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Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
p. 345

Articulus III. De caelis in comparatione ad motoris influentiam.

Consequenter quaeritur tertio loco de caelis in comparatione ad motoris influentiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum primum mobile moveatur a Deo immediate tantum, an mediante aliqua virtute creata.

Secundum est, utrum moveatur ab Intelligentia, an a propria forma.

Quaestio I. Utrum caelum immediate moveatur a Deo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod caelum immediate moveatur a Deo:

Ad oppositum. 1. Primo per Philosophum, qui in secundo de Caelo et mundo dicit: « Causa prima movet causatum primum »; causa autem prima non est nisi Deus: ergo etc.

2. Item, Boethius de Consolatione1, loquens ad Dominum:

Stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri:

ergo videtur, quod maxime moveat illud quod est primum mobile; hoc autem est caelum: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Primi mobilis motor debet esse primus; sed « primus motor est immobilis omnino2 », quia nunquam est status nisi in immobili; sed nihil est omnino primum et immobile nisi solus Deus: ergo motus primi mobilis solus Deus est principium.

4. Item, ex motu et influentia caelestis corporis est conservatio omnium corporum viventium3: ergo ex motore eius erit conservatio omnium spirituum vivificantium, quia, sicut se habet mobile ad mobile, sic se habet motor ad motorem; sed solus Deus est ille qui est conservator et vivificator spirituum: ergo solus ipse movet primum caelum.

Sed contra: 1. Fundamenta. Immensitas potentiae et sapientiae et bonitatis hoc requirit, ut Deus communicet virtuti creatae actum, quem illa est nata suscipere4; sed actus, qui est movere secundum locum quodcumque corpus, est natus convenire virtuti creatae: ergo videtur, quod Deus nullum corpus moveat absque virtute alicuius creaturae.

2. Item, virtus motoris debet proportionari mobili5; sed virtus caeli finita est, virtus autem Dei infinita est: ergo ad hoc, quod salvetur in mundo proportio debita, videtur, quod inter Deum moventem et caelum motum sit ponere aliquam virtutem creatam et finitam.

3. Item, Philosophus6 dicit, quod si tanta virtus movet in tanto tempore, et maior in minori, et maxima in minimo, et infinita in nunc: ergo si Deus infinitae virtutis est, et ipse immediate movet caelum, videtur, quod in instanti revolvat ipsum ab oriente in occidens, quod manifeste falsum est. Si tu dicas, quod Deus in movendo non exercet totius virtutis suae effectum, quia cum sit movens voluntarium, potest movere et cito et tarde; tunc redit prima obiectio, quia, cum actus iste, scilicet movere successive, sit virtutis finitae, erit natus convenire creaturae.

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4. Item, ea quae sunt immediate a divina potentia, procedunt in esse secundum cursum mirabilem, ut patet in creatione et iustificatione et miraculorum operatione7: ergo si caelum immediate movetur a Deo, motus eius est mirabilis, non naturalis; quodsi est naturalis, non ergo est a Deo immediate.

### Conclusio. Deus movet primum mobile mediante aliqua virtute creata, cui ipse immediate cooperatur.

Respondeo: Praenotanda. Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in omni operatione Deus operatur intime et immediate, « cum Dei voluntas, sicut dicit Augustinus8, et habitum est in primo libro, sit prima et summa causa omnium specierum et motionum ». In aliquibus autem sic operatur, ut ipse sit tota causa; in aliquibus sic operatur et movet, ut virtutem agendi et movendi communicet creaturae. Et prima quidem dicuntur mirabilia, secunda vero naturalia, vel voluntaria quantum ad egressum.

Sensus quaestionis. Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum motus primi mobilis immediate sit a Deo, non est quaestio, utrum virtus divina intime operetur et immediate ad illam mutationem exercendam, quia sic nihil movetur, nisi ipse moveat et cooperetur virtuti motivae; sed est quaestio, utrum motus primi mobilis sit a Deo tanquam a tota causa, an simul cum virtute divina movente moveat aliqua virtus creata. — Conclusio. Et ad istam quaestionem satis de plano responderi potest, quod cum motus ille sit natus convenire virtuti finitae propter sui successionem, et divina bonitas ad sui manifestationem communicet creaturae quod ipsa nata est suscipere, quod Deus primum mobile movet mediante aliqua virtute creata, sicut et alia mobilia. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae, quamvis aliquae non necessario cogant.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Solutio oppositorum. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de Philosopho, dici posset satis probabiliter, quod Philosophus non intellexit, quod primi orbis motor per modum efficientis esset Deus. Ipse enim ponit, virtutem motoris adeo proportionari mobili, quod si minimum vel modicum corpus apponeretur corpori, lassaretur virtus motoris in movendo, sicut dicit in libro de Caelo et mundo9. Notandum. Sed ponit, quod Deus moveat primum causatum metaphorice, sicut finis et desideratum; aut si ponit, quod moveat per modum efficientis, non ponit, quod ipse solus moveat, sed cooperante virtute mobili proportionata. Unde verbum suum potest intelligi esse dictum per quandam appropriationem et primariam influentiae suae susceptionem.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Boethio, quod Deus cuncta movet; dicendum, quod ex illa auctoritate non concluditur, quod solus Deus moveat10, sed quod non moventur absque divinae virtutis influentia. Nulla enim virtus alicuius motoris potest vel modicum operari sine beneficio et auxilio eius, qui penitus est immobilis, sicut in primo libro11 ostensum fuit et in sequentibus ostendetur, cum quaeritur, utrum omnis actio sit a Deo.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motor primi mobilis est primus et immobilis; dicendum, quod non oportet motorem primi mobilis esse omnimode primum, vel omnimode immobilem; sed sufficit quod sit primus respectu aliorum motorum sive virtutum moventium, et quod sit immobilis secundum eum modum, per quem movet12. Non enim oportet esse statum in motore primi mobilis simpliciter, sed in genere creaturarum. Omnes autem creaturae defectivae sunt et reducuntur ad ipsum Deum, qui est principium et finis omnium, citra quem nec est perfecta quies nec perfectus status13.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut influentia mobilis conservat mobilia, ita influentia motoris motores alios; dicendum, quod illud non oportet, quia non est consimilis proportio, pro eo quod ordo est in corporibus mundi secundum tantam praedominantiam et excellentiam, quod unum potest simpliciter influere in alterum. Spiritus vero rationales, qui sunt vivificatores et motores corporum, sic habent gradum et ordinem, ut tamen secundum suum supremum a Deo immediate perficiantur et formentur; et hoc est propter rationem imaginis, per quam immediate sunt ipsius Dei capaces14.

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Scholion.

I. Dum recentiores astronomi et physici de motibus corporum caelestium et de proportionibus, quae sunt in his motibus secundum legem gravitationis sive attractionis, plurima accurate exploraverunt; S. Bonav. hic disputat de ipsa virtute motiva in se considerata, qua causantur illi motus legesque motus; quae quaestio profecto non potest solvi sola observatione motuum, vel proportionum, secundum quas illa causa motiva agit. — Quoad utramque huius articuli quaestionem quatuor exortae sunt opiniones, quarum duae primae communiter a Scholasticis reprobantur. Prima contendit, ab ipso Deo ut totali causa primum mobile immediate moveri; quod a S. Doctore in I. quaest. reprobatur, secundum principia iam I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. et II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. posita. — Secunda sententia (q. 2.) corporibus caelestibus tribuit animam, quae sit causa immediata motus; et haec sententia non tantum philosophis Arabis, sed etiam Platoni et Aristoteli a multis, imprimis a B. Alberto et Richardo, adscribitur. Scotus autem asserit, Aristotelem loqui de animatione non in sensu formali, sed secundum virtutem motricem. Etiam S. Thom. (S. I. q. 70. a. 3. in corp.) dicit: « Unde inter ponentes, ea esse animata, et ponentes ea inanimata, parva vel nulla differentia invenitur in re, sed in voce tantum ». De hac autem animatione ipse S. Augustinus dubitavit, qui, ut observat Scotus (hic q. 1. n. 5.), in ipsa retractatione sua, quam commemorat S. Bonav. (q. 2. in corp.), eam non ut prorsus falsam reprobat. Vide ipsa verba Augustini infra p. II. dub. 3. Sed Scholastici severius de eadem iudicant, si proprie intelligitur de anima ut forma. — Tertia et quarta opinio in 2. quaest. clare explicantur, et utraque a S. Bonav. approbatur, dummodo tertiae sententiae addatur, quod « si aliquid desit sibi ad movendi sufficientiam, suppleatur ab ipsa virtute divina ». Quarta opinio, quae tenet, quod aliquis intellectus creatus sit proximus motor caeli, communiter a Scholasticis tanquam probabilior sustinetur.

II. Utramque quaestionem huius articuli alii commentatores plerumque una quaestione absolvunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 52. m. 2. a. 4. quaest. incid. et q. 18. m. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. q. 70. a. 3; S. c. Gent. II. 69, III. c. 23. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. II. q. 53. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 6, et a. 3. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. et q. 3. a. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article III. On the heavens in comparison to the influence of the mover.

Consequently, it is asked in the third place concerning the heavens in comparison to the influence of the mover. And concerning this two things are asked.

First, it is asked whether the first mobile is moved by God immediately only, or by means of some created power.

The second is, whether it is moved by an Intelligence, or by its own proper form.

Question I. Whether the heaven is moved immediately by God.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the heaven is moved immediately by God:

On the opposite side. 1. First through the Philosopher, who in the second [book] On the Heavens and the World says: "The first cause moves the first caused"; but the first cause is none other than God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius On Consolation1, speaking to the Lord:

And, remaining stable, you grant all things to be moved:

therefore it seems that he most of all moves that which is the first mobile; but this is the heaven: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. The mover of the first mobile must be the first; but "the first mover is altogether immobile2," because there is never rest except in the immobile; but nothing is altogether first and immobile save God alone: therefore God alone is the principle of the motion of the first mobile.

4. Likewise, from the motion and influence of the celestial body comes the conservation of all living bodies3: therefore from its mover will come the conservation of all life-giving spirits, because, as the mobile relates to the mobile, so the mover relates to the mover; but God alone is he who is the conserver and vivifier of spirits: therefore he alone moves the first heaven.

On the contrary: 1. Foundations. The immensity of his power and wisdom and goodness requires this, that God communicate to created power the act which that [power] is suited by nature to receive4; but the act, which is to move whatsoever body according to place, is suited by nature to befit a created power: therefore it seems that God moves no body without the power of some creature.

2. Likewise, the power of the mover must be proportioned to the mobile5; but the power of the heaven is finite, whereas the power of God is infinite: therefore in order that the due proportion may be preserved in the world, it seems that between God moving and the heaven moved some created and finite power must be posited.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher6 says that if such-and-such a power moves in such-and-such a time, and a greater [power] in less [time], and the greatest in the least, and an infinite [power] in a now: therefore if God is of infinite power, and he himself immediately moves the heaven, it seems that in an instant he would revolve it from east to west, which is manifestly false. If you should say that God in moving does not exercise the full effect of his power, because, since he is a voluntary mover, he can move both quickly and slowly; then the first objection returns, because, since this act, namely to move successively, is of finite power, it will be suited by nature to befit a creature.

4. Likewise, those things which are immediately from divine power proceed into being according to a miraculous course, as is evident in creation and in justification and in the working of miracles7: therefore if the heaven is moved immediately by God, its motion is miraculous, not natural; but if it is natural, then it is not from God immediately.

### Conclusion. God moves the first mobile by means of some created power, with which he immediately cooperates.

I respond: Preliminaries. For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that in every operation God operates intimately and immediately, "since the will of God, as Augustine says8, and as was held in the first book, is the first and highest cause of all species and motions." In some things, however, he operates in such a way that he himself is the whole cause; in some things he operates and moves in such a way that he communicates to the creature the power of acting and moving. And the first indeed are called miraculous, the second natural, or voluntary as to their issuing forth.

The sense of the question. When therefore it is asked whether the motion of the first mobile is immediately from God, the question is not whether the divine power operates intimately and immediately for exercising that change, because in this sense nothing is moved unless he himself moves and cooperates with the motive power; but the question is whether the motion of the first mobile is from God as from the whole cause, or whether together with the divine power moving some created power [also] moves. — Conclusion. And to this question one can quite plainly respond, that since that motion is suited by nature to befit a finite power on account of its successiveness, and the divine goodness for its own manifestation communicates to the creature that which it is naturally suited to receive, God moves the first mobile by means of some created power, just as also the other mobiles. — And the reasons adduced for this are to be granted, although some do not necessarily compel.

To the arguments on the affirmative side:

To 1. Solution of the opposing [arguments]. To that indeed which is objected from the Philosopher, it can be said probably enough that the Philosopher did not understand that the mover of the first orb was God by way of efficient [cause]. For he himself posits that the power of the mover is so proportioned to the mobile that if even the smallest or least body were added to a body, the power of the mover would be wearied in moving, as he says in the book On the Heavens and the World9. To be noted. But he posits that God moves the first caused metaphorically, as end and as that which is desired; or if he posits that he moves by way of efficient [cause], he does not posit that he alone moves, but with the mobile's proportioned power cooperating. Hence his statement can be understood to have been said by a certain appropriation and by [reference to] the primary reception of his influence.

To 2. To that which is objected from Boethius, that God moves all things; it must be said that from that authority it is not concluded that God alone moves10, but that they are not moved without the influence of the divine power. For no power of any mover can operate even a little without the benefit and aid of him who is wholly immobile, as was shown in the first book11 and as will be shown in what follows, when it is asked whether every action is from God.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the mover of the first mobile is first and immobile; it must be said that it is not necessary that the mover of the first mobile be in every way first, or in every way immobile; but it suffices that it be first in respect of the other movers or moving powers, and that it be immobile according to that mode by which it moves12. For it is not necessary that there be rest in the mover of the first mobile absolutely, but [only] in the genus of creatures. But all creatures are defective and are led back to God himself, who is the principle and end of all, beyond whom there is neither perfect rest nor perfect stay13.

To 4. To that which is objected, that as the influence of the mobile conserves mobiles, so the influence of the mover [conserves] other movers; it must be said that this does not follow, because the proportion is not similar, for this reason: that order is in the bodies of the world according to such great predominance and excellence that one can simply influence another. But rational spirits, who are vivifiers and movers of bodies, have a grade and order in such a way that nevertheless according to their highest [part] they are perfected and formed by God immediately; and this is on account of the character of image, by which they are immediately capable of God himself14.

Scholion.

I. While more recent astronomers and physicists have accurately explored very many things concerning the motions of the celestial bodies and concerning the proportions which are in these motions according to the law of gravitation or attraction; St. Bonaventure here disputes concerning the motive power itself considered in itself, by which those motions and the laws of motion are caused; which question certainly cannot be solved by the mere observation of motions, or of the proportions according to which that motive cause acts. — As to each of the two questions of this article four opinions have arisen, of which the first two are commonly rejected by the Scholastics. The first contends that the first mobile is moved immediately by God himself as the total cause; which is rejected by the Holy Doctor in Question I, according to the principles already posited in I Sent. d. 45. a. 2. and II Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — The second opinion (q. 2.) attributes to the celestial bodies a soul which is the immediate cause of motion; and this opinion is ascribed by many not only to the Arab philosophers, but also to Plato and Aristotle, especially to Blessed Albert and Richard. Scotus, however, asserts that Aristotle speaks of animation not in the formal sense, but according to motive power. Likewise St. Thomas (S. I. q. 70. a. 3. in corp.) says: "Hence between those who posit them to be animate, and those who posit them to be inanimate, little or no difference is found in the matter, but only in word." Of this animation, however, St. Augustine himself was in doubt, who, as Scotus observes (here q. 1. n. 5.), in his very Retractation, which St. Bonaventure recalls (q. 2. in corp.), does not reprove it as utterly false. See the very words of Augustine below at p. II. dub. 3. But the Scholastics judge more severely of the same, if it is properly understood of soul as form. — The third and fourth opinions are clearly explained in the second question, and both are approved by St. Bonaventure, provided that to the third opinion is added that "if anything is wanting to it for the sufficiency of moving, let it be supplied by the divine power itself." The fourth opinion, which holds that some created intellect is the proximate mover of the heaven, is commonly maintained by the Scholastics as the more probable.

II. Each of the two questions of this article other commentators usually settle in a single question. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 52. m. 2. a. 4. quaest. incid. and q. 18. m. 4. — Scot., in each Scriptum here q. 1. — St. Thom., here q. unica a. 3; S. I. q. 70. a. 3; S. c. Gent. II. 69, III. c. 23. — B. Albert., here a. 6; S. p. II. tr. II. q. 53. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 6, and a. 3. q. 4. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 3. and q. 3. a. 4. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. III. metro 9.
    Book III, metre 9.
  2. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 44. (c. 3.), ubi hanc propositionem tanquam conclusionem praecedentium probationum exhibet; XII. Metaph. text. 43. (XI. c. 8.). Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 4. et pag. 32, nota 7.
    Aristotle, VIII Physics text 44 (c. 3.), where he presents this proposition as the conclusion of the preceding proofs; XII Metaphysics text 43 (XI c. 8.). Cf. above p. 14, note 4 and p. 32, note 7.
  3. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 68. (c. 12.); supra pag. 74, nota 2. et in hac d. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. — In fine arg. cod. T primum mobile pro primum caelum.
    Cf. Aristotle, II On the Heavens and the World, text 68 (c. 12.); above p. 74, note 2, and in this distinction, art. 1, q. 2, in the body. — At the end of the argument codex T reads primum mobile for primum caelum.
  4. Vide supra d. 11. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3.
    See above d. 11, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3.
  5. Colligitur ex Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 36. et 71. (c. 6.), ubi dicit: « Primum enim primi et incorruptibile incorruptibilis et ingenerabile ingenerabilis motivum est »; et text. 71. (c. 12.): Omnis autem finiti corporis ad finitum virtus est. Cfr. etiam VII. Phys. text. 35. seqq. (c. 3.). — De seqq. cfr. VIII. Phys. text. 79. seqq. (c. 10.), ubi ostendit, in magnitudine finita non posse inveniri potentiam infinitam.
    It is gathered from Aristotle, II On the Heavens and the World, text 36 and 71 (c. 6.), where he says: "For the first [mover] of the first [moved] is incorruptible of [what is] incorruptible and ungenerable of [what is] ungenerable as motive"; and text 71 (c. 12.): But all power of a finite body is [directed] to the finite. Cf. also VII Physics text 35 ff. (c. 3.). — For what follows cf. VIII Physics text 79 ff. (c. 10.), where he shows that in a finite magnitude an infinite power cannot be found.
  6. Arg. hoc insinuatur ab Averroe, II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 38; Libr. VI. Phys. text. 13. (c. 2.); VII. text. 33. seqq. (c. 3.) et VIII. text. 79. seqq. (c. 10.). — In hac prop. multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt movet. Terminus nunc idem est ac instans.
    This argument is suggested by Averroes, II On the Heavens and the World, text 38; Book VI Physics text 13 (c. 2.); VII text 33 ff. (c. 3.) and VIII text 79 ff. (c. 10.). — In this proposition many codices with editions 1, 2 omit movet. The term nunc is the same as instans.
  7. Cfr. Anselm., de Concept. virg. et orig. pecc. c. 11, ubi distinguit tres rerum cursus, scil. mirabilem, naturalem et voluntarium, ac dicit, quod « ea quae nec natura creata, nec voluntas creaturae, sed solus Deus facit, semper miranda sint ».
    Cf. Anselm, On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin c. 11, where he distinguishes three courses of things, namely the miraculous, the natural and the voluntary, and says that "those things which neither created nature, nor the will of a creature, but God alone does, are always to be wondered at."
  8. Libr. III. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9, ubi textus originalis post omnium subiungit corporalium. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 1. Ibid. in corp. q. principia, quae hic tanguntur, diffusius explicantur.
    Book III On the Trinity c. 4, n. 9, where the original text after omnium adds corporalium. — Cf. I Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. fundamentum 1. Ibid. in the body of the question the principles which are here touched on are more amply explained.
  9. Vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
    See below d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. in the body.
  10. Libr. II. text. 71. (c. 12.) secundum versionem Arabico-latinam: « Et si in aliquo orbe orbium erraticorum essent plures stellae, esset ultimus orbis in labore ». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: « Intendebat [Aristoteles], quod potentia moti ex eo addet supra potentiam suam [motoris] naturalem: quoniam causa laboris in animalibus est, ut addat potentia moti super potentiam motoris; quoniam potentia moti necessario est opposita potentiae motoris ». Haec Aristotelis verba respicit Averroes, ibid. text. 38, dicens: Et hoc apparet ex hoc, quod dicet post Aristoteles; quoniam si ceteri orbes habuissent ex multitudine stellarum, quod habet orbis stellatus, tunc motor eorum non posset movere eos in velocitate, quam modo habent; et similiter esset, si orbis esset maior, quam sit. Et ideo credendum est, quod potentiae moventium sunt terminatae proportionis ad corpora mota (ed. Venet. 1560). — Quod Deus moveat ut finis et desideratum, docet Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 36. (XI. c. 7.); II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 66. (c. 12.).
    Book II text 71 (c. 12.) according to the Arabico-Latin version: "And if in any of the wandering orbs there were several stars, the last orb would be in toil." Which words Averroes thus expounds: "He intended [Aristotle] that the power of the moved would from this add upon his [the mover's] natural power: because the cause of toil in animals is that the power of the moved adds upon the power of the mover; since the power of the moved is necessarily opposed to the power of the mover." Averroes refers to these words of Aristotle, ibid. text 38, saying: And this is evident from this, that Aristotle says afterwards; for if the other orbs had had from the multitude of stars what the starry orb has, then their mover could not move them at the speed which they now have; and likewise it would be if the orb were greater than it is. And therefore it is to be believed that the powers of movers are of a proportion limited to the bodies moved (ed. Venet. 1560). — That God moves as end and desired, Aristotle teaches, XII Metaphysics text 36 (XI c. 7.); II On the Heavens and the World, text 66 (c. 12.).
  11. Supple cum Vat. cuncta.
    Supply with the Vatican [edition] cuncta.
  12. Dist. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1; d. 15. a. 2. q. 2; et infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1.
    Distinction 37, part I, art. 1, q. 1; d. 15, a. 2, q. 2; and below d. 17, a. 1, q. 1.
  13. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 35. (c. 5.).
    Cf. Aristotle, VIII Physics text 35 (c. 5.).
  14. Vide supra pag. 43, nota 5.
    See above p. 43, note 5. ---
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