccator est dignus poena, quia Dei imaginem deformat: ergo nunquam satisfacit nisi per reformationem imaginis; sed in eo qui satisfacit4b et rursus peccat, nunquam reformatur imago: ergo talis nunquam satisfacit.
4. Item, in peccato est conversio et aversio, et poena debetur peccatori ratione aversionis; sed peccata omnia conveniunt in aversione5b: ergo satisfactio respicit peccata secundum id, in quo conveniunt: ergo impossibile est satisfacere de uno sine alio.
Conclusio. Error est ponere, quod peccator satisfaciat pro uno peccato, persistens in alio.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui posuerunt, quod de uno peccato poterat fieri satisfactio, peccatore persistente in alio. Et ratio eorum erat divina benignitas, quae acceptat satisfactionem quantumcumque modicam. — Sed tamen hi non consideraverunt sufficienter, quid sit satisfacere. Non enim satisfacere dicit tolerantiam poenae tantum, quia Deus in malis nostris non delectatur6b, sed delectatur in iustitia voluntatis nostrae et reconciliatione, quae non potest haberi de una culpa sine alia, tum propter connexionem virtutum in una gratia, quae delet omnem culpam mortalem, cum habeat omnem virtutem connexam7b; tum propter divinam largitatem, quae secundum partem non gratificat, immo omnem offensam condonat; tum propter peccata mortalia, quae omnia communicant in aversione et contemptu Dei, et omnia sunt contra Deum et contra unum: et ideo, si Deus remitteret culpam de uno sine alio, simul esset is cui remittitur, amicus et inimicus, conversus et aversus.
Et ideo, sicut dicit Magister8b, error est hoc ponere, quod homo satisfaciat Deo, offendendo Deum, quia semper manet aversio et imaginis deformatio et inimicitia. Et ideo dicitur Ecclesiastis nono9b: Qui in uno peccaverit multa bona perdet; et beatus Iacobus, secundo capitulo: Qui offendit in uno factus est omnium reus: quia qui peccat in uno non satisfacit pro aliquo, eo quod in omni peccato unus offenditur, et impossibile est, quod Deus sit amicus et inimicus eiusdem.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de illa Glossa, Sola quod non peribit; dicendum, quod intelligitur, quia operibus pietatis praeparatur ad gratiam, per quam satisfaciat de omnibus.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de transgressione, dicendum, quod non est simile. Quia enim mala facimus, ideo mali sumus; et ideo, quia actus non sunt connexi, nec transgressiones; sed non quia bona facimus, boni sumus, sed econtra10b; et ideo oportet, quod ante sit amicus, quam pro aliquo peccato satisfaciat; et si amicus, ergo nullum peccatum habet mortale.
3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod isti peccato debetur tanta poena de se, nisi remittatur per gratiam, quam impossibile est illi persolvere, quia infinita; et ideo nunquam taxari potest poena debita, quousque manet in culpa.
4. Ad aliud, quod Deus vult plus satisfactionem quam creditor solutionem; dicendum, quod Deus similiter recipit satisfactionem paulatim; sed quamdiu est in aliqua culpa, non est in solvendo aliquid, immo in obligando se potius; et ideo Deus non recipit11b.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de veniali, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia veniale stat simul cum gratia, per quam contingit satisfacere; non sic mortale, immo quodlibet mortale tollit fundamentum satisfactionis, sicut melius patebit in sequenti problemate12b.
Scholion ad hunc articulum unicum redditur cum Quaestione I huius articuli.
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Question II. Whether it is possible to satisfy God for one sin while another is retained.
Secondly it is asked whether it is possible to satisfy God for one sin while another is retained. And that it is, seems to be the case:
1. To the Fourth [chapter] of First Timothy1: Godliness is profitable unto all things; the Gloss: «The sum of Christian discipline is in piety and mercy; and whoever follows it, even if he should suffer the slipperiness of the flesh, will without doubt be scourged, yet not perish»; and it is clear that it understands [this] of mortal slipperiness, because, if [it were understood] of venial [sin], even without that one would not perish: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because satisfaction corresponds to transgression by opposition: therefore, since it is possible to transgress successively, first in one way, then in another; it likewise seems that one may also satisfy2 first for one sin, then for another.
3. Likewise, to one sin one penalty is due and one
satisfaction, whence too another [penalty] is imposed; suppose then that for some sin the due penalty be imposed; if one carries it out, nothing further can or ought to be exacted from him1b; but he can carry it out while committing another fault: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, God desires more that satisfaction be made to him by a sinner than any creditor [desires] payment from a debtor; but a creditor who greatly desires payment receives payment of one [debt] without another: therefore God too [receives] satisfaction for one sin without another.
5. Likewise, a man can satisfy for one venial [sin] while committing also another: therefore by equal reasoning [also] for a mortal one; or else why not?
On the contrary: 1. Isaiah fifty-eight2b: Behold, you fast for strifes and contentions; and afterward: Is such a fast as this what I have chosen? as if to say: No. Therefore a fast for sin does not please God when in fasting sins are committed.
2. Likewise, Gregory in a homily3b: «Whoever so weeps for some things that he commits others either does not know how to do penance, or dissembles it».
3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because in this the sinner is worthy of penalty, because he deforms the image of God: therefore he never satisfies except by a reformation of the image; but in him who satisfies4b and again sins, the image is never reformed: therefore such a one never satisfies.
4. Likewise, in sin there is conversion and aversion, and a penalty is due to the sinner by reason of the aversion; but all sins agree in aversion5b: therefore satisfaction regards sins according to that in which they agree: therefore it is impossible to satisfy for one without another.
Conclusion. It is an error to hold that a sinner satisfies for one sin while persisting in another.
I respond: It must be said that some have held that satisfaction could be made for one sin while the sinner persisted in another. And their reason was the divine kindness, which accepts satisfaction however small. — But nevertheless these men did not sufficiently consider what it is to satisfy. For to satisfy does not mean only the bearing of penalty, because God does not delight in our evils6b, but delights in the justice of our will and in reconciliation, which cannot be had of one fault without another: both on account of the connection of the virtues in one grace, which blots out every mortal fault, since it has every virtue connected7b; and on account of the divine generosity, which does not show favor in part, but rather pardons every offense; and on account of mortal sins, which all share in aversion and contempt of God, and are all against God and against the one: and therefore, if God were to remit the fault of one without another, he to whom it is remitted would be at once friend and enemy, converted and averted.
And therefore, as the Master says8b, it is an error to hold this — that a man should satisfy God while offending God — because the aversion and the deformation of the image and the enmity always remain. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiastes nine9b: He who sins in one thing shall lose many good things; and blessed James, in the second chapter: Whoever offends in one thing is made guilty of all: because he who sins in one does not satisfy for anything, in that in every sin the one [God] is offended, and it is impossible that God be friend and enemy of the same person.
1. To the objection therefore from that Gloss, Solely that he will not perish; it must be said that it is understood [thus], that by works of piety he is prepared for the grace by which he may satisfy for all.
2. To the objection from transgression, it must be said that it is not similar. For because we do evil things, therefore we are evil; and therefore, since the acts are not connected, neither are the transgressions; but not because we do good things are we good, but the contrary10b; and therefore it is necessary that one be a friend before he satisfies for any sin; and if he is a friend, then he has no mortal sin.
3. To the other [objection] it must be said that to this sin so great a penalty is due of itself — unless it be remitted by grace — that it is impossible for him to pay it, because it is infinite; and therefore the due penalty can never be assessed so long as he remains in fault.
4. To the other [objection], that God desires satisfaction more than a creditor [desires] payment; it must be said that God likewise receives satisfaction little by little; but as long as one is in any fault, he is not paying anything, but rather binding himself the more; and therefore God does not receive [it]11b.
5. To the objection from the venial [sin], it must be said that it is not similar, because the venial stands together with the grace through which it happens that one satisfies; not so the mortal, but rather any mortal [sin] takes away the foundation of satisfaction, as will better appear in the following problem12b.
The scholion for this Articulus Unicus is rendered with Question I.
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- 1Vers. 8. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum, delibata est ex Comment. Ambrosio olim tributo.Verse 8. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary [Gloss] in Peter Lombard and Lyra, is drawn from the Commentary once attributed to Ambrose.
- 2Codd. I K substituunt satisfactio possit fieri, edd. vero possit satisfacere.Codices I K substitute satisfaction can be made, but the editions [read] one can satisfy.
- 1bUt dictum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; d. 3. p. 1. a. 1. q. 3; III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. (ubi de iis qui ante novam legem). — Pro sine fide enim edd. et sine fide eius.As was said above, d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3; III Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, in the body (where [it treats] of those who [were] before the new law). — For without faith, for the editions [read] and without his faith.
- 2bVers. 4. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 5.Verse 4. — The following text is ibid., v. 5.
- 3bLibr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 34. n. 15.Book II, Homilies on the Gospels, homily 34, n. 15.
- 4bCod. X addit de uno.Codex X adds for one.
- 5bVide II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 2. — De maiori vide ibid. pag. 802, nota 3. verba Augustini.See II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 2. — On the major [premise] see ibid., p. 802, note 3, the words of Augustine.
- 6bSive, ut ait Gregor., Regula pastor. p. III. c. 30: Neque enim Deus nostris cruciatibus pascitur. Cfr. supra pag. 37, nota 6.Or, as Gregory says, Pastoral Rule p. III, c. 30: For God is not fed by our torments. Cf. above, p. 37, note 6.
- 7bDe quo vide III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1, ubi etiam seq. ratio insinuatur (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.). — Edd. annexam.On which see III Sent. d. 36, q. 1, where the following reasoning too is intimated (cf. here the Master's text, c. 7). — The editions [read] annexam [annexed].
- 8bHic in lit. c. 1. seqq.Here in the text, c. 1 ff.
- 9bVers. 18. — Seq. textus est Iac. 2, 10. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. q. 4. ad 1. — Inferius pro aliquo cod. aa reliquo.Verse 18. — The following text is James 2:10. Cf. III Sent. d. 36, q. 4, ad 1. — Below, for anything codex aa [reads] the rest.
- 10bVirtus enim est, ut ait Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, ex qua et bonus homo ipse efficietur et bene opus suum reddet. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 804, nota 7. et pag. 1004, nota 2. nec non tom. III. pag. 388, nota 2.For virtue is, as Aristotle says, Ethics II, c. 6, that by which both the man himself is made good and renders his work well. Cf. tom. II, p. 804, note 7, and p. 1004, note 2, and also tom. III, p. 388, note 2.
- 11bVide quaest. seq.See the following question.
- 12bVide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---