Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37
ARTICULUS I.
Utrum omnis actio, secundum quod actio, sit a Deo.
Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis actio, secundum quod actio. Secundo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis conservatio. Tertio quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis compositio.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum a Deo sit omnis actio, secundum quod actio.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnis actio, secundum quod actio, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ioannis decimo quinto1: Sine me nihil potestis facere; sed omnis actio aliquo modo est ens, sive sit actio peccati, sive alia: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod illud intelligitur de actione bona; contra: Isaiae decimo2: Nunquid elevabitur securis contra eum qui secat in ea; Glossa: « Sicut instrumenta nihil sunt per se agentia, ita Sennacherib nihil per se operatus est »: si ergo actio Sennacherib mala erat et crudelis, et Sennacherib in illa actione erat instrumentum Dei; videtur ergo, quod omnis mala actio sit ab ipso tanquam a primo principio.
2. Item, quae sunt eiusdem generis, habent eadem principia prima3; sed dare eleemosynam propter Deum, et dare eleemosynam propter vanam gloriam eiusdem generis actiones sunt in genere naturae: si ergo actio ista, qua quis dat eleemosynam propter Deum, est a Deo; videtur, quod et actio illa, qua quis dat eleemosynam causa inanis gloriae, sit a Deo.
3. Item, operatio miraculorum est a solo Deo; sed aliquis in faciendo miracula peccat, quia facit propter vanam gloriam: ergo videtur, quod aliqua actio substrata deformitati culpae sit a Deo: ergo pari ratione et omnis alia.
4. Item, omnis scientia a Domino Deo est4; sed aliquis addiscit propter avaritiam: ergo cum addiscere non possit, nisi Deo coadiuvante et cooperante, et illud addiscere sit peccatum; actio substrata peccato comparatur ad Deum sicut ad principium.
5. Item, aliquis adulterando generat prolem; quaero igitur, utrum illa actio sive coitus ille sit a Deo, vel non. Si est a Deo, habeo propositum. Si non est a Deo, ergo proles genita non est a Deo. Si igitur hoc est impossibile ponere, quod aliquis homo sit, qui non sit a Deo: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod actio substrata peccato non sit a Deo.
6. Item, actio, quae substernitur peccato, non omnino nihil est, sicut manifeste apparet. Si igitur aliquo modo est ens; quaero, a quo sit. Si est a potentia creaturae, necesse est, quod sit ab ea secundum id quod habet de entitate: illud ergo, secundum quod actio est ab illa potentia, aut est a Deo, aut non. Si est a Deo, cum « omne illud, quod est causa causae, sit causa causati5 », per se intelligendo — videlicet, si medium causatum est causa postremi, secundum id quod habet a primo — tunc sequitur necessario, quod talis actio sit a Deo. Si vero non est a Deo, tunc quaero: aut est a se, aut ab alio. Si ab alio, tunc quaero similiter de illo alio: aut est a se, aut ab alio: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel erit ponere, quod creatura aliquid habeat a se ipsa, vel quod habeat ab alio quam a Deo, quod sit primum principium, in quo sit status. Sed haec omnia sunt impossibilia et sequuntur ex hoc, quod ponitur aliqua actio non esse a Deo6: ergo etc.
Ad oppositum.
Sed contra:
1. Deus non facit contra suam prohibitionem, quia tunc sibi ipsi contrarius esset; sed Deus prohibet aliquam actionem, secundum quod actio est, sicut prohibuit Adae non comedere de pomo7: ergo videtur, quod illa comestio Adae non fuerit a Deo. Quod autem illa actio prohibita fuerit, secundum quod actio, apparet, quia comedere de pomo illo de se erat bonum, et nulla erat in eo deformitas, nisi postquam fuit prohibitum.
2. Item, omnis actio, quae est a bona voluntate, ut est operans per caritatem, est bona bonitate perfecta in genere moris8; sed omnis actio, quae egreditur a Deo, egreditur a voluntate optima, in qua est summa caritas: ergo omnis actio, cuius Deus principium est, est bona bonitate moris. Sed actio substrata peccato non est bona bonitate moris: ergo non est a Deo.
3. Item, omnia quaecumque Deus facit, facit bono fine — universa enim operatur propter se9 — omne autem, quod fit bono fine, simpliciter bonum est; actio autem substrata peccato non est simpliciter bona: ergo non potest esse a Deo tanquam a causa.
4. Item, quandocumque operans continuatur regulae10 in operando, recte operatur et bene; sed regula liberi arbitrii est ipsa rectitudo voluntatis divinae: ergo in omni operatione, in qua Deus cooperatur libero arbitrio, cum fit continuatio operantis ad regulam, est rectitudo. Si igitur in aliqua operatione per totum est obliquatio, videtur, quod cooperatio eius non sit a Deo.
5. Item, si operatio, quae est subiecta peccato, est a Deo et a libero arbitrio, aut tota est a Deo et tota a libero arbitrio, aut pars a Deo et pars a libero arbitrio. Si tota a Deo et tota a libero arbitrio: ergo videtur, quod tota sit simul et bona et mala; quod est omnino impossibile. Si pars a Deo et pars a libero arbitrio; sed qua ratione ponitur una pars esse a libero arbitrio, eadem ratione potest poni et altera: et sic videtur, quod tota operatio ita sit a libero arbitrio, quod non sit a Deo.
6. Item, si Deus cooperatur libero arbitrio in actione, quae est substrata peccato; aut igitur liberum arbitrium movet principalius quam Deus, aut e converso. Constat, quod liberum arbitrium in nulla operatione neque principalius neque aeque principaliter potest movere, sicut Deus, cum Deus tam in movendo quam in causando, cuiuscumque dicatur esse sive causa sive motor, principalissimus intelligatur. Si11 ergo Deus movet principalius, ergo si motor principalis excitat et movet motorem non principalem; videtur, quod in operatione culpabili liberum arbitrium excitetur a Deo: ergo cum adulter luxuriatur, et latro furatur, ad tales actiones a Deo excitantur; quod omnino est absurdum.
Conclusio.
Omnis actio, sive substrata peccato sive non, quatenus est actio, est a Deo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut Magister dicit in littera12, circa istam quaestionem fuerunt diversae positiones adeo magnorum virorum et adeo rationabiles, ut nec Magister ausus fuerit definire, quae earum magis contineat veritatem. Attamen, quia per multam discussionem dubia ducuntur ad manifestationem, nunc communiter tenetur, quod illa opinio verior sit, quae dicit, quod omnis actio, sive substrata peccato sive non, secundum id quod est actio, est a Deo. — Nec immerito, quia istud oportet ponere, si pensetur eminentia divinae potentiae et indigentia potentiae creaturae.
Quia enim Deus est causa primordialissima, ideo est influentiae maximae in causas secundas, et adeo magnae influentiae, ut nec modicum seu quantumcumque parvum, dum tamen aliquo modo sit ens, procedat ab aliqua causa creata, nisi cooperante divina omnipotentia13. — Omnis etiam potentia creata, quantum est de se, defectiva est nec est pure activa: ergo quantumcumque faciat modicam operationem, necesse habet adiuvari ab ea potentia, quae est actus purus propter omnimodam impermixtionem cum materia, et quae sola sibi sufficit, nullo modo indigens iuvari a causa alia.
Et ideo haec positio, quae dicit, omnem actionem esse a Deo, secundum quod actio est, absque omni ambiguitate tenenda est. Unde Anselmus in libro de Concordia praedestinationis et praescientiae14: « Omnis qualitas et omnis actio et quidquid habet aliquam essentiam, a Deo est, a quo est omnis iustitia et nulla iniustitia. Facit igitur Deus omnia, quae iusta vel iniusta voluntate fiunt, id est bona opera et mala. In bonis quidem facit, quod sunt et quod bona sunt; in malis vero facit, quod sunt, sed non, quod mala sunt ». Et iterum ibidem: « Omnes actiones et omnes motus facit Deus, quia
ipse facit res, a quibus et ex quibus et per quas et in quibus fiunt: et nulla res habet ullam potentiam volendi aut faciendi, nisi illo dante; ipsum quoque velle, quod aliquando iustum est, aliquando iniustum15, a Deo est ». « Non esse vero rectum, non est quid, nec a Deo est ». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ad primam partem inductae.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus non facit contra suam prohibitionem; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed Deus cum prohibet aliquam actionem, non prohibet sibi, sed alii; nec prohibet16 suam cooperationem, quam non subtrahit creaturae, sed ipsi creaturae prohibet operationem; et ideo, dum cooperatur ei, non facit contra suam prohibitionem. Et si tu obiicias mihi, quod nihilominus actio prohibita a Deo est a Deo; dicendum, quod in actione prohibita est duo considerare: et quod est actio et quod est prohibita; ab eo autem fit, secundum quod est actio, non autem secundum quod prohibita; et ideo non sequitur, quod contra se ipsum faciat.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis actio, quae est a voluntate bona, est bona; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet in voluntate creata, sed non oportet, quod veritatem habeat in voluntate increata, loquendo de bonitate moris. Et ratio huius est ista: quia, cum aliqua actio est a bona voluntate creata, cum voluntas increata, quae ei cooperatur, absque dubio bona sit, simpliciter actio illa bona est, quia tota eius causa est bona. Sed cum17 voluntas increata est bona, quae cooperatur voluntati creatae, voluntas creata potest esse deordinata, et ratione illius potest venire defectus circa operationem illam. Unde sicut videmus, quod in aliqua operatione, quae est a Deo et a virtute creata, ex defectu virtutis creatae totaliter deficit operatio illa; sic etiam ex deordinatione voluntatis creatae contingit, depravari illam actionem. — Aliter posset dici, quod operatio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur operatio opus operans; alio modo opus operatum. Et cum dicitur: si voluntas est bona, opus est bonum; hoc intelligendum est de opere operante, quod scilicet est actus ipsius voluntatis, ut velle; et sic non habet instantiam in Deo, quia velle Dei Deus est, et actio Dei Deus est, isto modo. Si autem dicatur operatio ipsum opus operatum, sic non sequitur, quod tale opus sit bonum bonitate completa sive meritoria, sed sufficit, quod sit bonum bonitate naturae, sicut patet. Opera, quae procedunt a voluntate Dei, bona sunt bonitate naturae, et hanc bonitatem habet actio, quae substrata est malitiae.
3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus facit omnia propter se; dicendum, quod verum est; et concedendum est etiam, quod actionem malitiae substratam propter se facit; propter se enim cooperatur creaturae. Cum autem dicitur, quod operatio, quae fit propter Deum, est bona bonitate moris; hoc intelligitur de operatione rationalis creaturae. Nam de Deo intelligi non potest, pro eo quod Deus non tantum cooperatur creaturae rationali, sed etiam irrationali; illa tamen operatio non dicitur esse bona bonitate moris.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quando agens creatum continuatur regulae dirigenti, non errat; dicendum, quod verum est, si simpliciter continuetur ei. Tunc autem continuatur ei simpliciter, quando continuatur et quantum ad operationem et quantum ad circumstantias. Cum vero exit in operationem circumstantiis debitis privatam, in hoc, quod exit in operationem, ei continuatur, sed in hoc, quod privat eam debitis circumstantiis, deficit et ab ea discontinuatur; et ita discontinuatur, non agendo, sed deficiendo, et deficiendo est principium mali; et in hoc, quod deficit, a Deo recedit, quia defectus ille a Deo non est. Quamvis enim Deus cooperetur operanti, non tamen deficit cum deficiente18.
5. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut tota operatio est a Deo etc.; dicendum, quod tota est a Deo, et tota a libero arbitrio. Non enim est intelligendum, quod Deus cooperetur libero arbitrio, sicut cum duo ferunt lapidem, unus cooperatur alteri; sed quia Deus est intime agens in omni actione, et intimus est ipsi potentiae operanti, ita quod potentia ipsa in nihil exit, quod non sit ab ipso. — Et si obiiciat, quod eadem actio erit tota bona et tota mala; dicendum, quod Deus illi actioni non dat nisi bonitatem naturae; liberum autem arbitrium non privat eam bonitate naturae, sed bonitate moris. Et ista duo non habent oppositionem, videlicet, quod aliquid habeat bonitatem naturae et privatum sit bonitate moris.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est principale movens in tali actione; dicendum, quod verum est; attamen non sequitur ex hoc, quod excitet liberum arbitrium ad faciendam illam operationem. Excitatio enim dicit aliquem effectum gratiae, praevenientem19 ipsam voluntatem. Hoc autem requiritur in bonis meritoriis; in aliis vero operibus indifferentibus vel etiam malis non est nisi sola cooperatio divinae virtutis, quae existens in creatura potentialiter, essentialiter et praesentialiter, sicut conservat eam in essendo, sic adiuvat in operando; propter quod conceditur ibi esse cooperatio, non tamen praeventio, vel subsecutio.
I. Hic incidit difficilis quaestio de concursu Dei ad actiones malas. In hac 1. quaestione inquiritur generatim de concursu Dei ad omnem actionem; deinde autem in tribus quaest. seq. articuli principia iam demonstrata applicantur ad actiones diversis defectibus affectas; ubi praenotanda est distinctio triplicis defectus, quae a. 2. q. 3. in corp. explicatur. De immediato concursu Dei ad omnes actiones creaturarum iam actum est I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2, ubi in scholio nonnulla de opinionibus theologorum notata sunt (cfr. etiam hic dub. 2, supra d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1, d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.). In quo sensu Deus dicitur causa universalis et particularis, vide I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. Duplex autem difficultas concursui praedicto generatim obstare videtur, scilicet, quod deroget tum verae causalitati secundarum causarum (de quo vide supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.) tum libertati creaturarum intellectualium (de quo aliqua dicuntur supra d. 26. a. 6, d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.). Specialis autem et tertia difficultas est circa actus moraliter malos, quae tam difficilis esse videbatur Magistro, ut dubius circa hanc quaestionem determinandam haeserit. De eadem re multum disputatum est etiam inter antiquiores Scholasticos, ut constat ex Summa Praepositivi (p. II.), qui opinatur, nullo modo actiones malas a Deo esse, contra quem specialiter disputat Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 3.). Communem autem posteriorum Scholasticorum opinionem defendit Guliel. Antissiodorensis in sua Summa aurea, « cuius dicta Alex. Hal. communiter inserit », ut dicit Dionys. Carth. (II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2.). Inter subsequentes Scholasticos solum Durandum (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4. et hic q. 1.), concursum Dei immediatum ad actiones creaturarum, in specie ad actiones malas, impugnasse iam observatum est in scholio ad I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Ipse S. Bonav., suffragante S. Thoma, concludit, quod communis doctrina « absque omni ambiguitate tenenda est ».
II. Aegid. R. (loc. cit.), qui quinque viis probat hanc sententiam, observat: « Actio et est ens et est actio; et ut est ens est a Deo tanquam a primo ente, a quo sunt omnia alia entia; sed ut est actio, est etiam a Deo quodam speciali modo, quia reducitur in Deum non solum generaliter, prout reducuntur in Deum omnia entia generaliter tanquam in primum ens, sed etiam specialiter, prout omnes actiones specialiter reducuntur in Deum tanquam in primum agens ». Quae doctrina sumta est ex S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 79. a. 2.) dicente: « Actus peccati et est ens et est actus; et ex utroque habet, quod sit a Deo ». Idem S. Doctor in Quaest. disput. de Potent. q. 3. a. 7. profundam suam inquisitionem sic concludit: « Sic ergo Deus est causa actionis cuiuslibet, in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conservat eam, et in quantum applicat actioni, et in quantum eius virtute omnis alia virtus agit ». — Notum est, praesertim circa illa verba: « in quantum applicat actioni », ortam esse inter posteriores theologos et scholas controversiam, quae intime cohaeret cum diversis sententiis de efficacia gratiae (cfr. supra d. 26. q. 6.). Utriusque sententiae summa vulgo exprimitur terminis praemotio physica et concursus simultaneus; de quibus consulantur utriusque scholae probati auctores.
III. Praeter citatos locos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2, et Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2, q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 105. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 66. 67. 89. 90. 162, de Malo, hic q. 3. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 35. a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 14. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica et II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2.
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ARTICLE I.
Whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God.
Concerning the first point three things are asked. First it is asked, whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God. Second it is asked, whether every conservation is from God. Third it is asked, whether every composition is from God.
QUESTION I.
Whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God. And that it is, it seems:
1. John, fifteenth [chapter]1: Without me you can do nothing; but every action is in some way a being, whether it be an action of sin, or another: therefore etc. If you say that this is understood of a good action; on the contrary: Isaiah, tenth [chapter]2: Shall the axe be exalted against him that cutteth with it; the Gloss: « Just as instruments are nothing acting by themselves, so Sennacherib wrought nothing by himself »: if therefore the action of Sennacherib was evil and cruel, and Sennacherib in that action was the instrument of God; it seems therefore that every evil action is from him as from a first principle.
2. Likewise, things which are of the same genus have the same first principles3; but to give alms for the sake of God, and to give alms for the sake of vainglory are actions of the same genus in the genus of nature: if therefore that action by which one gives alms for the sake of God is from God; it seems that also that action by which one gives alms for the cause of empty glory is from God.
3. Likewise, the working of miracles is from God alone; but someone in working miracles sins, because he does it for the sake of vainglory: therefore it seems that some action subjected to the deformity of fault is from God: therefore by parity of reasoning so is every other.
4. Likewise, all knowledge is from the Lord God4; but someone learns for the sake of avarice: therefore since he cannot learn except with God aiding and cooperating, and that learning is sin; the action subjected to sin is related to God as to a principle.
5. Likewise, someone by committing adultery generates offspring; I ask therefore, whether that action or that coitus is from God, or not. If it is from God, I have what I propose. If it is not from God, therefore the offspring generated is not from God. If therefore it is impossible to posit that there be some human who is not from God: therefore also that [is impossible] from which it follows, namely that the action subjected to sin be not from God.
6. Likewise, the action which is subjected to sin is not altogether nothing, as is manifestly apparent. If therefore it is in some way a being; I ask, from what it is. If it is from the potency of the creature, it is necessary that it be from it according to that which it has of entity: that therefore, insofar as it is an action from that potency, is either from God, or not. If it is from God, since « everything which is the cause of a cause, is the cause of the caused5 », understood per se — namely, if the middle caused is the cause of the last, according to that which it has from the first — then it follows necessarily that such an action is from God. But if it is not from God, then I ask: it is either from itself, or from another. If from another, then I ask likewise concerning that other: it is either from itself, or from another: therefore either it will be a going to infinity, or it will be to posit that the creature has something from itself, or that it has from another than from God, which is a first principle, in which there is a stopping-point. But all these are impossible and follow from this, that some action is posited not to be from God6: therefore etc.
To the opposite.
On the contrary:
1. God does not act against his own prohibition, because then he would be contrary to himself; but God prohibits some action, insofar as it is an action, just as he prohibited Adam not to eat of the apple7: therefore it seems that that eating of Adam was not from God. But that that action was prohibited, insofar as it is an action, appears, because to eat of that apple was of itself good, and there was no deformity in it, except after it was prohibited.
2. Likewise, every action which is from a good will, as is one operating through charity, is good with a perfect goodness in the genus of morals8; but every action which goes forth from God goes forth from the best will, in which is the highest charity: therefore every action of which God is the principle is good with the goodness of morals. But the action subjected to sin is not good with the goodness of morals: therefore it is not from God.
3. Likewise, all things whatsoever God does, he does with a good end — for he wrought all things for himself9 — but everything which is done with a good end is simply good; but the action subjected to sin is not simply good: therefore it cannot be from God as from a cause.
4. Likewise, whenever the agent is conjoined to the rule10 in operating, he operates rightly and well; but the rule of free choice is the rectitude itself of the divine will: therefore in every operation in which God cooperates with free choice, when there is a conjoining of the agent to the rule, there is rectitude. If therefore in some operation throughout the whole there is a swerving, it seems that its cooperation is not from God.
5. Likewise, if the operation which is subject to sin is from God and from free choice, either it is wholly from God and wholly from free choice, or part from God and part from free choice. If wholly from God and wholly from free choice: therefore it seems that the whole is at once both good and evil; which is altogether impossible. If part from God and part from free choice; but by whatever reasoning one part is posited to be from free choice, by the same reasoning the other can also be posited: and so it seems that the whole operation is so from free choice that it is not from God.
6. Likewise, if God cooperates with free choice in an action which is subjected to sin; either therefore free choice moves more principally than God, or conversely. It is established that free choice in no operation can move either more principally or equally principally as God, since God, both in moving and in causing — of whatever it be said to be either cause or mover — is understood to be the most principal. If11 therefore God moves more principally, therefore if the principal mover excites and moves the non-principal mover; it seems that in a culpable operation free choice is excited by God: therefore when the adulterer commits lust, and the thief steals, they are excited by God to such actions; which is altogether absurd.
Conclusion.
Every action, whether subjected to sin or not, insofar as it is an action, is from God.
I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text12, concerning this question there were diverse positions of men so great and so reasonable, that not even the Master dared to define which of them contained the more truth. Yet, because through much discussion doubts are led to manifestation, now it is commonly held that that opinion is the truer which says that every action, whether subjected to sin or not, according to that which is action, is from God. — And not without reason, because this must be posited, if the eminence of the divine power and the indigence of the power of the creature be weighed.
For because God is the most primordial cause, therefore he is of the greatest influence into secondary causes, and of so great influence that not even a little or however small a thing, provided it be in some way a being, proceeds from any created cause, except with the divine omnipotence cooperating13. — Also every created potency, so far as is of itself, is defective and is not purely active: therefore however small an operation it makes, it has need to be aided by that potency which is pure act on account of its complete unmixedness with matter, and which alone suffices for itself, in no way needing to be aided by another cause.
And therefore this position, which says that every action is from God, insofar as it is action, is to be held without any ambiguity. Whence Anselm in the book On the Concord of Predestination and Foreknowledge14: « Every quality and every action and whatever has any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice and no injustice. God therefore does all things which are done by a just or unjust will, that is, good works and evil. In good [works] indeed he does that they are and that they are good; but in evil he does that they are, but not that they are evil ». And again in the same place: « God does all actions and all motions, because
he himself makes the things from which and out of which and through which and in which they are done: and no thing has any power of willing or doing, except by his giving; the willing itself also, which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust15, is from God ». « But not-to-be-right is not anything, nor is it from God ». — The reasons therefore adduced for the first part are to be granted.
1. But to that which is objected, that God does not act against his own prohibition; it must be said that it is true. But God, when he prohibits some action, does not prohibit [it] to himself, but to another; nor does he prohibit16 his own cooperation, which he does not withdraw from the creature, but he prohibits the operation to the creature itself; and therefore, while he cooperates with it, he does not act against his own prohibition. And if you object to me, that nonetheless the action prohibited by God is from God; it must be said that in a prohibited action there are two things to consider: both that it is an action and that it is prohibited; but by him it is done, insofar as it is action, but not insofar as prohibited; and therefore it does not follow that he acts against himself.
2. To that which is objected, that every action which is from a good will is good; it must be said that this has truth in a created will, but it is not necessary that it have truth in an uncreated will, speaking of the goodness of morals. And the reason for this is this: that, when some action is from a good created will, since the uncreated will, which cooperates with it, is without doubt good, that action is simply good, because its whole cause is good. But when17 the uncreated will is good, which cooperates with the created will, the created will can be disordered, and by reason of that a defect can come about concerning that operation. Whence just as we see that in some operation which is from God and from a created power, from the defect of the created power that operation wholly fails; so also from the disorder of the created will it happens that that action is depraved. — Otherwise it could be said that operation is spoken of in two ways. In one way operation is called the work operating; in another way the work operated. And when it is said: if the will is good, the work is good; this is to be understood of the operating work, which namely is the act of the will itself, as the willing; and so it does not have an instance in God, because the willing of God is God, and the action of God is God, in this manner. But if operation be called the work operated itself, then it does not follow that such a work be good with complete or meritorious goodness, but it suffices that it be good with the goodness of nature, as is clear. Works which proceed from the will of God are good with the goodness of nature, and this goodness the action has which is subjected to malice.
3. But to that which is objected, that God does all things for himself; it must be said that it is true; and it must also be granted that he does for himself the action subjected to malice; for he cooperates with the creature for his own sake. But when it is said that the operation which is done for the sake of God is good with the goodness of morals; this is understood of the operation of a rational creature. For it cannot be understood of God, for the reason that God cooperates not only with the rational creature, but also with the irrational; yet that operation is not said to be good with the goodness of morals.
4. To that which is objected, that when a created agent is conjoined to the directing rule, he does not err; it must be said that it is true, if he is simply conjoined to it. But then he is conjoined to it simply, when he is conjoined both as to the operation and as to the circumstances. But when he goes out into an operation deprived of due circumstances, in this, that he goes out into the operation, he is conjoined to it, but in this, that he deprives it of due circumstances, he fails and is disjoined from it; and so he is disjoined, not by acting, but by failing, and by failing is the principle of evil; and in this, that he fails, he recedes from God, because that defect is not from God. For although God cooperates with the one operating, yet he does not fail with the one failing18.
5. To that which is asked: whether the whole operation is from God etc.; it must be said that it is wholly from God, and wholly from free choice. For it is not to be understood that God cooperates with free choice as when two carry a stone, one cooperates with the other; but because God is intimately acting in every action, and is intimate to the operating potency itself, so that the potency itself goes out into nothing which is not from him. — And if one object that the same action will be wholly good and wholly evil; it must be said that God gives to that action only the goodness of nature; but free choice does not deprive it of the goodness of nature, but of the goodness of morals. And these two do not have opposition, namely, that something have the goodness of nature and be deprived of the goodness of morals.
6. To that which is objected, that God is the principal mover in such an action; it must be said that it is true; yet it does not follow from this that he excites free choice to the doing of that operation. For excitation says some effect of grace, preceding19 the will itself. But this is required in meritorious goods; in other works, indifferent or even evil, there is nothing except the sole cooperation of the divine power, which existing in the creature potentially, essentially, and presentially, just as it conserves it in being, so it aids it in operating; on account of which it is granted that there is there cooperation, yet not prevention, or consequence.
I. Here arises the difficult question concerning the concurrence of God to evil actions. In this first question it is inquired in general concerning the concurrence of God to every action; but then in the three following questions of the article the principles already demonstrated are applied to actions affected by diverse defects; where the distinction of a threefold defect is to be noted beforehand, which is explained in a. 2. q. 3. in the body. Concerning the immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of creatures it has already been treated in I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2, where in the scholion some things were noted concerning the opinions of theologians (cfr. also here dub. 2, above d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1, d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.). In what sense God is called the universal and particular cause, see I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. But a twofold difficulty seems generally to oppose the aforesaid concurrence, namely, that it derogates both from the true causality of secondary causes (concerning which see above d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.) and from the liberty of intellectual creatures (concerning which some things are said above d. 26. a. 6, d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.). But a special and third difficulty is concerning morally evil acts, which seemed so difficult to the Master that he stuck, doubtful, concerning the determining of this question. Concerning the same matter much was disputed also among the more ancient Scholastics, as is established from the Summa of Praepositivus (p. II.), who is of the opinion that in no way are evil actions from God, against whom Aegid. R. specially disputes (here q. 1. a. 3.). But the common opinion of the later Scholastics is defended by Guliel. of Auxerre in his Summa aurea, « whose sayings Alex. Hal. commonly inserts », as Dionys. Carth. says (II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2.). Among the subsequent Scholastics it has already been observed in the scholion to I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. that Durandus alone (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4. and here q. 1.) impugned the immediate concurrence of God to the actions of creatures, specially to evil actions. S. Bonaventure himself, with St. Thomas favoring, concludes that the common doctrine « is to be held without any ambiguity ».
II. Aegid. R. (in the cited place), who proves this opinion by five ways, observes: « Action is both being and action; and as it is being it is from God as from the first being, from whom are all other beings; but as it is action, it is also from God in a certain special way, because it is led back into God not only generally, as all beings are led back into God generally as into the first being, but also specially, as all actions are specially led back into God as into the first agent ». Which doctrine is taken from St. Thomas (S. I. II. q. 79. a. 2.) saying: « The act of sin is both being and act; and from both it has that it is from God ». The same holy Doctor in the Disputed Questions on Power q. 3. a. 7. concludes his profound inquiry thus: « Thus therefore God is the cause of every action, insofar as he gives the power of acting, and insofar as he conserves it, and insofar as he applies it to the action, and insofar as by his power every other power acts ». — It is known, especially concerning those words: « insofar as he applies it to the action », that there arose among later theologians and schools a controversy which intimately coheres with the diverse opinions concerning the efficacy of grace (cfr. above d. 26. q. 6.). The sum of each opinion is commonly expressed by the terms physical premotion and simultaneous concurrence; concerning which let the approved authors of each school be consulted.
III. Besides the cited places: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 3. — Scot., here q. 1. 2, and Report. here q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1. a. 2, q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 105. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 66. 67. 89. 90. 162, de Malo, here q. 3. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 35. a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 14. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica and II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2.
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- Vers. 5.Verse 5.
- Vers. 15. Vulg. ibi gloriabitur pro elevabitur. — Glossam habet Lyranus. — In fine arg. pro omnis mala actio codd. K Y omnis alia actio.Verse 15. There the Vulgate [reads] gloriabitur ("shall glory") for elevabitur ("shall be exalted"). — Lyranus has the Gloss. — At the end of the argument, for omnis mala actio ("every evil action") codd. K Y [read] omnis alia actio ("every other action").
- Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 33. et X. text. 12. seqq. (IV. c. 28. et IX. c. 3. seq.).See Aristotle, V. Metaphysics text 33 and X. text 12 seqq. (IV. c. 28. and IX. c. 3. seq.).
- Libr. I. Reg. 2, 3: Deus scientiarum Dominus est. — Mox pro cooperante codd. F K T W cc ee et alii cum ed. 1 operante.I. Kings 2, 3: The Lord is the God of knowledge. — Soon, for cooperante ("cooperating") codd. F K T W cc ee and others, with ed. 1, [read] operante ("operating").
- Alanus ab Insulis, I. de Arte seu articulis cathol. fidei, n. 1.Alan of Lille, I. On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith, n. 1.
- Edd. praeter 1 sic: et sequitur ex hoc, quod aliqua actio non est a Deo.The editions except 1 [read] thus: and it follows from this, that some action is not from God.
- Gen. 2, 17. — Pro non comedere ed. 1 ne comederet; codd. L O bene omittunt non ante comedere. In fine arg. pro prohibitum cod. bb prohibita.Genesis 2, 17. — For non comedere ("not to eat") ed. 1 [reads] ne comederet ("that he should not eat"); codd. L O rightly omit non before comedere. At the end of the argument, for prohibitum cod. bb [reads] prohibita.
- Cfr. infra d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et dub. 2.Cfr. below d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. and dub. 2.
- Prov. 16, 4: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus. — De propos. seq. vide infra d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.Proverbs 16, 4: The Lord wrought all things for himself. — Concerning the following proposition see below d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.
- Edd. subdunt dirigenti. Paulo inferius pro cum fit codd. P Q Z et edd. 2, 3 quando fit, Vat. quoniam fit.The editions add dirigenti ("directing"). A little below, for cum fit codd. P Q Z and edd. 2, 3 [read] quando fit, the Vatican [edition] quoniam fit.
- Edd., excepta 1, omissa vocula Si, conclusionem ergo Deus movet principalius praecedentibus adnectunt. Aliquanto superius pro in nulla operatione Vat. in illa operatione.The editions, except 1, omitting the little word Si ("if"), attach the conclusion therefore God moves more principally to the preceding [clauses]. Somewhat above, for in nulla operatione ("in no operation") the Vatican [edition reads] in illa operatione ("in that operation").
- Hic c. 1. seq. — Mox pro positiones cod. F opiniones.Here c. 1. seq. — Soon, for positiones ("positions") cod. F [reads] opiniones ("opinions").
- Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 18. (c. 14.): Patet autem sic esse, quemadmodum in universo est Deus, et vicissim cuncta in illo [in textu Graeco κἂν ἐκείνῃ (scil. ψυχῇ), cuius verba ed. Didot sic reddit, vel potius interpretatur: sic etiam in anima]; moventur enim omnia ab inexistente in nobis numine. Cfr. de Mundo, c. 7. (c. 6.), et Liber de Causis, propos. 1. — Pro omnipotentia edd., excepta 1, potentia, et deinde pro Omnis etiam codd. B D Q Omnis enim. Paulo ante pro parvum Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 parum.Aristotle, VII. Eudemian Ethics c. 18. (c. 14.): But it is clear to be thus, just as in the universe there is God, and in turn all things are in him [in the Greek text κἂν ἐκείνῃ (that is, "in the soul"), whose words the Didot edition renders, or rather interprets, thus: so also in the soul]; for all things are moved by the divine power existing within us. Cfr. On the World, c. 7. (c. 6.), and the Book of Causes, prop. 1. — For omnipotentia the editions, except 1, [read] potentia, and then for Omnis etiam codd. B D Q [read] Omnis enim. A little before, for parvum the Vatican [edition], with edd. 3, 4, [reads] parum.
- Quaest. 1. c. 7. Ibidem et duo textus seqq. — In primo textu pro iusta vel iniusta codd. F I K T V Y bb ee et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 iusta sive iniusta.Question 1. c. 7. In the same place and the two following texts. — In the first text, for iusta vel iniusta ("just or unjust") codd. F I K T V Y bb ee and others, with edd. 2, 3, 4, [read] iusta sive iniusta ("just or unjust").
- Textus originalis prosequitur: nec est aliud quam uti potestate volendi et voluntate, quas Deus dat; in quantum est, bonum est etc. — Idem textus origin. pro potentiam volendi exhibet potestatem volendi et in testimonio seq. recte pro rectum, loco cuius vocabuli Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 posuerunt bonum.The original text continues: nor is it anything other than to use the power of willing and the will, which God gives; insofar as it is, it is good, etc. — The same original text, for potentiam volendi exhibits potestatem volendi, and in the following testimony rightly [has] rectum ("right"), in place of which word the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 put bonum ("good").
- In cod. C additur sibi.In cod. C is added sibi ("to himself").
- Vat. addit hoc quod.The Vatican [edition] adds hoc quod.
- Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp.Cfr. above d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. at the end of the body.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 praevenientis. Mox pro in bonis cod. N in operibus.Cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] praevenientis. Soon, for in bonis ("in goods") cod. N [reads] in operibus ("in works").