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Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS II.

De comparatione culpae ad poenam[^1] secundum inseparabilitatem.

Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo reperire poenam sine merito praecedentis culpae.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ecclesiastici quinto: Altissimus est patiens redditor2; sed patiens non statim vindicat iram suam, sed usque in tempus exspectat: ergo videtur, quod

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Deus peccatorem non statim puniat: ergo contingit, in aliquo esse culpam sine poena.

2. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; sed meritum non habet statim coniunctum praemium: ergo videtur similiter, quod culpa non statim habeat iunctam poenam: ergo etc.

3. Item, « poena est, ut dicit Augustinus3, labor involuntarius »; sed impiis et peccatoribus in hac vita multa prospera proveniunt; et plures sunt, qui adeo in malo laetantur, quod dolorem non sentiunt: ergo videtur, quod ponere sit peccatum absque poena, saltem ad tempus.

4. Item, si statim peccator, cum peccat, punitur, aut punitur sufficienter, aut non sufficienter. Si sufficienter: ergo non deberet amplius in inferno puniri. Si non sufficienter: ergo aliquid de culpa ad tempus remanet impunitum. Sed qua ratione aliquid remanet impunitum, eadem ratione et totum: ergo videtur, quod peccatum possit saltem ad tempus separari a poena.

5. Item, multo misericordior et benignior est Deus, quam sit aliquis homo; sed ad laudem benignitatis humanae spectat, ut in nullo vindicet iniuriam sibi factam: ergo multo fortius hoc decet facere Deum: ergo videtur, quod saltem ad tempus debeat relinquere peccatum impunitum.

Sed contra:

1. Augustinus primo Confessionum4: « Iussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut poena sua sit sibi omnis inordinatus animus »: si ergo ad culpam necessario sequitur animi inordinatio, necessario igitur ad culpam sequitur aliqua punitio.

2. Item, ubicumque est peccatum, ibi est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis5; ubicumque autem hoc est, ibi est damnificatio; ubicumque autem damnificatio est merito culpae, ibi est iusta punitio: ergo impossibile est, culpam esse in aliquo absque poena.

3. Item, quicumque inordinate convertitur ad bonum ut nunc, avertitur a bono simpliciter6; et quicumque acquirit carnalem delectationem, perdit spiritualem consolationem7; sed perdere spiritualem consolationem, ad quam anima nata est, et amittere Deum, qui est omne bonum animae, hoc est maximum damnum et poenam incurrere: ergo videtur, quod nunquam peccatum committitur absque poena.

4. Item, universum ideo dicitur esse valde bonum, quia optime ordinatum8; sed in eo quod est optime ordinatum, non potest esse ordinis corruptio, nec simpliciter nec ad tempus; sed peccatum absque poena est inordinatum: ergo impossibile est, ad momentum peccatum esse impunitum.

5. Item, ad iustitiae perfectionem spectat superare iniustitiam, sicut ad sapientiae perfectionem spectat vincere malitiam, ut dicitur Sapientiae septimo9: Sapientia vincit malitiam; sed quia sapientia vincit malitiam, impossibile est, aliquod malum esse, quod divina sapientia non statim ordinet et exinde bonum aliquod eliciat: ergo cum iustitia Dei similiter omnem superet iniustitiam, impossibile est, aliquam culpam committi, quin statim ad eam sequatur aliqua poena.

Conclusio.

Impossibile est, culpam in aliquo esse, quin ad ipsam sequatur poena inseparabiliter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod impossibile est, culpam in aliquo esse, quin ad ipsam sequatur poena inseparabiliter. — Et ratio huius potest sumi ex perfectione divinae aequitatis, et ex pulcritudine universitatis, et ex inordinatione culpae, et ex conditione peccantis naturae.

Ex perfectione divinae aequitatis ratio sumitur. Tantae enim aequitatis est Deus, qui est iudex omnium10, ut non patiatur dedecus peccati ad modicum esse sine decore iustitiae; omni enim modo debet iustitia iniustitiam superare. — Ex pulcritudine universitatis ratio sumitur. Universum enim ex ordine pulcritudinem habet, et talis est ista pulcritudo, qualem decuit fieri ad ostensionem summae sapientiae; et ideo nullo modo foedari potest, ac per hoc nec ad momentum esse in ea aliquid inordinatum, et ita nec peccatum a poena separatum. — Ex corruptione culpae ratio sumitur. Nunquam enim culpa committitur, quin modus, species et ordo circa actionem voluntatis privetur; et dum voluntas se voluntarie in actu suo deordinat, semetipsam incurvat; et dum incurvatur, modo, specie et ordine privatur quantum ad habilitatem ad bonum. Talis autem privatio magna est in ipsa anima damnificatio et laesio. Et ideo dicit Augustinus in quodam sermone de Innocentibus11: « Nemo habet iniustum lucrum sine iusto damno; ubi lucrum, ibi damnum; lucrum in arca, et damnum in conscientia; tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem; acquirit pecuniam, et perdit iustitiam ». — Ex conditione peccantis naturae ratio sumitur. Quia voluntas rationalis, quae est causa peccati, quasi media est inter sensualitatem et synderesim, media est etiam inter Deum et alias creaturas; et cum se convertit ad haec inferiora, ab eo

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recedit, qui sursum est; et dum acquirit parvum bonum, amittit magnum bonum, quia, dum acquirit bonum ut nunc, amittit bonum simpliciter; et quae erat media facit se ipsam infimam. Similiter, cum peccando concordat cum sensualitate, discordat cum synderesi; et dum cum synderesi discordat, incurrit ex illa repugnantia remorsum quendam et afflictionem internam. Et ita, dum peccat, perdit magnum bonum, perdit honorem proprium, perdit solatium et incurrit remorsum12. — Et sic patet, quod ad culpam inseparabiliter sequitur poena, sive dicatur poena quaedam damnificatio, sive dicatur poena afflictio sive involuntaria passio. Sed poena, quae est damnificatio, semper sequitur et actu et habitu, quia nunquam est homo in culpa, quin semper sit in damno. Afflictio vero sive remorsio sequitur saltem in habitu; quamvis propter delectationem intensam, vel inconsiderationem sive distractionem animi non sentiatur.

Et ex hoc patet, qualiter peccatum claudit in se poenam, et qualiter peccatum potest dici poena peccati, et etiam poena sui ipsius. Secundum enim diversam comparationem voluntatis peccantis ad synderesim et sensualitatem, idem ipsum et habet rationem peccati et habet rationem poenae, sicut ostensum est. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod poena consequitur culpam inseparabiliter.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Altissimus est patiens redditor; dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de poena, scilicet quantum ad statum inchoationis, et quantum ad statum consummationis. Et primo modo punitur homo remediabiliter, secundo irremediabiliter. Poenam igitur secundum statum inchoationis et remediabilitatis statim infert Deus, quia hoc decet suam iustitiam. Secundum statum vero consummationis et irremediabilitatis differt; hoc enim decet suam benignitatem et patientiam, secundum cuius divitias nos exspectat ad poenitentiam13.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non statim remunerat; dicendum, quod sicut in poena magnitudo afflictionis differtur, et interior afflictio et remorsio peccatum concomitatur, sic et in bene factis multitudo dulcedinis absconditur bene facientibus14; nihilominus tamen aliquae primitiae spiritus degustantur, et in omni bono opere quaedam iucunditas conscientiae et tranquillitas bene operanti conceditur, quae est sicut fructus et remuneratio operis illius. Et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus15: Laborantem agricolam oportet primo de fructibus edere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena est passio involuntaria et afflictiva; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam ibi est et damnificatio et afflictio, quamvis non semper sentiatur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus punit sufficienter, aut non; dicendum, quod punire sufficienter hoc est dupliciter: aut simpliciter, aut secundum quod competit statui16. In praesenti igitur punitur culpa sufficienter; sed hoc non simpliciter, sed prout competit statui praesenti. Et ideo in tali punitione salvatur debitus ordo; et nihilominus post egressum animae a corpore debet fieri poenae accumulatio; nec remanet in praesenti nec in futuro aliquid impunitum, sed totum punitur, licet etiam plus et minus, secundum quod exigit tempus et locus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo benignus totum condonat; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, cum Deus sit ipsa iustitia, si propriam offensam dimitteret impunitam, iniuriam faceret ipsi iustitiae; non sic autem est de homine17. Praeterea, cum ipse sit ultimus iudex, ei reservantur omnia punienda; unde quod ipse dimittit impunitum, alius punire non potest. Non sic autem est de homine, qui habet alium superiorem iudicem, et quod ipse non punit quasi ad Deum remittit.

Scholion
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I. Utraque huius articuli quaestio abundat salutari doctrina. Quoad 1. quaest. recole quod supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2. dictum est, praesertim (q. 2. ad 4.) de poena acta, inflicta et contracta. — Quaestio 1. tangitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 7. 8, et a S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 33. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 1. De eadem: B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 121. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

II. Quoad seq. (2. quaest.) consentiunt antiqui doctores in hoc, quod poena, licet ordinari possit non tantum ad praecedens malum, sed etiam ad posterius bonum (hic ad 4.), in praesenti tamen providentia semper aliquo modo respiciat aliquod peccatum. Hinc dicit S. Thom. (de Malo, q. 1. a. 4. in corp.): « Habet autem hoc traditio fidei, quod nullum nocumentum creaturae rationalis potuisset incurrere, neque quantum ad animam neque quantum ad corpus neque quantum ad aliqua exteriora, nisi peccato praecedente, vel in persona, vel saltem in natura ». — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 87. a. 7. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.

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English Translation

ARTICLE II.

On the comparison of guilt to punishment[^1] according to inseparability.

Consequently it is asked concerning the comparison of guilt to punishment according to inseparability. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following.

Second it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to find punishment without the merit of preceding guilt.

QUESTION I.

Whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following. And that it can, it seems:

1. Ecclesiasticus, fifth [chapter]: The Most High is a patient rewarder2; but the patient one does not at once avenge his wrath, but waits even until a [later] time: therefore it seems that

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God does not at once punish the sinner: therefore it can happen that in something there is guilt without punishment.

2. Likewise, God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but merit does not at once have a reward joined [to it]: therefore it seems likewise that guilt does not at once have a punishment joined [to it]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « punishment is, as Augustine says3, involuntary labor »; but to the impious and to sinners many prosperous things come in this life; and there are many who rejoice so much in evil that they feel no grief: therefore it seems that there can be sin without punishment, at least for a time.

4. Likewise, if a sinner is at once punished when he sins, he is either punished sufficiently or not sufficiently. If sufficiently: therefore he ought not to be punished further in hell. If not sufficiently: therefore something of the guilt remains for a time unpunished. But by whatever reason something remains unpunished, by the same reason also the whole: therefore it seems that sin can at least for a time be separated from punishment.

5. Likewise, God is much more merciful and kind than any human is; but it pertains to the praise of human kindness that one avenge in no way an injury done to oneself: therefore much more strongly does it befit God to do this: therefore it seems that at least for a time he ought to leave sin unpunished.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine, first [book] of the Confessions4: « Thou hast commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every disordered soul be its own punishment to itself »: if therefore disorder of soul necessarily follows upon guilt, therefore some punishment necessarily follows upon guilt.

2. Likewise, wherever there is sin, there is the privation of mode, species, and order5; but wherever this is, there is damage; but wherever there is damage by the merit of guilt, there is just punishment: therefore it is impossible that guilt be in something without punishment.

3. Likewise, whoever is disorderedly turned toward a good as-of-now is turned away from the good without qualification6; and whoever acquires carnal delight loses spiritual consolation7; but to lose the spiritual consolation for which the soul is born, and to lose God, who is the whole good of the soul, this is to incur the greatest damage and punishment: therefore it seems that sin is never committed without punishment.

4. Likewise, the universe is said to be very good because it is most-well ordered8; but in that which is most-well ordered there cannot be a corruption of order, neither without qualification nor for a time; but sin without punishment is disordered: therefore it is impossible that for a moment sin be unpunished.

5. Likewise, it pertains to the perfection of justice to overcome injustice, just as it pertains to the perfection of wisdom to conquer malice, as is said in Wisdom, seventh [chapter]9: Wisdom conquers malice; but because wisdom conquers malice, it is impossible that there be any evil which the divine wisdom does not at once order and from thence draw out some good: therefore since the justice of God likewise overcomes all injustice, it is impossible that any guilt be committed without some punishment at once following upon it.

Conclusion.

It is impossible that guilt be in anything without punishment following upon it inseparably.

I respond: It must be said that it is impossible that guilt be in anything without punishment following upon it inseparably. — And the reason for this can be taken from the perfection of the divine equity, and from the beauty of the universe, and from the disorder of guilt, and from the condition of the sinning nature.

From the perfection of the divine equity the reason is taken. For God, who is the judge of all10, is of such great equity that he does not allow the shame of sin to be even for a little while without the comeliness of justice; for in every way justice ought to overcome injustice. — From the beauty of the universe the reason is taken. For the universe has its beauty from order, and such is this beauty as it befit to be made for the showing of the highest wisdom; and therefore it can in no way be defiled, and through this neither can there be in it for a moment anything disordered, and so neither sin separated from punishment. — From the corruption of guilt the reason is taken. For never is guilt committed without the mode, species, and order being deprived as regards the action of the will; and while the will voluntarily disorders itself in its act, it bends itself in upon itself; and while it is bent inward, it is deprived of mode, species, and order as to its aptitude for the good. But such a privation is a great damage and harm in the soul itself. And therefore Augustine says in a certain sermon on the Innocents11: « No one has unjust gain without just loss; where there is gain, there is loss; gain in the chest, and loss in the conscience; he took the garment, and lost faith; he acquires money, and loses justice ». — From the condition of the sinning nature the reason is taken. Because the rational will, which is the cause of sin, is as it were midway between sensuality and synderesis, it is also midway between God and the other creatures; and when it turns itself toward these lower things, it withdraws from him who is above

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it; and while it acquires a small good, it loses a great good, because, while it acquires a good as-of-now, it loses the good without qualification; and that which was midway makes itself lowest. Likewise, when in sinning it accords with sensuality, it discords with synderesis; and while it discords with synderesis, it incurs from that conflict a certain remorse and inner affliction12. And so, while it sins, it loses a great good, it loses its proper honor, it loses solace, and incurs remorse. — And thus it is clear that punishment follows upon guilt inseparably, whether the punishment be called a certain damage, or whether the punishment be called affliction or involuntary suffering. But the punishment which is damage always follows both in act and in habit, because the human is never in guilt without always being in damage. But the affliction or remorse follows at least in habit; although on account of intense delight, or inconsideration or distraction of mind, it is not felt.

And from this it is clear how sin encloses in itself punishment, and how sin can be called the punishment of sin, and even the punishment of itself. For according to the diverse comparison of the will of the sinner to synderesis and sensuality, the very same thing both has the character of sin and has the character of punishment, as has been shown. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which prove that punishment follows upon guilt inseparably.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that the Most High is a patient rewarder; it must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of punishment, namely as to the state of inception, and as to the state of consummation. And in the first way the human is punished remediably, in the second irremediably. The punishment therefore according to the state of inception and remediability God inflicts at once, because this befits his justice. But according to the state of consummation and irremediability he defers [it]; for this befits his kindness and patience, according to whose riches he awaits us unto repentance13.

2. To that which is objected, that God does not at once reward; it must be said that just as in punishment the magnitude of affliction is deferred, and the interior affliction and remorse accompanies the sin, so also in good deeds a multitude of sweetness is hidden away from those doing good14; nevertheless some first-fruits of the spirit are tasted, and in every good work a certain joy of conscience and tranquillity is granted to the one working well, which is as it were the fruit and reward of that work. And this is what the Apostle says15: The laboring husbandman ought first to eat of the fruits.

3. To that which is objected, that punishment is an involuntary and afflictive suffering; the response is already clear from those things which have been said. For there is there both damage and affliction, although it is not always felt.

4. To that which is objected, that God punishes sufficiently, or not; it must be said that to punish sufficiently is [understood] in two ways: either without qualification, or according to what befits the state16. In the present [life] therefore guilt is punished sufficiently; but this not without qualification, but as befits the present state. And therefore in such punishment the due order is preserved; and nonetheless after the departure of the soul from the body there ought to be an accumulation of punishment; nor does anything remain unpunished, either in the present or in the future, but the whole is punished, although also more and less, according as time and place require.

5. To that which is objected, that the kind human forgives all; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that, since God is justice itself, if he were to dismiss his own offense unpunished, he would do an injury to justice itself; but it is not so concerning the human17. Furthermore, since he is the last judge, to him are reserved all things to be punished; whence what he dismisses unpunished, another cannot punish. But it is not so concerning the human, who has another higher judge, and what he himself does not punish he as it were remits to God.

Scholion
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I. Each question of this article abounds in salutary doctrine. As to the 1st question, recall what was said above d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2., especially (q. 2. ad 4.) concerning punishment that is enacted, inflicted, and contracted. — Question 1 is touched upon by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 94. m. 7. 8, and by St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 33. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 1. On the same: B. Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. II. tr. 22. q. 121. m. 1. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

II. As to the following (the 2nd question), the ancient doctors agree in this, that punishment, although it can be ordered not only to a preceding evil, but also to a subsequent good (here ad 4.), nevertheless in the present [order] providence always in some way regards some sin. Hence St. Thomas says (On Evil, q. 1. a. 4. in the body): « But the tradition of faith holds this, that no harm could befall the rational creature, neither as to soul nor as to body nor as to any external things, except with sin preceding, either in the person, or at least in the nature ». — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III. q. 87. a. 7. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 7. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. K X Y bb cc et ed. 1 poenae ad culpam.
    Codd. K X Y bb cc and ed. 1 [read] poenae ad culpam ("of punishment to guilt").
  2. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  3. Verba huius sententiae August. vide supra pag. 784, nota 6.
    For the words of this sentence of Augustine, see above p. 784, note 6.
  4. De Vera Relig. c. 10. n. 76.
    On True Religion c. 10. n. 76.
  5. Cap. 12. n. 19.
    Chapter 12. n. 19.
  6. Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2.
    Cfr. above d. 35. a. 2.
  7. Cfr. Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 9. n. 16.
    Cfr. Gregory, XVIII. Morals c. 9. n. 16.
  8. Gen. 1, 31: Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 10. n. 3; et I. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. nec non d. 46. q. 6.
    Gen. 1, 31: And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. Cfr. Augustine, Enchiridion c. 10. n. 3; and I. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. as well as d. 46. q. 6.
  9. Vers. 30: Sapientiam autem non vincit malitia.
    Verse 30: But malice does not conquer wisdom.
  10. Hebr. 12, 23: Sed... et iudicem omnium Deum. — Quoad ea quae sequuntur, vide supra pag. 770, nota 1.
    Hebr. 12, 23: But... and to God the judge of all. — As to those things which follow, see above p. 770, note 1.
  11. Nunc 220. in Appendice (alias 10. de Sanctis) n. 2, ubi textus originalis pro tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem exhibet tollit vestem et perdit fidem. Cfr. Serm. 8. de Decem Plagis et decem praeceptis, c. 7. n. 8. — De hac ratione vide supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.
    Now 220. in the Appendix (otherwise 10. On the Saints) n. 2, where the original text for tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem ("he took the garment, and lost faith") gives tollit vestem et perdit fidem ("he takes away the garment and loses faith"). Cfr. Serm. 8. On the Ten Plagues and the Ten Precepts, c. 7. n. 8. — On this argument see above d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. and a. 2. q. 1.
  12. Cfr. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 9. n. 12. et Epist. 140. (alias 120.) seu de Gratia novi Testam. lib. ad Honorat. c. 2. n. 3. seq. Cfr. etiam Gregor., XI. Moral. c. 9. n. 12, et XXVII. c. 25. n. 48. — De synderesi agitur infra d. 39. a. 2.
    Cfr. Augustine, II. On Genesis against the Manicheans c. 9. n. 12. and Epist. 140. (otherwise 120.), that is, On the Grace of the New Testament, the book to Honoratus, c. 2. n. 3. seq. Cfr. also Gregory, XI. Morals c. 9. n. 12, and XXVII. c. 25. n. 48. — Synderesis is treated below d. 39. a. 2.
  13. Respicitur illud Rom. 2, 4: An divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et longanimitatis contemnis? ignoras, quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit? — Cod. Z misericordiam pro patientiam.
    Reference is made to that [text of] Rom. 2, 4: Or dost thou despise the riches of his goodness and patience and longsuffering? knowest thou not that the kindness of God leadeth thee to repentance? — Cod. Z [reads] misericordiam ("mercy") for patientiam ("patience").
  14. Psalm. 30, 20: Quam magna multitudo dulcedinis tuae, Domine, quam abscondisti timentibus te. — Rom. 8, 23: Non solum autem illa, sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes etc.
    Psalm 30, 20: How great is the multitude of thy sweetness, O Lord, which thou hast hidden for them that fear thee. — Rom. 8, 23: And not only it, but ourselves also, having the first-fruits of the spirit, etc.
  15. Epist. II. ad Tim. 2, 6, ubi Vulgata: laborantem agricolam oportet primum de fructibus percipere. — Cod. K operantibus pro operanti.
    II. To Timothy 2, 6, where the Vulgate [reads]: the laboring husbandman ought first to partake of the fruits. — Cod. K [reads] operantibus for operanti.
  16. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt praesenti, sed prorsus inconvenienter, cum in subnexis duplex status distinguatur, praesens et futurus. — Paulo superius post Deus codd. M Q addunt aut.
    The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 add praesenti ("present"), but quite unfittingly, since in what follows a twofold state is distinguished, present and future. — A little above, after Deus codd. M Q add aut ("or").
  17. Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12, ubi ostenditur, quodsi peccatum a Deo dimitteretur impunitum, tunc peccantem et non-peccantem aequales esse ante Deum, peccatum nulli legi subiacere, et iniustitiam liberiorem esse quam iustitiam sicque Deo similem.
    Cfr. Anselm, I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12, where it is shown that, if sin were dismissed by God unpunished, then the sinner and the non-sinner would be equal before God, sin would be subject to no law, and injustice would be freer than justice and thus like God.
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