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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo. Et quod sic, videtur.

Fundamenta.

1. « Peccatum, sicut dicit Anselmus1, non est aliud quam absentia vel carentia iustitiae, ubi debet esse »; sed privatio iustitiae passiva non est aliud

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quam carentia debitae iustitiae: ergo, essentialiter loquendo, culpa est corruptio, prout est passio.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro primo Confessionum2: « Iussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut omnis motus inordinatus poena sibi sit »; sed motus inordinatus est culpa; poena autem motus inordinati non est nisi ipsa corruptio passiva, quam homo incurrit ex illa inordinatione: ergo peccatum est ipsa privatio-passio, formaliter loquendo.

3. Item, « omnes actiones animae passiones sunt », sicut vult Philosophus3: ergo omnis inordinata actio animae est inordinata passio; sed quod est inordinatum est culpa: ergo illa passio sive corruptio inordinata est culpa.

4. Item, cum anima deformat se ipsam, ipsa deformitas, qua anima deformatur, remanet in ea, et culpa similiter; aut ergo illa deformitas est culpa, aut aliquod aliud; et constat, quod culpa, quae remanet in anima, non est aliud quam ipsa deformitas, qua anima deformis facta est: ergo videtur, quod peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio.

5. Item, corruptio-passio, in qua est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, aut est culpa, aut est poena. Si poena: ergo videtur, quod talis privatio sit a Deo: ergo Deus animam reddit deformem et iustitia privatam; quod profanum est dicere. Restat ergo, quod sit culpa.

Sed contra:

1. Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio4: « Culpa est malum, quod facimus, et poena malum, quod patimur »: si ergo corruptio-passio est malum, quod patimur, videtur, quod non sit culpa, sed poena.

2. Item, Augustinus5: « Malum culpae est affectio voluntaria, malum vero poenae est affectio involuntaria »; sed corruptio-passio non est voluntaria, sed involuntaria, quia nemo vult corrumpi nec deformari: ergo non videtur, quod sit culpa, sed poena.

3. Item, Magister in littera6: « Peccatum dicitur privatio active, non passive; nam ideo malum vel peccatum dicitur corruptio, quia naturam qualicumque privat bono ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Omnis poena est iusta et laudabilis7; sed omnis corruptio-passio est poena, cum damnificet et puniat eum qui corrumpitur: ergo omnis corruptio-passio est iusta et laudabilis. Sed nulla culpa est iusta et laudabilis: ergo nulla culpa est corruptio passive dicta.

5. Item, causa et effectus essentialiter distinguuntur; sed peccatum corrumpit et est principium corruptionis passivae, sicut prius ostensum est8: ergo corruptio-passio et ipsa culpa distinguuntur essentialiter: non est igitur culpa corruptio boni passive dicta.

Conclusio.

Non tantum corruptio sive privatio boni active dicta, sed eadem etiam passive dicta habet rationem culpae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, sicut praetactum est9: peccatum est corruptio, consistens circa voluntatem et eius actum, cum sit obliquatio a rectitudine iustitiae. (Praenotandum.) Voluntas autem in actu suo est « instrumentum se ipsum movens10 »; unde, quando voluntas ad aliquid movetur libere, si moveatur vel afficiatur inordinate, illa inordinatio respicit voluntatem moventem et voluntatem motam, quia voluntas, dum inordinate afficitur, inordinate movet et inordinate movetur. Quoniam igitur culpa, prout consideratur in actu, nihil aliud est quam motus voluntatis inordinatus, et ad illum motum concurrit actio et passio, non tantum est corruptio-actio, immo etiam corruptio-passio. (Conclusio 1.) Nam et inordinatio, qua anima se deordinat, et inordinatio, qua anima deordinatur, utraque est culpa, differens comparatione, una tamen per essentiam. — Et quia quales sunt actus, tales sunt habitus, maxime cum habitus generantur ex actibus, sicut est in genere malorum habituum11; hinc est, quod deformitas vel privatio in voluntate relicta et habet in se aliquid correspondens actioni, et aliquid correspondens etiam passioni. Nam voluntas, dum peccat actualiter, efficitur inhabilis, et in quantum habet rationem moventis et in quantum habet rationem moti. Et ita culpa, considerata ut in habitu, et in quantum remanet in anima post actum peccati, et est corruptio sive privatio correspondens actioni, et est corruptio sive privatio correspondens passioni. Et sic eadem culpa est corruptio sive privatio boni, non solum active, sed etiam passive dicta, secundum veritatem

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loquendo. (Corollarium.) Secundum appropriationem vero, corruptio illa, in quantum est active intellecta, tenet mere rationem culpae, in quantum vero passive dicta, tenet rationem poenae; quia, in quantum est active dicta, tenet rationem voluntarii12, in quantum vero passive, rationem involuntarii. (Explicatur.) — Nec ista sunt incompossibilia circa eandem actionem et motum. Nam expresse videmus, quod in eadem actione corporali una et eadem actio et delectat et laedit, et per consequens contristat; sicut, cum scabiosus scalpendo cutem suam dilaniat, et dilaniando delectatur et dilaniando etiam laeditur, et13 unum placet, et reliquum displicet. Similiter et in eadem actione spirituali est aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad commutabile bonum, et conversio placet, et aversio displicet. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod eadem culpa potest dici active et passive; prout tamen active dicitur, proprie tenet rationem culpae, in quantum vero passive, tenet rationem poenae. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod aliqua corruptio-passio, utpote illa quae est rectitudinis privatio, culpa est.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod culpa est malum, quod facimus etc.; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam cum idem motus possit esse actio et passio, in quo voluntas se ipsam movet; sic et eadem actio potest esse poenae et culpae, licet sub alia et alia ratione. — Similiter respondendum est ad sequens, quod obiicitur de voluntario et involuntario.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de verbo Magistri, dicendum, quod illud dicitur per quandam appropriationem; magis enim proprie dicitur culpa corruptio-actio quam corruptio-passio. (Notandum.) Verum est etiam, quod aliquis, dum caret iustitia, quam debet habere, culpabilis est. Ratio tamen principalis, quare culpabilis est, est ex hoc, quod ipse fecit sibi illam carentiam; nam si involuntarie eam sustineret aliunde, tunc teneret potius rationem poenae quam culpae14.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena est iusta et laudabilis; dicendum, quod est poena inflicta et poena acta et poena contracta15. (Triplex poena.) Et cum dicitur, quod omnis poena est iusta et laudabilis, hoc intelligitur de poena inflicta; de poena acta vel contracta non habet veritatem, nisi prout intelliguntur sub ratione poenae. Privatio autem boni passiva sive ipsius animae deformatio non est poena inflicta, sed est poena acta, quia anima hanc poenam in se facit, dum peccat.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est causa corruptionis passivae; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de peccato, quod est in actu, quod est causa corruptionis in voluntate per modum habitus; et utrobique16, sicut ostensum est prius, habet rationem actionis et passionis. — (Alia solutio.) Potest tamen dici, quod etsi peccatum dicatur corrumpere, non tamen est proprie causa corruptionis, sed potius ipse peccans. Et si dicatur peccatum esse causa corruptionis passivae, hoc dicitur ratione ipsius peccantis, sicut actio dicitur esse causa passionis ratione ipsius agentis; fortassis enim idem potest esse actio et passio, sola comparatione differens17.

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English Translation
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QUESTION II.

Whether sin is the very corruption-as-passion, speaking essentially.

Secondly it is asked, whether sin is the very corruption-as-passion, speaking essentially. And that it is, it seems.

Fundamenta.

1. « Sin, as Anselm says1, is nothing other than the absence or lack of justice where it ought to be »; but the passive privation of justice is nothing other

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than the lack of the justice that is due: therefore, speaking essentially, guilt is a corruption insofar as it is a passion.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the first book of the Confessions2: « You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered motion should be a punishment to itself »; but a disordered motion is guilt; and the punishment of a disordered motion is nothing but the very passive corruption which the human incurs from that disorder: therefore sin is the very privation-as-passion, speaking formally.

3. Likewise, « all the actions of the soul are passions », as the Philosopher holds3: therefore every disordered action of the soul is a disordered passion; but what is disordered is guilt: therefore that disordered passion or corruption is guilt.

4. Likewise, when the soul deforms itself, the deformity itself by which the soul is deformed remains in it, and likewise the guilt; therefore either that deformity is guilt, or [it is] something else; and it is evident that the guilt which remains in the soul is nothing other than the very deformity by which the soul has been made deformed: therefore it seems that sin is the very corruption-as-passion.

5. Likewise, corruption-as-passion, in which there is a privation of measure, species, and order, is either guilt or punishment. If punishment: then it seems that such a privation is from God: therefore God renders the soul deformed and deprived of justice; which it is profane to say. It remains therefore that it is guilt.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine, On Free Will4: « Guilt is the evil which we do, and punishment the evil which we suffer »: if therefore corruption-as-passion is an evil which we suffer, it seems that it is not guilt, but punishment.

2. Likewise, Augustine5: « The evil of guilt is a voluntary affection, but the evil of punishment is an involuntary affection »; but corruption-as-passion is not voluntary, but involuntary, since no one wills to be corrupted or deformed: therefore it does not seem that it is guilt, but punishment.

3. Likewise, the Master in the text6: « Sin is called a privation actively, not passively; for evil or sin is called a corruption precisely because it deprives the nature of some good ».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Every punishment is just and praiseworthy7; but every corruption-as-passion is a punishment, since it harms and punishes him who is corrupted: therefore every corruption-as-passion is just and praiseworthy. But no guilt is just and praiseworthy: therefore no guilt is a corruption spoken of passively.

5. Likewise, cause and effect are essentially distinguished; but sin corrupts and is the principle of passive corruption, as was shown before8: therefore corruption-as-passion and guilt itself are essentially distinguished: therefore guilt is not corruption of the good spoken of passively.

Conclusion.

Not only corruption or privation of the good spoken of actively, but the same also spoken of passively, has the character of guilt.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted, as was touched upon before9: sin is a corruption, consisting around the will and its act, since it is a deviation from the rectitude of justice. (To be premised.) But the will in its act is « an instrument moving itself10 »; whence, when the will is moved freely toward something, if it be moved or affected in a disordered way, that disorder regards the will as moving and the will as moved, because the will, while it is disordered in its affection, moves in a disordered way and is moved in a disordered way. Since therefore guilt, insofar as it is considered in the act, is nothing other than a disordered motion of the will, and to that motion both action and passion concur, it is not only corruption-action, but also corruption-passion. (Conclusion 1.) For both the disorder by which the soul disorders itself, and the disorder by which the soul is disordered, each is guilt, differing in comparison, yet one in essence. — And because as the acts are, such are the habits, especially since habits are generated from acts, as is the case in the genus of evil habits11; hence it is that the deformity or privation left in the will both has in itself something corresponding to action, and something corresponding also to passion. For the will, while it sins actually, is rendered unfit, both insofar as it has the character of mover and insofar as it has the character of moved. And thus the guilt, considered as in habit, and insofar as it remains in the soul after the act of sin, is both a corruption or privation corresponding to action, and a corruption or privation corresponding to passion. And thus the same guilt is a corruption or privation of the good, not only spoken of actively, but also passively, speaking according to truth

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[, essentially] speaking. (Corollary.) But according to appropriation, that corruption, insofar as it is understood actively, holds merely the character of guilt, but insofar as it is spoken of passively, holds the character of punishment; because, insofar as it is spoken of actively, it holds the character of the voluntary12, but insofar as [it is spoken of] passively, [it holds] the character of the involuntary. (It is explained.) — Nor are these incompossible regarding the same action and motion. For we expressly see that in the same bodily action one and the same action both delights and wounds, and consequently saddens; just as, when a scabby person, by scratching, lacerates his own skin, both by lacerating he is delighted and by lacerating he is also wounded, and13 the one pleases, and the other displeases. Likewise also in the same spiritual action there is an aversion from the unchangeable good and a conversion to a changeable good, and the conversion pleases, and the aversion displeases. So too in the matter proposed it is to be understood that the same guilt can be spoken of actively and passively; yet insofar as it is spoken of actively, it properly holds the character of guilt, but insofar as [it is spoken of] passively, it holds the character of punishment. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that some corruption-as-passion, namely that which is a privation of rectitude, is guilt.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. 2. To that therefore which is first objected, that guilt is the evil which we do, etc.; the response is now clear from the things which have been said. For since the same motion can be action and passion, in which the will moves itself; so too the same action can be of punishment and of guilt, although under one and another character. — Likewise it must be responded to what follows, which is objected concerning the voluntary and the involuntary.

3. To that which is objected thirdly concerning the word of the Master, it must be said that this is said by a certain appropriation; for corruption-action is more properly called guilt than corruption-passion. (To be noted.) It is also true that someone, while he lacks the justice which he ought to have, is culpable. Yet the principal reason why he is culpable is from this, that he made that lack for himself; for if he were to sustain it involuntarily from elsewhere, then it would hold rather the character of punishment than of guilt14.

4. To that which is objected, that every punishment is just and praiseworthy; it must be said that there is punishment inflicted, punishment enacted, and punishment contracted15. (Threefold punishment.) And when it is said that every punishment is just and praiseworthy, this is understood of punishment inflicted; of punishment enacted or contracted it does not hold true, except insofar as they are understood under the character of punishment. But the passive privation of the good, or the deformation of the soul itself, is not a punishment inflicted, but is a punishment enacted, because the soul makes this punishment in itself while it sins.

5. To that which is objected, that sin is the cause of passive corruption; it must be said that this is understood of sin which is in act, which is the cause of corruption in the will by way of a habit; and in both ways16, as was shown before, it has the character of action and of passion. — (Another solution.) Yet it can be said that, even though sin is said to corrupt, it is nevertheless not properly the cause of corruption, but rather the sinner himself. And if sin be said to be the cause of passive corruption, this is said by reason of the sinner himself, just as action is said to be the cause of passion by reason of the agent himself; for perhaps the same thing can be action and passion, differing in comparison alone17.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De Casu diaboli, c. 9. et 16; de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et 6. Cfr. supra pag. 722, nota 3.
    On the Fall of the Devil, c. 9 and 16; On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 3 and 6. Cfr. above p. 722, note 3.
  2. Cap. 12. n. 19, ubi textus origin. et Vat. pro motus exhibent animus, quod infra d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. etiam codd. et edd. ponunt. — De propos. seq. cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 18. n. 52.
    Cap. 12. n. 19, where the original text and the Vatican [edition] for motus exhibit animus, which below at d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. the codices and editions also place. — On the following proposition cfr. Augustine, III. On Free Will c. 1. n. 1. seqq. and c. 18. n. 52.
  3. Vide I. de Anima, text. 3. et 12. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi potentiae et operationes animae vocantur passiones (πάθη), et supra pag. 648, nota 3.
    See I. On the Soul, text 3 and 12 seqq. (c. 1), where the powers and operations of the soul are called passions (πάθη), and above p. 648, note 3.
  4. Libr. I. c. 1. n. 1: Duobus enim modis appellare solemus malum: uno, cum male quemque fecisse dicimus; alio, cum mali aliquid esse perpessum. Cfr. supra pag. 625, nota 9.
    Book I. c. 1. n. 1: For in two ways we are accustomed to call [something] evil: in one, when we say that someone has done ill; in another, when [we say] that he has suffered something of evil. Cfr. above p. 625, note 9.
  5. Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. Verba vide supra pag. 719, nota 1.
    Book III. On Free Will c. 9. n. 26. For the words see above p. 719, note 1.
  6. Hic c. 3. in fine.
    Here c. 3, at the end.
  7. Vide infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. — Inferius cod. bb quem corrumpit pro eum qui corrumpitur. In fine arg. Vat. cum ed. 1 et nonnullis codd. addit sicut prius ostensum est; in seq. arg. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 haec verba omittit.
    See below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. — Further on, cod. bb [reads] quem corrumpit for eum qui corrumpitur. At the end of the argument the Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 and several codices adds sicut prius ostensum est; in the following argument the Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4 omits these words.
  8. Quaest. praeced. — De maiori vide supra pag. 656, nota 7. in fine.
    The preceding question. — On the major [premise] see above p. 656, note 7, at the end.
  9. Quaest. praeced. — Codd. F K subiiciunt quod.
    The preceding question. — Codd. F K subjoin quod.
  10. Secundum Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 564, nota 9.
    According to Anselm, On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will q. 3. c. 11. Cfr. above p. 564, note 9.
  11. Vide supra pag. 718, nota 9. et pag. 760, nota 6.
    See above p. 718, note 9, and p. 760, note 6.
  12. Aliquot codd., inter quos F K Q, hic repetunt tenet.
    Several codices, among which F K Q, here repeat tenet.
  13. Vat. quod.
    The Vatican [edition reads] quod.
  14. Cfr. infra d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 2, d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    Cfr. below d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. and a. 3. q. 2, d. 41. a. 2. q. 1, in the body.
  15. Vide supra pag. 767, nota 6, ubi verba Praepositivi huic spectantia attulimus. Verbis ibi allatis Praepositivus haec addit: Illa quae est poena contracta, est vitium; illa nullo modo a Deo est, nec est dicendum, quod sit iusta poena, nisi forte dicatur iusta, quia iustum fuit, ut Deus desereret primum parentem, et eo deserto, illa secuta est. De ea [scil. contracta], quae non est vitium, concedimus, quod a Deo est... De poena acta concedimus, quod est iusta poena et iniuste facta, i. e. iniuste faciens. Veniale peccatum est iniusta poena, i. e. iniuste facta, licet non iniustum faciens. Poena vera illata pro peccato, illa iusta poena est et est a Deo. Cfr. infra d. 42. dub. 1.
    See above p. 767, note 6, where we adduced the words of Praepositivus pertaining to this. To the words there adduced Praepositivus adds these: That which is contracted punishment is a vice; it is in no way from God, nor is it to be said that it is a just punishment, unless perhaps it be called just because it was just that God should forsake the first parent, and, he being forsaken, it followed. Concerning that [contracted] which is not a vice, we grant that it is from God... Concerning enacted punishment we grant that it is a just punishment and unjustly made, that is, unjustly making. Venial sin is an unjust punishment, that is, unjustly made, although not unjustly making. But the punishment truly inflicted for sin, that is a just punishment and is from God. Cfr. below d. 42. dub. 1.
  16. Edd., excepta 1, utrumque.
    The editions, except 1, [read] utrumque.
  17. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion of the preceding question.
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