Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 41, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus

p. 955

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod fides intentionem dirigit. Multi enim habentes fidem habent malas intentiones: ergo videtur, quod intentionis directio a fide non habeat esse. Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de fide, quae per dilectionem operatur¹, utpote de fide formata; tunc potius videtur, quod directio intentionis debuit attribui caritati quam fidei.

Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc, cum directio intentionis aliquo modo attribuatur fidei, aliquo modo caritati: quare similiter non attribuitur spei, cum et ipsa sit virtus theologica et respiciat finem, sicut fides et caritas?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum intentio duo respiciat, videlicet oculum intellectus et pedem affectus², duplici indiget directivo, quorum unum respiciat aspectum, et hoc est fides; alterum vero affectum, et hoc est caritas. Et ideo dicit Bernardus³, quod ad simplicitatem oculi concurrit caritas et veritas. Quando ergo Magister dicit, quod fides dirigit intentionem, non de quacumque fide intelligit, sed de fide operante per dilectionem, sicut obiectum est. Magis tamen directionem attribuit fidei quam caritati, quia dirigere in via potius est luminis illustrantis quam virtutis adiuvantis, licet utrumque sit necessarium ad hoc, quod homo recte ambulet: et quod lumen videat et quod pedem rectum habeat. Propter defectum primi non recte incedit caecus, et propter defectum secundi non recte incedit claudus.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de spe, dicendum, quod spei, proprie loquendo, non est dirigere, sed erigere; quia spes exspectat per modum futuri: unde quasi dat quandam securitatem, ne in via deficiat⁴. Fides autem et caritas praesentialiter potentias, in quibus sunt, in operibus dirigunt; quia una illuminat, et altera inflammat; et ideo una dirigit respectu veritatis, altera vero respectu bonitatis; quantum ad quae duo sufficienter attenditur rectificatio animae in suis operibus. Et ideo non oportet, quod spei attribuatur directio, sed solum erectio, licet illa erectio quodam modo dici possit directio⁵.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est. Sed contra: infideles habent opera virtutum politicarum⁶; sed virtutes politicae non sunt habitus mali, sed boni, quia non sunt vitia, sed Dei dona: ergo videtur, quod opera illarum virtutum non sint peccatum. — Item, infidelis homo potest dare eleemosynam, ut Deus manifestet sibi viam veritatis; et in hoc disponit se, ut Deus det ei habitum fidei. Sed in hoc, quod homo ad gratiam se disponit, non peccat: ergo non videtur, quod omnis vita infidelium sit culpa, sive omnis actio. — Oppositum autem huius est, quia arbor mala non potest fructus bonos facere⁷: ergo si infideles malam voluntatem habent et indirectam intentionem et carent fide et caritate, ergo videtur, quod omnia faciant male et nihil bene.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod infideles non peccant in omni sua actione; nam quando eorum actio non repugnat fidei nec bonis moribus, non est ratio aliqua, quare in ea debeat esse peccatum.

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Quod ergo dicitur in littera, quod « omnis vita infidelium est peccatum »; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur propter hoc, quod omnis actio, quam faciunt in tota vita sua, sit culpabilis et demeritoria, sed hoc ideo dicitur, quia per nullam actionem, quam agunt, liberantur a culpa, quamdiu in infidelitate persistunt. Et ideo sensus est: omnis vita infidelium est peccatum, id est non sine peccato. — Similiter intelligenda est sequens auctoritas⁸, et aliae consimiles, cum dicitur, quod « ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus »; non quia illa virtus sit vitium, sed quia deficit a verae virtutis perfectione; quia virtus vera dicitur, quia veraciter perducit ad vitam. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod arbor mala non potest fructus bonos facere; intelligenda est locutio per se, id est, si operetur voluntas mala, in quantum mala, scilicet mala intentione. Si autem non per se intelligatur, non est sermo verus, nisi intelligatur de bono perfecto, quod quidem est bonum meritorium; sed tunc non sequitur: non facit fructum bonum, ergo facit fructum malum; quia inter tale bonum et malum est medium, sicut supra⁹ fuit ostensum.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod peccata, quae a nescientibus vel coactis perpetrantur, non omnino possunt sine voluntate committi. Videtur enim falsum dicere, primum, quia voluntarium praesupponit cognitionem, sicut vult Philosophus¹⁰: ergo quod fit per nescientiam vel ignorantiam est simpliciter involuntarium: ergo committitur sine voluntate. — Item, coactio inducit violentiam; sed violentia excludit voluntatem: ergo quod fit a coacto non est voluntarium¹¹.

Quaeritur ergo: qualiter Augustinus intelligit, cum dicit, quod quae fiunt per coactionem et ignorantiam non fiunt praeter voluntatem?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod novem sunt gradus voluntarii, secundum quos peccata voluntarie¹² dicuntur fieri secundum plus et minus. — Primo enim et principaliter dicitur voluntarium quod est a voluntate nullo inclinante, nec exterius nec interius; sic fuit peccatum luciferi voluntarium. — Secundo modo voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate, aliquo suggerente exterius, sed nullo inclinante interius; et sic fuit peccatum primi hominis voluntarium. — Tertio modo dicitur voluntarium quod est a voluntate, aliquo tamen inclinante exterius et interius; et sic est peccatum mortale, quod aliquis perpetrat ex deliberatione et intentione post lapsum naturae. — Quarto modo aliquid est voluntarium, quod est a voluntate non movente ad illud directe, movente tamen ad incompossibile¹³, sicut est peccatum omissionis, quo quis omittit ad matutinum surgere, quia voluntarie se inebriavit. — Quinto modo aliquid est voluntarium, quod est a voluntate non movente ad illud directe nec appetente, sed aliud refugiente, sicut est peccatum, quod homo facit mortis timore. — Sexto modo est aliquid voluntarium, quod est a voluntate non plene id quod agit cognoscente; et sic peccatum ex ignorantia dicitur voluntarium. — Septimo modo dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quia consequitur ad aliquid, quod voluntarie factum est ab illo eodem, a quo illud fit; et sic peccata, quae consequuntur ebrietatem, in quam homo se scienter induxit, dicuntur aliquo modo voluntaria¹⁴. — Octavo modo dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quia est ab aliquo potente prohibere et non prohibente; et sic peccatum veniale, quod est primus motus, dicitur esse voluntarium. — Nono modo dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quod introductum est a voluntate aliena sicut a causa prima; et sic peccatum originale dicitur voluntarium.

In omnibus istis modis praedictis aliquo modo salvatur ratio voluntarii; proprie tamen et principaliter in duobus modis primis. Et propterea dicit Augustinus¹⁵, quod illud quod dixerat, scilicet omne peccatum voluntarium, de peccato primi parentis esse intelligendum, non quia illud solum sit voluntarium, sed quia illud inter cetera mere est voluntarium. Alia enim aliquo modo voluntaria sunt, licet non ita plene, sicut illud quod fit per nescientiam et per coactionem.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod tam coactio quam ignorantia excludit rationem voluntarii; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi est omnimoda ignorantia et coactio sufficiens; sed voluntas nunquam cogitur coactione sufficienti; ideo coactio nunquam tollit rationem voluntarii¹⁶. Ignorantia vero aliquando est per omnimodam privationem discretionis,

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et tunc tollit simpliciter rationem voluntarii; aliquando vero dicit privationem alicuius cognitionis determinatae¹⁷, utpote privationem alicuius circumstantiae, remanente nihilominus cognitione actus et aliarum circumstantiarum; sicut est de illo qui fornicatur nesciens, fornicationem esse peccatum mortale, sciens tamen, se cognoscere non suam; et tunc minuit, non tollit rationem voluntarii; et sic loquitur Magister in littera. — Et per hoc patent illa duo obiecta.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, that faith directs the intention. For many who have faith have evil intentions: therefore it seems that the direction of intention does not come from faith. If you say that he is speaking of the faith which works through love¹, that is, of formed faith; then it rather seems that the direction of intention ought to have been attributed to charity rather than to faith.

Likewise, it is asked along with this, since the direction of intention is attributed in one way to faith and in another way to charity: why is it not likewise attributed to hope, since hope too is a theological virtue and regards the end, just as faith and charity do?

I respond: It must be said that, since the intention regards two things, namely the eye of the intellect and the foot of the affection², it needs a twofold directive: one to regard the gaze, and this is faith; the other to regard the affection, and this is charity. And therefore Bernard says³ that to the simplicity of the eye there concur both charity and truth. When, therefore, the Master says that faith directs the intention, he does not understand it of any faith whatever, but of the faith working through love, as has been objected. Yet he attributes the direction to faith rather than to charity, because to direct on the way pertains rather to the illumining light than to the assisting power, although both are necessary for a man to walk rightly: that he may both see the light and have a right foot. Through the defect of the first the blind man does not walk rightly, and through the defect of the second the lame man does not walk rightly.

To that which is asked concerning hope, it must be said that it does not belong to hope, properly speaking, to direct, but to raise up; because hope awaits after the manner of the future: whence it gives, as it were, a certain security, lest one fail on the way⁴. But faith and charity direct in their works the powers in which they presently reside; because the one illumines and the other inflames; and therefore the one directs with respect to truth, the other with respect to goodness; and with respect to these two the rectification of the soul in its works is sufficiently attended to. And therefore it is not necessary that direction be attributed to hope, but only raising up, although that raising up can in a certain manner be called direction⁵.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: All the life of unbelievers is sin. But on the contrary: unbelievers have works of the political virtues⁶; but the political virtues are not evil habits, but good ones, because they are not vices, but gifts of God: therefore it seems that the works of those virtues are not sin. — Likewise, an unbelieving man can give alms, that God may reveal to him the way of truth; and in this he disposes himself, that God may give him the habit of faith. But in this, that a man disposes himself toward grace, he does not sin: therefore it does not seem that all the life of unbelievers is fault, or every action. — But the opposite of this holds, because an evil tree cannot bear good fruit⁷: therefore if unbelievers have an evil will and a misdirected intention and lack faith and charity, then it seems that they do everything badly and nothing well.

I respond: It must be said that unbelievers do not sin in their every action; for when their action is not repugnant to faith nor to good morals, there is no reason why there should be sin in it.

What therefore is said in the text, that « all the life of unbelievers is sin »; it must be said that this is not said because every action which they do in their whole life is culpable and demeritorious, but it is said for this reason, that by no action which they perform are they freed from fault, so long as they persist in unbelief. And therefore the sense is: all the life of unbelievers is sin, that is, not without sin. — In like manner is to be understood the following authority⁸, and others similar to it, when it is said that « where the recognition of truth is lacking, virtue is false »; not because that virtue is a vice, but because it falls short of the perfection of true virtue; for it is called true virtue because it leads truly to life. — To that, therefore, which is objected, that an evil tree cannot bear good fruit; the saying is to be understood per se, that is, if an evil will operates, insofar as it is evil, namely with an evil intention. But if it is not understood per se, the statement is not true, unless it is understood of the perfect good, which indeed is meritorious good; but then it does not follow: it does not bear good fruit, therefore it bears evil fruit; because between such good and evil there is a mean, as was shown above⁹.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the sins which are perpetrated by the ignorant or the coerced cannot at all be committed without the will. For it seems to say something false: first, because the voluntary presupposes cognition, as the Philosopher holds¹⁰: therefore what is done through nescience or ignorance is simply involuntary: therefore it is committed without the will. — Likewise, coercion induces violence; but violence excludes the will: therefore what is done by one coerced is not voluntary¹¹.

It is asked therefore: in what way does Augustine understand it, when he says that the things which are done through coercion and ignorance are not done apart from the will?

I respond: It must be said that there are nine grades of the voluntary, according to which sins are said to be done voluntarily¹² according to more and less. — First and principally, that is called voluntary which is from the will with nothing inclining, neither exteriorly nor interiorly; thus the sin of Lucifer was voluntary. — In the second mode, that is called voluntary which is from the will, with something suggesting exteriorly, but nothing inclining interiorly; and thus the sin of the first man was voluntary. — In the third mode, that is called voluntary which is from the will, with something however inclining both exteriorly and interiorly; and such is mortal sin, which someone perpetrates from deliberation and intention after the fall of nature. — In the fourth mode, something is voluntary which is from the will not moving toward it directly, but moving toward something incompossible¹³, as is the sin of omission, by which someone omits to rise for matins, because he voluntarily got himself drunk. — In the fifth mode, something is voluntary which is from the will not moving toward it directly nor desiring it, but fleeing something else, as is the sin which a man does through fear of death. — In the sixth mode, something is voluntary which is from the will not fully knowing what it does; and thus sin from ignorance is called voluntary. — In the seventh mode, something is called voluntary because it follows upon something which was done voluntarily by the same one by whom it is done; and thus the sins which follow upon drunkenness, into which a man knowingly induced himself, are said to be in some manner voluntary¹⁴. — In the eighth mode, something is called voluntary because it is from one able to prohibit and not prohibiting; and thus venial sin, which is the first movement, is said to be voluntary. — In the ninth mode, something is called voluntary which was introduced by another's will as by a first cause; and thus original sin is called voluntary.

In all these aforesaid modes the account of the voluntary is in some manner preserved; properly, however, and principally in the first two modes. And therefore Augustine says¹⁵ that what he had said, namely every sin is voluntary, is to be understood of the sin of the first parent, not because that alone is voluntary, but because that, among the rest, is purely voluntary. For the others are in some manner voluntary, although not so fully, as is that which is done through nescience and through coercion.

But to that which is objected, that both coercion and ignorance exclude the account of the voluntary; it must be said that this is true where there is complete ignorance and sufficient coercion; but the will is never coerced by sufficient coercion; therefore coercion never takes away the account of the voluntary¹⁶. But ignorance is sometimes through a complete privation of discretion,

et tunc tollit simpliciter rationem voluntarii; aliquando vero dicit privationem alicuius cognitionis determinatae¹⁷, that is, the privation of some circumstance, with the cognition of the act and of the other circumstances nonetheless remaining; as is the case with one who fornicates not knowing that fornication is a mortal sin, knowing however that he is having relations with one not his own; and then it diminishes, but does not take away, the account of the voluntary; and thus the Master speaks in the text. — And through this those two objections are made clear.

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Apparatus Criticus

Gal. 5, 6, ubi Vulg. per caritatem pro per dilectionem. — Paulo inferius pro attribuatur codd. H T et alii attribuitur.
Galatians 5, 6, where the Vulgate has per caritatem ("through charity") in place of per dilectionem ("through love"). — A little further on, in place of attribuatur codices H T and others read attribuitur.
Vide eius verba supra pag. 891, nota 4.
See his words above, page 891, note 4.
Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in fine corp.
Compare above, distinction 38, article 2, question 2, at the end of the body.
Supple: homo. Respicitur illud Matth. 13, 32: Et dimittere eos ieiunos nolo, ne deficiant in via. — De spe fusius agitur III. Sent. d. 26. per totam. — Paulo superius pro exspectat cod. cc et ed. 1 spectat.
Supply: homo ("man"). Reference is made to that passage of Matthew 13, 32 [recte 15, 32]: "And I am not willing to send them away fasting, lest they faint on the way." — Hope is treated more fully in III Sentences, distinction 26, throughout. — A little above, in place of exspectat ("awaits") codex cc and the first edition read spectat.
Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Albert., hic a. 4; a S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; a Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. et circa lit.; a Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; ab Aegid. R., dub. lit. 1.
This doubt is also resolved by Blessed Albert, here article 4; by St. Thomas, here question 1, article 1; by Peter of Tarentaise, here question 1, article 2, and on the text; by Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; by Giles of Rome, doubt on the text 1.
Cfr. supra pag. 901, nota 5. — De ratione in minori adducta vide supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., nec non III. Sent. d. 33. q. 5, et Alex. Hal. S. p. III. q. 64. m. 2.
Compare above, page 901, note 5. — On the reasoning adduced in the minor, see above, distinction 28, article 2, question 3, in the body, and also III Sentences, distinction 33, question 5, and Alexander of Hales, Summa, part III, question 64, member 2.
Matth. 7, 18. — De hac ratione cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XL. in principio, et hic c. I. — In fine arg. plures codd. faciunt pro faciant, et ed. 1 omnia quae faciunt, male faciunt et nihil bene.
Matthew 7, 18. — On this reasoning compare above, the text of the Master, distinction 40, at the beginning, and here, chapter 1. — At the end of the argument several codices read faciunt in place of faciant, and the first edition: all the things which they do, they do badly and nothing well.
Scil. eiusdem Augustini; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Aliquanto superius pro culpabilis cod. T culpa. Mox pro verae virtutis Vat. et edd. 3, 4 vera virtutis, et deinde Vat. sola quae veraciter pro quia veraciter.
Namely, of the same Augustine; see here, the text of the Master, chapter 1. — Somewhat above, in place of culpabilis codex T has culpa. Soon after, in place of verae virtutis the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 have vera virtutis, and then the Vatican edition alone quae veraciter in place of quia veraciter.
Art. 1. q. 3. De ipsa difficultate in hoc dubio proposita et de sententia S. Augustini vide supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. 2. et scholion. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3; Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 3.
Article 1, question 3. On the difficulty proposed in this doubt and on the opinion of St. Augustine, see above, distinction 28, article 2, questions 1 and 2, and the scholion. — Compare on this doubt Blessed Albert, here article 5; St. Thomas, here question 1, article 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here question 1, article 3, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here article 1, question 3; Giles of Rome, here question 1, article 3.
Libr. III. Ethic. c. 1. Verba ipsius vide supra pag. 592, nota 3.
Book III of the Ethics, chapter 1. For his words see above, page 592, note 3.
Cfr. supra pag. 619, nota 5. — Quaestio, quam auctor deinde ponit, respicit textum huius dubii, ex Augustino delibatum et a Magistro hic in lit. c. 3. allatum. — Pro a coacto cod. W « coactione », cod. bb coactione tantum, sine a.
Compare above, page 619, note 5. — The question which the author then poses regards the text of this doubt, drawn from Augustine and adduced by the Master here in the text, chapter 3. — In place of a coacto codex W reads « coactione », codex bb coactione only, without a.
In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 habetur voluntaria et deest dein fieri.
In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 there stands voluntaria, and fieri is then lacking.
Cod. cc et edd. 1, 2 impossibile. In Vat. legitur tamen ad illud ex quo sequitur, in ed. 3 tamen illud ex consequenti. Mox pro inebriavit cod. T inebriat.
Codex cc and editions 1, 2 read impossibile ("impossible"). In the Vatican edition is read tamen ad illud ex quo sequitur; in edition 3 tamen illud ex consequenti. Soon after, in place of inebriavit codex T has inebriat.
Cfr. supra pag. 527, nota 4. — Mox pro et non prohibente edd. praeter 1 non tamen prohibente.
Compare above, page 527, note 4. — Soon after, in place of et non prohibente the editions except the first read non tamen prohibente.
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — In Vat., quae etiam interpunctionem mutavit, legitur sic: esse, est intelligendum.
See here, the text of the Master, chapter 3. — In the Vatican edition, which also changed the punctuation, it is read thus: esse, est intelligendum.
Cfr. supra d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq. — De ignorantia vide supra d. 22. a. 2. q. 3.
Compare above, distinction 25, part 2, question 4 and following. — On ignorance see above, distinction 22, article 2, question 3.
In Vat. desunt verba cognitionis determinatae, utpote privationem alicuius.
In the Vatican edition the words cognitionis determinatae, utpote privationem alicuius ("of some determinate cognition, namely the privation of some [circumstance]") are wanting.

← Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 3