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Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
p. 850

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Hieronymi1; ait enim sic: Ad oppositum. « Quidquid patimur, peccata nostra meruerunt ».

2. Item, Gregorius in quadam collecta2: « Nulla eis nocebit adversitas, si nulla dominetur eis iniquitas »: ergo si non praecessit dominium culpae, videtur, quod nullo modo sequi possit supplicium poenae.

3. Item, Augustinus in primo Retractationum3: « Mors et vita a Domino Deo est; sed vita ut a donante, et mors ut a vindicante »: si igitur mors est a Deo ut a vindicante, pari ratione et omnis alia poena. Sed omnis vindicta respicit meritum culpae praecedentis: ergo videtur, quod in nullo sit aliqua poena, quin in ipso prius fuerit culpa illius poenae meritoria.

4. Item, poena, quantum est de se, dicit aliquod malum; dividitur enim malum in malum culpae et malum poenae4: ergo sicut malum culpae dicit privationem alicuius boni et alicuius ordinis, ita etiam et malum poenae: ergo sicut malum culpae indiget ordinari, ita et malum poenae. Sed sicut malum culpae ordinatur per sequens malum poenae, sic malum poenae per anterius malum culpae: ergo sicut culpa non potest esse sine poena, sic nec poena sine culpa.

5. Item, omnis punitio, secundum quod huiusmodi, est effectus divinae iustitiae: iustitia autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, considerat exigentiam meritorum; nullum autem est meritum poenae nisi peccatum5: ergo impossibile est, aliquem puniri nisi in eo, quod praecesserit macula peccati.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Iob decimo septimo6: Non peccavi, et in amaritudinibus moratur oculus meus. Et similiter Iob sexto: Utinam appenderentur peccata mea, quibus iram merui, et calamitas, quam patior, in statera; quasi arena maris haec gravior appareret: ergo videtur, quod poenae, quae fuerunt in Iob, non fuerunt merito praecedentium peccatorum.

2. Item, Ioannis nono7: Quis peccavit, hic, aut parentes eius, ut caecus nasceretur? ibi dicitur: Neque hic peccavit, neque parentes eius; et exponit Augustinus, quod hoc non dicitur, quia non peccaverunt, sed quia caecitas non erat poena peccati: ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, pro peccato originali non meretur quis nisi semel mori8; et Lazarus non tantum fuit mortuus semel, sed bis: ergo videtur, quod aut mors prima, aut secunda fuerit ei absque merito peccati inflicta.

4. Item, tota die videmus, quod impius affligit iustum; et de hoc etiam propheta conqueritur Habacuc primo9: Quare taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se? Sed non esset iusta querela Prophetae, si iustus pro peccatis suis puniretur: ergo videtur, quod multae poenae infligantur, quae non infliguntur merito peccatorum.

5. Item, Christus fuit a Iudaeis interfectus; et planum est, quod in ipso nullum fuit omnino peccatum; et mors illa poena fuit, hoc constat: ergo videtur, quod poena possit esse absque culpa praeambula.

Conclusio.

Poena potest esse in aliquo sine culpa propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elici potest.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod malum poenae dupliciter potest ordinari: uno modo ad malum culpae, quod puniendo ordinat; alio modo in comparatione ad bonum, quod Deus elicit ex illa poena. (Duplex ordinatio poenae.)

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Dico igitur, quodsi aliqua poena infligatur, cuius ordinatio principaliter consistat in comparatione ad malum; quod necessario requirit, malum culpae praecessisse10, nec tantum praecessisse, sed etiam aliquo modo concomitari inseparabiliter. (Conclusio 1.) Poena enim aut est directe ordinata ad puniendum, aut est ordinata principaliter ad malum excludendum. (Subdistinctio.) Primo modo est poena infernalis, et secundo modo est poena purgatoria11. Et primo modo requirit poena praesentiam culpae secundum deformitatem et maculam; secundo modo requirit culpae praesentiam secundum reatum et sequelam.

Si autem poena infligatur principaliter propter ordinem, quem habet ad bonum, quod inde elicitur; aut ergo propter bonum proprium, aut propter bonum alienum. Si propter bonum proprium, sic requirit, quod in subiecto illo aliquando fuerit culpa, et quod possit esse de futuro. (Conclusio 2.) Si autem propter bonum alienum, sic sufficit poenae, ut fuerit culpa in alio, quam in eo qui punitur, in eo videlicet, pro quo poena illa sustinetur; per quem modum fuit in Christo, cuius mors et passio ordinata erat ad redimendum genus humanum et liberandum et reparandum a lapsu, in quem ceciderat ex peccato primi parentis. (Conclusio 3.)

Et sic patet, quod omnis poena aliquo modo respicit culpam; sed quaedam ut praesentem in se, utpote poena infernalis; quaedam ut praeteritam in se, sed praesentem in reatu et sequela, sicut poena purgatoria; quaedam vero solum ut praeteritam, et hoc in eo, qui punitur; et sic est omnis poena iustorum, Christo excepto; quaedam vero respicit culpam non in se, sed in alio, sicut patet in Christo. (Epilogus.)

— Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit causata a culpa; dicendum est, quod si intelligatur de causa meritoria de condigno, sic non habet veritatem; si autem intelligatur de causa sine qua non, sic aliquo modo veritatem habet. Nulla enim esset poena in homine, nisi praecessisset culpa. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, qua scilicet quaeritur, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente; sive qua quaeritur, utrum poena possit separari a culpa. (Corollarium.) Concedendum est enim, quod sic, propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elicitur. (Conclusio generalis.)

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod Hieronymus non accipit ibi mereri pro merito condigni, sed potius pro merito congrui, quod quidem est sicut dispositio praeambula. Et verum est, sicut dictum est12, quod nisi fuisset in nobis peccatum originale, in nobis non esset contracta poenalitas, unde esset aliqua afflictio poenae; et quod in Christo fuit, hoc fuit solummodo voluntarie.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Gregorio, dicendum, quod facienda est vis in hoc quod dicit: nulla nocebit adversitas; nam adversitas, quae non infligitur homini, exigente merito praecedentis peccati, non est ad eius nocumentum, sed potius ad eius profectum, iuxta illud Apostoli13: Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mors est a Deo vindicante, et ita aliae poenae; dicendum, quod in opere iustitiae se multum immiscet opus misericordiae. (Notandum.) Et ideo, quamvis prima dispositio ad poenam fuerit vindicta, multae tamen poenae consequuntur ad illam dispositionem, quae potius sunt beneficia divinae misericordiae et divinae visitationis, quam sint instrumentum irae. Cum ergo dicitur, quod mors est a Deo vindicante, hoc intelligitur de ipsa necessitate moriendi; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod omnis alia poena sit a Dei vindicta, immo, sicut tactum est, potest esse a Dei misericordia, quae erudit et flagellat omnem filium, quem recipit14. Sic enim competit praesenti statui.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena ordinatur ad culpam, sicut e converso; dicendum, quod non est simile. Poena15 enim habet ordinari, sicut dictum est, dupliciter: non solum ad prius, sed etiam ad posterius. Peccatum autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, ordinari habet solum ad posterius, videlicet ad poenam; et ideo culpa semper dicit inordinationem, nisi praesentialiter adsit poena; poena vero propter ordinationem ad posterius bonum, ordinata et utilis esse potest, etiam si nulla sit culpa in eo qui punitur, illius poenae meritoria. Illud enim malum recompensatur per maius bonum, quod inde elicitur, sicut patet in caeco nato et in Iob et in Lazaro et in quolibet viro iusto. Quot autem bona inde eliciantur, invenietur determinatum in quarto, distinctione decima quinta16.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, iam patet responsio; quia, etsi punitio sit a divina iustitia, nihilominus tamen plerumque est a divina misericordia. Sicut enim vult Augustinus in quodam sermone17,

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quem facit de flagellatione Pharaonis: cum Deus immittebat Pharaoni flagella, impendebat misericordiae beneficia, quia cor eius ad conversionem excitabat; cum vero subtrahebat, hoc erat ex rigore iustitiae, quae propter ipsius Pharaonis peccata, dum illa flagella subtrahebat, ipsum obdurari sinebat; et pro tanto Scriptura dicit, quod cor eius indurabat18.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether punishment can be in anything without preceding guilt.

Secondly it is asked, whether punishment can be in anything without preceding guilt. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Jerome1; for he says thus: To the opposite. « Whatever we suffer, our sins have merited ».

2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain collect2: « No adversity shall harm them, if no iniquity holds dominion over them »: therefore if dominion of guilt has not preceded, it seems that the chastisement of punishment can in no way follow.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the first [book] of the Retractations3: « Death and life are from the Lord God; but life as from one giving, and death as from one taking vengeance »: if therefore death is from God as from one taking vengeance, by parity of reasoning so is every other punishment. But all vengeance regards the merit of preceding guilt: therefore it seems that in no one is there any punishment, but that in him there first was the guilt meritorious of that punishment.

4. Likewise, punishment, as far as concerns itself, denotes some evil; for evil is divided into the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment4: therefore just as the evil of guilt denotes the privation of some good and of some order, so also does the evil of punishment: therefore just as the evil of guilt needs to be ordered, so also the evil of punishment. But just as the evil of guilt is ordered through the following evil of punishment, so the evil of punishment [is ordered] through the prior evil of guilt: therefore just as guilt cannot be without punishment, so neither punishment without guilt.

5. Likewise, all punishment, as such, is an effect of divine justice: but justice, as such, considers the exigency of merits; but there is no merit of punishment except sin5: therefore it is impossible that anyone be punished except in him in whom the stain of sin has preceded.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta.

1. Job, seventeenth [chapter]6: I have not sinned, and yet my eye abides in bitterness. And likewise Job, sixth [chapter]: Would that my sins, by which I have merited wrath, and the calamity that I suffer, were weighed in a balance; this would appear heavier than the sand of the sea: therefore it seems that the punishments which were in Job were not by the merit of preceding sins.

2. Likewise, John, ninth [chapter]7: Who has sinned, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind? there it is said: Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents; and Augustine explains that this is not said because they did not sin, but because the blindness was not the punishment of sin: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, for original sin one merits only to die once8; and Lazarus was dead not only once, but twice: therefore it seems that either the first death, or the second, was inflicted on him without the merit of sin.

4. Likewise, all day we see that the impious afflicts the just; and of this also the prophet complains, Habakkuk, first [chapter]9: Why are you silent, while the impious tramples down one more just than himself? But the Prophet's complaint would not be just, if the just man were punished for his own sins: therefore it seems that many punishments are inflicted which are not inflicted by the merit of sins.

5. Likewise, Christ was slain by the Jews; and it is plain that in him there was no sin whatsoever; and that death was a punishment, this is established: therefore it seems that punishment can be without preceding guilt.

Conclusion.

Punishment can be in anything without guilt on account of the ordination which it has toward a subsequent good, which can be elicited from it.

I respond: It must be said that the evil of punishment can be ordered in two ways: in one way to the evil of guilt, which it orders by punishing; in another way in comparison to a good, which God elicits from that punishment. (The twofold ordination of punishment.)

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I say therefore that if some punishment be inflicted whose ordination consists principally in comparison to evil; this necessarily requires that the evil of guilt have preceded10, and not only that it have preceded, but also that it in some way be inseparably concomitant. (Conclusion 1.) For punishment is either directly ordered to punishing, or is ordered principally to excluding evil. (Subdistinction.) In the first way is infernal punishment, and in the second way is purgatorial punishment11. And in the first way punishment requires the presence of guilt according to deformity and stain; in the second way it requires the presence of guilt according to liability and sequel.

But if punishment be inflicted principally on account of the order which it has toward a good which is elicited from it; then either it is on account of a proper good, or on account of a good of another. If on account of a proper good, then it requires that in that subject guilt have been at some time, and that it be able to be in the future. (Conclusion 2.) But if on account of a good of another, then it suffices for the punishment that guilt have been in another than in him who is punished, namely in him for whom that punishment is borne; in which manner it was in Christ, whose death and passion were ordained to redeeming the human race and freeing and repairing it from the lapse into which it had fallen by the sin of the first parent. (Conclusion 3.)

And thus it is clear that all punishment in some way regards guilt; but some [punishment regards it] as present in itself, such as infernal punishment; some as past in itself, but present in liability and sequel, like purgatorial punishment; but some only as past, and this in him who is punished; and such is all the punishment of the just, Christ excepted; but some regards guilt not in itself, but in another, as is clear in Christ. (Epilogue.)

— When therefore it is asked, whether all punishment is caused by guilt; it must be said that if it be understood of a meritorious cause of condignity, then it does not hold true; but if it be understood of a cause without which not, then it holds true in some manner. For there would be no punishment in the human, unless guilt had preceded. — And by this is clear the response to the question proposed, namely by which it is asked, whether punishment can be in anything without preceding guilt; or by which it is asked, whether punishment can be separated from guilt. (Corollary.) For it must be granted that it can, on account of the ordination which it has toward a subsequent good, which is elicited from it. (General conclusion.)

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. To that therefore which is objected concerning Jerome, it must be said that Jerome does not there take to merit for the merit of condignity, but rather for the merit of congruity, which indeed is like a preambular disposition. And it is true, as has been said12, that unless there had been in us original sin, there would not have been contracted in us a penal condition, whence there would be some affliction of punishment; and as for what was in Christ, this was solely voluntary.

2. To that which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that force must be put on what he says: no adversity shall harm; for the adversity which is not inflicted on the human by the exigency of the merit of preceding sin is not to his harm, but rather to his profit, according to that [word] of the Apostle13: To those who love God all things work together unto good.

3. To that which is objected, that death is from God taking vengeance, and so the other punishments; it must be said that into the work of justice there mingles much the work of mercy. (To be noted.) And therefore, although the first disposition to punishment was vengeance, yet many punishments follow upon that disposition which are rather benefits of divine mercy and of divine visitation than instruments of wrath. When therefore it is said that death is from God taking vengeance, this is understood of the very necessity of dying; but from this it does not follow that every other punishment is from God's vengeance; rather, as has been touched upon, it can be from God's mercy, which instructs and scourges every son whom he receives14. For thus it befits the present state.

4. To that which is objected, that punishment is ordered to guilt, as conversely [guilt to punishment]; it must be said that it is not similar. For punishment15 has to be ordered, as has been said, in two ways: not only to what is prior, but also to what is posterior. But sin, as such, has to be ordered only to what is posterior, namely to punishment; and therefore guilt always denotes disorder, unless punishment be present at the moment; but punishment, on account of its ordination to a posterior good, can be ordered and useful, even if there be no guilt in him who is punished meritorious of that punishment. For that evil is recompensed by a greater good which is elicited from it, as is clear in the man born blind and in Job and in Lazarus and in every just man. But how many goods are elicited therefrom, will be found determined in the fourth [book], in distinction fifteen16.

5. To that which is objected last, the response is already clear; for, even though punishment be from divine justice, nevertheless it is for the most part from divine mercy. For as Augustine holds in a certain sermon17,

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which he makes about the scourging of Pharaoh: when God sent scourges upon Pharaoh, he bestowed the benefits of mercy, because he stirred his heart toward conversion; but when he withdrew [them], this was from the rigor of justice, which, on account of Pharaoh's own sins, while it withdrew those scourges, permitted him to be hardened; and to that extent Scripture says that his heart was hardened18.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. In Ezech. c. 5, 16: Famem et pestilentiam et bestias pessimas et quidquid aliud malorum sustinemus in saeculo, propter nostra venire peccata manifestum est.
    On Ezekiel, c. 5, 16: Famine and pestilence and the worst beasts and whatever else of evils we endure in this world, that it comes on account of our sins is manifest.
  2. Libr. Sacram., sabbato infra Quinquages. in ultima collecta super populum, quae incipit Tuere (in Brev. Rom. feria 6. post Quinquages. ad 2. Vesp.). In textu origin. pro Nulla eis habetur Nulla ei (populo), et dein post dominetur omittitur eis, quae vocula etiam abest a codd. K (a prima manu) T V W Y bb ee et aliis.
    Book of Sacraments, on the Saturday within Quinquagesima, in the last collect over the people, which begins Tuere (in the Roman Breviary on Friday after Quinquagesima at second Vespers). In the original text, for Nulla eis it has Nulla ei (to the people), and then after dominetur the word eis is omitted, which little word is also absent from codd. K (by a first hand) T V W Y bb ee and others.
  3. Cap. 21. n. 2. — Textus s. Scripturae est Eccli. 11, 14.
    Chapter 21, n. 2. — The text of sacred Scripture is Ecclesiasticus 11, 14.
  4. Cfr. supra pag. 825, nota 3, et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 6. — De minori subsumta cfr. supra a. I. q. I. et quaest. praeced.
    Cfr. above p. 825, note 3, and Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 94. m. 6. — On the minor assumed [premise] cfr. above a. I. q. I. and the preceding question.
  5. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.
    See here the letter of the Master, c. 5.
  6. Vers. 2. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 2. seq.
    Verse 2. — The following text is in the place cited, v. 2. seq.
  7. Vers. 2. seq. — Super hunc loc. August., tr. 44. n. 3. ait: Habebant enim peccatum parentes eius, sed non ipso peccato factum est, ut caecus nasceretur.
    Verse 2 seq. — On this place Augustine, treatise 44, n. 3, says: For his parents had sin, but it was not by that sin brought about that he should be born blind.
  8. Hebr. 9, 27: Et quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori etc. — Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 4, ubi eadem infertur obiectio et solvitur.
    Hebrews 9, 27: And as it is appointed for humans to die once etc. — Cfr. above d. 33. dub. 4, where the same objection is brought forward and solved.
  9. Vers. 13.
    Verse 13.
  10. In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur: in comparatione ad malum culpae puniendum, necesse est, aliquam culpam praecessisse; et post pauca in Vat. sola: Poena enim ordinata ad puniendum culpam, aut est directe ordinata ad solum puniendum, aut est ordinata etc.
    In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 it reads: in comparison to the evil of guilt to be punished, it is necessary that some guilt have preceded; and a little after, in the Vatican [edition] alone: For punishment ordered to punishing guilt is either directly ordered to punishing alone, or is ordered etc.
  11. Vide August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 13, ubi Platonici refelluntur, qui omnes poenas et in hac vita et post mortem non nisi purgatorias esse contendebant.
    See Augustine, On the City of God XXI, c. 13, where the Platonists are refuted, who contended that all punishments, both in this life and after death, are only purgatorial.
  12. Supra d. 30. a. I. q. I.
    Above d. 30. a. I. q. I.
  13. Rom. 8, 28. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pluribus codd. ante infligitur omittit non.
    Romans 8, 28. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 and several codices omits non before infligitur.
  14. Hebr. 12, 6.
    Hebrews 12, 6.
  15. Permulti codd. cum primis edd. Culpa; perperam.
    Very many codices with the first editions [read] Culpa; wrongly.
  16. Part. I. dub. 2. — Pro Quot autem bona codd. T W ee et alii cum ed. 2 Quod autem bona.
    Part I, dub. 2. — For Quot autem bona codd. T W ee and others with ed. 2 [read] Quod autem bona.
  17. Nunc 22. in Appendice (quia sermo Caesarii est — alias 88. de Tempore) n. 2-6, super Exod. 9, 12: Induravit Dominus cor Pharaonis.
    Now 22 in the Appendix (since it is a sermon of Caesarius — otherwise 88, On the Season) n. 2-6, on Exodus 9, 12: The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh.
  18. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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