Dist. 18, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 18
Articulus III. De clave scientiae specialiter.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur specialiter de clave, quae dicitur scientia. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum scientia sit clavis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit alia clavis quam potentia.
Quaestio I. Utrum scientia sit clavis.
Circa primum ostenditur, quod scientia sit clavis. Primo sic.
1. Super illud Matthaei decimo sexto1: Tibi dabo claves; Glossa2: « Clavis dicitur scientia et potentia, qua debet dignos recipere et indignos repellere »: ergo scientia est clavis.
2. Item, in quodam sermone de Apostolis Petro et Paulo3 dicitur: « Petrus accepit clavem potentiae, Paulus clavem scientiae »: ergo scientia est clavis.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne illud quod directe repugnat errori, scientia est, vel de genere scientiae; sed clavis aliqua est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
Probatio minoris. Hieronymus super illud4: Tibi dabo claves etc.: « Sciat prudens lector, hoc esse de futuro promissum, quia, si statim datae essent, nunquam in eo error pravae confessionis locum habuisset »; ergo aliqua clavium excludit errorem.
4. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera, distinctione praecedenti5: « Qui vult peccata confiteri, ut inveniat gratiam, quaerat sacerdotem, qui sciat ligare et solvere, ne, cum negligens circa se exstiterit, negligatur »: ergo necessarium est absolventi habere scientiam: ergo si illud quod tenet rationem ad aperiendum, est clavis; videtur, quod scientia clavis sit.
Sed contra: 1. Super illud6: Tibi dabo claves etc.; Glossa: « Praesentis iudicii potestatem »: ergo videtur, quod utraque clavis est potestas, non ergo scientia.
2. Item, claves dantur in ordine et consequuntur praecise ordinem7; sed multi habent ordinem, p. 479 qui non habent scientiam, et e converso: ergo scientia non est clavis.
3. Item, clavis semel habita nunquam amittitur, sicut nec ordo; sed scientia habita potest amitti: ergo scientia non est clavis.
4. Item, si scientia est clavis, aut scientia innata, aut acquisita, aut infusa. Si innata; ergo claves sunt a natura. Si scientia acquisita; ergo claves sunt per acquisitionem, non per gratiam. Si infusa; sed multi sunt, qui nihil noverunt per infusionem propter suam nequitiam810: ergo mali non habent claves. Si tu dicas, quod infunditur scientia, quae est gratis data, sicut Salomoni; contrarium videmus aperte, quia omnes fere ita sunt simplices et idiotae post susceptionem sacerdotii, ut ante.
Conclusio. Scientia non est clavis, secundum quod dicit habitum, sed secundum quod dicit auctoritatem sive officium discernendi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio antiquorum.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod scientia est clavis, prout scientia nominat habitum sciendi discernere. Sed non est clavis principalis nec per se, sed prout iuncta est auctoritati solvendi et ligandi; et haec clavis non est de esse ordinis, sed de bene esse, ita quod, si aliquis recipit ordinem de facto, non habens scientiam, factum est; sed exsecutionem iurisdictionis in absolvendo non recipit sine periculo animae, eo quod altera clavium caret. Et hi dixerunt, quod quidam habeant scientiam clavium, ut illi qui habent scientiam acquisitam; quidam claviculam, ut illi qui carent acquisita, tamen per naturalem industriam noscunt quod ars docet et Scriptura; quidam vero nullam, ut qui carent utraque. Et videtur fuisse opinio Magistri911 — Sed non videtur hoc bene posse sustineri — licet aliquam habeat probabilitatem — cum dicamus, has claves ordinem consequi et ita dari sicut ordinem, et ita durare, sicut ordo durat.
Et ideo est secunda opinio, quod scientia non est clavis, secundum quod dicit habitum; sed in quantum dicit auctoritatem sive officium discernendi; hoc autem officium sive haec auctoritas est consequens ordinem inseparabiliter; et haec clavis est essentialiter. — Et haec fuit Praepositivi12, et hanc tenent communiter doctores, hoc addentes, quod scientia-habitus est sicut dispositio faciens ad bene esse vel etiam sicut dispositio materialis, sine qua altera clavis exire non potest in actum. Sicut enim vis visiva non est humidum crystallinum13, tamen illud exigit ad suam operationem; sic ipsa auctoritas discernendi requirit habitum scientiae; et quanto melius habetur scientia, tanto meliori modo habetur clavis. Et ideo maluerunt Sancti hanc clavem vocare hoc nomine quam alio. — Ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem.
1. 2. Nam primae auctoritates, quae dicunt scientiam clavem, intelliguntur de scientia, prout dicit auctoritatem discernendi.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod non intelligit tantum quantum ad esse nec etiam solum quantum ad bene esse, sed etiam ulterius quantum ad perfectum esse; sicut fuerunt14 in Apostolis, qui post adventum Spiritus sancti non fuerunt decepti nec a veritate abducti.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, quod solus sciens potest utiliter ligare; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia habitus scientiae sit clavis, sed quia dispositio est ad clavem, sicut dictum est.
Quae autem ad oppositum inducuntur, concedenda sunt, quoniam verum concludunt, scilicet scientiam, ut dicit habitum, non esse clavem.
I. Antiqui doctores communiter distinguunt duas claves, quae secundum S. Thomam (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. ad 1.) non distinguuntur in auctoritatis essentia, sed ex comparatione ad diversos actus. Sed Scot. (hic d. 18. q. unica n. 10.) tenet, esse « simpliciter duas, ita quod simpliciter verum est, illud verbum Christi: Tibi dabo claves etc, et possent de potentia Dei absoluta separari ab invicem »; « una tamen sunt unitate ordinis ». Idem etiam in dubio ponit doctrinam Angelici, quod istae claves sint idem cum charactere sacerdotali, qui, cum sit unus in se, se extendat ad diversos actus; de quo agitur infra d. 19. a. 2.
II. Quoad 1. quaestionem opinio Magistri, quae primo loco ponitur, communiter a posterioribus Scholasticis improbatur. — Circa 2. quaestionem dicit S. Doctor: « Sunt duae claves »; p. 480 sed addit: « Tamen, quia ex his constat una plena auctoritas, ideo in uno ordine dantur et unum respiciunt »; quae verba nec S. Thomae nec Scoto contradicunt.
De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. d. 20. m. 3. 4. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 7. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. 3; Suppl. q. 17. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. i. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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Article III. On the key of knowledge specifically.
Next, with respect to the third article, inquiry is made specifically concerning the key which is called knowledge. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether knowledge is a key. Second it is asked whether it is a key other than power.
Question I. Whether knowledge is a key.
Concerning the first point it is shown that knowledge is a key. First thus.
1. On that text of Matthew, chapter sixteen1: To thee I will give the keys; the Gloss2: « The key is called knowledge and power, by which one ought to receive the worthy and repel the unworthy »: therefore knowledge is a key.
2. Likewise, in a certain sermon on the Apostles Peter and Paul3 it is said: « Peter received the key of power, Paul the key of knowledge »: therefore knowledge is a key.
3. Likewise, by reason it seems so: for everything that directly opposes error is knowledge, or of the genus of knowledge; but some key is of this kind: therefore etc.
Proof of the minor. Jerome on that text4: To thee I will give the keys etc.: « Let the prudent reader know that this was promised concerning the future, because, if they had been given at once, no error of perverse confession would ever have had place in him »; therefore some one of the keys excludes error.
4. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is held in the text, in the preceding distinction5: « Let him who wishes to confess his sins, that he may find grace, seek a priest who knows how to bind and to loose, lest, when he has been negligent about himself, he be neglected »: therefore it is necessary for the one absolving to have knowledge: therefore if that which holds the account for opening is a key, it seems that knowledge is a key.
On the contrary: 1. On that text6: To thee I will give the keys etc.; the Gloss: « The power of present judgment »: therefore it seems that each key is a power, therefore not knowledge.
2. Likewise, the keys are given in ordination and follow precisely upon ordination7; but many have ordination p. 479 who do not have knowledge, and conversely: therefore knowledge is not a key.
3. Likewise, a key once had is never lost, just as neither is ordination; but knowledge once had can be lost: therefore knowledge is not a key.
4. Likewise, if knowledge is a key, either knowledge is innate, or acquired, or infused. If innate; then the keys are from nature. If knowledge is acquired; then the keys are by acquisition, not by grace. If infused; but there are many who have come to know nothing by infusion on account of their wickedness810: therefore the wicked do not have the keys. If you say that knowledge is infused which is freely given, as to Solomon; we see the contrary plainly, because almost all are as simple and ignorant after receiving the priesthood as before.
Conclusion. Knowledge is not a key insofar as it denotes a habit, but insofar as it denotes the authority or office of discerning.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this there was a twofold opinion of the ancients.
For some said that knowledge is a key, insofar as knowledge names the habit of knowing how to discern. But it is not a key principally nor of itself, but insofar as it is joined to the authority of loosing and binding; and this key is not of the being of ordination, but of its well-being, so that, if someone in fact receives ordination without having knowledge, it has been done; but he does not receive the exercise of jurisdiction in absolving without peril to the soul, because he lacks one of the keys. And these said that some have the knowledge of keys, as those who have acquired knowledge; some a little key, as those who lack acquired knowledge yet by natural industry know what art and Scripture teach; some none at all, as those who lack both. And this seems to have been the opinion of the Master911 — But this does not seem able to be well sustained — although it has some probability — since we say that these keys follow ordination and are thus given just as ordination is, and so endure as ordination endures.
And therefore there is a second opinion, that knowledge is not a key insofar as it denotes a habit; but insofar as it denotes the authority or office of discerning; and this office or this authority follows ordination inseparably; and this is a key essentially. — And this was the opinion of Praepositivus12, and the doctors commonly hold it, adding this, that knowledge-as-habit is like a disposition making for well-being, or even like a material disposition, without which the other key cannot pass into act. For just as the power of sight is not the crystalline humor13, yet requires it for its operation; so the very authority of discerning requires the habit of knowledge; and the better knowledge is had, the better the manner in which the key is had. And therefore the Saints preferred to call this key by this name rather than by another. — From these things the objections to each side are evident.
1. 2. For the first authorities, which call knowledge a key, are understood of knowledge insofar as it denotes the authority of discerning.
3. To that which is objected from Jerome, it must be said that he does not understand it only with respect to being, nor even only with respect to well-being, but further also with respect to perfect being; as it was14 in the Apostles, who after the coming of the Holy Spirit were not deceived nor led away from the truth.
4. To that which is objected from Augustine, that only one who knows can usefully bind; it must be said that this is not because the habit of knowledge is a key, but because it is a disposition toward the key, as has been said.
But the things adduced for the opposite are to be conceded, since they conclude what is true, namely that knowledge, insofar as it denotes a habit, is not a key.
I. The ancient doctors commonly distinguish two keys, which according to St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, ad 1) are not distinguished in the essence of authority, but by comparison to diverse acts. But Scotus (here d. 18, q. unica, n. 10) holds that they are « simply two, so that that word of Christ is simply true: To thee I will give the keys etc., and they could by God's absolute power be separated from one another »; « yet they are one with a unity of ordination ». He also in a doubt sets down the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, that these keys are the same as the priestly character, which, since it is one in itself, extends to diverse acts; concerning which it is treated below in d. 19, a. 2.
II. As to the first question, the opinion of the Master, which is set down in the first place, is commonly disapproved by the later Scholastics. — Concerning the second question the Holy Doctor says: « There are two keys »; p. 480 but he adds: « Yet, because from these there results one full authority, therefore they are given in one ordination and regard one thing »; which words contradict neither St. Thomas nor Scotus.
On both questions: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, d. 20, m. 3, 4. — Scotus, loc. cit., n. 7 ff. — St. Thomas, loc. cit., quaestiuncula 2, 3; Suppl. q. 17, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 3, i. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
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- 1Matth. 16, 19. Hieron. in v. 23. ait: Aedificabo, inquit, super te Ecclesiam meam etc, et: Dabo tibi claves regni caelorum; omnia de futuro, quae si statim dedisset ei, nunquam in eo pravae opinionis [alias: confessionis] error invenisset locum.Matthew 16, 19. Jerome on verse 23 says: I will build, he says, my Church upon thee etc., and: I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; all in the future, which, if he had given to him at once, no error of perverse opinion [otherwise: confession] would ever have found place in him.
- 2Vers. 19. — Glossa ordinaria apud Lyranum est ex Beda (in hunc loc.) dicente: Et tibi dabo claves regni caelorum, id est discernendi scientiam potentiamque, qua dignos debeas in regnum recipere et indignos secludere.Verse 19. — The Ordinary Gloss in Lyra is from Bede (on this passage), saying: And to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, that is, the knowledge and power of discerning, by which thou shouldst receive the worthy into the kingdom and shut out the unworthy.
- 3Serm. 202. in appendice serm. Augustini (alias 27. de Sanctis et post 79. in appendice) n. 1.Sermon 202 in the appendix of Augustine's sermons (otherwise 27 On the Saints and after 79 in the appendix), n. 1.
- 4Psalm. 84, 11. Vide supra d. 15. p. I. q. 1.Psalm 84, 11. See above, d. 15, p. I, q. 1.
- 5Dist. 46. a. 2. q. 3.Distinction 46, a. 2, q. 3.
- 6Cfr. supra d. 17. p. III. a. I. q. 2. ad 5. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.Cf. above, d. 17, p. III, a. I, q. 2, ad 5. — See the scholion to the preceding question.
- 7Matth. 16, 19. Hieron. in v. 23.Matthew 16, 19. Jerome on verse 23.
- 8Matth. 16, 19. — Glossa est interlinearis apud Lyranum.Matthew 16, 19. — The Gloss is the interlinear one in Lyra.
- 9Ut ostenditur infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. Ibid. q. 2. insinuatur maior seq. arg.As is shown below, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1. In the same place, q. 2, the major of the following argument is intimated.
- 10Sap. 1, 4: Quoniam in malevolam animam non introibit sapientia etc. — Post pauca respicitur III. Reg. 3, 11. seq. (de Salomone).Wisdom 1, 4: For wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul etc. — A little after, reference is made to 3 Kings 3, 11 ff. (concerning Solomon).
- 11Infra d. XIX. c. 1. — Superius pro scientiam clavium codd. FGIK scientiam clavem.Below, d. XIX, c. 1. — Above, for the knowledge of keys the codices FGIK [read] the knowledge a key.
- 12Sum. p. IV. q. Quae sint claves sacerdotis, ubi ait Magister, dicit in sententiis, quod non omnes sacerdotes habent illam clavem [scientiae]; sed potest dici, quod omnes habent, nisi sit aliquis omnino amens. Nullus enim est, qui in aliquo non sciat discernere inter peccata, licet non sciat discernere inter omnia; sed quod minus scit a sciente debet quis discere... Alii dicunt, quod tantum una est clavis, scil. potestas ligandi et solvendi; sed propter duos usus duae dicuntur. Sed hoc de auctoritate non habent; unde eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua probatur. Alii dicunt, quod duae sunt claves, officium discernendi est una, officium ligandi alia; secundum quos et omnes sacerdotes et soli habent duas claves; et hoc satis probabile est.Summa, p. IV, q. What the keys of the priest are, where the Master says, he says in the Sentences, that not all priests have that key [of knowledge]; but it can be said that all have it, unless someone be wholly out of his mind. For there is no one who does not in some respect know how to discern among sins, although he may not know how to discern among them all; but what one knows less, he ought to learn from one who knows... Others say that there is only one key, namely the power of binding and loosing; but on account of two uses they are called two. But this they do not hold on authority; whence it is despised with the same ease with which it is proved. Others say that there are two keys, the office of discerning being one, the office of binding the other; according to whom both all priests and they alone have two keys; and this is sufficiently probable.
- 13Membrano seu tunicae, quae dicitur specularis (pellucida), inclusum.Enclosed in the membrane or tunic which is called specular (transparent).
- 14Codd. H aa fuit.Codices H aa [read] fuit.