Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 41
Articulus II.
Quaestio III. Utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Anselmus de Originali Peccato1: « Miratur, inquit, forte aliquis, cur pro culpa voluntatis membra puniuntur et sensus; verum non est ita; non enim punitur nisi voluntas; nam nihil est alicui poena, nisi quod contra voluntatem est, et nulla res poenam sentit, nisi quae voluntatem habet; membra autem et sensus per se nihil volunt. Sicut igitur voluntas membris et sensibus operatur, ita in ipsis ipsa aut torquetur, aut delectatur ». Ex hac auctoritate habetur, quae claudit in se ratiocinationem, quod proprium sit voluntatis puniri.
2. Item, Augustinus in libro Sex Quaestionum2: « Voluntas quippe ipsa punitur sive animi supplicio, sive corporis, ut, quae delectatur in peccatis, ipsa plectatur in poenis ».
3. Item, ratione: « Opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem »3; sed voluntarium et involuntarium sunt opposita; sed poena est affectio involuntaria, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio: ergo sicut culpa, quae est affectio voluntaria, respicit voluntatem tanquam illud a quo est; sic videtur, quod poena respiciat voluntatem tanquam illud contra quod est.
4. Item, culpa est meritum poenae; sed meritum respectu praemii et habet rationem ordinis et habet rationem dispositionis: si ergo dispositio et illud, ad quod disponit, sunt in eodem, et culpa, ut in ratione culpae est, potius respicit voluntatem: ergo et poena.
Sed contra: 1. Quatuor, ut dicit Beda4, inflicta sunt nobis pro peccato, scilicet « ignorantia, malitia, infirmitas, concupiscentia »; sed quod infligitur pro peccato est poena: ergo ignorantia est poena;
sed constat, quod ignorantia non respicit voluntatem, sed rationem: ergo etc.
2. Item, duplex est poena in futuro, videlicet poena damni et poena sensus; sed poena damni, quae est in carentia visionis Dei, non tantum respicit voluntatem, immo multo magis respicit rationem; poena vero sensus, quae est in concrematione ignis, multo magis respicit partem sensibilem et coniunctum, quam respiciat voluntatem rationalem, cum sentire sit passio coniuncti5: ergo videtur, quod poena principalius respiciat alias potentias animae quam voluntatem.
3. Item, si poena respicit voluntatem, aut hoc est, quia est secundum voluntatem, aut quia est contra voluntatem. Si quia secundum voluntatem: ergo nemo puniretur, nisi qui vellet; quod plane falsum est. Si quia contra voluntatem: ergo cum vir iustus voluntarie sustineat omnes poenas, et maxime Christus, nulli viro iusto nec etiam Christo poenalis esset aliqua passio, quod manifeste falsum est.
4. Item, si poena respiceret voluntatem tanquam subiectum proprium: ergo sicut nemo potest peccare, nisi qui habet usum voluntatis, sic nemo posset puniri, nisi qui voluntatis usum haberet; sed hoc plane falsum est — nam parvuli puniuntur pro peccatis parentum — et multa etiam tormenta patiuntur, non solum in habitu, verum etiam in actu — ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Poena, ut est ultio, et etiam ut est passio laedens, affligens et displicens, directe respicit ipsam voluntatem, ut tantum laedens et affligens potest respicere et alias potentias.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod poena ratione poenae duo nominat, videlicet nocumentum naturae et instrumentum divinae iustitiae: unum tanquam materiale, reliquum tanquam formale. Unde poena et est ultio et etiam est passio6. Cum ergo poena comparatur ad aliquid, hoc potest esse aut in quantum ultio, aut in quantum passio. — Si in quantum ultio, sic proprie habet comparari ad ipsam voluntatem. Deus enim non ulciscitur se de manu, vel pede, vel aliqua potentia sensitiva, sed de voluntate deliberativa, de qua ulciscitur Deus non solum affligendo ipsam in se, sed etiam affligendo eam in ceteris membris corporis, in quibus ipsa cupiebat delectari.
Si autem comparetur poena ad aliquid, in quantum est passio, sic dicendum est, quod cum non quaecumque passio poena sit secundum completam rationem poenae, sed passio laedens, passio affligens, passio displicens; sic adhuc poena, secundum quod plene tenet rationem poenae, scilicet poena, quae facit hominem recte miserum, adhuc respicit voluntatem ratione sui completivi. Nemo enim plene miser est, sicut dicit Augustinus7, ex hoc, quod patitur solum, sed ex hoc, quod patitur et scit se pati et non vult se pati. — Secundum autem quod passio tenet semiplenam rationem poenae, prout dicitur passio laedens vel affligens in eo, in quo non est nata esse, quantum est de prima conditione naturae; sic non tantum respicit voluntatem, sed etiam omnes potentias animae et omnia membra corporis; non tamen respicit illa sine voluntate, quia in nullo potest esse poena, nisi in quo est rationalis voluntas. Unde bruta, quamvis patiantur, non tamen puniuntur.
Sic igitur patet, quod poena, et in quantum est ultio, et in quantum est passio, plene tenens rationem poenae, directe respicit ipsam voluntatem, ita quod proprium est ipsius voluntatis puniri. Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. In quantum tamen est passio laedens vel affligens, habet respicere alias potentias et etiam corporis organa. Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad rationes, quae ad oppositum inducuntur.
1. 2. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur de ignorantia et de poena damni et sensus, patet responsio. Nam etsi ignorantia dicat privationem alicuius boni, quod respiciat cognitivam, et similiter poena damni, et similiter poena sensus privationem delectationis et quietis partis sensitivae; totum tamen hoc Deus ordinat ad vindicandum et ulciscendum se de voluntate. Ipsa enim est, quae directe adversatur divinae iustitiae, dum perpetrat iniustitiam; et ideo ordo divinae iustitiae punientis directe respicit illius deordinationis remotionem. Ipsa etiam sola fuit, quae sibi se principium posuit et Deum derelinquendo contempsit, dum peccavit; et ideo debet per poenarum multitudinem in servitutem Dei redigi, ut quae dehonoravit Deum voluntarie contemnendo, honoret ipsum involuntarie supplicia patiendo8.
3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in viris iustis et in Christo non fuit poena involuntaria; dicendum, quod ibi non tenet poena rationem ultionis9, nisi relata ad voluntatem Adae peccatricem, respectu cuius voluntatis omnis poena est involuntaria, quia voluntas peccatrix quaerit oblectationem, et quaerendo oblectationem refugit passionem. — Ad illud quod obiicitur de parvulo, qui patitur poenas; responderi potest sicut ad hoc.
Ad rationem poenae spectat, quod ipsa sit contraria voluntati; quod communiter docetur et approbatur a S. Thoma (S. 1. q. 48. a. 5, q. 64. a. 3, 1. II. q. 87. a. 6.), qui hoc principio utitur, ut explicet poenam ignis, qua affliguntur daemones (IV. Sent. d. 44. q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.). — De hac autem quaestione non invenimus explicite tractantes nisi Petrum a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3; Richard. a Med., a. 2. q. 3, et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Article II.
Question III. Whether, just as to sin, so also to be punished is proper to the will.
Thirdly it is asked whether, just as to sin, so also to be punished is proper to the will. And it seems that it is:
1. Anselm, On Original Sin1: « Someone perhaps wonders, he says, why for the fault of the will the members and the senses are punished; but it is not so; for nothing is punished except the will; for nothing is a punishment to anyone except what is against the will, and no thing feels punishment except one which has a will; but the members and the senses by themselves will nothing. Just as, therefore, the will operates through the members and the senses, so in them it is itself either tormented or delighted ». From this authority, which encloses within itself a reasoning, it is had that to be punished is proper to the will.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of the Six Questions2: « For the will itself is punished, whether by a punishment of the soul or of the body, so that what is delighted in sins may itself be chastised in punishments ».
3. Likewise, by reason: « Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing »3; but the voluntary and the involuntary are opposites; but punishment is an involuntary affection, as Augustine says in the book On Free Choice: therefore, just as fault, which is a voluntary affection, regards the will as that from which it is; so it seems that punishment regards the will as that against which it is.
4. Likewise, fault is the merit of punishment; but merit with respect to reward has both the character of order and the character of disposition: if therefore the disposition and that toward which it disposes are in the same thing, and fault, as it is in the character of fault, rather regards the will: therefore punishment too.
On the contrary: 1. Four things, as Bede says4, were inflicted on us for sin, namely « ignorance, malice, infirmity, concupiscence »; but what is inflicted for sin is a punishment: therefore ignorance is a punishment;
but it is established that ignorance does not regard the will, but the reason: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, there is a twofold punishment in the future, namely the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense; but the punishment of loss, which consists in the lack of the vision of God, not only regards the will, but rather much more regards the reason; and the punishment of sense, which consists in the burning of fire, much more regards the sensible part and the composite, than it regards the rational will, since to feel is a passion of the composite5: therefore it seems that punishment more principally regards the other powers of the soul than the will.
3. Likewise, if punishment regards the will, this is either because it is according to the will, or because it is against the will. If because it is according to the will: then no one would be punished except one who willed it; which is plainly false. If because it is against the will: then since a just man voluntarily endures all punishments, and most of all Christ, no penal passion would belong to any just man, nor even to Christ, which is manifestly false.
4. Likewise, if punishment were to regard the will as its proper subject: then just as no one can sin except one who has the use of the will, so no one could be punished except one who had the use of the will; but this is plainly false — for little children are punished for the sins of their parents — and they also suffer many torments, not only in habit, but also in act — therefore etc.
Conclusion.
Punishment, as it is retribution, and also as it is a passion that wounds, afflicts, and displeases, directly regards the will itself; insofar only as it wounds and afflicts can it regard also the other powers.
I respond: It must be said that punishment by reason of punishment names two things, namely a harm to nature and an instrument of divine justice: the one as material, the other as formal. Hence punishment is both retribution and also a passion6. When therefore punishment is compared to something, this can be either insofar as it is retribution, or insofar as it is a passion. — If insofar as it is retribution, then it is properly to be compared to the will itself. For God does not avenge himself upon the hand, or the foot, or any sensitive power, but upon the deliberative will, of which God takes vengeance not only by afflicting it in itself, but also by afflicting it in the other members of the body, in which it desired to be delighted.
But if punishment be compared to something insofar as it is a passion, then it must be said that, since not every passion is a punishment according to the complete character of punishment, but a passion that wounds, a passion that afflicts, a passion that displeases; so still punishment, according as it fully holds the character of punishment, namely the punishment which makes a man truly miserable, still regards the will by reason of what completes it. For no one is fully miserable, as Augustine says7, from the fact that he merely suffers, but from the fact that he suffers and knows himself to suffer and does not will to suffer. — But according as the passion holds a half-full character of punishment, as it is called a passion that wounds or afflicts in that in which it is not by nature meant to be, so far as belongs to the first condition of nature; so it regards not only the will, but also all the powers of the soul and all the members of the body; yet it does not regard them apart from the will, because in nothing can there be punishment except in that in which there is a rational will. Hence the brutes, although they suffer, are nevertheless not punished.
Thus therefore it is clear that punishment, both insofar as it is retribution, and insofar as it is a passion fully holding the character of punishment, directly regards the will itself, so that it is proper to the will itself to be punished. Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded. Insofar, however, as it is a passion that wounds or afflicts, it does regard the other powers and also the organs of the body. And according to this the response to the arguments which are brought for the opposite is clear.
1. 2. For to that which is objected concerning ignorance and concerning the punishment of loss and of sense, the response is clear. For although ignorance signifies a privation of some good which regards the cognitive power, and likewise the punishment of loss, and likewise the punishment of sense a privation of the delight and rest of the sensitive part; yet God orders all this toward avenging and taking vengeance upon the will. For it is the will that directly opposes divine justice, while it perpetrates injustice; and therefore the order of avenging divine justice directly regards the removal of that disorder. It also was the will alone that set itself up as its own principle and despised God by forsaking him, when it sinned; and therefore it ought through the multitude of punishments to be reduced into the servitude of God, so that, having dishonored God by despising him voluntarily, it may honor him involuntarily by suffering punishments8.
3. 4. To that which is objected, that in just men and in Christ there was no involuntary punishment; it must be said that there punishment does not hold the character of retribution9, except as related to the sinning will of Adam, with respect to which will every punishment is involuntary, because the sinning will seeks gratification, and in seeking gratification flees passion. — To that which is objected concerning the little child who suffers punishments; one can respond as to this.
It belongs to the character of punishment that it be contrary to the will; which is commonly taught and approved by St. Thomas (S. 1. q. 48. a. 5, q. 64. a. 3, 1. II. q. 87. a. 6.), who uses this principle to explain the fire by which the demons are afflicted (IV Sent. d. 44. q. 3. a. 3. little-question 3.). — On this question, however, we do not find any treating it explicitly except Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, a. 2. q. 3, and Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- Cap. 4. In testimonio allato textus originalis pro puniuntur exhibet puniantur, et circa finem cum Vat. et ed. 1 voci membris praemittit in. Circa initium testimonii edd., excepta 1, pro culpa substituunt per culpam. — Versus finem arg. pro quae claudit in Vat. et edd. 2, 3 legitur quod claudit, et dein in Vat. sola rationem pro ratiocinationem. — In codd. T W bb et aliis deest vel concomitanter, et in Vat. nec non in edd. 3, 4 desiderantur verba, quae habentur in initio arg. post Ad tria sequentia, verba scil. quae subiungit.Chapter 4. In the testimony cited the text of the original reads let them be punished for they are punished, and toward the end, with the Vatican edition and ed. 1, prefixes in to the word members. Near the beginning of the testimony the editions, except ed. 1, substitute through fault for fault. — Toward the end of the argument, for which encloses the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3 read that it encloses, and then the Vatican edition alone reads reason for reasoning. — In codices T, W, bb and others or concomitantly is lacking, and in the Vatican edition as also in editions 3, 4 the words are wanting which are had at the beginning of the argument after to the three following, namely the words which he adds.
- Plenius: in libro Sex Quaestionum, contra paganos expositorum ad Deogratias, seu Epist. 102. (alias 49.) q. 4. n. 27. — Pro sive animi supplicio Vat. sive sit animi supplicium. — Codd. et edd. hic falso signant librum Octoginta trium Quaestionum. — Cfr. hic q. 1. in corp. et d. 21. dub. 4.More fully: in the book of the Six Questions, expounded against the pagans, to Deogratias, that is, Epistle 102 (otherwise 49.) q. 4. n. 27. — For whether by a punishment of the soul the Vatican edition reads whether it be a punishment of the soul. — The codices and editions here falsely cite the book of the Eighty-three Questions. — Cf. here q. 1 in the body and d. 21, dub. 4.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Verba August. mox memorata, quae habentur III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26, vide supra pag. 719, nota 1. — Post Item, ratione cod. M supplet videtur. In fine arg. pro contra quod est cod. cc et ed. 1 circa quod est, et paulo ante pro quod poena respiciat multi codd. (nonnulli a secunda manu iam sunt correcti) et primae edd. perperam quod culpa respiciat, cod. U quod poena vel culpa respiciat.Aristotle, Categories, ch. On Opposites, and Topics II, ch. 3 (c. 7.). — The words of Augustine mentioned just after, which are had in On Free Choice III, c. 9, n. 26, see above, p. 719, note 1. — After Likewise, by reason codex M supplies it seems. At the end of the argument, for against which it is codex cc and ed. 1 read about which it is, and a little before, for that punishment regards many codices (some have already been corrected by a second hand) and the first editions wrongly read that fault regards, codex U that punishment or fault regards.
- Cfr. supra pag. 682, nota 3.Cf. above, p. 682, note 3.
- Cfr. supra pag. 328, nota 2.Cf. above, p. 328, note 2.
- Aristot., de Somno et vigil. c. 1: Quoniam autem non animae proprium est sentire neque corporis (cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus; qui vero dicitur sensus, ut actio, motus quidam per corpus animae est), manifestum est, quod neque animae passio propria neque inanimatum corpus possibile est sentire. Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 12. (c. 1.).Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking c. 1: But since to feel is not proper to the soul nor to the body (for of whatever there is a power, of the same there is also an act; but what is called sense, as action, is a certain motion through the body of the soul), it is manifest that neither is a passion proper to the soul, nor is it possible for an inanimate body to feel. Cf. On the Soul I, text 12 (c. 1.).
- Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 8–9. S. Doctor discutiens, quis beatus, quis miser sit dicendus, ait (c. 8. n. 11.): « Unde etsi nullus sensus relinquitur, quo [vita] sit misera (propterea enim beata vita discedit, quoniam tota vita discedit), miser est tamen, quamdiu sentit, quia scit, se nolente, consumi propter quod cetera et quod prae ceteris diligit ». Epist. 102. (alias 49.) q. 4. n. 26. ait: In voluntate propria metietur malus homo mala opera, et in ea metietur ei miseria... Ac per hoc ibi etiam fit vel beatus vel miser, hoc est in ipso suae voluntatis affectu, quae omnium factorum meritorumque mensura est. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit adhuc, et mox pro recte [i. e. vere] miserum Vat. sola substituit esse miserum.Book XIII On the Trinity c. 8–9. The holy Doctor, discussing who is to be called blessed and who miserable, says (c. 8. n. 11.): « Hence even if no sense remains by which [life] may be miserable (for the blessed life departs for this reason, that the whole life departs), nevertheless he is miserable, as long as he feels, because he knows that, against his will, he is consumed on account of that which he loves above all else ». In Epistle 102 (otherwise 49.) q. 4. n. 26. he says: In his own will an evil man will measure out evil works, and in it misery will be measured out to him... And by this he becomes there either blessed or miserable, that is, in the very affection of his will, which is the measure of all deeds and merits. — A little above the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 omits still, and presently for truly [i. e. truly] miserable the Vatican edition alone substitutes to be miserable.
- Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. seqq.; Anselm., I. Cur Deus Homo, c. 14. — Paulo ante pro ut quae dehonoravit Vat. quae dehonoravit, omisso ut. — Vide supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. in corp.Cf. Augustine, On the City of God XIV, c. 13 seqq.; Anselm, Why God Became Man I, c. 14. — A little before, for so that, having dishonored the Vatican edition reads which dishonored, omitting so that. — See above, d. 36, a. 3, q. 2, in the body.
- Vide supra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro rationem ultionis cod. T rationem poenae ultionis.See above, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, for the character of retribution codex T reads the character of the punishment of retribution. ---