Bonaventure

I. Gratia sanctificans, cum sit principium vitae supernaturalis, etiam principium motus est (hic fundam. 5.). Hinc antiqui Scholastici ipsum habituale donum gratiae distinguebant in gratiam operantem et cooperantem, secundum duplicem eiusdem effectum (cfr. infra d. 27. a. 1. q. I. et dub. 1; S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. I. II. q. III. a. 2.). Ipsi enim virtutem infusam et actualem motionem intima quadam connexione inter se coniunctas esse considerabant et saepe eodem nomine significabant, ut iam dictum est (hic q. I. scholion). Inde etiam causa repetenda esse videtur, quod de gratia actuali illa aetate parum et quasi obiter tractaretur.

De multiplici sensu, quem termini gratiae operantis et cooperantis, praevenientis et subsequentis in libris Augustini et aliorum auctorum habent, vide infra d. 27. locc. citt. Prima illa distinctione S. Doctor hic utitur, ut explicet duplicem modum, quo gratia movet liberum arbitrium, scilicet ut dispositio et ut instrumentum: ut dispositio, quatenus illud gratia cooperante informatur et «se ipsum movet per gratiam ad diversa opera» (ad 5.); ut instrumentum, quatenus Deus per gratiam operantem, cum sua origine divina semper coniunctam, operatur in liberum arbitrium illudque movet. — Ad rem faciunt verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. ad 2.): «Liberum arbitrium secundum duplicem rationem comparatur ad gratiam, scilicet in ratione recipientis et in ratione operantis; et tamen utrumque est voluntatis seu liberi arbitrii, scilicet recipere gratiam et cum gratia operari». Additur ibid., quod gratia comparata ad liberum arbitrium sub ratione recipientis dicitur gratia operans; sed cooperans, secundum quod simul liberum arbitrium operatur cum gratia. Porro paulo inferius legitur: «In receptione gratiae, hoc est, quando efficit voluntatem bonam, prior est actio gratiae, deinde consensus ipsius arbitrii seu cooperatio in consentiendo, et ideo gratia dicitur hic operans. Sed liberum arbitrium dicitur cum gratia operari, quando operatur bonum per gratiam. Quia ergo opus elicitur a potentia arbitrii, ipsa gratia iuvante, ipsum liberum arbitrium dicitur operans, ipsa vero gratia cooperans velut adminiculans operanti». — Doctrinam S. Bonaventurae aliis verbis et quibusdam additamentis explicat Richard. a Med. (hic a. unicus q. 5.): «Gratia movet liberum arbitrium et per modum efficientis instrumentalis et per modum formae. Primo modo movet liberum arbitrium in instanti suae infusionis, quia in illo instanti Spiritus S. tanquam principale agens per suam influentiam, quae est gratia, tanquam per instrumentale efficiens in libero arbitrio causat quandam excitationem et inclinationem ad bonum voluntatis actum. Illa autem excitatio vel inclinatio non est actus volendi, sed dispositio ad illum actum, vel aliqualis inchoatio illius actus; quia in eliciendo actum volendi semper cooperatur liberum arbitrium. Sed ad causandam illam excitationem vel inclinationem, quae in ipso causatur in instanti infusionis gratiae, liberum arbitrium est passivum tantum. — Movet etiam gratia liberum arbitrium per modum formae, in quantum liberum arbitrium per formam gratiae potest se movere et elevare ad opera meritoria de condigno, quibus motibus se movere sine gratia non poterat» etc. — Breviter Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica a. 7.) sic quaestionem solvit: «Movere aliquid dupliciter contingit: aut effective, sicut sol movet vaporem elevando sursum; aut dispositive, sicut pondus eius vel levitas movet inclinando ipsum. Primo modo Deus movet liberum arbitrium, et ipsum liberum arbitrium se ipsum, gratia perfectum et habilitatum ad se movendum. Secundo modo gratia movet ipsum». — Quod gratia habitualis habeat actum in anima et effective et formaliter, docet etiam S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 5. ad 2; S. I. II. q. III. a. 2. in fine corp.), sed paulo aliter hanc distinctionem explicat.

Ceterum doctrina S. Bonaventurae in hac quaestione proposita optime convenit cum decretis Concilii Tridentini (Sess. VI. praesertim c. 5. et can. 4. 5.) de efficacia gratiae; immo dici potest, eam non esse nisi quandam expositionem verborum Concilii Arausicani II. (a. 529.), a Bonifacio II. confirmati (can. 9.): «Quoties bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur».

II. Cooperationem liberi arbitrii ad actus salutares a saec. XVI. multae haereses diversimode negarunt, quarum errores decretis Concilii Tridentini et Summorum Pontificum condemnati sunt. Hinc catholici theologi de efficacia gratiae, de cooperatione liberi arbitrii et de vero sensu doctrinae S. Augustini specialiores et plerumque satis intricatas quaestiones instituerunt et in plurimis libris tractarunt eo laudabili fine, ut concordiam gratiae et libertatis defenderent et evidentius demonstrarent. In fide quidem concordes, diversas vias demonstrationis ingressi sunt. Hinc de ratione, qua efficacia gratiae connectitur cum consensu voluntatis, gravissimae et spinosissimae controversiae exortae sunt, praecipue inter celebres scholas duorum Ordinum de Ecclesia optime meritorum, scilicet S. Dominici et Societatis Iesu. S. Sedes post longissimas disputationes et inquisitiones, ab an. 1598 in famosa Congregatione de auxiliis habitas, de ipso obiecto controversiae nihil definivit, nec sub Paulo V., quando (1607) Congregatio de auxiliis dissoluta est, nec sub sequentibus Pontificibus; vetitum tamen est, ne quis in hac quaestione tractanda partem suae oppositam «aut qualificaret, aut censura quapiam notaret». Insuper a Paulo V. et Urbano VIII. prohibitum est, libros et tractatus de auxiliis edere; quae prohibitio postea consuetudine derogata est. Ultimo Clemens XII. (2 Oct. 1733) decreta Clementis XI. et Benedicti XIII, ad quandam defensionem Thomisticae scholae lata, comprobat quidem et confirmat, sed addit: «Nolumus, aut per nostras, aut per ipsorum laudes Thomisticae scholae delatas, quas iterato nostro iudicio comprobamus et confirmamus, quidquam esse detractum ceteris catholicis scholis, diversa ab eadem in explicanda divinae gratiae efficacia sentientibus, quarum etiam erga hanc S. Sedem praeclara sunt merita». Denique ibidem rursus interdicitur, ne «notam aut censuram aliquam theologicam iisdem scholis diversa sentientibus inurere, aut earum sententias conviciis et contumeliis incessere audeant, donec de iisdem controversiis haec s. Sedes aliquid definiendum aut pronuntiandum censuerit» (Denzinger, Enchirid. symbolor. et definit., ed. 3. pag. 312. seqq.). His sapientissimis S. Sedis iudiciis standum est.

III. Controversia utriusque scholae praecipue versatur circa explicationem gratiae sufficientis et efficacis, et etiam praevenientis, de quo consulantur proprii utriusque scholae probati auctores. Cum autem in nostro I. tomo p. 710 in scholio n. 2. (ubi agitur de causalitate divinae voluntatis in praedestinatione implicata) aliqua dicta sint de diversa ratione, qua a duabus scholis catholicis explicatur causalitas et connexio divinae voluntatis cum consensu voluntatis creatae; ea quae ibi de causalitate divinae motionis in genere secundum scholam Societatis Iesu occurrunt, nimis breviter et indistincte prolata sunt, ita ut, si de sola gratia praeveniente dicta intelliguntur, non exprimant veram huius celebris scholae sententiam. Hinc melius et mentem nostram et veram dictae scholae sententiam hoc loco explicamus. Docetur igitur ab eadem, voluntatem illustratione et excitatione gratiae praevenientis (sive mere sufficientis sive etiam efficacis) ita ad consensum praemoveri, ut ad dissentiendum libera maneat, ac proinde consensus ex hac gratia ita sequatur, ut etiam possit non sequi. Connexionem autem infallibilem gratiae efficacis cum consensu liberi arbitrii ut explicet, ipsa utitur scientia media, qua Deus ante omne decretum absolutum praevideat, quid voluntas humana in hypothesi, quod hac vel illa gratia excitaretur, factura esset, et ex hac praevisione praedestinatis decernat gratias efficaces i. e. tales, cum quibus eos libere cooperaturos infallibiliter praescivit. Hanc autem sententiam eadem affirmat exprimere genuinum doctrinae Ss. Augustini et Thomae sensum. — Quoad diversas sententias de concursu Dei generali ad actus voluntatis liberos, sed naturalis ordinis, vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.

IV. Hanc praecise quaestionem explicite tractatam non vidimus ab aliis antiquis scholasticis nisi ab his: Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. unicus q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Alii rem tangunt in quaestione de gratia operante et cooperante, quos vide in scholio ad d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.

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I. Sanctifying grace, since it is the principle of supernatural life, is also the principle of motion (here, fundamentum 5). Hence the ancient Scholastics distinguished the very habitual gift of grace into operating and cooperating grace, according to its twofold effect (cf. below d. 27. a. 1. q. I. and dub. 1; St. Thomas, here a. 5; S. I-II. q. 111. a. 2.). For they considered infused virtue and actual motion to be joined together by a certain intimate connection, and often signified them by the same name, as has already been said (here q. I., scholion). Hence too the cause seems to be sought why actual grace was treated of in that age but little and as it were in passing.

Concerning the manifold sense which the terms of operating and cooperating, prevenient and subsequent grace have in the books of Augustine and of other authors, see below d. 27, the places cited. The Holy Doctor uses that first distinction here in order to explain the twofold manner in which grace moves free choice, namely as disposition and as instrument: as disposition, inasmuch as free choice is informed by cooperating grace and «moves itself through grace to diverse works» (ad 5.); as instrument, inasmuch as God through operating grace, always joined to its divine origin, operates in free choice and moves it. — To the point are the words of Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. ad 2.): «Free choice is related to grace according to a twofold character, namely in the character of recipient and in the character of operating; and yet each belongs to the will or free choice, namely to receive grace and to operate with grace». It is added there that grace related to free choice under the character of recipient is called operating grace; but cooperating, according as free choice operates together with grace. Further, a little below it is read: «In the reception of grace, that is, when it effects a good will, the action of grace is prior, then the consent of the choice itself or cooperation in consenting, and therefore grace is here called operating. But free choice is said to operate with grace when it works good through grace. Since therefore the work is elicited by the potency of choice, with grace itself helping, free choice itself is called operating, but grace itself cooperating as it were ministering to the one operating». — The doctrine of St. Bonaventure, in other words and with certain additions, Richard of Mediavilla explains (here, sole article, q. 5): «Grace moves free choice both by way of instrumental efficient and by way of form. In the first way it moves free choice in the instant of its infusion, because in that instant the Holy Spirit, as the principal agent, through his influence, which is grace, as through an instrumental efficient, causes in free choice a certain arousal and inclination to a good act of the will. But that arousal or inclination is not the act of willing, but a disposition toward that act, or some inchoation of that act; because in eliciting the act of willing free choice always cooperates. But for causing that arousal or inclination, which is caused in it in the instant of the infusion of grace, free choice is passive only. — Grace also moves free choice by way of form, inasmuch as free choice, through the form of grace, can move and elevate itself to meritorious works of condignity, by which motions it could not move itself without grace» etc. — Briefly Peter of Tarentaise (here q. sole a. 7.) thus solves the question: «To move something happens in two ways: either effectively, as the sun moves vapor by raising it upward; or dispositively, as its weight or lightness moves [a body] by inclining it. In the first way God moves free choice, and free choice itself [moves] itself, perfected and enabled by grace to move itself. In the second way grace moves it». — That habitual grace has an act in the soul both effectively and formally, St. Thomas also teaches (here q. sole a. 5. ad 2; S. I-II. q. 111. a. 2. at the end of the corpus), but he explains this distinction a little otherwise.

For the rest, the doctrine of St. Bonaventure proposed in this question agrees excellently with the decrees of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. especially c. 5. and can. 4. 5.) on the efficacy of grace; nay, it can be said that it is nothing but a certain exposition of the words of the Second Council of Orange (a. 529.), confirmed by Boniface II (can. 9.): «As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work».

II. From the sixteenth century many heresies in diverse ways denied the cooperation of free choice unto salutary acts, whose errors were condemned by the decrees of the Council of Trent and of the Supreme Pontiffs. Hence Catholic theologians instituted more specialized and generally rather intricate questions concerning the efficacy of grace, the cooperation of free choice, and the true sense of the doctrine of St. Augustine, and treated them in very many books with this laudable aim, that they might defend the harmony of grace and freedom and demonstrate it more evidently. Concordant indeed in faith, they entered upon diverse paths of demonstration. Hence concerning the manner in which the efficacy of grace is connected with the consent of the will, most grave and most thorny controversies arose, especially between the celebrated schools of two Orders most excellently deserving of the Church, namely those of St. Dominic and of the Society of Jesus. The Holy See, after the longest disputations and inquiries held from the year 1598 in the famous Congregation de auxiliis, defined nothing concerning the very object of the controversy, neither under Paul V., when (1607) the Congregation de auxiliis was dissolved, nor under the following Pontiffs; yet it was forbidden that anyone, in treating this question, should «either qualify or note with any censure» the part opposed to his own. Moreover by Paul V. and Urban VIII. it was prohibited to publish books and tractates de auxiliis; which prohibition was afterward derogated by custom. Lastly Clement XII. (2 Oct. 1733) indeed approved and confirmed the decrees of Clement XI. and Benedict XIII, issued for a certain defense of the Thomistic school, but added: «We do not wish, either through our praises or through theirs conferred on the Thomistic school, which by repeated judgment of ours we approve and confirm, that anything be detracted from the other Catholic schools, which think differently from it in explaining the efficacy of divine grace, and whose merits toward this Holy See are also illustrious». Finally there again it is forbidden that they should «brand the same schools thinking differently with any theological note or censure, or assail their opinions with reproaches and insults, until this Holy See shall have judged that something is to be defined or pronounced concerning the same controversies» (Denzinger, Enchirid. symbolor. et definit., ed. 3. pag. 312. seqq.). One must stand by these most wise judgments of the Holy See.

III. The controversy of the two schools turns chiefly about the explanation of sufficient and efficacious grace, and also of prevenient [grace], concerning which let the approved authors proper to each school be consulted. But since in our first volume, p. 710, in the scholion n. 2 (where there is treated the causality of the divine will implied in predestination), some things were said about the diverse manner in which the causality and connection of the divine will with the consent of the created will is explained by the two Catholic schools; the things that occur there concerning the causality of divine motion in general according to the school of the Society of Jesus were set forth too briefly and indistinctly, so that, if they are understood of prevenient grace alone, they do not express the true opinion of this celebrated school. Hence we here better explain both our mind and the true opinion of the said school. It is therefore taught by it that the will is, by the illumination and arousal of prevenient grace (whether merely sufficient or also efficacious), so premoved to consent that it remains free to dissent, and consequently the consent so follows from this grace that it can also not follow. But to explain the infallible connection of efficacious grace with the consent of free choice, it uses middle knowledge (scientia media), whereby God, before every absolute decree, foresees what the human will would do on the hypothesis that it were aroused by this or that grace, and from this foreknowledge decrees for the predestined efficacious graces, i. e. such as those with which he infallibly foreknew that they would freely cooperate. And this opinion the same [school] affirms expresses the genuine sense of the doctrine of Saints Augustine and Thomas. — As to the diverse opinions about God's general concurrence to the free acts of the will, but of the natural order, see below d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.

IV. This precise question we have not seen explicitly treated by other ancient scholastics except by these: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. sole a. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here sole article q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Others touch the matter in the question on operating and cooperating grace, whom see in the scholion to d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.

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