Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum motus caeli sit a propria forma, vel ab Intelligentia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum motus caelorum sit a propria forma, vel ab Intelligentia. Et quod sit a propria forma, videtur:

Ad oppositum.

1. Sicut vult Philosophus¹: « Natura est principium motus et quietis in eo, in quo est »: ergo omnis motus naturalis est a forma intrinseca; sed « motus caeli est naturalis », sicut probat Philosophus: ergo est a propria forma.

2. Item, leve sua levitate et virtute potest sursum ascendere, nullo impellente, et similiter grave descendere absque aliqua Intelligentia movente². Si ergo forma caeli perfectior est quam elementaris, et figura eius aptissima ad motum circularem, videtur, quod moveri possit a propria forma absque omni Intelligentia.

3. Item, plus est movere se ipsum exeundo locum proprium quam non exeundo; sed virtus lucis est se diffundere per corpora alterius naturae, et etiam diffundendo redire: ergo videtur, quod multo fortius corpus caeli per naturam lucis possit se in suo orbe movere absque influentia alicuius spiritualis substantiae.

4. Item, motus animalium est a forma propria et intrinseca, et hoc spectat ad complementum motus: ergo cum motus caeli sit multo completior, erit a forma propria et intrinseca: ergo vel caeli non moventur ab Intelligentia, vel Intelligentia est ipsius caeli perfectio et forma. Sed Intelligentia aliqua non est perfectio caeli, sicut dicit Damascenus secundo libro, capitulo sexto³: « Caeli sunt inanimati et insensibiles »: ergo etc.

5. Item, nullus motus necessarius pendet a voluntate creaturae tanquam a principali motore; sed motus caeli est uniformis et necessarius secundum Sanctos et philosophos⁴: ergo non est a voluntate alicuius Angeli vel Intelligentiae.

6. Item, virtus illius Angeli vel Intelligentiae est finita; sed virtus finita in movendo recipit fatigationem et laborem, maxime cum movet illud quod non est per se mobile: aut ergo⁵ caelum movetur propria forma, aut si movetur virtute Intelligentiae, necesse est, illam laborare et lassari.

Fundamenta.

Contra: 1. « Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur⁶ »; sed caelum secundum se totum movetur: ergo videtur, quod praeter materiam et formam eius sit ponere aliquid, a quo moveatur; hoc autem non est nisi Angelus vel Intelligentia: ergo etc.

2. Item, « omnis motor est in actu respectu mobilis »⁷, sed totum caelum est mobile; sed nihil idem est simul in actu et potentia: ergo caelum non potest moveri a se sive propria virtute.

3. Item, « omnis motor sufficiens distat a mobili⁸ »: cum ergo nulla forma extensa distet a materia, nulla forma extensa potest esse motor sufficiens. Sed forma caeli est forma corporalis et extensa, et motus eius, cum sit praecipuus inter alios motus, est a motore sufficiente: ergo non potest esse a virtute propriae formae.

4. Item, omne quod naturaliter movetur ad locum aliquem, si movetur ab illo loco, movetur praeter naturam⁹: ergo si caelum movetur naturaliter ab oriente in occidens, ab occidente in oriens non regyratur per naturam: ergo videtur, quod caelum habeat motorem alium quam formam propriam.

5. Item, omne quod movetur propria forma, movetur propter propriam indigentiam; natura enim formae non movet nisi propter appetitum rei, qua naturaliter indiget¹⁰; sed caelum, sicut dicunt Sancti et philosophi, non movetur propter propriam indigentiam: ergo non movetur a propria forma et natura.

6. Item, quod movetur a propria forma naturaliter movente nunquam quiescit nisi violenter, ipso existente in eadem dispositione¹¹; sed caelum, quantum ad naturam suae formae, semper erit in eadem dispositione: ergo aut non movetur a propria forma et natura, aut nunquam quiescit, vel si quiescit, violenter quiescit. Si igitur caelum aliquando quietabitur, et non violenter, ergo motus eius non est a virtute formae intrinsecae.

Conclusio. Caelum non est animatum, sed vel movetur a propria forma, Deo defectum virtutis supplente, vel a Deo mediante Angelo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in hac quaestione duae sunt positiones probabiles, concordes rationi et Scripturae, praeter illam tertiam viam, quam quidam philosophi¹² posuisse videntur, scilicet quod caeli haberent animas, et quod caelum esset magnum animal, et quod moveretur a propria forma perfectiva, sicut movetur animal; et hanc animam motricem posuerunt regi et dirigi a Deo mediante Intelligentia. — Opinio Avicennae.

Reprobatur. Sed haec positio falsa est et erronea. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, « caeli sunt inanimati et insensibiles »; et quod dicuntur Deum aliquando benedicere¹³, hoc est dictum per prosopopeiam. Et ista est communis sententia Sanctorum.

Retractatio Augustini. Ideo Augustinus retractat illud verbum, quod dixerat in libro de Immortalitate animae¹⁴, quod mundus animatur; et si aliqui Sancti videantur hoc dicere, sicut Hieronymus super Ecclesiastem, hoc totum intelligendum est dictum metaphorice. Non solum autem haec positio est contra catholicos doctores, sed etiam contra philosophicos tractatores, qui ponunt, quod substantia intellectualis non unitur corpori nisi mediante vegetabili et sensibili; et ita, si caelum perficeretur a substantia spirituali, haberet sentire et vegetari, et ita naturaliter posset corrumpi¹⁵. — Et propter hoc, ista positione omnino eiecta, intelligendum est, quod duplex est hic modus dicendi satis catholicus.

Opinio catholica 1. Quidam enim dicunt, quod caelum movetur a propria forma hoc modo. Caelum habet quantitatem et figuram et per hanc est ad motum habile; habet nihilominus lucis perfectionem et formam, quae inter ceteras formas corporales est maxime activa, et quasi medium tenens inter formas spirituales et corporales¹⁶; et per virtutem huius formae moventur corpora caelestia orbiculariter multo sufficientius, quam elementa moveantur motu recto; nec oportet, ad motum caeli adhiberi ministerium Angeli vel animae, sicut nec ad motum cuiuslibet elementaris naturae. Nec obstat illud, quod movens debet esse aliud a mobili; quia, sicut animal secundum aliud sui movet, secundum aliud sui est mobile, et tamen totum

est movens et mobile¹⁷; sic et in caelo intelligendum est, quod est mobile per naturam quantitatis et figurae, et movens per naturam lucis activae. Nec obstat illud, quod recedit ab eodem loco, ad quem movetur; caelum enim proprie non habet moveri ad locum, sed potius circa locum; nec pars, quae est in oriente, movetur ad occidens, quia illum situm intendat determinate, sed quia intendit moveri orbiculariter, qui est motus competens suae naturae. Unde sicut dicitur in radio, quod procedit et retrocedit per virtutem suam, cum fit repercussio, ad aliquod corpus splendidum; sic est in proposito. Et per hoc respondent ad omnes obiectiones. — Difficultates eiusdem. Difficile tamen est secundum hanc positionem sustinere, quomodo caelum moveatur a propria forma et naturali, et illa permanente, quiescat¹⁸ praeter violentiam. Difficile est etiam intelligere, quomodo non moveatur propter propriam indigentiam, si appetitus ille est in forma intrinseca. Et ideo isti compelluntur ad hoc redire, ut dicant, quod ad motum caeli non sufficit virtus propriae formae, sed simul cum ea requiritur influxus divinae potentiae, secundum quem caelum habet moveri et quiescere. — Oritur alia quaestio. Sed tunc remanet quaestio, quid sit ille influxus, utrum dicat quid creatum, vel increatum; et sive hoc dicat, sive illud, non est facile explicare, quare Deus illum motum exerceat sine ministerio spiritualis creaturae, cum illi sit natus convenire. — Non tamen improbatur. Nec tamen de facili potest hoc improbari, si quis hoc dicat, quod defectum istius creaturae corporalis velit Deus per semetipsum supplere, ut ostendat, se esse Deum caeli et terrae¹⁹; et ita dicatur caelum moveri virtute propria, quod, si aliquid desit sibi ad movendi sufficientiam, suppleatur ab ipsa virtute divina. Et sic sustinendo hanc positionem, responsio ad obiecta est satis plana.

Opinio et conclusio 2. Alia vero positio est, quod Deus movet caelum mediante Intelligentia creata sive mediante Angelo; et hoc competebat ordini, quem Deus constituit universo, de quo dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram²⁰, quod Deus sic mundum ordinavit, ut spiritum praeficeret omni corpori. Et ideo, sicut congruum est, Angelos deputari ad ministerium hominum, sic etiam congruum est, deputari ad motum et regimen caelorum, cum in hoc etiam ministrent homini viatori et divinae subserviant maiestati. Et hoc videtur Augustinus sentire in tertio de Libero Arbitrio²¹, loquens de angelica natura, de qua dicit, quod « non sua maiestate continet omnia, sed inhaerendo illi maiestati et eius imperiis devotissime obtemperando, a quo et per quem et in quo facta sunt omnia ». — Notandum. Et haec positio magnorum est tam in theologia quam in philosophia, quia concors pietati fidei et rationi plurimum esse videtur. Si igitur hanc positionem sustinere velimus, de facili potest ad obiecta in contrarium responderi.

Solutio obiectorum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo, quod motus ille est naturalis; dicendum, quod motus ille per comparationem ad primum mobile naturalis esse dicitur, quia natura eius et figura illi motui concordat; nec oportet, quod omne quod est naturale, sit a principio intrinseco, sicut a tota causa, sed sufficit, quod virtus intrinseca cooperetur virtuti activae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de gravi et levi, dicendum, quod ad motum gravis non sufficit solummodo gravitas sive qualitas propria, immo concurrit virtus loci attrahentis et virtus loci expellentis et virtus corporis quinti, praeter illa duo moventia, quae ponit Philosophus²², scilicet generans grave et leve, et removens prohibens; et quia haec ad motum caeli non possunt concurrere, oportet, quod concurrat virtus spiritualis substantiae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de diffusione lucis, dicendum, quod ille non est motus localis proprie, sed magis motus alterationis. — Notandum. Unde sicut ignis potest calorem suum diffundere deorsum, tamen virtute propria non se movet de loco, in quo est; sic in caelesti corpore intelligendum est esse.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad completionem motus facit, quod aliquid moveatur a principio intrinseco; dicendum, quod hoc accidit. Non enim hoc est propter unionem motoris ad mobile, sed propter sufficientiam motoris, qui quidem est substantia spiritualis, distans a materia; unde distantia motoris a mobili et completio motoris illa est, quae facit ad motoris²³ perfectionem. Hoc autem multo magis reperitur in motu caeli, quod movetur ab Angelo sive ab Intelligentia, separata secundum substantiam, unita secundum virtutem, quam si moveretur a propria forma.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessarium non pendet a voluntario; dicendum, quod verum est de voluntate vertibili. Quamvis autem voluntas Angeli sit per naturam vertibilis, tamen per gloriam omnino invertibilis efficitur; et talem substantiam intelligendum est esse caeli motricem, quae, ut dicit Augustinus²⁴, summae maiestati continenti

perfecte inhaereat. Et quod talis substantia sit motrix caeli, ostendit ipsius motus nobilitas et uniformitas et necessitas; Notandum. ostendit nihilominus quies futura, cum perfecta erit superna civitas, ad quam consummandam finaliter ordinatur ministratio angelica.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum sit virtutis finitae, lassatur; dicendum, quod lassationem non facit finitas, sed improportio motoris ad mobile, vel contrarietas, vel ineptitudo ex parte mobilis; quorum nullum est in proposito. Et sic patent quaesita, et per hoc etiam manifestantur quae dicuntur in littera²⁵.

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Question II. Whether the motion of the heaven is from its own form or from an Intelligence.

Secondly it is asked whether the motion of the heavens is from its own form or from an Intelligence. And that it is from its own form, it seems:

To the opposite.

1. As the Philosopher holds¹: "Nature is the principle of motion and of rest in that in which it is": therefore every natural motion is from an intrinsic form; but "the motion of the heaven is natural," as the Philosopher proves: therefore it is from its own form.

2. Likewise, the light [body] by its lightness and power can ascend upward, with nothing impelling, and similarly the heavy can descend without any moving Intelligence². If therefore the form of the heaven is more perfect than the elemental, and its figure most fit for circular motion, it seems that it can be moved by its own form without any Intelligence.

3. Likewise, it is more to move oneself by going out from one's own place than by not going out; but it is the power of light to diffuse itself through bodies of another nature, and even, in diffusing, to return: therefore it seems that much more strongly the body of the heaven can, through the nature of light, move itself within its orb without the influence of any spiritual substance.

4. Likewise, the motion of animals is from a proper and intrinsic form, and this pertains to the completion of motion: therefore since the motion of the heaven is much more complete, it will be from a proper and intrinsic form: therefore either the heavens are not moved by an Intelligence, or the Intelligence is the very perfection and form of the heaven. But no Intelligence is the perfection of the heaven, as Damascene says in book II, chapter 6³: "The heavens are inanimate and insensible": therefore etc.

5. Likewise, no necessary motion depends upon the will of a creature as upon a principal mover; but the motion of the heaven is uniform and necessary according to the Saints and the philosophers⁴: therefore it is not from the will of some Angel or Intelligence.

6. Likewise, the power of that Angel or Intelligence is finite; but a finite power in moving incurs fatigue and labor, especially when it moves that which is not of itself movable: therefore either⁵ the heaven is moved by its own form, or, if it is moved by the power of an Intelligence, it is necessary that that Intelligence grow weary and tired.

Foundations.

On the contrary: 1. "Everything that is moved is moved by another"⁶; but the heaven according to itself as a whole is moved: therefore it seems that besides its matter and its form one must posit something by which it is moved; but this is nothing other than an Angel or Intelligence: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, "every mover is in act with respect to the movable"⁷, but the whole heaven is movable; but the same thing is not at once in act and potency: therefore the heaven cannot be moved by itself, that is, by its own power.

3. Likewise, "every sufficient mover stands at a distance from the movable"⁸: since therefore no extended form stands at a distance from matter, no extended form can be a sufficient mover. But the form of the heaven is a corporeal and extended form, and its motion, since it is the chief among the other motions, is from a sufficient mover: therefore it cannot be from the power of its own form.

4. Likewise, everything that is naturally moved toward some place, if it is moved from that place, is moved against nature⁹: therefore if the heaven is moved naturally from east to west, from west to east it is not turned back by nature: therefore it seems that the heaven has some mover other than its own form.

5. Likewise, everything that is moved by its own form is moved on account of its own need; for the nature of a form moves only on account of the appetite for the thing it naturally needs¹⁰; but the heaven, as the Saints and philosophers say, is not moved on account of its own need: therefore it is not moved by its own form and nature.

6. Likewise, that which is moved by its own form naturally moving never rests except violently, while that form remains in the same disposition¹¹; but the heaven, as to the nature of its form, will always be in the same disposition: therefore either it is not moved by its own form and nature, or it never rests, or, if it rests, it rests violently. If therefore the heaven shall at some time be brought to rest, and not violently, then its motion is not from the power of an intrinsic form.

Conclusion. The heaven is not animate, but either is moved by its own form, with God supplying the defect of its power, or by God by the mediation of an Angel.

I respond: It must be said that in this question there are two probable positions, in accord with reason and Scripture, besides that third way which certain philosophers¹² seem to have held — namely, that the heavens had souls, and that the heaven was a great animal, and that it was moved by a perfective proper form, just as an animal is moved; and they held this moving soul to be ruled and directed by God by the mediation of an Intelligence. — The opinion of Avicenna.

It is refuted. But this position is false and erroneous. For as Damascene says, "the heavens are inanimate and insensible"; and as for the fact that they are said sometimes to bless God¹³, this is said by prosopopoeia. And this is the common opinion of the Saints.

Augustine's retractation. Hence Augustine retracts that word which he had said in the book On the Immortality of the Soul¹⁴ — that the world is animated; and if any of the Saints seem to say this, as Jerome on Ecclesiastes [does], this is wholly to be understood as said metaphorically. Not only, moreover, is this position against the catholic doctors, but also against the philosophical treatises, which lay down that an intellectual substance is not united to a body except by the mediation of the vegetative and the sensitive; and so, if the heaven were perfected by a spiritual substance, it would have sensation and vegetation, and so naturally it could be corrupted¹⁵. — And on account of this, that position being altogether cast out, it is to be understood that here there is a twofold sufficiently catholic way of speaking.

First catholic opinion. For some say that the heaven is moved by its own form in this way. The heaven has quantity and figure and through this is fit for motion; it has nonetheless the perfection and form of light, which among other corporeal forms is the most active, and as it were holds a middle place between spiritual and corporeal forms¹⁶; and through the power of this form the celestial bodies are moved circularly much more sufficiently than the elements are moved with rectilinear motion; nor is it necessary that the ministry of an Angel or a soul be applied to the motion of the heaven, just as neither to the motion of any elemental nature. Nor does it stand in the way that the mover must be other than the movable; for, just as an animal moves by one part of itself, and is movable by another part of itself, and yet the whole

is mover and movable¹⁷; so also it is to be understood in the heaven, that it is movable by the nature of quantity and figure, and mover by the nature of active light. Nor does it stand in the way that it recedes from the same place to which it is moved; for the heaven properly speaking does not move to a place, but rather around a place; nor is the part that is in the east moved toward the west because it intends that location determinately, but because it intends to be moved circularly, which is the motion befitting its nature. Hence just as it is said of a ray that it goes forth and returns by its own power, when a reflection occurs onto some bright body; so it is in the matter at hand. And by this they respond to all the objections. — Difficulties of the same [opinion]. It is nevertheless difficult, according to this position, to maintain how the heaven is moved by its own and natural form, and how, with it remaining, it should rest¹⁸ apart from violence. It is also difficult to understand how it is not moved on account of its own need, if that appetite is in its intrinsic form. And therefore they are compelled to return to this: that they say that for the motion of the heaven the power of its own form is not sufficient, but together with it is required the influx of the divine power, according to which the heaven has its being-moved and being-at-rest. — Another question arises. But then there remains the question, what that influx is — whether it designates something created or uncreated; and whether one says this or that, it is not easy to explain why God should exercise that motion without the ministry of a spiritual creature, since it is fitting for such a creature. — Not, however, refuted. Nor yet can this be easily refuted, if someone should say that God wills by Himself to supply the defect of this corporeal creature, in order to show that He is the God of heaven and of earth¹⁹; and so that the heaven be said to be moved by its own power, in such a way that, if something is lacking to it for the sufficiency of moving, it be supplied by the divine power itself. And thus, holding this position, the response to the objections is fairly plain.

Second opinion and conclusion. But there is another position: that God moves the heaven by the mediation of a created Intelligence or by the mediation of an Angel; and this befits the order which God established in the universe, concerning which Augustine says, on Genesis according to the letter²⁰, that God so ordered the world that He set spirit over every body. And therefore, just as it is fitting that Angels be deputed to the ministry of men, so also it is fitting that they be deputed to the motion and governance of the heavens, since in this also they minister to wayfaring man and serve the divine majesty. And Augustine seems to hold this in the third [book] of On Free Choice²¹, speaking of the angelic nature, of which he says that "it does not by its own majesty contain all things, but by clinging to that majesty and most devoutly obeying its commands, by whom and through whom and in whom all things have been made." — To be noted. And this position is of great [authors] both in theology and in philosophy, since it seems most in harmony with the piety of the faith and with reason. If therefore we wish to maintain this position, it is easy to respond to the objections to the contrary.

Solution of the objections.

1. To that which is objected in the first place — that that motion is natural — it must be said that that motion is called natural by comparison to the prime movable, because its nature and its figure are in accord with that motion; nor is it necessary that everything which is natural be from an intrinsic principle as from a total cause, but it suffices that an intrinsic power cooperate with the active power.

2. To that which is objected concerning the heavy and the light, it must be said that for the motion of the heavy gravity or its proper quality alone does not suffice — rather, the power of the attracting place and the power of the expelling place and the power of the quintessential body concur, besides those two movers which the Philosopher posits²², namely the generator of the heavy and light, and that which removes the impediment; and because these cannot concur for the motion of the heaven, it is required that the power of a spiritual substance concur.

3. To that which is objected concerning the diffusion of light, it must be said that that is not properly a motion of place, but rather a motion of alteration. — To be noted. Hence, just as fire can diffuse its heat downward, yet by its own power does not move itself from the place in which it is; so it is to be understood [to be] in the celestial body.

4. To that which is objected — that it makes for the completion of motion that something be moved from an intrinsic principle — it must be said that this is accidental. For this is not on account of the union of the mover with the movable, but on account of the sufficiency of the mover, which is indeed a spiritual substance, distant from matter; whence the distance of the mover from the movable and the completion of the mover is what makes for the mover's²³ perfection. But this is found much more in the motion of the heaven, which is moved by an Angel or Intelligence — separate as to substance, united as to power — than if it were moved by its own form.

5. To that which is objected — that the necessary does not depend on the voluntary — it must be said that this is true of a changeable will. Although, however, the will of an Angel is by nature changeable, yet through glory it is rendered altogether unchangeable; and such a substance is to be understood to be the mover of the heaven, which, as Augustine says²⁴, cleaves perfectly to the supreme containing majesty. And that such a substance is the mover of the heaven is shown by the very nobility and uniformity and necessity of its motion; To be noted. it is shown nonetheless by the future rest, when the heavenly city shall be perfected, for whose final consummation the angelic ministry is ordered.

6. To that which is objected — that since it is of a finite power, it grows weary — it must be said that weariness is not caused by finitude, but by disproportion of the mover to the movable, or by contrariety, or by ineptitude on the part of the movable; none of which is present in the matter at hand. And thus what was sought is clear, and through this also are manifested those things which are said in the text²⁵.

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