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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 35

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ARTICULUS I.

Utrum bonum per peccatum corrumpatur.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum peccatum sit boni corruptio.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum aliquod bonum habeat corrumpere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in Enchiridio1: « Quid est aliud, quod dicitur malum, nisi privatio boni »? « Bonum enim minui malum est ». Cum ergo culpa commit-

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titur, necessario ibi aliquod bonum privatur; sed non est dare, quod privetur per aliud quam per culpam: ergo necesse est ponere, quod peccatum habeat bonum privare et privando corrumpere. Et hoc Augustinus insinuat expressius paulo post, cum subiungit: « Ideo malum corruptio est naturae, quia eam qualicumque privat bono ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostendit Augustinus2 tali ratione: « Quod nullo bono privat non nocet », ergo quod nocet aliquo bono privat; sed malum nocet, hoc manifestum est: ergo aliquod bonum adimit et aliquo bono privat; sed quod privat et adimit bonum, illud corrumpit: ergo etc.

3. Item, sicut se habent vitia corporum ad corpora, sic vitia animarum ad animas; sed vitia corporum laedunt et aliquo modo corrumpunt corpora: ergo vitia animarum aliquid corrumpunt circa ipsam animam3; talia autem vitia sunt peccata: ergo etc.

4. Item, quando quis peccat, aut perdit aliquid boni, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo ita bonus est post, sicut ante: ergo ita bonus est qui peccat, sicut ille qui non peccat: ergo ita debet placere Deo unus, sicut alter; quod est manifeste falsum. Restat igitur, quod aliquid boni perdit. Sed illud bonum, quod perditur4, corrumpitur: ergo est alicuius boni corruptivum.

Sed contra hoc arguitur sic:

Ad oppositum.

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini5, qui dicit, quod « peccatum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis »; sed corruptionis non est corrumpere — nam si corruptio corrumperet, pari ratione et alia corruptio, et sic in infinitum; et iterum, actionis non est agere — ergo videtur, quod si peccatum est corruptio, quod eius non sit corrumpere.

2. Item, si peccatum corrumpit — aut ratione boni substrati, aut ratione defectus. Ratione boni substrati non, quia, cum corrumpere bonum sit malum, bonum, in quantum bonum, esset causa mali; quod est6 falsum. Si ratione defectus; sed contra: corrumpere est agere; nullus defectus est principium actionis: ergo peccatum ratione defectus non corrumpit.

3. Item, si corrumpit, aut ergo corrumpit peccantem, aut alium. Alium non; constat, quia multa sunt peccata, quae non fiunt in alium. Si corrumpit peccantem; sed contra: nihil corrumpit se ipsum; et nihil secundum idem natum est esse agens et patiens7; et iterum, nullum malum poenae corrumpit punientem: ergo videtur, quod malum culpae non corrumpit peccantem nec aliquem alium: ergo etc.

4. Item, si corrumpit, aut ex parte carnis, aut ex parte animae. Ex parte carnis, non, quia multa sunt peccata, quae conferunt ad regimen sanitatis corporalis et ad oblectationem carnis. Si ex parte animae; sed contra: anima est immortalis8, ergo in ea nulla cadit corruptio; nam si corruptio caderet, impossibile esset, ipsam esse perpetuam.

5. Item, si corrumpit, aut corrumpit quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad potentias, aut quantum ad actum. Quantum ad substantiam, non; hoc constat. Quantum ad potentias, non, ut videtur, quia potentiae sunt incorruptibiles, sicut et substantia9; praeterea, nec intenduntur nec remittuntur, nec habet quis minorem potentiam voluntatis post culpam quam ante culpam. Quantum ad actum, non, ut videtur, quia peccatum substernit sibi actum et supponit; et nihil corrumpit illud, sine quo esse non potest et per quod egreditur in esse: ergo peccatum non corrumpit quantum ad actum nec quantum ad potentiam, ut visum est: ergo etc.

6. Item, si peccatum corrumpit aliquod bonum, aut ergo corrumpit bonum naturae, aut bonum gratiae. Non bonum naturae, quia ei non opponitur, et ut vult Dionysius10, « nihil existentium corrumpitur in eo quod est essentia vel natura ». Si igitur corrumpit bonum gratiae: ergo nullus potest peccare nisi habens gratiam, quia bonum non corrumpitur nisi in eo in quo est. Sed hoc est falsum, quia peccatores peccare possunt: ergo etc.

Est igitur quaestio, quod bonum est illud quod habet in nobis peccatum corrumpere?

Conclusio.

Malum culpae bonum corrumpit, non auferendo vel diminuendo potentiam, sed tollendo habitum rectitudinis et diminuendo habilitatem mediam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut Augustinus in pluribus locis11 dicit, peccatum corrumpit et aliquo bono privat. Cum enim per peccatum fiat animae deformatio et obscuratio, nec possit intelligi, aliquid deformari vel obscurari sine amissione alicuius luminis et pulcritudinis; necesse est intelligi, per peccatum aliquod in nobis bonum corrumpi.

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Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod peccatum non est qualiscumque privatio nec cuiuscumque boni nec in quacumque creatura reperta, sed peccatum sive culpa privatio est iustitiae. « Iustitia autem, ut dicit Anselmus12, est rectitudo voluntatis ». Voluntas autem est in sola rationali creatura, ac per hoc et iustitia; et sicut iustitia est voluntatis rectitudo, sic culpa, quae est iniustitia, est voluntatis obliquatio. Sicut igitur per obliquationem fit declinatio a rectitudine et quaedam rectitudinis exterminatio, sic in culpae commissione fit in anima quaedam rectitudinis ademptio sive corruptio. — Et est attendendum, quod cum ad rectitudinem voluntatis tria concurrunt, videlicet ipsa potentia rectificabilis et ipse habitus rectitudinis et ipsa habilitas media; peccatum non corrumpit ipsam potentiam, secundum quod potentia est, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid; ipsum vero habitum rectitudinis simpliciter tollit; ipsam vero habilitatem mediam quodam modo corrumpit et quodam modo relinquit. Ergo potentiam nec diminuit nec aufert, iustitiam simpliciter tollit, habilitatem vero mediam diminuit, dum homo per peccatum minus et minus redditur ad rectitudinem iustitiae habilis, secundum quod linea, quae magis et magis curvatur, minus est habilis ad dispositionem rectitudinis13. — Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt, quod malum culpae habet bonum corrumpere.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod privationis non est privare, nec corruptionis corrumpere; dicendum, quod quamvis actus non habeat generare alium actum, tamen habitus habet generari ex actibus14; et ideo malum culpae, prout est corruptio et deordinatio existens in actu, potest esse causa deordinationis voluntatis secundum habitum. Et ideo peccatum sive malum culpae dicitur corrumpere, quia actus inordinatus voluntatem reddit inhabilem; nec significatur ex hoc, quod actio sit ex actione, sed quod deordinatio in habitu sit ex deordinatione in actu.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum malum corrumpat ratione boni substrati, vel ratione defectus; dicendum, quod corrumpere duo dicit, videlicet agere et deficere; nam corruptio est actio cum defectu. Dico igitur, quod malum culpae habet corrumpere, ita quod ratione boni substrati est ratio agendi, ratione vero defectus est ratio deficiendi. Et istud patet: voluntas enim, dum peccat, corrumpit se, quia, dum se ipsam movet deordinate, reddit se inordinatam et ad bonum minus habilem; nec potest se deordinare nisi volendo et se ipsam movendo. Et quod dico se movere, dico aliquod bonum substratum; quod autem dico inordinatum, dico defectum. Et huius satis congruum exemplum ponit Augustinus, et Magister recitat in littera15, quod malitia corrumpit, sicut corrumpit abstinentia. Ad corruptionem autem abstinentiae et concurrit vis naturalis consumtiva et defectus alimenti, et ita actio cum defectu. Similiter in proposito est intelligendum.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut peccans corrumpit se, aut alterum; dicendum, quod corrumpit se. Quod vero subiungit, quod nihil corrumpit se ipsum; dicendum, quod verum est, si agat secundum operationem naturae suae debitam; culpa autem non fit secundum ordinem naturae, sed praeter naturam. Et si obiiciat, quod nihil est agens et patiens secundum idem; dicendum, quod istud falsum est in his potentiis, quae possunt super se ipsas reflecti. Nam, sicut dicit Anselmus16, « voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens »; et cum deordinate se ipsam movet, se laedit et sibi ipsi nocumentum infert, pro eo quod vel recto ordine se privat, vel a recto ordine se elongat.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, aut peccatum corrumpit ratione carnis, aut animae; dicendum, quod principaliter ratione animae. Nam etsi peccatum aliquod corrumpat ratione carnis, hoc accidit, sicut superfluitas coitus vel cibi et potus nocet corpori. In anima autem peccatum semper aliquam corruptionem facit non secundum substantiam, secundum quam est immortalis et incorruptibilis, sed secundum rectitudinem et habilitatem ad ipsam, secundum quam anima est variabilis et vix in eodem statu permanet17, sicut patet per experientiam, quamdiu sumus in hac miseria.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum corrumpat quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad potentiam, aut quantum ad actum; dicendum, quod malum culpae corrumpit quantum ad actum, non simpliciter, sed in quantum actus ille est ordinabilis in finem; non enim culpa privat ipsum actum, sed privat ordinem actus in finem. Et per hunc etiam modum dico, quod non corrumpit potentiam, sed habilitatem sive ordinabilitatem, per quam ordinatur ad suum complementum. Obiectio autem illa currit, ac si diminueret potentias sub ratione potentiae, et actum sub ratione actus; et ideo patet illud.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum corrumpat bonum gratiae, vel naturae; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo et generaliter, malum culpae est privatio habilitatis mediae inter bonum naturae et bonum gratiae, quae quodam modo tenet medium inter

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bonum gratiae et bonum naturae. Et ratione eius quod ad bonum gratiae ordinat, attenditur penes ipsam bonum et malum moris; ratione vero eius quod naturalis est, non tantum habet esse in iustis, sed etiam in peccatoribus; et ideo peccatum, sive fiat ab aliquo, qui habet iustitiam, sive fiat a peccatore, semper invenit aliquid, quod privet et corrumpat.

Scholion

I. In tota hac distinctione veritas catholica de corruptione, quae oritur ex peccato, copiose et profunde explanatur; unde eliminantur duo extreme oppositi errores, error scilicet Pelagianorum, qui talem corruptionem, praecipue quoad peccatum originale, negabant, et error novatorum saeculi XVI. et XVII, qui eandem ita exaggerabant, ut bona naturae praestantiora peccato exstincta esse opinarentur. — Quid sit peccatum, vide hic dub. 1. 3. 6; et quod tria includat, infra d. 42. dub. I, et IV. Sent. d. 18. p. I. dub. 1. — Effectus autem peccati, qui afficiunt ipsum subiectum, sunt vel formales, ut « deformitas et macula », vel simpliciter effectivi, qui sunt « secundum reatum [poenae] et sequelam » (infra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.). De primis effectibus agitur in hac dist., de secundis in sequente. — Inter effectus, qui sunt extra subiectum, principalis est, quod obiective violatur lex et ordo Dei, et offenditur ipse Deus, de quo cfr. infra q. 3; III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 3, IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

II. In subiecto peccante tria considerari possunt: gratia supernaturalis, quae perficit naturam; natura, quae perficitur, et habilitas naturae ad ipsam gratiam. De effectu peccati quoad gratiam non est difficultas, cum constet, quod gratia sanctificans et habitus caritatis peccato mortali essentialiter opponuntur; unde peccator « a semetipso fugat gratiam divinam, et Deus dicitur auferre » (supra d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4.); quod magis explicatur infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 5. — Natura autem ipsa in se nullatenus corrumpitur, quia est subiectum peccati, non ipsi contrarium. — Tota igitur difficultas et quaestio est de tertio, sive de habilitate, « quae est ordo boni naturalis ad gratiam » (S. Thom., de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 14.), vel, ut dicit S. Bonav. (hic a. 2. q. 3.), « est idoneitas animae ad suscipiendam gratiam et ad cooperandum gratiae iam susceptae ». De hoc resolvit S. Bonav. cum aliis doctoribus, quod ipsa peccato corrumpitur non in toto, sed in parte, non secundum id quod est, sed secundum id ad quod est (infra a. 2. q. 3. et hic in corp. et ad 4. 5.). Haec et alia in quaest. 1. et 2. dicta ut facilius intelligantur, pauca praenotamus.

1. Cum voluntas se ipsam moveat, actus voluntarius non tantum est a voluntate, sed etiam in voluntate, quia non tantum est emissio actus, sed etiam eius receptio (S. Thom., de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 4.). Hinc est, quod dum actus naturalis nihil causat in agente, econtra « ex actibus moralibus potest causari aliquid in agente, ut habitus et dispositio, vel etiam aliquid oppositum » (ibid.). Porro actus malus est a voluntate ut actio, in voluntate ut passio, unde corruptio ipsius actus est a voluntate ut corruptio-actio, in voluntate ut corruptio-passio. Corruptio enim, active sumta, « est actio cum defectu »; nec « culpa privat ipsum actum, sed privat ordinem actus in finem » (hic q. 1. ad 2. 5; cfr. S. Thom., hic a. 3.).

2. Corruptio-actio est in se et directe volita et libera, unde in ipsa primo et per se invenitur ratio culpae sive culpa actualis. Corruptio-passio ordinarie non est volita nisi indirecte, quod sufficit, ut suo modo participet rationem culpae. Utraque autem corruptio, scilicet ipsius actus et voluntatis, unum quid constituunt, sive « culpa est differens comparatione, una tamen per essentiam » (hic q. 2.).

3. Corruptio-actio est aliquid transiens; corruptio-passio potest, transacto actu, remanere in voluntate ut peccatum habituale, quod est tum prava eiusdem dispositio et vitiatio, tum culpa, scilicet « in ordine ad suam causam » (S. Thom., S. 1. II. q. 86. a. 1. ad 3. et a. 2.). Peccatum igitur habituale in se, formaliter loquendo, non est a voluntate, sed in voluntate ut corruptio-passio, quae tamen a voluntate trahit et originem et rationem culpae. — Culpam autem hanc recentiores theologi cum S. Augustino vocant reatum culpae, ut distinguatur a culpa actuali. Antiqui autem Scholastici utramque nomine culpae exprimebant, vocem autem reatus reservabant pro reatu poenae sive obligatione ad poenam sustinendam (cfr. infra d. 42. dub. I.).

4. Sicut in peccato est aversio et conversio, « sic in ipso habitu peccati est privatio habitus boni [rectitudinis supernaturalis et naturalis] et quaedam habilitatio ad actum peccati... et privatio [scilicet per actum culpabilem] habilitatis bonae est ipsum peccatum, formaliter loquendo; ipsa vero habilitatio sive pronitas ad actum peccati non est peccatum, nisi materialiter loquendo, pro eo quod non est culpa, nisi quamdiu manet ibi privatio » (supra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.). Hinc facile intelligitur, quod cum corruptio-actio essentialiter et semper sit culpa, non poena; corruptio-passio in peccato habituali sub diversa comparatione habeat rationem tum culpae, tum poenae (infra d. 36. dub. 2. et a. 1. 2.).

5. Scot. (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 6. 7.) videtur docere, quod peccatum habituale consistat in ordinatione passiva ad poenam; tamen non eodem modo explicatur, ut videri potest ibi in scholio et in Commentario (ed. Waddingi). — Nominales autem negabant, peccatum actuale esse corruptionem alicuius boni, quod sit in voluntate, sed voluerunt, esse tantum corruptionem alicuius rectitudinis, quae inesse deberet actui vel, ut vult Occham, voluntati (cfr. Biel, hic q. unica). — Iam supra (d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. in schol.) observatum est, verba macula et deformitas non in eodem sensu sumi a S. Bonav. et a S. Thoma.

III. De 1. et 2. huius articuli quaest. alii magistri sub diversis titulis et plerumque unica quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 95. m. 2. a. 3. § 5, q. 104. m. 8. a. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 5. et d. 34. a. 5; S. 1. II. q. 85. a. 1; de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. — B. Albert., S. p. 1. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3; d. 34. q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., d. 34. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I.

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English Translation

ARTICLE I.

Whether the good is corrupted through sin.

QUESTION I.

Whether sin is a corruption of the good.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether sin has the power to corrupt some good. And that it does, it seems.

1. Augustine in the Enchiridion1: « What else is that which is called evil, except the privation of good »? « For to lessen the good is evil ». Since therefore guilt is commit-

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ted, necessarily there some good is deprived; but it cannot be granted that it be deprived by anything other than by guilt: therefore it is necessary to posit that sin has [the power] to deprive the good and by depriving to corrupt it. And this Augustine intimates more expressly a little afterward, when he subjoins: « Therefore evil is a corruption of nature, because it deprives it of good in whatever way ».

2. Likewise, this same thing Augustine shows2 by such a reasoning: « That which deprives of no good does no harm », therefore that which harms deprives of some good; but evil harms, this is manifest: therefore it takes away some good and deprives of some good; but that which deprives and takes away good, that corrupts: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, as the vices of bodies stand to bodies, so the vices of souls to souls; but the vices of bodies injure and in some manner corrupt bodies: therefore the vices of souls corrupt something about the soul itself3; but such vices are sins: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when someone sins, either he loses something of good, or nothing. If nothing: therefore he is as good afterward as before: therefore he who sins is as good as he who does not sin: therefore one ought to please God as much as the other; which is manifestly false. It remains therefore that he loses something of good. But that good which is lost4, is corrupted: therefore it is corruptive of some good.

On the contrary it is argued thus:

To the opposite.

1. First, by the authority of Augustine5, who says that « sin is a corruption of mode, species, and order »; but it does not belong to a corruption to corrupt — for if a corruption corrupted, by parity of reasoning so would another corruption, and so to infinity; and again, it does not belong to an action to act — therefore it seems that, if sin is a corruption, it does not belong to it to corrupt.

2. Likewise, if sin corrupts — either by reason of the underlying good, or by reason of the defect. By reason of the underlying good, no, because, since to corrupt the good is evil, the good, insofar as it is good, would be the cause of evil; which is6 false. If by reason of the defect; but on the contrary: to corrupt is to act; no defect is a principle of action: therefore sin does not corrupt by reason of the defect.

3. Likewise, if it corrupts, then either it corrupts the one sinning, or another. Another, no; this is established, because there are many sins which are not committed against another. If it corrupts the one sinning; but on the contrary: nothing corrupts itself; and nothing is by nature apt to be agent and patient with respect to the same [thing]7; and again, no evil of punishment corrupts the one punishing: therefore it seems that the evil of guilt corrupts neither the one sinning nor any other: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if it corrupts, [it does so] either on the part of the flesh, or on the part of the soul. On the part of the flesh, no, because there are many sins which contribute to the regimen of bodily health and to the delight of the flesh. If on the part of the soul; but on the contrary: the soul is immortal8, therefore in it no corruption falls; for if corruption did fall, it would be impossible for it to be perpetual.

5. Likewise, if it corrupts, either it corrupts as to substance, or as to the powers, or as to the act. As to substance, no; this is established. As to the powers, no, as it seems, because the powers are incorruptible, like also the substance9; furthermore, they are neither intensified nor remitted, nor does anyone have a lesser power of will after guilt than before guilt. As to the act, no, as it seems, because sin lays the act under itself and presupposes it; and nothing corrupts that without which it cannot be and through which it goes forth into being: therefore sin does not corrupt as to the act nor as to the power, as has been seen: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if sin corrupts some good, then either it corrupts the good of nature, or the good of grace. Not the good of nature, because it is not opposed to it, and as Dionysius holds10, « nothing of existing things is corrupted in that which is essence or nature ». If therefore it corrupts the good of grace: therefore no one can sin except one having grace, because good is not corrupted except in that in which it is. But this is false, because sinners can sin: therefore etc.

The question therefore is, what is that good which sin has [the power] to corrupt in us?

Conclusion.

The evil of guilt corrupts the good, not by taking away or diminishing the power, but by removing the habit of rectitude and diminishing the intermediate aptitude.

I respond: It must be said that, without doubt, as Augustine in many places11 says, sin corrupts and deprives of some good. For since through sin there comes about a deformation and darkening of the soul, nor can it be understood that anything is deformed or darkened without the loss of some light and beauty; it is necessary to understand that through sin some good in us is corrupted.

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For the understanding of which it is to be noted that sin is not just any privation, nor of just any good, nor found in just any creature, but sin or guilt is the privation of justice. « But justice, as Anselm says12, is the rectitude of the will ». But the will is in the rational creature alone, and through this also justice; and just as justice is the rectitude of the will, so guilt, which is injustice, is the bending-aside of the will. Just as therefore through the bending-aside there comes about a turning-away from rectitude and a certain destruction of rectitude, so in the commission of guilt there comes about in the soul a certain removal or corruption of rectitude. — And it is to be attended to that, since for the rectitude of the will three [things] concur, namely the rectifiable power itself and the habit of rectitude itself and the intermediate aptitude itself; sin does not corrupt the power itself, insofar as it is a power, neither simply nor in a qualified way; but the habit of rectitude itself it simply removes; the intermediate aptitude itself it in some manner corrupts and in some manner leaves. Therefore it neither diminishes nor takes away the power, it simply removes justice, but it diminishes the intermediate aptitude, while a human through sin is rendered less and less apt for the rectitude of justice, according as a line which is more and more curved is less apt for the disposition of rectitude13. — It is to be granted therefore, as the reasons show, that the evil of guilt has [the power] to corrupt the good.

1. To that indeed which is objected, that it does not belong to a privation to deprive, nor to a corruption to corrupt; it must be said that, although an act does not have [the power] to generate another act, yet a habit has [the power] to be generated from acts14; and therefore the evil of guilt, insofar as it is a corruption and disorder existing in the act, can be the cause of the disorder of the will as to the habit. And therefore sin or the evil of guilt is said to corrupt, because the inordinate act renders the will unapt; nor is it signified by this that an action is from an action, but that the disorder in the habit is from the disorder in the act.

2. To that which is asked, whether evil corrupts by reason of the underlying good, or by reason of the defect; it must be said that to corrupt states two [things], namely to act and to fail; for corruption is an action with a defect. I say therefore that the evil of guilt has [the power] to corrupt, such that by reason of the underlying good there is the ground of acting, but by reason of the defect there is the ground of failing. And this is plain: for the will, while it sins, corrupts itself, because, while it moves itself inordinately, it renders itself disordered and less apt for the good; nor can it disorder itself except by willing and by moving itself. And when I say it moves itself, I state some underlying good; but when I say inordinate, I state a defect. And of this Augustine puts a sufficiently fitting example, and the Master recites it in the text15, that malice corrupts, just as abstinence corrupts. For toward the corruption of abstinence there concur both the natural consuming force and the defect of nourishment, and thus action with a defect. Similarly it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is asked: whether the one sinning corrupts himself, or another; it must be said that he corrupts himself. But as to what is subjoined, that nothing corrupts itself; it must be said that it is true, if it acts according to the operation due to its nature; but guilt does not come about according to the order of nature, but beside nature. And if one objects that nothing is agent and patient with respect to the same; it must be said that that is false in those powers which can reflect upon themselves. For, as Anselm says16, « the will is an instrument moving itself »; and when it moves itself inordinately, it injures itself and inflicts harm upon itself, for the reason that either it deprives itself of right order, or it withdraws itself from right order.

4. To that which is asked, whether sin corrupts by reason of the flesh, or of the soul; it must be said that [it does so] principally by reason of the soul. For even if some sin corrupts by reason of the flesh, this happens just as the superfluity of intercourse or of food and drink harms the body. But in the soul sin always makes some corruption, not as to substance, according to which it is immortal and incorruptible, but as to rectitude and the aptitude toward it, according to which the soul is changeable and scarcely remains in the same state17, as is plain by experience, as long as we are in this misery.

5. To that which is asked, whether it corrupts as to substance, or as to power, or as to act; it must be said that the evil of guilt corrupts as to the act, not simply, but insofar as that act is orderable to the end; for guilt does not deprive [it of] the act itself, but deprives [it of] the order of the act to the end. And in this same way I say that it does not corrupt the power, but the aptitude or orderability through which it is ordered to its completion. But that objection runs as if it diminished the powers under the character of power, and the act under the character of act; and therefore that [point] is plain.

6. To that which is asked, whether it corrupts the good of grace, or of nature; it must be said that, speaking properly and generally, the evil of guilt is the privation of the intermediate aptitude between the good of nature and the good of grace, which in some manner holds the middle between

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the good of grace and the good of nature. And by reason of that whereby it orders toward the good of grace, the moral good and evil are reckoned with respect to it; but by reason of that whereby it is natural, it has being not only in the just, but also in sinners; and therefore sin, whether it be done by someone who has justice, or be done by a sinner, always finds something which it deprives and corrupts.

Scholion

I. In this whole distinction the catholic truth concerning the corruption which arises from sin is copiously and profoundly explained; whence two extremely opposed errors are eliminated, namely the error of the Pelagians, who denied such corruption, especially as to original sin, and the error of the innovators of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who so exaggerated it that they opined the more excellent goods of nature to be extinguished by sin. — What sin is, see here dub. 1. 3. 6; and that it includes three [things], below d. 42. dub. I, and IV. Sent. d. 18. p. I. dub. 1. — But the effects of sin which affect the subject itself are either formal, like « deformity and stain », or simply effective, which are « as to the liability [of punishment] and the consequence » (below d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in the body). The first effects are treated in this distinction, the second in the following. — Among the effects which are outside the subject, the principal is that objectively the law and order of God is violated, and God himself is offended, concerning which cfr. below q. 3; III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 3, IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

II. In the sinning subject three [things] can be considered: supernatural grace, which perfects nature; nature, which is perfected; and the aptitude of nature toward that grace. Concerning the effect of sin as to grace there is no difficulty, since it is established that sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are essentially opposed to mortal sin; whence the sinner « of himself drives away the divine grace, and God is said to take it away » (above d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4.); which is more explained below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 5. — But nature itself in itself is in no way corrupted, because it is the subject of sin, not contrary to it. — The whole difficulty therefore and question is about the third, that is, about the aptitude, « which is the order of the natural good toward grace » (St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 14.), or, as S. Bonaventure says (here a. 2. q. 3.), « is the suitability of the soul for receiving grace and for cooperating with grace already received ». Concerning this S. Bonaventure resolves with the other doctors that it is corrupted by sin not in whole, but in part, not according to that which it is, but according to that toward which it is (below a. 2. q. 3. and here in the body and ad 4. 5.). That these and other things said in questions 1 and 2 may be more easily understood, we set down a few things beforehand.

1. Since the will moves itself, the voluntary act is not only from the will, but also in the will, because it is not only the emission of the act, but also its reception (St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 4.). Hence it is that, while a natural act causes nothing in the agent, on the contrary « from moral acts something can be caused in the agent, such as a habit and disposition, or even something opposed » (ibid.). Further, the evil act is from the will as action, in the will as passion, whence the corruption of the act itself is from the will as corruption-action, in the will as corruption-passion. For corruption, taken actively, « is an action with a defect »; nor does « guilt deprive [it of] the act itself, but deprive [it of] the order of the act to the end » (here q. 1. ad 2. 5; cfr. St. Thomas, here a. 3.).

2. Corruption-action is in itself and directly willed and free, whence in it primarily and per se is found the character of guilt or actual guilt. Corruption-passion is ordinarily not willed except indirectly, which suffices that it participate in its own way in the character of guilt. But both corruptions, namely of the act itself and of the will, constitute some one [thing], that is « guilt is differing in comparison, yet one by essence » (here q. 2.).

3. Corruption-action is something transient; corruption-passion can, the act being past, remain in the will as habitual sin, which is both the depraved disposition and vitiation of the same, and guilt, namely « in relation to its cause » (St. Thomas, Summa 1. II. q. 86. a. 1. ad 3. and a. 2.). Habitual sin therefore in itself, speaking formally, is not from the will, but in the will as corruption-passion, which nevertheless from the will draws both its origin and the character of guilt. — But this guilt the more recent theologians, with St. Augustine, call the liability of guilt, that it may be distinguished from actual guilt. But the ancient Scholastics expressed both by the name of guilt, and reserved the word liability for the liability of punishment or the obligation to undergo punishment (cfr. below d. 42. dub. I.).

4. Just as in sin there is turning-away and turning-toward, « so in the very habit of sin there is the privation of the good habit [of supernatural and natural rectitude] and a certain aptitude toward the act of sin... and the privation [namely through a culpable act] of the good aptitude is sin itself, speaking formally; but the aptitude itself or proneness toward the act of sin is not sin, except materially speaking, for the reason that it is not guilt, except as long as the privation remains there » (above d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.). Hence it is easily understood that, since corruption-action is essentially and always guilt, not punishment; corruption-passion in habitual sin under a diverse comparison has the character both of guilt and of punishment (below d. 36. dub. 2. and a. 1. 2.).

5. Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 6. 7.) seems to teach that habitual sin consists in a passive ordination to punishment; yet it is not explained in the same way, as can be seen there in the scholion and in the Commentary (ed. Wadding). — But the Nominalists denied that actual sin is a corruption of some good which is in the will, but held it to be only a corruption of some rectitude which ought to be present in the act or, as Occam holds, in the will (cfr. Biel, here q. unica). — Already above (d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. in the scholion) it was observed that the words stain and deformity are not taken in the same sense by S. Bonaventure and by St. Thomas.

III. On the 1. and 2. question of this article other masters treat under various titles and generally in a single question: Alex. Hal., Summa p. II. q. 95. m. 2. a. 3. § 5, q. 104. m. 8. a. 4. — Scot., in each Scriptum, here q. unica. — S. Thom., here a. 5. and d. 34. a. 5; Summa 1. II. q. 85. a. 1; de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. — B. Albert., Summa p. 1. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 4. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 3; d. 34. q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., d. 34. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., here q. I.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 11. n. 3. — Testimonium subnexum sicut et illud quod in fine arg. allegatur, habentur ibid. c. 12. n. 4. — In secundo testimonio pro minui malum edd. et plures codd. minus malum.
    Chapter 11, n. 3. — The testimony subjoined, as also that which is adduced at the end of the argument, are found in the same place c. 12. n. 4. — In the second testimony, for minui malum ("to lessen the good is evil") the editions and several codices [read] minus malum ("less evil").
  2. Enchirid. c. 12. n. 4; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3; II. de Morib. Manich. c. 3. n. 5. — In omnibus fere Augustini scriptis contra Manichaeos testimonia, quae hic in 1. et 2. fundam. memorantur, tanquam argumenta principalia ad refutandos istos sectarios recurrunt. — Codd. H K Y nullo modo substituunt pro nullo bono.
    Enchiridion c. 12. n. 4; XII. On the City of God, c. 3; II. On the Morals of the Manichees c. 3. n. 5. — In almost all of Augustine's writings against the Manichees the testimonies which here in the 1st and 2nd fundamentals are mentioned recur as principal arguments for refuting those sectaries. — Codd. H K Y substitute nullo modo ("in no way") for nullo bono ("of no good").
  3. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 11. n. 3, cuius verba supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. allata sunt.
    Cfr. Augustine, Enchiridion c. 11. n. 3, whose words were adduced above in the text of the Master, d. XXXIV. c. 4.
  4. Edd., excepta 1, et pauci codd., inter quos est cod. ee, perdit.
    The editions, except 1, and a few codices, among which is cod. ee, [read] perdit ("loses").
  5. De Natura boni, c. 4. Cfr. 83 Qq. q. 6. — De seq. propos. vide supra pag. 33, nota 6, et Damasc., Dialog. contra Manichaeos, n. 61. Principium illud: actionis non est agere, innititur in axiomate: actiones sunt suppositorum.
    On the Nature of the Good, c. 4. Cfr. 83 Questions q. 6. — On the following proposition see above p. 33, note 6, and Damascene, Dialogue against the Manichees, n. 61. That principle, it does not belong to an action to act, rests upon the axiom: actions belong to supposits.
  6. Multi codd., ut F I K L O R S V W ee, cum ed. 2 esset.
    Many codices, such as F I K L O R S V W ee, with ed. 2, [read] esset.
  7. De prima parte huius propos. cfr. supra pag. 640, nota 4; de secunda supra pag. 347, nota 7.
    On the first part of this proposition cfr. above p. 640, note 4; on the second, above p. 347, note 7.
  8. Ut probatum est supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro in ea edd., excepta 2, in eam, quae verba Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 deinde post nam si corruptio iterum ponit.
    As was proved above d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Thereupon for in ea the editions, except 2, [read] in eam, which words the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 then places again after nam si corruptio.
  9. Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cfr. above d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. and d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.
  10. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Vide supra pag. 813, nota 4.
    On the Divine Names c. 4. § 23. See above p. 813, note 4.
  11. Vide hic nota 1. et supra pag. 688, nota 2.
    See here note 1 and above p. 688, note 2.
  12. Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3. et 13. Cfr. de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3, ubi etiam quae sequuntur, insinuantur; et Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12.
    Dialogue on Free Choice c. 3. and 13. Cfr. On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 3, where also the things which follow are intimated; and Dialogue on Truth, c. 12.
  13. Cfr. hic a. 2. q. 3, et supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
    Cfr. here a. 2. q. 3, and above d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. in the body.
  14. Verba Aristot. vide supra pag. 633, nota 6. — Aliquanto inferius pro quia actus cod. W in quantum actus, plures codd., ut B P V, omittunt quia, pro quo codd. C F et. Subinde pro significatur codd. C R S T et alii cum edd. 1, 2 significat (propter abbreviationem verbi in aliquibus codd. potest etiam legi « Hic significat », c. 4.). Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. sequitur.
    The words of Aristotle: see above p. 633, note 6. — Somewhat below, for quia actus cod. W [reads] in quantum actus; several codices, such as B P V, omit quia, in place of which codd. C F [have] et. Thereupon for significatur codd. C R S T and others, with edd. 1, 2, [read] significat (on account of the abbreviation of the verb in some codices it can also be read « Hic significat », c. 4.). The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] sequitur.
  15. Hic c. 4.
    Here c. 4.
  16. De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. — In fine solutionis pro vel a recto edd., excepta 1, vel contrario.
    On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice q. 3. c. 11. — At the end of the solution, for vel a recto ("or from right [order]") the editions, except 1, [read] vel contrario ("or contrary").
  17. Iob 14, 2.
    Job 14, 2.
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