← Back to Distinction 26

Dist. 26, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 647

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Voluntas est animi motus ad aliquid assequendum etc. Sicut enim dicit Philosophus1: «Peccat qui definit id quod est in quiete, per id quod est in motu»; sed voluntas est potentia: ergo male definitur, cum dicitur: «Voluntas est animi motus».

p. 648

— Item, velle plus est agere quam pati, ergo plus movere quam moveri: si ergo motus sonat in passionem, videtur, quod voluntas non debeat dici animi motus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Anselmus2, voluntas dicitur aequivoce ad voluntatem-instrumentum, et voluntatem-affectionem, et voluntatem-usum. Et Augustinus non definit hic voluntatem, prout accipitur pro potentia, sed prout accipitur pro usu. — Et si tu quaeras, quare magis definit voluntatem, prout accipitur pro usu quam pro potentia? ratio huius est, quia potentiae manifestantur per actus3, et ideo, cognita voluntate-usu, per consequens cognoscitur voluntas-potentia. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod usus voluntatis non est passio, sed actio, et ita non debet dici motus; dicendum, quod motus non tantummodo accipitur passive, immo etiam accipitur active; et praeterea omnes actiones animae quodam modo passiones sunt4.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans est fides cum dilectione. Videtur enim, quod ista notificatio gratiae non sit conveniens. Cum enim gratia et virtus diversas habeant notificationes, non videtur, quod unum habeat notificari per alterum5. — Item, cum gratia non solummodo ponat in anima fidem et caritatem, sed etiam spem; videtur insufficienter dicere Magister, cum dicit, quod est fides cum dilectione.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum diversae definitiones et notificationes gratiae assignentur diversimode, penes quid sumitur ratio et distinctio harum?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister non intendit in illo verbo notificare gratiam gratum facientem quantum ad suam essentiam, sed intendit eam notificare quasi per posterius et quodam modo per effectum. Cum enim habitus cognoscantur per actus, et actus gratiae duplex sit secundum duplicem potentiam, videlicet secundum intellectum et affectum: ideo per illos habet gratia notificari. Et quia in illos actus non exit gratia, nisi mediantibus habitibus virtutum, videlicet fidei et caritatis, ideo notificans gratiam dicit, quod gratia nihil aliud est quam fides cum dilectione, pro eo quod per istos duos habitus habet anima in actus exire, per quos innotescit nobis gratia6.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur de pluralitate definitionum, dicendum, quod gratia habet comparari ad suum principium, habet comparari ad suum subiectum, habet comparari ad suum oppositum, habet comparari ad suum effectum, habet etiam comparari ad suum praemium; et secundum has diversas comparationes diversae reperiuntur eius notificationes.

Secundum comparationem ad suum principium est illa Isidori7: «Gratia est divinae misericordiae donum, per quod bonae voluntatis est exitus». — Per comparationem autem ad suum subiectum, sic est illa quae datur super illud Psalmi8: Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo: «Gratia est quidam nitor animae ad conciliandum sanctum amorem». — Per comparationem ad suum oppositum, sic est illa quae datur in Glossis super Epistolas9: «Gratia est iustificatio et remissio peccatorum». — Per comparationem ad suum effectum, sic est illa Chrysostomi10: «Gratia est sanitas mentis et delectatio cordis». — Per comparationem autem ad suum praemium, sic est illa: Gratia est similitudo gloriae. — Secundum autem omnes comparationes istas sic assignatur una definitio magistralis11, quae talis est: Gratia est forma, a Deo gratis data sine

p. 649

meritis, gratum faciens habentem et opus eius bonum reddens. Invenitur autem et alia notificatio gratiae, qua dicitur: Gratia est manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, quae sumta est ex illo quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios duodecimo12: Unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus etc.; sed ista est notificatio gratiae gratis datae.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Fides, qua iustificatus es, gratis tibi data est. Ex hoc enim videtur velle dicere Augustinus, et Magister, quod mediante fide fit iustificatio; sed contrarium huius est, quia ab eodem est animae iustificatio, a quo est vivificatio. Sed vivificatio est ab ipsa gratia; nam fides sine gratia non vivificat, immo mortua est: ergo non videtur, quod iustificatio sit a fide, sed a gratia. Si tu dicas, quod iustificationem attribuat fidei ratione adiunctae gratiae; quaeritur: quare non attribuit alii virtuti, sicut fidei? — Item, quaeritur: quid est quod dicit, quod fides impetrat iustificationem13? Aut intelligit de informi, aut de formata. Non de informi, quia per eam nihil meremur et nihil impetramus. Si de formata, hoc non potest sane intelligi. Nemo enim habet fidem formatam, nisi sit iustificatus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod iustificatio dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo iustificatio dicitur iustitiae infusio; alio modo iustificatio dicitur in iustitia14 exercitatio. Secundum autem quod iustificatio dicitur in iustitia exercitatio, sic verbum Magistri, immo Augustini, verum est et planum. Nemo enim in iustitia exercitatur, nisi mediante fide operante per dilectionem; et haec15 dicitur impetrare iustificationem, id est profectum iustitiae, qui consequitur ex bonorum operum et meritorum multiplicatione, quod non contingit esse sine fide et caritate. Sine fide enim, sicut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo16, impossibile est placere Deo; sine caritate etiam impossibile est, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio. — Si autem dicatur iustificatio iustitiae infusio, sic adhuc habet veritatem, licet non ita plane. Aut enim est infusio iustitiae in parvulo, aut in adulto. Si in parvulo; sic dicitur esse iustificatio per fidem non propriam, sed parentum, vel totius Ecclesiae, sicut dicit Augustinus ad Bonifacium17. Si autem sit iustificatio in adulto; sic, cum quatuor concurrant ad iustificationem, scilicet gratiae infusio, contritio, motus liberi arbitrii et peccati remissio, sicut dicunt magistri; et motus liberi arbitrii sit motus, qui pertinet ad virtutem fidei: non inconvenienter dicitur adultus per fidem iustificari; nec huic obstat, quod iustificatur per gratiam. Illa enim quatuor necessario requiruntur ad iustificationem impii; et ideo aliquando homo dicitur iustificari per gratiam, aliquando per fidem, aliquando per poenitentiam, quia peccati remissio praesupponit illa tria. Et per hoc patent obiecta. Ista enim melius explanantur in quarto, distinctione decima septima18.

---

English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is asked about what he says: The will is a motion of the soul toward attaining something, etc. For, as the Philosopher says1: «He errs who defines that which is at rest by that which is in motion»; but the will is a potency: therefore it is ill-defined, when it is said: «The will is a motion of the soul».

— Likewise, to will is more to act than to be acted upon, therefore more to move than to be moved: if therefore motion sounds of passion, it seems that the will ought not to be called a motion of the soul.

I respond: It must be said that, as Anselm says2, "will" is said equivocally of the will-as-instrument, the will-as-affection, and the will-as-use. And Augustine does not here define the will as it is taken for the potency, but as it is taken for the use. — And if you ask, why he rather defines the will as it is taken for use than for potency? the reason for this is that potencies are made known through their acts3, and therefore, once the will-as-use is known, the will-as-potency is consequently known. — To that which is objected, that the use of the will is not a passion but an action, and so ought not to be called a motion; it must be said that motion is not taken only passively, but indeed is also taken actively; and moreover all the actions of the soul are in a certain way passions4.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that grace, going before and preparing the will, is faith with love. For it seems that this notification of grace is not fitting. For since grace and virtue have diverse notifications, it does not seem that the one should be made known through the other5. — Likewise, since grace places in the soul not only faith and charity, but also hope; it seems that the Master speaks insufficiently, when he says that it is faith with love.

Alongside this it is asked: since the diverse definitions and notifications of grace are assigned in diverse ways, in respect of what is the ground and distinction of these taken?

I respond: It must be said that the Master, in that word, does not intend to make grace, which makes-pleasing, known as to its essence, but he intends to make it known as it were through what is posterior and in a certain way through its effect. For since habits are known through their acts, and the act of grace is twofold according to the twofold potency, namely according to the intellect and the affection: therefore through these grace is made known. And because grace does not go forth into those acts except through the mediating habits of the virtues, namely of faith and charity, therefore he, making grace known, says that grace is nothing other than faith with love, for the reason that through these two habits the soul has its going-forth into the acts through which grace becomes known to us6.

But to that which is asked about the plurality of definitions, it must be said that grace may be compared to its principle, may be compared to its subject, may be compared to its opposite, may be compared to its effect, and may also be compared to its reward; and according to these diverse comparisons diverse notifications of it are found.

According to the comparison to its principle there is that of Isidore7: «Grace is the gift of the divine mercy, through which there is the going-forth of a good will». — But by the comparison to its subject, there is that which is given upon that word of the Psalm8: That he may make glad the face with oil: «Grace is a certain brightness of the soul for procuring holy love». — By the comparison to its opposite, there is that which is given in the Glosses upon the Epistles9: «Grace is justification and the remission of sins». — By the comparison to its effect, there is that of Chrysostom10: «Grace is the health of the mind and the delight of the heart». — But by the comparison to its reward, there is that: Grace is the likeness of glory. — And according to all these comparisons there is thus assigned one magisterial definition11, which is as follows: Grace is a form, given freely by God without

merits, making the one who has it pleasing and rendering his work good. But there is also found another notification of grace, by which it is said: Grace is the manifestation of the spirit unto profit, which is taken from that which is said in the first to the Corinthians, the twelfth chapter12: To each is given the manifestation of the spirit etc.; but this is the notification of grace freely given.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: The faith by which you have been justified has been freely given to you. For from this Augustine, and the Master, seem to wish to say that justification comes about through the mediation of faith; but the contrary of this is the case, because the justification of the soul is from the same source as is its vivification. But vivification is from grace itself; for faith without grace does not vivify, but rather is dead: therefore it does not seem that justification is from faith, but from grace. If you say that he attributes justification to faith by reason of the adjoined grace; it is asked: why does he not attribute it to another virtue, as to faith? — Likewise, it is asked: what is it that he says, that faith obtains justification13? Either he understands it of unformed faith, or of formed. Not of unformed, because through it we merit nothing and obtain nothing. If of formed, this cannot be soundly understood. For no one has formed faith, unless he is justified.

I respond: It must be said that justification can be spoken of in two ways. In one way justification is called the infusion of justice; in another way justification is called the exercise in justice14. But according as justification is called the exercise in justice, thus the word of the Master, indeed of Augustine, is true and plain. For no one is exercised in justice except by the mediation of faith working through love; and this15 is said to obtain justification, that is, the advance of justice, which follows from the multiplication of good works and merits, which does not happen to be without faith and charity. For without faith, as it is said to the Hebrews, the eleventh chapter16, it is impossible to please God; and without charity it is likewise impossible, as it is said in the first to the Corinthians, the thirteenth chapter. — But if justification be called the infusion of justice, thus it still has truth, although not so plainly. For either there is an infusion of justice in an infant, or in an adult. If in an infant; thus it is said to be a justification through a faith not its own, but of the parents, or of the whole Church, as Augustine says to Boniface17. But if there be justification in an adult; thus, since four things concur to justification, namely the infusion of grace, contrition, the motion of free choice, and the remission of sin, as the masters say; and the motion of free choice is a motion which pertains to the virtue of faith: it is not unfittingly said that the adult is justified through faith; nor does it stand against this, that he is justified through grace. For those four are necessarily required for the justification of the impious; and therefore sometimes a man is said to be justified by grace, sometimes by faith, sometimes by penance, because the remission of sin presupposes those three. And by this the objections are clear. For these things are better explained in the fourth book, the seventeenth distinction18.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.), ubi agens de vitiis definitionis (si definitio non derivatur et formatur ex simpliciter notioribus, neque ex iis quae nobis notiora sunt) ait: Si eius quod est in quiete et definitione, per indefinitum et quod in motu est, assignata est oratio nobis. Prius enim est et notius quod manens est et definitum, eo quod indefinitum et in motu est. — Mox edd., excepta I, et pauci codd. voci potentia praefigunt in.
    Bk. VI of the Topics, c. 3 (c. 4), where, treating of the vices of definition (if a definition is not derived and formed from things simply more known, nor from those things which are more known to us), he says: If the account given to us of that which is at rest and in its definition is given through what is indefinite and in motion [it is faulty]. For that which abides and is definite is prior and more known, inasmuch as the indefinite is also in motion. — Further on, the editions, except I, and a few codices prefix in to the word potentia.
  2. De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. Vide supra pag. 601, nota 6.
    On the Harmony of God's Foreknowledge [Predestination, and Grace] with Free Choice, q. 3, c. 11. See above, p. 601, note 6.
  3. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4).
  4. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 118. (c. 11.) et III. text. 2. et 12. seqq. (c. 4. seq.), ubi dicit, sentire et intelligere esse «pati quoddam». — Pro omnes actiones cod. bb omnes affectiones. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 8, et S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 1; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 118 (c. 11) and III, text 2 and 12 ff. (c. 4 f.), where he says that to perceive and to understand are «a certain being-acted-upon». — For omnes actiones codex bb reads omnes affectiones. — This doubt is also resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 8, and Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 1; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1.
  5. Nam, ut ait Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 2, neque unam duorum, neque duas eiusdem definitiones possibile est esse. — Definitiones varias virtutis videsis infra d. 27. dub. 3.
    For, as Aristotle says, Topics VII, c. 2, it is impossible that there be either one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. — You may see the various definitions of virtue below, d. 27, dub. 3.
  6. Vat. omittit gratia, substituto paulo superius dicitur gratia pro habet anima. Mox pro de pluralitate codd. I V de diversitate.
    The Vatican edition omits gratia, having substituted a little above dicitur gratia for habet anima. Next, for de pluralitate codices I, V read de diversitate.
  7. Libr. II. Differentiarum (de Differentiis rerum; alias: de Differ. spiritual.) c. 32. (alias 27.) n. 115: Gratia autem est divinae misericordiae donum gratuitum, per quod et bonae voluntatis initium et operis promeremur effectum. Explicationem huius sent. vide infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.
    Bk. II of the Differences (On the Differences of Things; otherwise: On Spiritual Differences) c. 32 (otherwise 27), n. 115: But grace is the gratuitous gift of the divine mercy, through which we merit both the beginning of a good will and the effect of the work. See the explanation of this opinion below, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.
  8. Ps. 103, 16. — Haec definitio delibata est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc locum; vide supra pag. 637, nota 3.
    Ps. 103:16. — This definition is drawn from Augustine, Enarration on this passage; see above, p. 637, note 3.
  9. In Glossa interlin. super Rom. 1, 3. et 5, 15. Glossa ordinaria in I. Tim. 1, 2. annotat: Misericordia hic accipitur pro eo quod in aliis Epistolis gratia dicitur, id est remissio peccatorum.
    In the interlinear Gloss on Rom. 1:3 and 5:15. The ordinary Gloss on 1 Tim. 1:2 notes: Mercy here is taken for that which in the other Epistles is called grace, that is, the remission of sins.
  10. Explicans illud Rom. 1, 7: Gratia vobis et pax, dicit (hom. 1. n. 4.), quod «qui adoptionem servat et sanctificationem accurate custodit, illo qui diademate redimitur et purpura induitur, longe splendidior feliciorque est, atque in praesenti vita tranquillitate fruitur magna, spe bona fretus nullamque habens tumultus et perturbationis occasionem, sed voluptate perpetua gaudens. Hilaritatem enim et laetitiam non imperii magnitudo... parere solet, sed recte factum spirituale tantum et bona conscientia». Ibid. c. 3, 14. verba abundantiam gratiae interpretans ait (hom. 10. n. 2): Haec itaque omnia abundantiam gratiae Paulus vocavit ostendens, nos pharmacum accepisse non modo par vulneri, sed etiam sanitatem» etc. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 6: «Secundum Anselmum gratia est cordis delectatio; secundum alios gratia est sanitas mentium». S. Thom., de Verit. q. 27. a. 1: Damascenus dicit, quod gratia est delectatio animae. — De seq. definit. gratiae cfr. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro et delectatio cod. K vel delectatio.
    Explaining that of Rom. 1:7: Grace to you and peace, he says (hom. 1, n. 4) that «he who keeps adoption and carefully guards sanctification is far more splendid and happy than he who is crowned with a diadem and clad in purple, and in the present life enjoys great tranquillity, relying on good hope and having no occasion of tumult and disturbance, but rejoicing in perpetual delight. For it is not the greatness of empire... that is wont to produce cheerfulness and gladness, but only a spiritual right deed and a good conscience». Likewise, c. 3, 14, interpreting the words the abundance of grace, he says (hom. 10, n. 2): All these things, then, Paul called the abundance of grace, showing that we have received a remedy not only matched to the wound, but even health» etc. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 6: «According to Anselm grace is the delight of the heart; according to others grace is the health of minds». St. Thomas, On Truth q. 27, a. 1: Damascene says that grace is the delight of the soul. — On the following definition of grace cf. d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — For et delectatio codex K reads vel delectatio.
  11. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 3; «Praepositivus et alii antiqui magistri sic definierunt eam: Gratia est habitus infusus, divinae bonitati et caritati similis, gratum faciens habentem et opus eius gratum reddens». Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6[1]. m. 2. a. 6. hanc quoque definitionem magistralem affert (secundum B. Albert., hic a. 1, et S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 3. delibatam ex August., libro de Corrept. et gratia): Gratia est habitus mentis universaliter totius vitae ordinativus.
    Blessed Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 3: «Praepositinus and the other ancient masters defined it thus: Grace is an infused habit, like to the divine goodness and charity, making the one who has it pleasing and rendering his work pleasing». Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 6, also adduces this magisterial definition (according to Blessed Albert, here a. 1, and Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 3, drawn from Augustine, the book On Rebuke and Grace): Grace is a habit of the mind ordering the whole of life universally.
  12. Vers. 7. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal. et B. Albert., locc. in nota praec. citt.
    Verse 7. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales and Blessed Albert, in the places cited in the preceding note.
  13. Cap. 2. Vat. cum ed. 3, 4 de hoc pro quid est.
    Ch. 2. The Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, reads de hoc for quid est.
  14. Pro in iustitia codd. H T iustitiae. Paulo inferius Vat. cum ed. 3, 4 omittit verba immo Augustini, loco quorum ed. 2 cum aliquibus codd. ponit immo magis; cod. aa cum ed. 4 exhibet immo magis Augustini.
    For in iustitia codices H, T read iustitiae. A little below, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 omits the words immo Augustini, in place of which edition 2 with some codices puts immo magis; codex aa with edition 4 gives immo magis Augustini.
  15. Ita Codd. A C K L O R S T etc. alii hoc, Vat. hic, quae subinde etiam cum ed. 3, 4 substituit quae pro qui.
    Thus codices A, C, K, L, O, R, S, T etc.; others read hoc, the Vatican edition hic, which thereupon also, with editions 3, 4, substitutes quae for qui.
  16. Ver. 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 1. seqq.: Si linguis hominum loquar etc. — Mox pro plane Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 plene.
    Verse 6. — The following text is the passage cited, v. 1 ff.: If I speak with the tongues of men etc. — Next, for plane the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads plene.
  17. Epist. 98. (alias 23.) n. 5. et 9.
    Letter 98 (otherwise 23), n. 5 and 9.
  18. Part. I. q. 1. per totum. — Pro decima septima codd. et primae edd. decima sexta, sed ibi agitur tantummodo de contritione. — Hoc dubium solvit Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    Part I, q. 1, throughout. — For the seventeenth the codices and the early editions read the sixteenth, but there it is treated only of contrition. — Peter of Tarentaise resolves this doubt, here on the text.
← Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 6