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Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo Deum defigat aspectum in ipsum lumen aeternum, an in aliquid infra ipsum.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo Deum defigat aspectum in ipsum lumen aeternum, an in aliquid infra ipsum. Et quod non videat ipsum fontem luminis, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum sextop302-8: Lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quam nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest: ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, nunquam Deum in sua luce vidit nec videre potest.

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2. Item, Ioannis primop303-1: Deum nemo vidit unquam; super illum locum dicit Chrysostomus: «Solus Filius eum vidit et Spiritus sanctus; qui autem creabilis est naturae, qualiter videre potest increabilem»? Si ergo anima Christi nec est Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, sed magis creatura; non videtur, quod illam lucem videat in se ipsa.

3. Item, quantum distat finitum ab infinito, tantum distat creatura a Creatore; sed propter infinitam distantiam nulla virtus finita potest cognoscere Deum ut immensump303-2: ergo pari ratione propter infinitam distantiam nulla virtus creata poterit cognoscere et videre lumen increatum per se ipsum.

4. Item, sicut ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur commensuratio quaedam, ita ad cognitionem a partep303-3 visionis requiritur assimilatio congrua; sed quae in nullo conveniunt non possunt assimilari: ergo Creator non potest a creatura in se ipso videri, cum nihil habeant commune.

5. Item, multo plus excedit claritas divinae lucis oculum animae Christi, quam sol excedat claritatem oculi materialis; sed oculus noster materialis non potest intueri lumen corporale in fonte propter excellentiam: ergo nec intellectus Christi.

6. Item, fons aeterni luminis in se ipso est infinitus et immensus; sed finitum non potest super infinitum: ergo cum virtus animae Christi sit finita, non poterit actus eius se protendere usque ad ipsum: ergo non poterit ipsum cognoscere in se ipso: ergo videtur, quod nec anima Christi nec alia anima cognoscat Deum in claritate sua.

Sed contra:

1. Super illud secundae ad Corinthios tertiop303-4: Nos revelata facie; Glossa: «Christus est imago Patris eadem cum illo, in quem tendimus, scilicet ut eum in essentia videamus»: si ergo Christi anima habet ad quod nitimur pervenire, ergo Deum videt in substantia et natura.

2. Item, plus est uniri alicui in unitatem personae quam in unionem facientem cognitionem; sed anima Christi Verbo aeterno immediate unita est in unitatem personaep303-5: ergo multo fortius ipsi veritati et luci Verbi unitur per cognitionem ipsius in se: ergo sine aliquo medio Deum videt.

3. Item, in cognitione conclusionum non est quies, sed solum in cognitione principiorum — et ratio huius est, quia anima cognoscit conclusiones per medium, principia vero cognoscit sine mediop303-6 — si ergo anima Christi cognoscit Deum mediante aliquo, ergo non quiescit in cognitione Dei; et si non quiescit in Deo, cum Deus sit finis ultimus, non est beata. Si ergo beata est, necessario sequitur, quod cognoscat divinam lucem in se ipsa; pari ratione et omnis anima beata.

4. Item, intellectus comprehensoris tantum elevatur, quantum affectus, quamvis caecus sit in via propter caecitatem ignorantiae; sed Christus fuit perfectissimus comprehensor: cum ergo ipse diligeret summam Dei bonitatem in se ipsa, omni effectu circumscripto, pari ratione lucem et veritatem in se ipsa videbat absque medio.

5. Item, aut immediate videt, aut per medium. Si immediate, habeo propositum; si per medium, aut per medium proportionabile, aut improportionabile. Si per medium improportionabile, ergo potius impeditur, quam iuvetur; si per medium proportionabile, contra: aut est creatum, aut increatum; increatum non, quia illud est unum solum; si creatum: ergo creatura potest esse proportionabilisp303-7 Creatori; et si hoc, cum nihil aliud impediat, quin creatura possit videre Deum in sua substantia, restat, quod anima Christi sic eum videre poterat et videbat.

6. Item, si per medium, aut illud est superius anima Christi beata, aut inferius. Si inferius; ergo immediatior est anima Christi Deo, quam sit illud quod tu dicis medium: ergo illo circumscripto, melius videbit Deum. Si superius; ergo aliquid est excellentius natura humanae mentis in Christo. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia omnia sunt subiecta pedibus eiusp303-8. Restat igitur, quod anima eius immediate et in ipso fonte videbat et videt lumen aeternum. — His etiam rationibus idem ostendi potest de qualibet anima beata.

Conclusio

Anima Christi et aliae animae beatae vident ipsum luminis fontem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod Deus a nulla creatura videbitur nec videtur in sua essen-

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-tia vel natura, sed videbitur in claritate sua, cum tantus sit fulgor ipsius immensitatis luminis, quod ad contuitum illius substantiae nullus oculus creaturae possit pertingere. — Hunc errorem evacuat Gregorius in Moralibus, tractans illud Iob vigesimo octavop304-1: Abscondita est ab oculis omnium viventium, ubi ait sic: «Fuerunt qui dicerent, in illa regione beatitudinis in claritate sua Deum conspici et in natura non videri; sed non est aliud claritas, aliud natura, sed ipsa natura est claritas, et ipsa claritas est natura». Et ideo iste error non multum rationabilis est, quia male intelligit lumen aeternum, in quo non differt essentia luminis et ipse actus lucendi.

Et ideo fuerunt alii moderniores, qui dixerunt, a nulla creatura posse aspici lumen aeternum in fonte suae claritatis, sed in quibusdam condescensionibus et theophaniis, et hoc propter improportionabilitatem oculi ad illam summam lucem, quae potius sua immensitate opprimeret, quam delectaret oculum creaturae, quae se habet ad ipsam, sicut oculus noctuaep304-2; et ideo oportuit, quod Deus se contemperaret ipsi animae, sicut sol contemperatur oculo mediante nube. — Sed hic modus dicendi non minus a veritate deviat quam praecedens. Unde etiam ipsum improbat magister Hugo, super Angelicam Hierarchiamp304-3: «Quid est, inquit, theophaniis Deum videri et extra illas non videri, nisi nunquam vere videri? Si enim sola imago semper videtur, veritas nunquam videtur. Tollant ergo phantasias suas, quibus lumen mentium nostrarum obtenebrare nituntur, neque nobis Deum nostrum simulacris exterminationum suarum intersepiant; quia nos, sicut nec satiare potest aliquid praeter ipsum, sic nec sistere potest aliquid usque ad ipsum».

Et ideo, his duobus modis tanquam erroneis abiectis, dicendum est tertio modo vere et catholice, quod anima Christi beatissima et aliae beatae animae vident ipsum luminis fontem, in quo reficiuntur, quiescunt, delectantur et quodam modo a claritate illius luminis absorbentur, ut Deus ab eis undique conspiciatur et videatur etiam in ipsisp304-4; et hoc potissime verum est in anima Christi. — Et ideo concedendae sunt auctoritates et rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

Ad intelligentiam autem auctoritatum adductarum in contrarium et consimilium notandum est, quod quinque modis habent exponi auctoritates Sanctorum, quae videntur dicere, Deum in sua substantia non posse videri. Primo modo sic: non potest videri, scilicet viribus nostris, potest tamen munere Dei. Unde super illud primae ad Timotheum sextop304-5: Lucem habitat inaccessibilem; Glossa: «Inaccessibilis est viribus nostris, accessibilis muneribus suis». — Secundo modo sic: non potest videri substantia, scilicet in via. Unde super illud primae ad Timotheum sextop304-6: Quem nullus hominum videre potest; Glossa: «Poterit autem aliquando». Et sic illud Exodi trigesimo tertio: Non videbit me homo et vivet. — Tertio modo sic: non potest substantia videri, id est plene comprehendi. Unde super illud Iob undecimop304-7: Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes? Glossa: «Eius essentia a nullo plene videbitur», plene, scilicet circumscribendo. — Quarto modo sic: non potest videri substantia, id est ratio substantiae. Unde ad Romanos primop304-8: Quod notum est Dei; Glossa: «Ratio substantiae eius latet omnem creaturam»; et hoc modo potest dici «Trinitas sibi soli nota esse». — Quinto modo sic: nemo Dei substantiam novit, vel aliquid tale, «quia non facit nosse». Matthaei vigesimo quartop304-9: De die autem illa et hora nemo novit, neque Angelus etc., sicut fovea caeca

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dicitur, quia non manifestat quod habet in se. Et sic dicit Chrysostomus, quod Angeli non vident, quid sit Deus.

Ad opposita:

Ad 1. 2. Et sic patent duae auctoritates, quia prima currit secundum primum modum, et secunda secundum quartum modum, vel quintum.

Ad 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum distat finitum ab infinito etc.; dicendum, quod distantia dicitur contra convenientiam; convenientia autem invenitur in triplici differentia, quantum ad praesens sufficit. Est enim convenientia commensurationis sive adaequationis, et convenientia participationis alicuius communis, et convenientia ordinis. Dico igitur, quod si distantia dicatur per privationem convenientiae adaequationis et participationis, infinita est distantia creati ad increatum, sicut infiniti ad finitum. Si vero dicatur distantia per privationem convenientiae ordinis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia creaturae immediate ordinantur ad Deum sicut ad principium et sicut ad finem, maxime creatura rationalisp305-1. Ad simplicem autem contuitum sufficit, quod sit convenientia ordinis, sed ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur convenientia secundum quandam aequalitatem sive adaequationem. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi anima creata non possit comprehendere infinitatem, quod non possit intueri luminis fontem. — Et per hoc patet sequens. Quod enim dicit, quod ad cognitionem requiritur assimilatio; dicendum, quod non oportet, quod assimilatio in natura tertia, sed sufficit, quod unum sit similitudo alterius, sicut in primo libro fuit determinatum, distinctione prima, tertia et trigesima quintap305-2.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excedit oculum lumen illud; dicendum, quod est excellentia conservans, et est excellentia corrumpens. Excellentia conservans est in spiritualibus, sed corrumpens in obiectis corporalibus; et ratio huius in primo librop305-3 est reddita et a parte obiecti et a parte modi comprehendendi: et ideo non est simile.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finitum non potest supra infinitum; dicendum, quod anima in cognoscendo Deum plus est in suscipiendo quam in agendo, immo omnis potentia animae respectu Dei se habet in ratione passivi — nedum potentia cognitiva active, quae de sua ratione dicit quodam modo passionem, sicut dicit Philosophusp305-4 et Priscianus. — Et ideo, cum intelligit Deum, non agit anima in Deum, sed Deus influit in animam, in qua influentia Deus condescendit per gratiam, et anima elevatur et efficitur deiformis. Et ipsa deiformitas est dispositio reddens oculum animae aptum ad videndum Deum, non quia facit proportionabilem quantitatem, quia semper illud lumen excedit in infinitum, sed quia facit proportionabilem qualitatem, quia datur ipsi animae aliquid, utpote similitudo, quodp305-5 ipsam animam et intellectum animae, cum Deo facit similem, reddit intelligentem. — Et si tu obiicias, quod licet visio et cognitio incipiat a passione, completur tamen in actione, cum ad visionem duo concurrant: receptio et iudiciump305-6; illum autem fontem luminis nulla potest creatura agere, quoniam ipsum a nullo potest pati; similiter de illo fonte luminis et veritate summa nullus potest iudicare, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religionep305-7, et ipsa ratio dictat, cum iudicans aliquo modo praesideat indicato; nullo modo videtur sustineri posse, quod anima Christi, vel alia anima beata iudicaret ipsum superni luminis fontem: ad hoc respondendum est, quod etsi ad actionem cognitionis aliquo modo concurrat non solum passio, sed etiam actio; non tamen concurrit actio, quae quidem fit per aliquam influentiam vel impressionem ipsius cognoscentis in cognoscibile, sed solum per quandam protensionem. Sicut etiam latet in dilectione, cum amo aliquem, anima amando aliquo modo agit, nihil tamen influit in amatum, nec dilectum aliquid patitur vel recipit ab amante: sic intelligendum est in cognitionep305-8. — Similiter, cum dicimus, visionem sive cognitionem perfici in iudicio; dicendum, quod verum est; sed ad hoc, quod videamus Deum, non oportet, quod de ipso iudicemus in se, sed sufficit ad claram visionem ab ipso lumine luminis illuminari et illuminatum oculum in ipsum protendere intuendo, et iudicare de ipso intuitu, cum non possit attingere ad hoc, ut de

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ipsa summa veritate iudicet, sed secundum ipsam iudicet anima de se ipsa et de sua cognitione. Nihil tamen impedit, aliquo modo accipiendo iudicium, secundum quod requiritur ad visionem, quin possit concedi, quod anima beata certissime iudicet, illud esse summum lumen, quod intuetur, sicut in primo librop306-1 fuit habitum. Et huic non repugnat verbum Augustini. Quantumcumque enim sive intuitus sive iudicium videatur in se habere naturam actionis; tamen respectu Dei vel divini luminis, a quo causatur, est passio et effectus. Unde quod anima videat Deum in se, hoc non est, quia anima possit supra Deum, sed magis quod Deus possit supra ipsam, adeo ut anima per divinam potentiam et influentiam elevetur supra ipsamp306-2. — Haec autem quae dicta sunt de anima Christi generaliter, valent ad quaestionem de visione Dei, similiter quae sequuntur.

Scholion

I. Conclusio confirmata est pluribus decretis Ecclesiae, praesertim Constitutione Benedicti XII. Benedictus Deus (an. 1336), ubi docetur, quod Beati in caelo «vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione obiecti visi se habente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente». — Alius error Beguardorum damnatus est an. 1311 a Clemente V. in Concilio Viennensi, scilicet «quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in se ipsa naturaliter est beata, quodque anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum» (cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.). — Prima et secunda opinio erronea (hic in corp.) tribuuntur quibusdam Armenis saeculi VII, Arnaldistis saec. XII. et posterius cuidam Graeco Gregorio Palamas. — Circa modum huius visionis multae exortae sunt disputationes et opiniones. Inter alia nonnulli iam illa aetate voluerunt, quod haec visio fiat per aliquam speciem seu similitudinem a Verbo impressam; quam opinionem Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1.) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 3.) censuerunt esse probabilem; sed Ss. Thom. et Bonav. cum communi sententia docent, ipsum Verbum, intellectui essentialiter praesens et unitum, supplere vicem speciei impressae. Consentit eis etiam Scotus, si agitur de facto, tamen possibile esse putat Deo etiam mediante specie impressa praedictam visionem efficere, quod discipuli S. Thomae communiter negant. De hac controversia S. Bonav. disertis verbis nihil determinat; tamen quaedam verba generalia in favorem Scotisticae sententiae cum De Barberiis exponi possent. Quod ipsa increata veritas sine specie impressa eminentissime informare possit intellectum, docetur variis locis v. g. hic solut. ad 3. 4. et 6, a. 2. q. 1-3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 5; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7.

II. Hoc loco pauci antiqui Commentatores hanc quaestionem explicite tractant, ut praeter S. Bonav. Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1, nec non Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. Ceteri rem hic tangunt in aliis quaestionibus, praesertim in illa, utrum Verbum cognoscatur mediante aliqua specie impressa (Durand., hic q. 2.), et diffusius, ubi disputant de visione beatifica in genere, ut Scot. IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 11. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2; S. I. q. 12. a. 1. seqq.; S. c. Gent. III. c. 51-54.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether Christ's soul, in knowing God, fixes its gaze on the eternal light itself, or on something below it.

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ's soul, in knowing God, fixes its gaze on the eternal light itself, or on something below it. And that it does not see the fount of light itself appears as follows.

1. First to Timothy 6p302-8: He dwells in inaccessible light, which no man has seen, nor indeed can see: therefore Christ, according as he is man, has never seen God in his light, nor can he see him.

2. Likewise, John 1p303-1: No one has ever seen God; upon that passage Chrysostom says: «The Son alone has seen him, and the Holy Spirit; but he who is of a creatable nature, how can he see the uncreatable»? If therefore Christ's soul is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but rather a creature; it does not appear that it sees that light in itself.

3. Likewise, by as much as the finite is distant from the infinite, by so much is the creature distant from the Creator; but on account of the infinite distance no finite power can know God as immensep303-2: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of the infinite distance, no created power will be able to know and see the uncreated light through itself.

4. Likewise, just as for the knowledge of comprehension a certain commensuration is required, so for the knowledge on the side ofp303-3 vision a fitting assimilation is required; but things which agree in nothing cannot be assimilated: therefore the Creator cannot be seen in himself by a creature, since they have nothing in common.

5. Likewise, the brightness of the divine light exceeds the eye of Christ's soul much more than the sun exceeds the brightness of the material eye; but our material eye cannot behold corporeal light in its fount on account of [its] excellence: therefore neither can the intellect of Christ.

6. Likewise, the fount of eternal light is in itself infinite and immense; but the finite cannot [reach] above the infinite: therefore since the power of Christ's soul is finite, its act will not be able to extend itself all the way to it: therefore it will not be able to know it in itself: therefore it appears that neither Christ's soul nor any other soul knows God in his brightness.

On the contrary:

1. Upon that text of Second Corinthians 3p303-4: We, with unveiled face; the Gloss: «Christ is the image of the Father, the same as him, toward whom we tend, namely that we may see him in [his] essence»: if therefore Christ's soul has [the thing] to which we strive to attain, therefore it sees God in substance and nature.

2. Likewise, it is more to be united to someone in unity of person than in a union producing knowledge; but Christ's soul is immediately united to the eternal Word in unity of personp303-5: therefore much more strongly is it united to the truth and light of the Word through knowledge of it in itself: therefore it sees God without any medium.

3. Likewise, in the knowledge of conclusions there is no rest, but only in the knowledge of principles — and the reason for this is that the soul knows conclusions through a medium, but knows principles without a mediump303-6 — if therefore Christ's soul knows God through some medium, then it does not rest in the knowledge of God; and if it does not rest in God, since God is the ultimate end, it is not beatified. If therefore it is beatified, it necessarily follows that it knows the divine light in itself; and by parity of reasoning so does every beatified soul.

4. Likewise, the intellect of one who is a comprehensor is elevated as much as his affection, although it is blind in the way on account of the blindness of ignorance; but Christ was a most perfect comprehensor: since therefore he loved the supreme goodness of God in itself, every effect being set aside, by parity of reasoning he saw the light and truth in itself without a medium.

5. Likewise, either it sees immediately, or through a medium. If immediately, I have my proposition; if through a medium, either through a proportionate medium, or an improportionate one. If through an improportionate medium, then it is hindered rather than helped; if through a proportionate medium, on the contrary: either it is created or uncreated; not uncreated, because that is one alone; if created: then a creature can be proportionatep303-7 to the Creator; and if this [is so], since nothing else hinders the creature from being able to see God in his substance, it remains that Christ's soul could so see him and did see him.

6. Likewise, if [it sees] through a medium, either that [medium] is superior to the beatified soul of Christ, or inferior. If inferior; then Christ's soul is more immediate to God than that which you call a medium: therefore, that being set aside, it will see God better. If superior; then there is something more excellent than the nature of the human mind in Christ. But this is impossible, because all things are subjected under his feetp303-8. It remains therefore that his soul saw and sees the eternal light immediately and in the fount itself. — By these reasonings too the same can be shown of any beatified soul.

Conclusion

Christ's soul and the other beatified souls see the fount of light itself.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that God will not be seen, nor is seen, by any creature in his essence

or nature, but will be seen in his brightness, since the splendor of the immensity of his light is so great that no creaturely eye can attain to the beholding of that substance. — Gregory in the Morals dispels this error, treating that text of Job 28p304-1: It is hidden from the eyes of all the living, where he speaks thus: «There were those who said that in that region of beatitude God is beheld in his brightness and is not seen in his nature; but brightness is not one thing and nature another, but the very nature is brightness, and the very brightness is nature». And so this error is not very reasonable, because it understands the eternal light badly, in which the essence of light and the very act of shining do not differ.

And so there were others more modern who said that the eternal light cannot be beheld by any creature in the fount of its brightness, but [only] in certain condescensions and theophanies, and this on account of the disproportion of the eye to that supreme light, which would oppress rather than delight the creaturely eye, which is related to it as the eye of an owlp304-2; and therefore it was necessary that God should temper himself to the soul, as the sun is tempered to the eye through the medium of a cloud. — But this manner of speaking deviates from the truth no less than the preceding. Hence master Hugo too refutes it, on the Angelic Hierarchyp304-3: «What is it, he says, for God to be seen in theophanies and not to be seen outside them, except never to be truly seen? For if only the image is always seen, the truth is never seen. Let them therefore put away their phantasms, by which they strive to darken the light of our minds, and let them not fence God our own from us by the images of their exterminations; because for us, just as nothing besides him can satisfy, so nothing short of him can bring us to a stand».

And so, these two manners having been cast aside as erroneous, it must be said in a third manner, truly and catholically, that the most beatified soul of Christ and the other beatified souls see the fount of light itself, in which they are refreshed, rest, are delighted, and in a certain way are absorbed by the brightness of that light, so that God is beheld by them on every side and is seen even in [the souls] themselvesp304-4; and this is most especially true in the soul of Christ. — And therefore the authorities and reasons adduced for this side must be granted.

But for an understanding of the authorities adduced to the contrary, and of similar ones, it must be noted that in five ways the authorities of the Saints can be expounded, which seem to say that God cannot be seen in his substance. In the first way thus: he cannot be seen, namely by our own powers, yet he can [be seen] by the gift of God. Hence upon that text of First Timothy 6p304-5: He dwells in inaccessible light; the Gloss: «It is inaccessible to our powers, accessible to his gifts». — In the second way thus: the substance cannot be seen, namely in the way. Hence upon that text of First Timothy 6p304-6: Whom no man can see; the Gloss: «Yet he will be able [to be seen] at some time». And thus that text of Exodus 33: Man shall not see me and live. — In the third way thus: the substance cannot be seen, that is, fully comprehended. Hence upon that text of Job 11p304-7: Wilt thou perhaps comprehend the traces of God? the Gloss: «His essence will be seen fully by none», fully, namely by circumscribing. — In the fourth way thus: the substance cannot be seen, that is, the account of the substance. Hence to the Romans 1p304-8: That which is known of God; the Gloss: «The account of his substance lies hidden from every creature»; and in this way it can be said «that the Trinity is known to itself alone». — In the fifth way thus: no one knows the substance of God, or anything of the sort, «because he does not make [it] known». Matthew 24p304-9: But of that day and hour no one knows, not even an Angel etc., just as a pit is called blind

because it does not manifest what it has in itself. And thus Chrysostom says that the Angels do not see what God is.

To the opposing arguments:

To 1, 2. And thus the two authorities are clear, because the first runs according to the first way, and the second according to the fourth way, or the fifth.

To 3, 4. To that which is objected, that the finite is so far distant from the infinite, etc.; it must be said that distance is spoken of as opposed to agreement; but agreement is found in a threefold difference, so far as suffices for the present. For there is the agreement of commensuration or adequation, the agreement of participation of something common, and the agreement of order. I say therefore that if distance be spoken of through the privation of the agreement of adequation and participation, the distance of the created to the uncreated is infinite, as of the infinite to the finite. But if distance be spoken of through the privation of the agreement of order; it must be said that this is false, because creatures are immediately ordered to God as to a principle and as to an end, most of all the rational creaturep305-1. But for a simple beholding it suffices that there be the agreement of order, whereas for the knowledge of comprehension the agreement according to a certain equality or adequation is required. And therefore it does not follow that, if the created soul cannot comprehend the infinity, it cannot behold the fount of light. — And through this the next [argument] is clear. For as to what it says, that for knowledge assimilation is required; it must be said that it is not necessary that [there be] assimilation in a third nature, but it suffices that the one be a likeness of the other, as was determined in the first book, distinction one, three, and thirty-fivep305-2.

To 5. To that which is objected, that that light exceeds the eye; it must be said that there is an excellence that preserves, and an excellence that corrupts. The preserving excellence is in spiritual things, but the corrupting in corporeal objects; and the reason for this was given in the first bookp305-3, both on the side of the object and on the side of the mode of comprehending: and therefore it is not the same case.

To 6. To that which is objected, that the finite cannot [reach] above the infinite; it must be said that the soul, in knowing God, is more in a state of receiving than of acting, indeed every power of the soul, with respect to God, is in the character of passive — not even the cognitive power [is] actively [so], which by its own nature implies in some manner a passion, as the Philosopherp305-4 and Priscian say. — And therefore, when it understands God, the soul does not act upon God, but God flows into the soul, in which influx God condescends through grace, and the soul is elevated and made deiform. And this very deiformity is the disposition rendering the eye of the soul apt for seeing God, not because it makes a proportionate quantity, since that light always exceeds [it] to infinity, but because it makes a proportionate quality, since something is given to the soul itself, namely a likeness, whichp305-5, making the soul itself and the intellect of the soul like to God, renders it understanding. — And if you object that, although vision and knowledge begin from passion, they are nevertheless completed in action, since for vision two things concur: reception and judgmentp305-6; but no creature can act upon that fount of light, since it can suffer nothing from anyone; likewise concerning that fount of light and supreme truth no one can judge, as Augustine says in On True Religionp305-7, and reason itself dictates [it], since the one judging in some way presides over the thing judged; in no way does it seem able to be maintained that Christ's soul, or any other beatified soul, should judge the fount of the supernal light itself: to this it must be responded that, although for the action of knowledge there concurs in some manner not only passion but also action; nevertheless there does not concur an action which indeed is made through some influx or impression of the knower into the knowable, but only through a certain protension. Just as it lies hidden also in love, when I love someone, the soul in loving in some manner acts, yet flows nothing into the beloved, nor does the beloved suffer or receive anything from the lover: so it is to be understood in knowledgep305-8. — Likewise, when we say that vision or knowledge is completed in judgment; it must be said that this is true; but in order that we may see God, it is not necessary that we judge concerning him in himself, but it suffices for clear vision to be illuminated by the light of light itself and for the illuminated eye to extend itself into him by beholding, and to judge concerning him by beholding, since it cannot attain to this, that

it should judge concerning the supreme truth itself, but according to it the soul judges concerning itself and concerning its own knowledge. Yet nothing prevents — taking judgment in some manner, according as it is required for vision — its being conceded that the beatified soul most certainly judges that that which it beholds is the supreme light, as was held in the first bookp306-1. And the word of Augustine does not contradict this. For however much beholding or judgment may seem in itself to have the nature of action; nevertheless with respect to God or the divine light, by which it is caused, it is a passion and an effect. Hence that the soul sees God in himself is not because the soul can [be] above God, but rather because God can [be] above it, so that the soul, through the divine power and influx, is elevated above itselfp306-2. — But these things which have been said of the soul of Christ generally hold good for the question concerning the vision of God, and likewise those which follow.

Scholion

I. The conclusion is confirmed by many decrees of the Church, especially the Constitution of Benedict XII, Benedictus Deus (a.d. 1336), where it is taught that the Blessed in heaven «see the divine essence by an intuitive and even facial vision, with no creature mediating in the character of an object seen, but the divine essence immediately showing itself to them, nakedly, clearly and openly». — Another error of the Beghards was condemned in 1311 by Clement V in the Council of Vienne, namely «that every intellectual nature is in itself naturally beatified, and that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to seeing God and beatifically enjoying him» (cfr. II Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.). — The first and second erroneous opinions (here in the body) are attributed to certain Armenians of the seventh century, to the Arnaldists of the twelfth century, and later to a certain Greek, Gregory Palamas. — Concerning the manner of this vision many disputations and opinions have arisen. Among other things, some even in that age wished that this vision should come about through some species or likeness impressed by the Word; which opinion Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 3. quaestiuncula 1.) and Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1. q. 3.) judged to be probable; but Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure, with the common opinion, teach that the Word itself, essentially present and united to the intellect, supplies the place of an impressed species. Scotus too agrees with them if it is a question of fact, yet he thinks it possible for God to effect the aforesaid vision even by means of an impressed species, which the disciples of St. Thomas commonly deny. Concerning this controversy St. Bonaventure determines nothing in express words; yet certain general words could be expounded in favor of the Scotist opinion, with De Barberiis. That the uncreated truth itself, without an impressed species, can in a most eminent way inform the intellect, is taught in various places, e.g. here in the solution to 3, 4, and 6, a. 2. q. 1-3; I Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 5; II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7.

II. In this place few of the ancient Commentators treat this question explicitly, as, besides St. Bonaventure, Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1, and also Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. The rest touch the matter here in other questions, especially in that one, whether the Word is known by means of some impressed species (Durandus, here q. 2.), and more at length where they dispute about the beatific vision in general, as Scotus IV Sent. d. 49. q. 11. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 49. q. 2; S. I. q. 12. a. 1. seqq.; S.c. Gent. III. c. 51-54.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 16. — Paulo superius pro infra ipsum edd. citra ipsum.
    Verse 16. — A little above, for infra ipsum (below it) the editions [read] citra ipsum (this side of it).
  2. Vers. 18. Cfr. I. Ioan. 4, 12. — Verba Chrysostomi inveniuntur in eius homil. 15. (alias 14.) in Ioan. n. 1. Cfr. eius lib. de Incomprehens. Dei natura, homil. 5. n. 1, et ibid. homil. 4. n. 4. In hoc testimon. cod. U pro qualiter substituit quomodo.
    Verse 18. Cfr. 1 John 4:12. — The words of Chrysostom are found in his homily 15 (otherwise 14) on John, n. 1. Cfr. his book On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, homily 5, n. 1, and ibid. homily 4, n. 4. In this testimony codex U substitutes quomodo (how) for qualiter (in what manner).
  3. Cfr. quaest. praeced.
    Cfr. the preceding question.
  4. Lectio a parte in pluribus codd. dubia est propter abbreviationem factam; pro a parte etiam legi posset apertae.
    The reading a parte (on the side of) is doubtful in several codices on account of the abbreviation made; in place of a parte one might also read apertae (of an open [vision]).
  5. Vers. 18. — Glossa, apud Lyranum interlinearis, invenitur etiam apud Petr. Lombardum, in hunc loc.
    Verse 18. — The Gloss, in Lyra the interlinear one, is found also in Peter Lombard, on this passage.
  6. Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Pro in unitatem personae non pauci codd. hic et in initio huius arg. in unitate personae.
    Cfr. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 1 seq. — In place of in unitatem personae (into unity of person) not a few codices read here and at the beginning of this argument in unitate personae (in unity of person).
  7. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — August., I. Confess. c. 1: Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.
    Cfr. Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 2. — Augustine, Confessions I, c. 1: For you have made us toward yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.
  8. Non quantitative i. e. ut sit tanta, quantus Deus est in virtute, sed qualitative sive quantum ad similitudinem expressam, quae datur mediante lumine gloriae. Sed hoc intelligitur de medio disponente, non de illo medio quo, quod vocatur species impressa. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7. et hic q. 3. ad 6.
    Not quantitatively, i.e. that it be as great as God is in power, but qualitatively, or as regards the expressed likeness, which is given by means of the light of glory. But this is understood of a disposing medium, not of that medium-by-which (medium quo) which is called the impressed species. Cfr. II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7, and here q. 3. ad 6.
  9. Respicitur Ps. 8, 8; Eph. 1, 22; Hebr. 2, 8. Cfr. supra pag. 266, nota 5. — Paulo superius post quod tu dicis cod. U inserit esse. Circa finem arg. pro His etiam cod. K habet His autem, et deinde multi codd. male omittunt idem.
    Reference is to Ps. 8:8; Eph. 1:22; Heb. 2:8. Cfr. above, p. 266, note 5. — A little above, after quod tu dicis codex U inserts esse. Toward the end of the argument, for His etiam codex K has His autem, and then many codices wrongly omit idem.
  10. Vers. 21. — Fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 erronee allegant v. 17: Non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum. Verba Gregorii, quae habentur in eius XVIII. Moral. c. 54. n. 90, sic ibi sonant: Fuere nonnulli, qui Deum dicerent etiam in illa regione beatitudinis in claritate quidem sua conspici, sed in natura minime videri. Quos nimirum minor inquisitionis subtilitas fefellit. Neque enim illi simplici et incommutabili essentiae aliud est claritas, et aliud natura, sed ipsa ei natura sua claritas, ipsa claritas natura est.
    Verse 21. — Almost all codices and editions 1, 2 erroneously cite v. 17: Gold or glass shall not be made equal to it. The words of Gregory, which are found in his Morals XVIII, c. 54, n. 90, run there thus: There were some who said that God is beheld even in that region of beatitude in his brightness indeed, but is by no means seen in his nature. These, doubtless, a lesser subtlety of inquiry deceived. For to that simple and unchangeable essence brightness is not one thing and nature another, but for it its very nature is its brightness, its very brightness is its nature.
  11. Supple cum cod. M ad lucem solis. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 1. (l. brevior, c. 1.): Sicut enim nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima (ed. Venet. 1489).
    Supply, with codex M, ad lucem solis (to the light of the sun). Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 1 (in the shorter book, c. 1): For just as the eyes of the night-raven are related to the light of day, so too the intellect of our soul to those things which are of all the most manifest in nature (Venice ed. 1489).
  12. Libr. II. c. 1. in fine. Textus origin. post vere videri addit et verum nunquam videri, et mox post veritas nunquam videtur subiungit quoniam imago veritas non est, etiam cum de veritate est; deinde pro obtenebrare exhibet obumbrare et pro exterminationum vocem autumationum [Vat. aestimationum, quae etiam in principio textus allati cum edd. 1, 2 ter videre substituit pro videri].
    Book II, c. 1, at the end. The original text, after vere videri (truly to be seen), adds et verum nunquam videri (and the truth never to be seen), and shortly after veritas nunquam videtur (the truth is never seen) it subjoins quoniam imago veritas non est, etiam cum de veritate est (since the image is not the truth, even when it is from the truth); then for obtenebrare it gives obumbrare, and for exterminationum the word autumationum [the Vatican: aestimationum, which also at the beginning of the cited text, with editions 1, 2, three times substitutes videre for videri].
  13. Id est, videatur Dei praesentia et influentia in ipsis. Sic etenim explicatur cognitio in creatura, quae distinguitur a cognitione per creaturam; cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. — Paulo superius ante luminis fontem cod. A interiicit superni.
    That is, that the presence and influx of God be seen in [the souls] themselves. For thus is explained knowledge in the creature, which is distinguished from knowledge through the creature; cfr. I Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. — A little above, before luminis fontem codex A interposes superni (of the supernal [light]).
  14. Vers. 16. — Glossa delibata est ex August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 6. n. 2.
    Verse 16. — The Gloss is drawn from Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 118, sermon 6, n. 2.
  15. Vers. 16. — Haec altera Glossa sumta est ex August., II. contra Maximin. Arian. c. 12. n. 2, et habetur apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Exod. 33, 20. — Pro Unde super codd. G I K N T U V Z ut super. Mox post Et sic illud cod. K supplet intelligitur.
    Verse 16. — This other Gloss is taken from Augustine, II Against Maximinus the Arian, c. 12, n. 2, and is found in Peter Lombard and Lyra. — The following passage of Scripture is Exod. 33:20. — For Unde super codices G I K N T U V Z [read] ut super. Shortly after, following Et sic illud, codex K supplies intelligitur.
  16. Vers. 7. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria, invenitur apud Strabum et Lyranum; sumta est ex Gregor., X. Moral. c. 8. n. 13, ubi sic legitur: Etsi hunc [Omnipotentem] in claritate sua quandoque conspicimus, non tamen eius essentiam plene contuemur. Angelica etenim, vel humana mens, cum ad incircumscriptum lumen inhiat, eo ipso se, quo est creatura, coangustat etc.
    Verse 7. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one, is found in Strabo and Lyra; it is taken from Gregory, X Morals, c. 8, n. 13, where it reads thus: Even if we sometimes behold him [the Omnipotent] in his brightness, we nevertheless do not fully gaze upon his essence. For the angelic, or human, mind, when it gapes toward the uncircumscribed light, by that very thing whereby it is a creature, straitens itself, etc.
  17. Vers. 19. — Haec quoque Glossa ordinaria est et habetur apud Strabum, Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum; mutuata est ex Origen., I. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. n. 16. Verba Trinitas sibi soli nota esse [cod. N est] sunt Isidori; cfr. supra pag. 299, nota 2.
    Verse 19. — This Gloss too is the ordinary one and is found in Strabo, Peter Lombard, and Lyra; it is borrowed from Origen, I Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, n. 16. The words Trinitas sibi soli nota esse [codex N est] are Isidore's; cfr. above, p. 299, note 2.
  18. Vers. 36. — Verba quia non facit nosse habentur in Glossa (ordinaria), quam vides apud Strabum et Lyranum, in hunc loc. Cfr. etiam August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34; 83 Qq. q. 60; I. de Trin. c. 12. n. 25. — Exemplum de fovea [vel fossa] caeca invenitur in August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34, nec non in Ioan. Evang. tr. 43. n. 6, ubi S. Doctor ait: Fossa caeca dicitur, non quia ipsa oculos perdidit, sed quia latendo non videntes facit.
    Verse 36. — The words quia non facit nosse are found in the Gloss (ordinary), which you see in Strabo and Lyra, on this passage. Cfr. also Augustine, I On Genesis against the Manichees c. 22, n. 34; 83 Questions q. 60; I On the Trinity c. 12, n. 25. — The example of the blind pit [or ditch] is found in Augustine, I On Genesis against the Manichees c. 22, n. 34, and also in his Tractates on John's Gospel tr. 43, n. 6, where the Holy Doctor says: A ditch is called blind, not because it itself has lost eyes, but because by lying hidden it makes [men] not seeing.
  19. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et 5, II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro sicut infiniti ad finitum codd. F G K L V (aa primitus) bb sicut finiti ad infinitum.
    Cfr. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 and 5, II Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — A little above, for sicut infiniti ad finitum codices F G K L V (aa originally) bb [read] sicut finiti ad infinitum.
  20. Dist. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1, d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1, q. 2. ad 3. et 4, d. 35. q. 1.
    Dist. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1; d. 3, p. I, q. 1, ad 1; q. 2, ad 3 and 4; d. 35, q. 1.
  21. Dist. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. — Subinde ante obiecti cod. U interserit subiecti; et non vituperanda est haec interpositio, siquidem loc. cit. praeter rationem a parte obiecti et modi etiam ratio a parte subiecti proponitur.
    Dist. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2. — Thereupon, before obiecti codex U inserts subiecti; and this interposition is not to be censured, since at the cited place, besides the reason on the side of the object and of the mode, a reason on the side of the subject too is proposed.
  22. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 118. (c. 11.), et III. text. 2. et 12. seqq. (c. 4. seq.), quo loco dicit, sentire et intelligere esse pati quoddam». Cfr. tom. II. pag. 825, nota 2. Dictum Prisciani supra allatum est pag. 10, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro nedum [intellige: multo minus se habet], quod ex codd. A bb scribit necdum) restituimus, alii codd. nec dicit, edd. nec dicitur.
    Book II On the Soul, text 118 (c. 11), and III text 2 and 12 seqq. (c. 4 seq.), in which place he says that to sense and to understand are a certain suffering». Cfr. tom. II, p. 825, note 2. The saying of Priscian was cited above, p. 10, note 6. — A little before, for nedum [understand: it stands much less so], which from codices A bb (which write necdum) we have restored, other codices [read] nec dicit, the editions nec dicitur.
  23. Codd. A bb quae. Edd. post quod superflue subiiciunt eum; superflue, inquimus, quippe cum haec coniunctio (non in praeposito) postea habeatur ante Deo. Mox verbo intelligentem id. praefigunt et; cod. K exhibet et ante reddit. Aliquanto superius pro quia semper illud multi codd. sed super illud.
    Codices A bb [read] quae. The editions, after quod, superfluously subjoin eum; superfluously, we say, since this conjunction (not in the antecedent) is afterward had before Deo. Shortly, before the word intelligentem the same [editions] prefix et; codex K exhibits et before reddit. Somewhat above, for quia semper illud many codices [read] sed super illud.
  24. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 221, nota 4. — Post pauca pro ipsum id. ipse.
    Cfr. tom. II, p. 221, note 4. — After a few [words], for ipsum the same [reads] ipse.
  25. Cap. 29. n. 53. et c. 31. n. 57. seq. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 68, nota 3. et pag. 69, nota 12. Cfr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 2. n. 34. et c. 14. n. 38.
    Chapter 29, n. 53, and c. 31, n. 57 seq. See the words in tom. I, p. 68, note 3, and p. 69, note 12. Cfr. II On Free Choice c. 2, n. 34, and c. 14, n. 38.
  26. Cod. G de cognitione. Mox pro in iudicio edd. substituunt in iudicio et paulo inferius post oculum subdunt etiam.
    Codex G [reads] de cognitione. Shortly, for in iudicio the editions substitute in iudicio, and a little below, after oculum, they add etiam.
  27. Dist. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 4, ubi distinguitur inter iudicium, quod fit discernendo, utrum scil. res sit, an non (hoc modo iudicium convenit omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti); et iudicium, quod fit approbando vel reprobando, num ita debeat esse; et sic intellectus non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis. — Paulo inferius edd. cum pluribus codd. omittunt Dei vel, pro quo in codd. E I T scriptum est Dei vi.
    Dist. 3, p. I, q. 1, ad 4, where a distinction is drawn between the judgment that is made by discerning, namely whether a thing is or not (in this way judgment belongs to every knowing intellect with respect to every object); and the judgment that is made by approving or reproving, whether it ought thus to be; and thus the intellect does not judge concerning the truth, but according to it [judges] concerning other things. — A little below, the editions with several codices omit Dei vel, in place of which in codices E I T is written Dei vi.
  28. Ante ipsam supple cum cod. A se. In fine solut. ante quae sequuntur cod. W interserit et.
    Before ipsam supply, with codex A, se. At the end of the solution, before quae sequuntur codex W inserts et.
← Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 1→