Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio III. Utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit in aliquod bonum in genere.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit in aliquod bonum in genere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Virtus consuetudinalis non dat novam potentiam voluntati, sed solum reddit eam facilem¹. Si igitur voluntas, habens virtutem consuetudinalem, potest in bonum in genere et bonum ex circumstantia; videtur, quod in hoc possit carens illa virtute, licet cum difficultate.

2. Item, brutum bruto per naturam potest compati: ergo et homo homini per naturam potest compati, circumscripto omni dono gratiae, et si potest compati et misereri, potest et eleemosynam largiri; et hoc est bonum in genere, dare eleemosynam indigenti: ergo etc.

3. Item, vitium non fortificat naturam²; sed homo vane gloriosus potest praedicare Evangelium vel facere aliquod opus bonum in se: ergo si hoc potest homo depravatus vitio inanis gloriae, multo fortius potest hoc ex potestate naturae.

4. Item, difficilius est avaro dare omnia quae habet, quam dare partem eorum quae habet; sed avarus absque omni dono gratiae potest fieri prodigus et dissipare omnia bona sua: ergo multo fortius absque dono³ gratiae potest dare unam eleemosynam, cum istud sit multum facilius.

5. Item, aut liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, potest in aliquod bonum, aut non. Si non: ergo nullius est potentiae. Si potest in aliquod, cum principium, quod est voluntas, distinguatur a principio, quod est natura⁴, illud non tantum erit bonum naturale, sed etiam bonum morale; sed minimum inter omnia bona moralia est bonum in genere: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Dominus Ioannis decimo quinto⁵ ait: Sine me nihil potestis facere; Glossa: « Nec parum boni »: igitur absque auxilio gratiae Dei liberum arbitrium non potest perficere aliquid boni.

2. Item, secundae ad Corinthios tertio⁶: Non quod simus sufficientes cogitare aliquid ex nobis, quasi ex nobis. Si igitur bonum cogitare, hoc est initium omnis boni; et hoc non possumus per nos: ergo nullum bonum per se potest liberum arbitrium, divina gratia destitutum.

3. Item, Augustinus ad Bonifacium Papam⁷: « Non potest homo aliquid boni velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo qui malum non potest velle ».

4. Item, Isidorus⁸: « Sciant defensores liberi arbitrii, nihil boni posse, nisi divinae gratiae iuvamine sustententur »: ergo redit idem quod prius.

5. Item, Bernardus super Cantica, homilia trigesima secunda⁹: « Sciant, inquit, hostes gratiae, nec ad bonum cogitandum sufficere cor humanum ». Et expressius in libro de Libero Arbitrio: « Tria in nobis Deus operatur: cogitare, velle et perficere. Primum sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos ».

6. Item, in eodem libro capitulo sexto¹⁰: « Velle siquidem in nobis est ex libero arbitrio, non autem posse quod volumus; non dico velle bonum aut velle malum, sed velle tantum ». — Ex his omnibus auctoritatibus concluditur, quod liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, non possit in aliquod bonum quantumcumque parvum.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Liberum arbitrium sola Dei cooperatione generali, absque gratia gratum faciente et gratis data, potest, licet difficiliter, facere aliquod bonum morale, quod in finem ultimum est ordinabile, non autem ordinatum.

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Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod opus aliquod tripliciter potest dici bonum. — Uno modo dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter¹¹; et hoc est bonum, quod est ordinatum in finem; et tale est bonum meritorium. Et in huiusmodi bonum non potest liberum arbitrium lapsum absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis.

Secundo modo aliquid dicitur bonum ex hoc, quod aliquo modo de congruo disponit ad bonum; et tale est bonum, quod fit extra caritatem; nihilominus tamen cum recta intentione. Et in tale non potest liberum arbitrium absque munere gratiae gratis datae, per quod illuminetur et dirigatur et excitetur, ut velit facere aliquid, quod sit Deo placitum. Et quod ad hoc sit munus gratiae necessarium, expresse innuitur Sapientiae octavo¹², ubi dicitur: Scivi, quoniam aliter non possum esse continens, nisi Deus det; et hoc ipsum erat sapientia, scire cuius hoc donum esset. Unde non est parvum donum gratiae cognoscere ipsum munus gratiae, et cognoscere, quod sine gratia homo salvari non potest.

Tertio modo dicitur aliquid bonum, quia in finem est ordinabile, et habet aliquam ordinationem intra se, sive ex transitu super materiam debitam, sicut pascere esurientem, sive ex debita circumstantia superaddita, videlicet cum hoc facit, cum exigit tempus et locus et opportunitas. Ad istud autem genus boni complendum, etsi gratia gratis data sit necessaria ad hoc quod fiat faciliter; circumscripto tamen omni munere gratiae, et libero arbitrio relicto in puris naturalibus, per naturale iudicatorium et instinctum posset in tale bonum, Deo sibi cooperante, sicut cooperatur aliis creaturis. Nam sine primo agente nullum agens potest agere, sicut suo loco infra¹³ manifestabitur, cum agetur, utrum omnis actio sit a Deo. Ad praesens autem tantum dixisse sufficiat, quod liberum arbitrium sola Dei cooperatione, absque aliquo munere gratiae, licet difficiliter, potest exire in aliquod bonum morale. Per illud tamen nec disponitur ad gratiam nec ad gloriam, quia non est in finem ultimum ordinatum, sed tantum ordinabile.

Et istud concludunt rationes ad primam partem inductae; et ideo concedendae sunt. In bonum autem, quod ducit ad bonum perfectum, sive merito congrui sive merito condigni, non potest absque auxilio Dei, sicut expresse dicunt auctoritates Sanctorum ad contrarium adductae; et sic omnes intelligendae sunt. — Et quod isto modo debeant intelligi, planum est. Nam si liberum arbitrium in solis naturalibus suis relinquatur, adhuc remanebit ei rationis iudicium, per quod cognoscet, parentes esse honorandos. Et constat, quod si habet hoc naturale iudicatorium, per illud per quod potest nosse, parentes esse honorandos, per illud potest cogitare; et cum habeat naturalem instinctum, potest etiam velle; et cum habeat exteriora organa sibi subservientia, potest opere implere. Sed prout illud facit iudicium rationis rectae absque munere gratiae, non dirigit ad obtinendum finem, qui Deus est, et mercedem aeternae beatitudinis, quam nosse non potest, nisi Deus revelet. Et propterea dicunt Sancti, quod nec cogitare nec velle nec facere potest bonum absque iuvamine divinae gratiae, quia loquuntur de bono, secundum quod est ordinatum ad assequendam beatitudinem. — Si autem intelligantur auctoritates de alio bono, tunc nomine gratiae non est intelligendus aliquis habitus superadditus naturalibus; sed intelligitur gratuita Dei influentia, per quam cetera conservat et adiuvat, ut compleant operationes suas. Et sic intelligitur illud verbum Ioannis decimo quinto¹⁴: Sine me nihil potestis facere; et illud Isaiae vigesimo sexto: Omnia opera nostra in nobis operatus es, Domine; et consimilia.

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Sic etiam intelligendum est illud quod dicitur in libro de Magistro: « nullus potest aliquid addiscere, nisi Deus doceat ». Hoc enim non dicitur, quia omnis cognitio sit infusa, sed quia lumen creatum non potest perficere operationem suam absque cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis homo, qui venit in hunc mundum. Et hoc modo intelligenda sunt verba Dionysii et aliorum Sanctorum, qui dicunt, quod omnis essentia est a prima essentia, et omnis vita a prima vita, et omnis intelligentia a prima intelligentia, et omnis bonitas a prima bonitate. Haec enim dicta sunt, non quia Deus sit tota causa, sed quia sine ipso non potest agere aliqua virtus creata.

Patet igitur ex praedictis, quantum sit necessaria libero arbitrio gratia gratum faciens, quia sine ea non potest a peccato resurgere, nec potest adversarium vincere, nec potest mandata Dei implere. Patet nihilominus, quantum sit necessaria gratia gratis data, quia sine ea non potest liberum arbitrium ad gratiam gratum facientem se disponere; non potest etiam omni tentationi resistere: non potest etiam in aliquod bonum quantumcumque modicum, quod sit ordinatum ad salutem. Et licet possit in aliquod bonum morale, vix aut nunquam faceret nisi malum propter peccati originalis corruptionem.

Scholion

III. Magni momenti et communiter nunc recepta est distinctio triplicis boni, posita in corp. sequentis quaest.; et constat, quod ipsa conformis est menti S. Augustini, cuius verba quidem de hac re non raro cum Baio conveniunt, sed sententia verbis subiecta omnino differt (cfr. in primis August., de Spiritu et lit. c. 27. 28.). Quando igitur S. August. toties repetit, omnem infidelium vitam esse peccatum, non dari virtutes steriles, nec ante fidem esse opera bona; ratio habenda est erroris, contra quem ipse totis viribus concertabat, scilicet naturalismi, cui Pelagiani, peccatum originale negantes, omnesque gentiles addicti erant, sibi attribuentes et bonum aliquod et meritum sine fide ac gratia. In explicando autem et determinando praecise sensu verborum S. Augustini catholici theologi diversas vias ingressi sunt. Explicationem, quam facit S. Bonav., vide infra d. 41. dub. 2, et IV. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. 2. — De virtutibus informibus idem loquitur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1, d. 27. a. 1. q. 4; de operibus in statu peccati factis IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3-6. — Non negligenda est egregia de gratia doctrina in fine huius quaest. cum insigni loco S. Bernardi.

IV. De hac (3.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 5. a. 2. § 2; p. IV. q. 13. m. 2. — Scoti loci apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 109. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 14. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, praesertim ad 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good in its kind.

Thirdly it is asked whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good in its kind. And that it can, seems [to be the case].

1. A habitual virtue does not give a new power to the will, but only renders it facile¹. If therefore the will, having a habitual virtue, can attain to good in its kind and good from circumstance; it seems that one lacking that virtue can attain to this, albeit with difficulty.

2. Likewise, a brute can have compassion on a brute by nature: therefore a man too can have compassion on a man by nature, every gift of grace being set aside; and if he can have compassion and be merciful, he can also bestow alms; and this is a good in its kind, to give alms to the needy: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, vice does not fortify nature²; but a vainglorious man can preach the Gospel or do some work good in itself: therefore if a man depraved by the vice of vainglory can do this, much more strongly can he do this from the power of nature.

4. Likewise, it is more difficult for a miser to give all that he has than to give a part of what he has; but a miser, without any gift of grace, can become prodigal and squander all his goods: therefore much more strongly, without a gift³ of grace, can he give a single alms, since that is much easier.

5. Likewise, either free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good, or it cannot. If it cannot: then it is of no power. If it can attain to something, since the principle which is the will is distinguished from the principle which is nature⁴, that will be not only a natural good, but also a moral good; but the least among all moral goods is good in its kind: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The Lord says in John, the fifteenth [chapter]⁵: Without me you can do nothing; the Gloss: « Not even a little good »: therefore without the help of God's grace free choice cannot accomplish anything of good.

2. Likewise, in the second [Epistle] to the Corinthians, the third [chapter]⁶: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves. If therefore to think the good — this is the beginning of all good; and this we cannot do through ourselves: therefore free choice, deprived of divine grace, can do no good through itself.

3. Likewise, Augustine to Pope Boniface⁷: « A man cannot will anything of good unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil ».

4. Likewise, Isidore⁸: « Let the defenders of free choice know that they can do nothing of good unless they are sustained by the help of divine grace »: therefore the same thing returns as before.

5. Likewise, Bernard on the Canticle, homily thirty-second⁹: « Let the enemies of grace know, he says, that the human heart is not even sufficient for thinking the good ». And more expressly in the book On Free Choice: « God works three things in us: to think, to will, and to accomplish. The first without us, the second with us, the third through us ».

6. Likewise, in the same book, chapter six¹⁰: « To will indeed is in us from free choice, but not to be able [to do] what we will; I do not say to will good or to will evil, but to will only ». — From all these authorities it is concluded that free choice, deprived of grace, cannot attain to any good however small.

Conclusion

Conclusion. Free choice, by the general cooperation of God alone, without grace making-pleasing and freely given, can, albeit with difficulty, do some moral good, which is orderable to the ultimate end, but not ordered [to it].

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that a work can be called good in three ways. — In one way something is called good simply¹¹; and this is the good which is ordered to the [ultimate] end; and such is the meritorious good. And to good of this sort fallen free choice cannot attain without the help of grace making-pleasing.

In a second way something is called good from this, that it in some way disposes congruously toward the good; and such is the good which is done outside charity; nevertheless with a right intention. And to such [good] free choice cannot attain without the gift of grace freely given, by which it may be illumined and directed and roused to will to do something pleasing to God. And that for this a gift of grace is necessary is expressly intimated in Wisdom, the eighth [chapter]¹², where it is said: I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it; and this very thing was wisdom, to know whose gift it was. Hence it is no small gift of grace to know the gift of grace itself, and to know that without grace a man cannot be saved.

In a third way something is called good because it is orderable to the end, and has some ordering within itself, whether from passing over the due matter, as feeding the hungry, or from a due circumstance superadded, namely when he does this when the time and place and opportunity require. But for the completing of this kind of good, even though grace freely given is necessary for it to be done easily; nevertheless, every gift of grace being set aside, and free choice left in its pure naturals, by the natural faculty of judgment and by instinct it could attain to such good, God cooperating with it, just as he cooperates with the other creatures. For without the first agent no agent can act, as will be shown in its place below¹³, when it is treated whether every action is from God. For the present, let it suffice to have said only this, that free choice, by the cooperation of God alone, without any gift of grace, can, albeit with difficulty, go forth into some moral good. Yet through this it is neither disposed to grace nor to glory, because it is not ordered to the ultimate end, but only orderable.

And this is what the reasons adduced for the first part conclude; and therefore they are to be granted. But to the good which leads to the perfect good, whether by the merit of congruity or by the merit of condignity, [free choice] cannot [attain] without the help of God, as the authorities of the Saints adduced to the contrary expressly say; and so they are all to be understood. — And that they ought to be understood in this way is plain. For if free choice is left in its naturals alone, there will still remain to it the judgment of reason, by which it will know that parents are to be honored. And it is certain that, if it has this natural faculty of judgment, by that through which it can know that parents are to be honored, by that it can think; and since it has the natural instinct, it can also will; and since it has the external organs subservient to it, it can fulfill [the work] in deed. But inasmuch as it makes this judgment of right reason without the gift of grace, it does not direct toward obtaining the end, which is God, and the reward of eternal beatitude, which it cannot know unless God reveals it. And therefore the Saints say that one can neither think nor will nor do good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of the good according as it is ordered to the attaining of beatitude. — But if the authorities are understood of another good, then by the name of grace there is not to be understood some habit superadded to the naturals; but there is understood the gratuitous influence of God, by which he conserves and aids the rest, that they may complete their operations. And thus is understood that word of John, the fifteenth [chapter]¹⁴: Without me you can do nothing; and that of Isaiah, the twenty-sixth: All our works you have wrought in us, O Lord; and the like.

Thus too is to be understood that which is said in the book On the Teacher: « no one can learn anything unless God teaches ». For this is not said because all knowledge is infused, but because the created light cannot perfect its operation without the cooperation of the uncreated light, by which every man is illumined who comes into this world. And in this way are to be understood the words of Dionysius and of the other Saints, who say that every essence is from the first essence, and every life from the first life, and every intelligence from the first intelligence, and every goodness from the first goodness. For these things have been said, not because God is the whole cause, but because without him no created power can act.

It is plain therefore from what has been said how necessary grace making-pleasing is to free choice, because without it [free choice] cannot rise again from sin, nor can it conquer the adversary, nor can it fulfill the commandments of God. It is plain nevertheless how necessary grace freely given is, because without it free choice cannot dispose itself to grace making-pleasing; nor can it resist every temptation: nor can it attain even to some good, however small, that is ordered to salvation. And although it can attain to some moral good, it would scarcely or never do [it] but rather evil, on account of the corruption of original sin.

Scholion

III. Of great moment and now commonly received is the distinction of the threefold good, set down in the body of the following question; and it is established that this is conformable to the mind of St. Augustine, whose words indeed on this matter not rarely agree with Baius, but the sense placed beneath the words differs entirely (cf. especially Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter c. 27. 28.). When therefore St. Augustine so often repeats that the whole life of unbelievers is sin, that there are no sterile virtues, and that before faith there are no good works; account must be taken of the error against which he himself contended with all his strength, namely naturalism, to which the Pelagians, denying original sin, and all the gentiles were addicted, attributing to themselves both some good and merit without faith and grace. But in explaining and determining precisely the sense of St. Augustine's words, the Catholic theologians entered upon diverse paths. The explanation which St. Bonaventure makes, see below d. 41. dub. 2, and IV Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. in the body and ad 1. 2. — Of unformed virtues he speaks in the same way III Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1, d. 27. a. 1. q. 4; of works done in the state of sin, IV Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3–6. — Not to be neglected is the excellent doctrine on grace at the end of this question with the notable passage of St. Bernard.

IV. On this (3rd) question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 64. m. 5. a. 2. § 2; p. IV. q. 13. m. 2. — Scotus's passages in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III. q. 109. a. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; S. I-II. q. 109. a. 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 14. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, especially ad 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. seqq. Virtus consuetudinalis ibi a Philosopho virtus vocatur moralis, quippe quae « ex more, id est assuetudine acquiritur, unde etiam nomen habuit » etc. — In fine arg. Vat. cum ed. 4 legit quod tunc possit carens virtute, cod. A possit sine omni virtute, cod. X possit carens gratia et virtute, ed. 1 possit absque virtute, cod. Z cum edd. 2, 3 possit carere virtute, cod. T quod non possit cadere a virtute; nostram lectionem formavimus fide codd. F K L M Q Y aa bb ee aliorumque plurium.
Cf. Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1ff. Habitual virtue is there called by the Philosopher moral virtue, inasmuch as it is « acquired from custom, that is, from habituation, whence too it took its name » etc. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with ed. 4 reads that he might then be able, lacking the virtue, cod. A able without any virtue, cod. X able lacking grace and virtue, ed. 1 able apart from virtue, cod. Z with edd. 2, 3 able to lack the virtue, cod. T that he might not be able to fall from the virtue; we formed our reading on the faith of codd. F K L M Q Y aa bb ee and very many others.
Immo nocet naturae, minuendo eius pulcritudinem et virtutem, ut docet August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. et 6.
On the contrary, it harms nature, diminishing its beauty and strength, as Augustine teaches, City of God XII, c. 3 and 6.
Edd., excepta 1, cum nonnullis codd. absque omni dono.
The editions, except 1, with several codices: without any gift.
Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 49. (c. 5.); II. Ethic. c. 1. et 3; III. c. 1. seqq.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 49 (c. 5); Ethics II, c. 1 and 3; III, c. 1ff.
Vers. 5. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis, habetur apud Lyranum et est secundum August., qui in Ioan. Evang. tr. 81. n. 3. dicit: Non ait, quia sine me parum potestis facere, sed nihil potestis facere.
Verse 5. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, is found in Lyra and is according to Augustine, who in his Tractates on John's Gospel tr. 81, n. 3, says: He does not say, because without me you can do little, but you can do nothing.
Vers. 5.
Verse 5.
Libr. I. Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifac. c. 3. n. 7.
Book I, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, to Boniface, c. 3, n. 7.
Libr. II. Sent. c. 3. n. 4: Sciant liberi arbitrii defensores, nihil posse in bonum sua praevalere virtute, nisi divinae gratiae sustententur iuvamine. — In fine textus pro sustententur multi codd. exhibent sustentetur, quae lectio cogit circa initium textus pro liberi arbitrii legere liberum arbitrium, quod propter abbreviationem verborum in mss. etiam legi posset. Sed hanc lectionem probare non possumus, nec placet lectio Vat. et edd. 3, 4, quae in principio nobiscum legunt defensores liberi arbitrii, sed post nihil boni subiiciunt liberum arbitrium.
Book II of the Sentences [Sententiae], c. 3, n. 4: Let the defenders of free choice know that they can prevail by their own power for nothing of good, unless they are sustained by the help of divine grace. — At the end of the text, for sustententur (let them be sustained) many codices read sustentetur (let it be sustained), which reading compels one, near the beginning of the text, to read for of free choice [genitive] free choice [accusative], which on account of the abbreviation of the words in the manuscripts could indeed also be read. But we cannot approve this reading, nor does the reading of the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 please [us], which at the beginning read with us defenders of free choice, but after nothing of good add free choice.
Num. 7: Sciant inimici gratiae, absque gratia nec ad cogitandum bonum sufficere cor humanum. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. c. 14. n. 46: Deus tria haec, hoc est bonum cogitare, velle, perficere operatur in nobis; primum profecto sine nobis etc.
No. 7: Let the enemies of grace know that, without grace, the human heart is not even sufficient for thinking the good. — The following text is from the place cited, c. 14, n. 46: God works these three things in us, that is, to think the good, to will, to accomplish; the first assuredly without us etc.
Num. 16, ubi textus originalis inest nobis pro in nobis est, et non etiam pro non autem.
No. 16, where the original text [reads] is present in us for is in us, and not also for but not.
Codd. H M addunt: quod de condigno disponit ad beatificationem [cod. H benefacere], ut quod fit in caritate.
Codd. H M add: which by condignity disposes toward beatification [cod. H to do well], as that which is done in charity.
Vers. 21, ubi Vulgata possem pro possum, et sapientiae pro sapientia.
Verse 21, where the Vulgate [reads] I could for I can, and of wisdom for wisdom.
Quod explicatur infra d. 36. dub. 3. — Mox pro cum exigit cod. bb quando exigit. Dist. 37. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo inferius cod. Y solius Dei pro sola Dei.
Which is explained below d. 36. dub. 3. — Shortly, for when it requires cod. bb [reads] whenever it requires. Dist. 37. a. 1. q. 1. — A little below cod. Y [reads] of God alone for by God alone.
Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 12. — Vat. et ed. 4 hic interiiciunt sufficienter, et aliquanto inferius post nunquam addunt tamen.
Verse 5. — The following text is from the place cited, v. 12. — The Vatican edition and ed. 4 here insert sufficiently, and somewhat lower, after never, add yet. ---

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