Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potestas solvendi.

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potentia solvendi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Domini, Matthaei decimo sexto¹: Tibi dabo claves regni caelorum: si ergo Dominus vere et proprie est locutus, non ergo tantum clavem, verum etiam claves dedit: ergo plures sunt claves. Sed non nisi potentia et scientia: ergo etc.

2. Item, «habitus et potentiae per actus dignoscuntur²», ergo pari ratione et instrumenta; sed scientia est ad discernendum, sive nominet auctoritatem sive habitum, potentia vero ligandi et solvendi est ad alterum actum: ergo etc.

3. Item, quae habent opposita diversa ipsa sunt diversa; sed scientia opponitur errori, ut dicit Hieronymus, et habetur in praecedenti problemate³; potentia autem solvendi opponitur difficultati: ergo etc.

4. Item, quae respiciunt diversas animae vires diversa sunt, loquendo de his quae superadduntur potentiis, pro eo quod accidentia et proprietates per subiecta propria distinguuntur⁴; scientia autem ad intellectum, et potentia ad affectum refertur: ergo videtur, quod sint duae.

Contra:

1. Clavis vel est ordo sacerdotalis, vel proprietas inseparabiliter annexa, sicut infra⁵ videbitur; sed ordo ille est unus: ergo et clavis ad illum ordinem spectans est una.

2. Item, claves sunt directae ad regnum caelorum aperiendum et ad obstaculum removendum⁶; sed regnum illud non est nisi unum, et ostium, quod sacerdos aperit, non est nisi unum, scilicet debitum aeternae poenae: ergo videtur, quod una tantum debeat esse clavis scientia et potentia.

3. Item, aut potentia ligandi et solvendi aperit per se solam, aut iuncta auctoritati discernendi; constat, quod non per se solam, sicut prius⁷ visum est, et hoc patet, quia nulli competit de aliquo decernere, de quo non competit discernere: si ergo actus aperiendi non competit ei nisi cum scientia, et clavis ab actu aperiendi denominatur; ergo ambae sunt una clavis.

4. Item, si claves istae distinguuntur, aut penes id, a quo sunt, aut in quo, aut ad quod. Si penes id, a quo, ut scientia a Filio, et potentia a Patre⁸; contra hoc est numerus et ordo: numerus, quia cum tres sint personae, tres deberent esse claves; ordo, quia, cum Pater secundum originem praeintelligatur, potestas solvendi praeiret scientiam; quod est inconveniens. — Si penes id, in quo sunt; cum ergo triplex sit in nobis potentia, secundum quam consistit imago, triplex deberet esse clavis: una in memoria, alia in intelligentia, tertia in voluntate; vel si non est in istis, sed in viribus, cum tres sint vires, in quibus sunt tres virtutes⁹, deberent tunc igitur esse tres claves, una in rationali, alia in concupiscibili et tertia in irascibili. — Si autem distinguuntur penes id, ad quod; sed illud est unum, scilicet aperire regnum: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod sunt ad solvendum et ligandum, et ita ad duo; contra: ad virtutem requiritur scire et velle et perseveranter operari¹⁰; sed scire et velle virtutem non plurificant, immo sunt in una virtute: ergo pari ratione discernere et solvere.

Conclusio.

In auctoritate sacerdotibus commissa duae sunt claves, scilicet potestas discernendi causam et sententiandi, concurrentes in unam plenam auctoritatem et in uno ordine datae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod distinctio clavium praedictarum di- p. 481 versimode sumitur a diversis. — Quidam enim distinctionem harum clavium sumunt penes id, a quo sunt et ad quod finaliter reducunt¹¹. Dicunt enim, quod sicut in Angelis est hierarchia descendens a hierarchia supercaelesti et ad illam ascendens et rediens; sic est in militante Ecclesia. In Angelis autem hierarchia, sicut dicit Dionysius¹², est ordo, scientia et actio, id est potestas ordinata scientia et actione, ita quod potestas respondet Patri, et haec apparet in Thronis; scientia Filio, et haec apparet in Cherubim; et actio sive opus Spiritui sancto, et haec apparet in Seraphim. Per hunc modum est intelligere in hierarchia ecclesiastica; quae maxime consistit penes Sacramentum ordinis, in quo confertur potestas ordinata scientia et actione; et hanc dicunt potestatem clavium, quae complectitur actum discernendi et solvendi: ita quod potestas respondeat Patri, et scientia Filio, et opus Spiritui sancto. Et secundum hos sunt in sacerdote tres potestates: una principalis et prima, quae est ipse ordo ut potestas conficiendi; secunda est potestas discernendi, et tertia absolvendi; ut sic appareat perfectissima pulcritudo in ordine ecclesiastico secundum repraesentationem illius superioris perfectissimae Trinitatis. — Si autem tu quaeras ab his: quare potestas conficiendi non est clavis? respondent tibi, quia non est ad alterum, sicut illae duae, sicut videbitur infra¹³. — Et haec quidem positio satis probabilis videtur esse.

Alii sumunt rationem distinguendi penes id, in quo sunt et contra quod sunt. Dicunt enim, quod hae duae claves respiciunt intellectum et affectum removendo duplex malum nobis inflictum, scilicet errorem per scientiam et difficultatem per potentiam. — Sed iste modus minus probabilis est quam primus, tum quia secundum rectam viam distinctionem clavium non inquirit, tum quia, etsi scientia sit in intellectu, tamen auctoritas discernendi in eadem potentia est, ut videtur aperte, cum auctoritate solvendi sive sententiandi. Non autem recte sumit rationem distinctionis: claves enim non dantur sacerdoti, ut sint in remedium sibi, sed ut sint directae¹⁴ in remedium aliis. In hoc tamen concordat cum prima, quod duae sunt claves secundum completam distinctionem.

Tertius modus distinguendi claves est penes id, ad quod immediate sunt. In foro autem poenitentiali duo sunt, quemadmodum in foro iudiciali. In illo enim sunt isti duo actus, scilicet discernere causam, et postmodum sententiare; et isti sunt actus diversi, et ad hoc, quod plene committatur alicui auctoritas, necesse est, utrumque committi, alioquin plenam non habet auctoritatem; est tamen duplex auctoritas concurrens in unam plenam, quod patet, quia eam contingit dividi. Committit enim aliquando Dominus Papa aliquibus, ut causam discutiant et instructam ante prolationem sententiae ad ipsum remittant; et hi habent auctoritatem discernendi, non sententiandi. Per hunc modum in auctoritate sacerdotibus commissa est sentiendum, quod cum sufficiens sit eis collata potestas arbitrandi inter peccatorem et Deum, quod utramque habent auctoritatem; et cum utraque harum sit ordinata ad aperiendum caelum, utraque dicitur clavis, et sunt duae claves; tamen, quia ex his constat una plena auctoritas, ideo in uno ordine dantur et unum respiciunt. — Et sic patet, quod sunt plures claves.

1. Et patet responsio ad primum obiectum in contrarium de ordinis unitate. — Posset tamen dici quod prima et unica potestas essentialis ordini sacerdotali est potestas conficiendi.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt ad unum dicendum, quod ad illud unum duplex actus necessario requiritur, scilicet discretio culpae et solutio poenae, et in his duobus duplex clavis consistit; non ergo penes finem ultimum, sed penes immediatum habent distinctionem¹⁵.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de apertione, dicendum secundum antiquos, quod ad eandem seram aperiendam in corporalibus videmus duplicem clavem: unam, quae aperit viam et dicitur anticlavis, et aliam, quae directe aperit, et haec dicitur principalis clavis. Sic in spiritualibus scientia est sicut anticlavis, quae dirigit iudicium, et potestas solvendi principalis clavis.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: penes quid distinguuntur? dicendum quod penes illud ad quod immediate sunt, scilicet discernere de culpa et solvere a poena, non penes hos actus solvere et ligare. Et si tu obiicias, quod scientia et operatio non faciunt duas virtutes; dicendum, quod scientia est duplex: una per modum praxis et experientiae, et haec est in qualibet virtute et est eis essentialis; alia vero est per modum cuiusdam directionis — sicut prudentia, quae, ut dicit Bernardus, «est auriga virtutum», et fides etiam est directiva theologicarum — et sic distinguitur ab his quae circa opus consistunt. Sic intelligendum est in proposito. — Et si tu quaeras a me: quare non sunt tot potestates, quot sunt vitia, a quibus solvunt? dicendum, quod ab omnibus illis solvunt secundum unam rationem et unum actum et modum consimilem; et ideo non oportet sic multiplicari.

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Question II. Whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing.

Secondly, it is asked concerning this matter, whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of the Lord, Matthew the sixteenth¹: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven: if therefore the Lord spoke truly and properly, then he gave not only a key, but indeed keys: therefore there are several keys. But [these are] nothing other than power and knowledge: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, "habits and potencies are known through their acts²," therefore by parity of reasoning instruments [are known] also; but knowledge is for discerning, whether it names an authority or a habit, while the power of binding and loosing is for the other act: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, things that have diverse opposites are themselves diverse; but knowledge is opposed to error, as Jerome says, and it is found in the preceding problem³; while the power of loosing is opposed to difficulty: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, things that regard diverse powers of the soul are diverse, speaking of those things which are superadded to the powers, on account of the fact that accidents and properties are distinguished through their proper subjects⁴; but knowledge is referred to the intellect, and power to the affect: therefore it seems that there are two.

On the contrary:

1. A key is either the priestly order, or a property inseparably annexed [to it], as will be seen below⁵; but that order is one: therefore also the key pertaining to that order is one.

2. Likewise, the keys are directed to opening the kingdom of heaven and to removing the obstacle⁶; but that kingdom is nothing but one, and the door, which the priest opens, is nothing but one, namely the debt of eternal punishment: therefore it seems that there ought to be only one key, [namely] knowledge and power.

3. Likewise, either the power of binding and loosing opens by itself alone, or joined to the authority of discerning; it is established that [it does] not [open] by itself alone, as was seen before⁷, and this is plain, because it belongs to no one to determine concerning anything about which it does not belong [to him] to discern: if therefore the act of opening does not belong to it except with knowledge, and a key is named from the act of opening; therefore both are one key.

4. Likewise, if these keys are distinguished, [it is] either with respect to that from which they are, or [that] in which, or [that] to which. If with respect to that from which, as knowledge from the Son, and power from the Father⁸; against this are number and order: number, because since there are three persons, there ought to be three keys; order, because, since the Father is pre-understood according to origin, the power of loosing would precede knowledge; which is unfitting. — If with respect to that in which they are; then since there is a threefold power in us, according to which the image consists, there ought to be a threefold key: one in the memory, another in the intelligence, a third in the will; or if it is not in these, but in the [appetitive] forces, since there are three forces, in which there are three virtues⁹, then accordingly there ought to be three keys, one in the rational, another in the concupiscible and a third in the irascible. — But if they are distinguished with respect to that to which [they are directed]; but that is one, namely to open the kingdom: therefore, etc. If you say that they are for loosing and binding, and thus for two; on the contrary: for virtue there is required to know and to will and to act perseveringly¹⁰; but to know and to will do not multiply virtue, but rather are in one virtue: therefore by parity of reasoning [neither do] to discern and to loose.

Conclusion.

In the authority committed to priests there are two keys, namely the power of discerning a case and of pronouncing sentence, concurring in one full authority and given in one order.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the distinction of the aforesaid keys is taken in diverse ways by diverse [authors]. p. 481 — For some take the distinction of these keys with respect to that from which they are and to which they finally reduce [them]¹¹. For they say that, just as among the Angels there is a hierarchy descending from the supercelestial hierarchy and ascending to it and returning; so it is in the Church Militant. But among the Angels the hierarchy, as Dionysius says¹², is order, knowledge and action, that is, power ordered with knowledge and action, such that power corresponds to the Father, and this appears in the Thrones; knowledge to the Son, and this appears in the Cherubim; and action or work to the Holy Spirit, and this appears in the Seraphim. In this manner it is to be understood in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; which consists chiefly in the Sacrament of order, in which is conferred the power ordered with knowledge and action; and this they call the power of the keys, which embraces the act of discerning and of loosing: such that power corresponds to the Father, and knowledge to the Son, and work to the Holy Spirit. And according to these there are in the priest three powers: one principal and first, which is the order itself as the power of consecrating; the second is the power of discerning, and the third of absolving; so that thus there may appear a most perfect beauty in the ecclesiastical order according to the representation of that higher most perfect Trinity. — But if you ask of these: why is the power of consecrating not a key? they answer you, because it is not toward another, like those two, as will be seen below¹³. — And this position indeed seems to be sufficiently probable.

Others take the ground of distinguishing with respect to that in which they are and against which they are. For they say that these two keys regard the intellect and the affect by removing the twofold evil inflicted on us, namely error through knowledge and difficulty through power. — But this manner is less probable than the first, both because it does not inquire into the distinction of the keys according to the right way, and because, although knowledge is in the intellect, nevertheless the authority of discerning is in the same power, as seems plain, [together] with the authority of loosing or of pronouncing sentence. But it does not rightly take the ground of the distinction: for the keys are not given to the priest that they may be a remedy to himself, but that they may be directed¹⁴ as a remedy to others. In this, however, it agrees with the first, that there are two keys according to a complete distinction.

The third manner of distinguishing the keys is with respect to that to which they are immediately [directed]. Now in the penitential forum there are two [things], just as in the judicial forum. For in the latter there are these two acts, namely to discern the case, and afterward to pronounce sentence; and these are diverse acts, and for this, that authority may be fully committed to someone, it is necessary that both be committed, otherwise he does not have full authority; nevertheless it is a twofold authority concurring into one full [authority], which is plain, because it happens to be divided. For sometimes the Lord Pope commits to certain persons, that they discuss a case and, [once] prepared, refer it back to him before the pronouncing of sentence; and these have the authority of discerning, not of pronouncing sentence. In this manner it is to be understood concerning the authority committed to priests, that since the power of arbitrating between the sinner and God conferred upon them is sufficient, they have both authority; and since each of these is ordered to opening heaven, each is called a key, and there are two keys; nevertheless, because from these there results one full authority, therefore they are given in one order and regard one [thing]. — And thus it is plain that there are several keys.

1. And the reply to the first objection to the contrary, concerning the unity of the order, is plain. — Yet it could be said that the first and only essential power of the priestly order is the power of consecrating.

2. To that which is objected, that they are toward one [thing], it must be said that toward that one [thing] a twofold act is necessarily required, namely the discernment of guilt and the loosing of punishment, and in these two the twofold key consists; therefore they have their distinction not with respect to the ultimate end, but with respect to the immediate [end]¹⁵.

3. To that which is objected concerning the opening, it must be said according to the ancients, that for opening the same lock in bodily [things] we see a twofold key: one, which opens the way and is called the fore-key (anticlavis), and another, which directly opens, and this is called the principal key. So in spiritual [things] knowledge is like the fore-key, which directs the judgment, and the power of loosing [is] the principal key.

4. To that which is asked: with respect to what are they distinguished? it must be said that [they are distinguished] with respect to that to which they are immediately [directed], namely to discern concerning guilt and to loose from punishment, not with respect to these acts, to loose and to bind. And if you object that knowledge and operation do not make two virtues; it must be said that knowledge is twofold: one by way of practice and experience, and this is in every virtue and is essential to them; the other, however, is by way of a certain direction — like prudence, which, as Bernard says, "is the charioteer of the virtues," and faith also is directive of the theological [virtues] — and thus it is distinguished from those things which concern the work. So it is to be understood in the present case. — And if you ask of me: why are there not as many powers as there are vices, from which they loose? it must be said that they loose from all those according to one ground and one act and a like manner; and therefore there is no need to multiply thus.