Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15
Articulus Unicus. De satisfactione in genere.
Quaestio I. Utrum possibile sit reconciliari Deo per satisfactionem.
Circa primum ostenditur, quod sit possibile Deo reconciliari:
1. Per definitionem eius quod est satisfacere, quia dicit Anselmus1: «Satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo reddere»; sed hoc est possibile homini: ergo possibile est satisfacere.
2. Item, quanto is, contra quem delinquitur, misericordior est, tanto minorem exigit poenam; et quanto minorem exigit poenam, tanto facilius et possibilius est ei satisfacere; sed Deus est multo misericordior homine: ergo si potest homini satisfieri et Deo.
3. Item, sufficienter aliquis punitur, quando tantum datur ei tormentum, quantum fuit delectamentum, quia haec est iustitia legis Moysaicae Deuteronomii vigesimo quinto2: Iuxta mensuram peccati erit et plagarum modus etc.; et legis divinae: Quantum se glorificavit etc.; sed aliquis potest sibi hoc facere: ergo potest Deo satisfacere.
Contra: 1. Tanta est offensa, quantus is est, qui offenditur; sed Deus est infinitus, qui offenditur in peccato: ergo et offensa. Sed quanta est offensa, tanta debet esse satisfactio, alioquin non fit satis: ergo in infinitum oportet quod homo se puniat. Sed hoc est impossibile alicui: ergo non potest Deo satisfacere homo de peccato.
2. Item, peccatum diaboli peccatum nostrum non excedit in infinitum, immo quanto eius culpa excedit humanam, tanto virtus naturae ad sustinendum mala et faciendum bona est fortior; sed diabolus non potest satisfacere: ergo nec homo.
3. Item, primus parens non potuit de culpa sua satisfacere, quia, cum esset homo, voluit in scientia assimilari Deo3; ideo ad satisfactionem necesse fuit, quod Deus fieret homo; sed quilibet peccator praefert voluntatem suam voluntati divinae: ergo non potest satisfacere.
4. Item, nullus de originali potuit satisfacere nisi per mortem Christi; sed multo minus ponderat originale quam actuale4: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Possibile est homini Deo satisfacere, quod duplici via explicatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic est unus modus dicendi satis probabilis, quod de omni eo quod est in peccato, non fit satisfactio, quoniam hoc est impossibile. Unde et Deus non exigit satisfactionem de omni eo quod est in culpa, sed aliquid condonat per misericordiam, de aliquo requirit satisfactionem per iustitiam, ut simul sit hic misericordia et veritas5; nec unquam est satisfactio, nisi praecedat condonatio, sicut nunquam est meritum, nisi praecedat donum gratuitum.
Unde notandum, quod in peccato duo sunt, scilicet offensa Dei et libido deordinata. Offensa Dei est infinita, et pro illa non fit satisfactio, sed Dei misericordia illam remittit suam dando gratiam; libido autem perversa finita est. Et quia Deus iustus est, non totum remittit, sed pro illa exigit poenam condignam; et quantum ad hoc possibile est Deo satisfacere6.
1. 2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima: ad primum, quia non fit satisfactio de offensa; ad secundum, quia diabolus non potest satisfacere propter impossibilitatem percipiendi gratiam, in qua remittatur sibi divina offensa7.
3. 4. Patet etiam responsio ad tertium. Deus enim per misericordiam relinquit omnino offensam dando gratiam, sed satisfactionem exigit de ipso damno, quod intulit sibi peccator per culpam et delectationem libidinosam. — Et quia Adam intulit sibi damnum mortis et toti posteritati; ideo non potuit plene satisfacere, nisi ille qui non esset mortis debitor et valeret totum genus humanum. Sed peccator quilibet, dum peccat, infert damnum in imaginis deformatione, quae reparabilis est, et infert damnum sibi, non aliis; et ideo non est simile8.
Alius etiam modus dicendi est satis probabilis
et videtur rationabilis, quod etsi divina misericordia relinquat offensam homini dando gratiam, non tamen ita omnino relinquit, quin etiam exigat de offensa satisfactionem per iustitiam. Et quia homo non potuit pro tanta offensa satisfacere, ideo Deus dedit ei Mediatorem, qui satisfaceret pro offensa. Unde in sola fide passionis Christi remittitur omnis culpa; sine fide enim nullus iustificatur1b; et secundum hoc dicunt, quod omnis satisfactio nostra virtutem habet a satisfactione Christi. Sed ipsa satisfactio Christi habet effectum in membris per Sacramentum baptismi plenum, per Sacramentum poenitentiae secundum partem2b, per fidem autem et ante novam legem et etiam post, ut in his qui non possunt confiteri, effectum habet adhuc minorem. Unde omnis satisfactio non tantum de peccato primi parentis, sed etiam de aliis fundata est super satisfactionem Mediatoris.
1. 2. 3. 4. Et secundum hanc3b viam facilis est responsio ad obiecta. Sicut enim offensa est infinita, sic quod Deus patitur est satisfactio infinita. — Similiter secundum patet, quia diabolus non habuit mediatorem, super quem posset fundari eius satisfactio. — Similiter patet tertium de Adam: quoniam, sicut ipse non potuit satisfacere de peccato suo, sic nemo posset sufficienter satisfacere de suo, nisi super satisfactionem passionis Christi per fidem esset fundatus.
I. Tota catholica doctrina de satisfactione, quae in hac dist. exponitur, nititur duobus principiis a Concilio Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 8. et can. 12. 13. 14. 15.) stabilitis, scilicet quod non semper tota poena simul cum culpa remittatur, et quod «pro peccatis quoad poenam temporalem Deo per Christi merita satisfiat poenis ab eo inflictis et patienter toleratis, vel a sacerdote iniunctis, vel sponte susceptis». — De definitione satisfactionis cfr. infra p. II. a. 1. q. 1; de satisfactione in genere et de Christi satisfactione in specie III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 1-4; de satisfactione plena et semiplena ibid. q. 4; de duplici satisfactione pro culpa et poena infra p. II. a. 1. q. 2, p. 1. dub. 2. 6-9; de satisfactione poenali et medicinali infra d. 20. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 16. p. I. dub. 13; de sacramentali infra d. 18. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
II. Ad I. quaestionem recte intelligendam vide infra p. II. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 4, ubi tangitur satisfactio Christi pro culpa et poena aeterna, dum hic proprie agitur de satisfactione Deo praestanda ex parte poenitentis per poenam temporalem. In satisfactione enim est «emenda praesens pro culpa praeterita» (infra p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). — Differentia inter utramque opinionem hic relatam in eo consistit, quod 1. opinio, cum in offensa Dei distinguat aliquid infinitum, nempe ex parte aversionis a Deo, et aliquid finitum ex parte conversionis; non nisi pro secundo (quod, utpote finitum, poenam tantum temporalem pro emenda requirit) satisfactionem a poenitente fieri posse asserat. Ad mentem Alexandri Hal. S. Thomas (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 1.) approbat et clarius explicat 2. opinionem; de 1. autem sic iudicat: «Sed hoc nihil est, quia satisfactio non respondet peccato, nisi secundum quod est offensa Dei, quod non habet ex parte conversionis, sed solum ex parte aversionis». — Revera etiam S. Bonav., licet hic non reprobet 1. opinionem, passim loquitur secundum alteram (cfr. seq. q. fundam. 4.) et approbat haec principia, quod «omnis satisfactio nostra habet virtutem a satisfactione Christi», et quod «est infinita, in quantum est Mediatoris» (Ita Alex. Hal., loc. infra cit. ad 4. 5.). De sententia Scoti circa satisfactionem pro peccatis cfr. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3. scholion. — De eadem: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 4. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit., et Supplementum Summae q. 13. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
III. Quaestio 2. communiter secundum doctrinam Magistri (hic q. I.) solvitur; cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. a. 1, nec non m. 3. (de definitione Anselmi ad 3.). — Scot., loc. cit. n. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. I; Suppl. q. 14. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Article Unique. On satisfaction in general.
Question I. Whether it is possible to be reconciled to God through satisfaction.
Concerning the first [point] it is shown that it is possible to be reconciled to God:
1. By the definition of that which is to make satisfaction, because Anselm says1: «To make satisfaction is to render to God the honor due [to him]»; but this is possible for man: therefore it is possible to make satisfaction.
2. Likewise, the more merciful is he against whom an offense is committed, the lesser the penalty he exacts; and the lesser the penalty he exacts, the more easily and the more possibly can satisfaction be made to him; but God is much more merciful than man: therefore if satisfaction can be made to man, [it can be made] also to God.
3. Likewise, someone is punished sufficiently when as much torment is given to him as was the pleasure, because this is the justice of the Mosaic law, Deuteronomy chapter twenty-five2: According to the measure of the sin shall be also the manner of the stripes etc.; and of the divine law: As much as he hath glorified himself etc.; but a man can do this for himself: therefore he can make satisfaction to God.
On the contrary: 1. The offense is as great as is he who is offended; but God, who is offended in sin, is infinite: therefore the offense too [is infinite]. But as great as is the offense, so great ought the satisfaction to be, otherwise enough is not done: therefore it is necessary that a man punish himself infinitely. But this is impossible for anyone: therefore man cannot make satisfaction to God for sin.
2. Likewise, the sin of the devil does not exceed our sin infinitely; nay rather, the more his fault exceeds the human [fault], the stronger is the power of [his] nature for enduring evils and doing good things; but the devil cannot make satisfaction: therefore neither [can] man.
3. Likewise, the first parent could not make satisfaction for his fault, because, since he was a man, he willed to be made like to God in knowledge3; therefore for satisfaction it was necessary that God should become man; but every sinner prefers his own will to the divine will: therefore he cannot make satisfaction.
4. Likewise, no one could make satisfaction for original [sin] except through the death of Christ; but original [sin] weighs much less than actual [sin]4: therefore etc.
Conclusion. It is possible for man to make satisfaction to God, which is explained by a twofold way.
I respond: It must be said that there is here one way of speaking, sufficiently probable, that satisfaction is not made for everything that is in sin, since this is impossible. Hence God too does not exact satisfaction for everything that is in fault, but remits something through mercy, and requires satisfaction for something through justice, so that here mercy and truth may be together5; nor is there ever satisfaction unless remission precedes, just as there is never merit unless a gratuitous gift precedes.
Hence it must be noted that in sin there are two things, namely the offense of God and disordered desire. The offense of God is infinite, and for it no satisfaction is made, but God's mercy remits it by giving grace; but perverse desire is finite. And because God is just, he does not remit the whole, but for it exacts a condign penalty; and with respect to this it is possible to make satisfaction to God6.
1. 2. And through this the response to the first two [objections] is clear: to the first, because satisfaction is not made for the offense; to the second, because the devil cannot make satisfaction on account of the impossibility of receiving grace, in which the divine offense might be remitted to him7.
3. 4. The response to the third is also clear. For God through mercy leaves the offense altogether [behind] by giving grace, but exacts satisfaction for the very harm which the sinner inflicted upon himself through fault and libidinous pleasure. — And because Adam inflicted upon himself and upon all posterity the harm of death; therefore he could not make full satisfaction, except he who was not a debtor of death and was worth the whole human race. But every sinner, when he sins, inflicts harm in the deformation of the image, which is reparable, and inflicts harm upon himself, not upon others; and therefore it is not similar8.
There is also another way of speaking, sufficiently probable
and it seems reasonable, that although the divine mercy leaves the offense [behind] for man by giving grace, yet it does not so wholly leave it that it does not also exact satisfaction for the offense through justice. And because man could not make satisfaction for so great an offense, therefore God gave him a Mediator, who would make satisfaction for the offense. Hence in the faith of Christ's passion alone is every fault remitted; for without faith no one is justified1b; and according to this they say that all our satisfaction has its power from the satisfaction of Christ. But the satisfaction of Christ itself has its effect in the members through the full Sacrament of baptism, through the Sacrament of penance in part2b, but through faith both before the new law and also after — as in those who cannot confess — it has a still lesser effect. Hence all satisfaction, not only for the sin of the first parent but also for the others, is founded upon the satisfaction of the Mediator.
1. 2. 3. 4. And according to this3b way the response to the objections is easy. For just as the offense is infinite, so what God suffers is an infinite satisfaction. — Likewise the second is clear, because the devil had no mediator upon whom his satisfaction could be founded. — Likewise the third concerning Adam is clear: since, just as he himself could not make satisfaction for his own sin, so no one could make sufficient satisfaction for his own [sin], unless he were founded, through faith, upon the satisfaction of Christ's passion.
I. The whole catholic doctrine concerning satisfaction, which is set forth in this distinction, rests upon two principles established by the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV, c. 8 and can. 12, 13, 14, 15), namely that not always is the whole penalty remitted at the same time as the fault, and that «for sins, as to the temporal penalty, satisfaction is made to God through the merits of Christ by penalties inflicted by him and patiently borne, or enjoined by a priest, or voluntarily undertaken». — On the definition of satisfaction cf. below p. II. a. 1. q. 1; on satisfaction in general and on Christ's satisfaction in particular, III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 1-4; on full and semi-full satisfaction, ibid. q. 4; on the twofold satisfaction for fault and penalty, below p. II. a. 1. q. 2, p. 1. dub. 2. 6-9; on penal and medicinal satisfaction, below d. 20. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. and d. 16. p. I. dub. 13; on sacramental [satisfaction], below d. 18. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
II. For rightly understanding Question I, see below p. II. a. 1. q. 2. fundamentum 4, where Christ's satisfaction for fault and eternal penalty is touched on, while here it is properly a question of the satisfaction to be rendered to God on the part of the penitent through temporal penalty. For in satisfaction there is «a present amendment for a past fault» (below p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). — The difference between the two opinions here related consists in this, that the 1st opinion, since it distinguishes in the offense of God something infinite, namely on the part of the aversion from God, and something finite on the part of the conversion, asserts that satisfaction can be made by the penitent only for the second (which, being finite, requires only a temporal penalty for amendment). In line with Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. ad 1.) approves and more clearly explains the 2nd opinion; but of the 1st he judges thus: «But this is nothing, because satisfaction does not correspond to the sin except insofar as it is an offense of God, which it does not have on the part of the conversion, but only on the part of the aversion». — In truth St. Bonaventure too, although here he does not reject the 1st opinion, throughout speaks according to the other (cf. the following q. fundamentum 4.) and approves these principles, that «all our satisfaction has its power from the satisfaction of Christ», and that «it is infinite, inasmuch as it is the Mediator's» (so Alexander of Hales, in the place cited below, ad 4. 5.). On the opinion of Scotus concerning satisfaction for sins cf. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3. scholion. — On the same: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. n. 4. seqq. — St. Thomas, in the place cited, and Supplement to the Summa q. 13. a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
III. Question 2 is commonly solved according to the doctrine of the Master (here q. I); cf. Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, m. 4. a. 1, and also m. 3. (on Anselm's definition, ad 3.). — Scotus, in the place cited, n. 10. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiuncula I; Suppl. q. 14. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, in the place cited, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- 1Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 11. et 20. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 1, ubi plura, quae hanc quaest. concernunt, proponuntur.Book I, Cur Deus homo, c. 11 and 20. Cf. III Sent. d. 20. q. 1, where many things are proposed which concern this question.
- 2Vers. 2. — Seq. textus est Apoc. 18, 7.Verse 2. — The following text is Apoc. 18:7.
- 3Cfr. Gen. 3, 5, et II. Sent. d. 22. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. Gen. 3:5, and II Sent. d. 22. a. 1. q. 1.
- 4Vide II. Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1. seq.See II Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1 sq.
- 5Psalm. 24, 10: Universae viae Domini, misericordia et veritas. Cfr. infra d. 46. a. 2. q. 2. seq.Psalm 24:10: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Cf. below d. 46. a. 2. q. 2 sq.
- 6Richard. a S. Vict., de Potestate ligandi et solvendi, c. 4. deducit hoc ex Ps. 31, 5: Tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei. — Cod. U addit: Vel aliter dici potest, quod etsi ad satisfaciendum inter Deum et hominem aequalitas non sit commensurationis, est tamen proportionis; exemplum de semine et fructu eius.Richard of St. Victor, On the Power of Binding and Loosing, c. 4, derives this from Ps. 31:5: Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of my sin. — Codex U adds: Or it can be said otherwise, that although for making satisfaction there is not between God and man an equality of commensuration, there is nevertheless [an equality] of proportion; an example from the seed and its fruit.
- 7Vide II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. I.See II Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. I.
- 8Cfr. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3. seq. — Superius post humanum cod. X addit redimere, ac pro et infert codd. E F G H V aa etiam infert.Cf. III Sent. d. 20. q. 3 sq. — Above, after human codex X adds to redeem, and for and inflicts codices E F G H V aa [read] also inflicts.
- 1bUt dictum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. (ubi de iis qui ante novam legem). — Pro sine fide enim edd. et sine fide eius.As was said above d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; III Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. in the body (where [it treats] of those who [were] before the new law). — For for without faith the editions [read] and without his faith.
- 2bVide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Mox pro et ante, quod praebent codd. I K, alii vel ut ante vel cum edd. ante.See above d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Soon, for and before, which codices I K offer, others [read] or as before or, with the editions, before.
- 3bCod. Y hanc secundam.Codex Y [reads] this second [way]. ---