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Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo comprehendat ipsum Verbum sibi unitum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsum Verbum sibi unitum. Et quod sic, videtur:

Fundamenta.

1. Primo per auctoritatem Apostoli ad Colossenses secundop298-4: In quo plenitudo Divinitatis corporaliter inhabitat, loquitur de Christo; sed ita cognoscit anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum, sicut habitat in ea: cognoscit ergo omnem plenitudinem eius; et hoc non est aliud quam comprehendere: ergo etc.

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2. Item, hoc ipsum dicit Damascenusp299-1: «In incarnatione Dei Verbi aimus omnem naturam Divinitatis in una suarum hypostaseon incarnatam esse», ergo totum Dei Verbum unitum est humanae naturae in Christo; sed eo modo natum est ab anima Christi cognosci, per quem modum potuit uniri: ergo si totum potuit uniri, videtur, quod in totum habeat cognosci. Sed hoc est comprehendi: ergo etc.

3. Item, Isidorus de Trinitatep299-2: «Trinitas sibi soli nota est et homini assumto»; aut ergo loquitur de notitia qualiscumque visionis, aut perfectae comprehensionis. Si primo modo loquatur, falsum est, quia multis Angelis et hominibus est nota: loquitur ergo de cognitione comprehensionis: ergo etc.

4. Item, simplex, cum attingitur, totum attingitur, pro eo quod non habet partem et partemp299-3: si ergo Verbum increatum est simplicissimum, videtur, quod totum et totaliter ab anima Christi attingatur, si aliquo modo attingitur. Sed attingitur aliquo modo: ergo comprehenditur. Si tu dicas, quod non valet, quia infinitum est, et ideo incomprehensibile; contra: sicut vere est infinitum, ita vere est simplex illud Verbum aeternum: ergo sicut ponitur incomprehensibile ratione immensitatis, ita deberet comprehendi ratione simplicitatis.

5. Item, anima Christi cognoscit ipsum Verbum; aut ergo aliquid est de claritate et veritate et pulcritudine, quod non cognoscat, aut nihil. Si aliquid: ergo in Deo est aliquid a Christo cognitum, et aliquid incognitum: ergo aliquid et aliquid, et ita pars et pars; quod non est intelligibilep299-4. Si nihil est omnino, quod non cognoscat, quia totum est idem ibi; videtur, quod totaliter intra suam cognitionem Deum claudat. Et hoc est Deum comprehendere: ergo etc.

6. Item, si anima Christi non cognoscit ipsum Verbum in sua tota plenitudine, adhuc deficit a cognoscendo aliquid de Verbo cognoscibile: potens ergo est in cognitione illa proficere: ergo cum desideret Deum perfecte nossep299-5, videtur, quod desiderium animae Christi non sit impletum, et quod ipsa non pervenerit ad beatitudinis statum perfectum.

7. Item, ille solus est beatus, qui comprehendit quod nos credimus et speramus; sed nos credimus ipsam Verbi immensitatem: si ergo Christus est et fuit beatus, videtur, quod ipsam immensitatem Verbi comprehendat.

Sed contra: 1. Damascenusp299-6: «Hoc solum intelligitur de Deo, quod incomprehensibilis est»; sed si anima Christi ipsum comprehenderet, intelligeret ipsum non incomprehensibilem, sed comprehensibilem: si ergo hoc a nemine potest intelligi, non potest Verbum increatum ab anima Christi comprehendi.

2. Item, Augustinus de Videndo Deop299-7: «Illud comprehenditur, cuius fines circumscribi possunt»; sed fines divinae immensitatis a nullo circumscribi possunt: ergo Deus a nulla anima potest comprehendi.

3. Item, omne quod comprehenditur, est finitum comprehendentip299-8, ergo quod comprehenditur a finito est ei finitum, et nihil est finitum finito, nisi quod est finitum simpliciter; sed Deus est infinitus simpliciter; anima Christi, cum sit creatura, est finita: ergo non potest comprehendere immensitatem Verbi sibi uniti.

4. Item, quod comprehendit alterum est maius illo, vel saltem ei aequatur, alioquin ipsum claudere intra se non posset; sed impossibile est, creaturam, nec per unionem nec per alium modum, aequari Creatorip299-9: ergo impossibile est, quod comprehendat Creatorem: ergo anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum non comprehendit. — His eisdem rationibus ostendi potest, quod nulla anima. (Nota.)

5. Item, Verbum increatum sic est unitum animae Christi, quod posset uniri alterip299-10; sic habitat in ipsa, quod in multis aliis: ergo sic est in anima sibi unita, quod etiam est extra, cum sit ubique: ergo semper excedit ipsam animam assumtam: ergo si tantum vel plus est extra quam intra, videtur, quod anima Christi non includat ipsum, ac per hoc non comprehendat.

6. Item, si anima Christi posset Verbum increatum comprehendere, posset per consequens aliquid maius cogitare — omni enim, cuius terminos cognoscimus, possumus intelligere aliquid addi — sed

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«Deus est quo maius cogitari non potest», ut dicit Anselmusp300-1: ergo Verbum unitum animae Christi, si comprehenderetur ab ipsa, non esset Deus. Sed est Deus: ergo non comprehenditur.

Conclusio.

Deus ab anima Christi et a quocumque intellectu finito non comprehenditur totaliter, licet cognoscatur totus.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod Verbum increatum et ipse Deus non solum ab anima Christi, sed etiam ab aliis animabus beatis habet comprehendip300-2, et aliquo modo est incomprehensibilis. (Opinio 1.) Comprehendi enim habet quantum ad essentiam, ut dixerunt, quae est finita, et ideo finita, quia in se ipsa simplex et perfecta; dicitur autem et est incomprehensibile quantum ad potentiam, quae respicit infinita; nunquam enim potest in tot, quin in plura. Et per hoc dissolvere voluerunt auctoritates Sanctorum et Scripturaep300-3, quae videntur invicem repugnare. Aliquando enim dicitur, quod Deus est incomprehensibilis; aliquando dicitur, quod Beati habent cognitionem comprehensionis et sunt comprehensores. — Sed iste modus dicendi in primo librop300-4 improbatus fuit, (Improbatur.) quia impossibile est, quod potentia excedat essentiam. Unde impossibile est, potentiam esse simpliciter infinitam, substantia et essentia existente finita. Et ibidem multipliciter ostenditurp300-5, quod divinum esse non solum in relatione ad nos, sed etiam in se ipso habet immensitatem. Et ideo iste modus dicendi stare non potest; et qui hoc primo dixit postmodum retractavit.

Alii vero dicere voluerunt, quod anima Christi, etsi sit finita, tamen ob gratiam unionis sublimatur ad aliquid infinitum; (Opinio 2.) habet enim aliquid, quod est supra omnem creaturae gradum, et quo nihil potest cogitari excellentius; et ex illa parte potest comprehendere Verbum sibi unitum; et hoc est etiam ipsius solius proprium. Et pro tanto dicunt dixisse Isidorum, quod «Trinitas nota est sibi soli et homini assumto». — Sed nec illud stare potest, (Improbatur.) quia, quamvis gratia unionis dicat aliquid infinitum ratione alterius extremi, tamen ratione animae unitae semper dicit quid finitum et rem virtutis finitaep300-6; quoniam anima Christi manet intra terminos creaturae. Et si est virtutis finitae, quomodo potest immensitatem comprehendere rei omnino infinitae et excedentis eam in infinitum?

Et propterea est tertius modus communior, probabilior et certior, (Opinio 3. et conclusio 1.) quod nec anima Christi nec aliqua creatura comprehendere potest immensitatem Verbi increati sive ipsius Dei, et tamen ipsum totum cognoscit. — Et possunt ista duo simul stare, immo (Ratio.) necesse est ponere, quamvis difficile sit intellectuip300-7 nostro capere. Si enim vere ponimus Deum simplicem, immo quia necessarium est sic credere et ponere; si cognoscitur, iam non secundum partem et partem, sed totus cognoscitur. Rursus, si Deum ponimus immensum, quia hoc credimus et fatemur; necesse est ponere, quod nunquam ab intellectu finito comprehendatur totaliter; et sic Deus a quacumque creatura ipsum cognoscente totus cognoscitur, sed tamen non totaliter. (Conclusio 2.)

Si autem quaeratur, quomodo illud posset intelligi; dicendum, quod difficillimum est intelligere, (Notandum de explicatione.) quia plus reperitur in creaturis de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine. — Intelligamus tamen gratia exempli aliquem oculum, (Exemplum 1.) cuius aspectus non sit omnino clarus; et intelligamus aliquod parvum album, tamen intensum in luminositate et claritate coloris: oculus ille videbit illud album totum, tamen eminentiam illius albedinis non comprehendit; sic suo modo in proposito intelligendum est. Sed non modica est hic dissimilitudo, quia in illo albo qualitas differt a claritate, in Deo autem est omnino idem. — Et ideo aliud exemplum consuevit poni in puncto, (Exemplum 2.) quip300-8 ratione suae simplicitatis totus attingitur ab

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una linea, non tamen comprehenditur, quia potest infinitas lineas terminarep301-1. Sed nec adhuc est illud simile, quia in puncto aliud est virtus, aliud essentia; non sic est in Deo, in quo est omnino idem. — Et ideo tertium exemplum ponendum est in substantia spirituali, (Exemplum 3.) quae est imago Dei: quia ipsa tota est in una parte corporis, et tamen in illa non definitur, quia ratione suae simplicitatis sic est tota in illa, quod tota est extra illam in parte alterap301-2; sic et Deus in una creatura totus et totus extra. Per hunc etiam modum oportet intelligere circa potentiam intellectivam. (Explicatur ratiocinatione.) — Sed hoc melius intelligitur ratiocinatione quam exemplorum suppositione. Si quis enim videt, quod in Deo simplicitas non opponitur infinitati, videre potest, quomodo Deus potest cognosci totus, et tamen non comprehendi.

Propter quod nota, quod infinitum accipitur secundum quantitatem, ut dicit Philosophusp301-3; (Dupliciter accipitur infinitum.) Augustinus autem dicit, quod est «quantitas molis et quantitas virtutis». Et ita secundum utrumque potest accipi infinitum, sed differenter. (Notabilis differentia.) Quoniam enim quantitas molis est partibilis et super partibile fundata; ideo infinitum secundum hanc quantitatem oppositionem habet ad simplex, et impossibile est, quod aliquid idem et secundum idem sit simplex et infinitum. Quoniam vero quantitas virtutis reperitur in simplicibus, immo quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentiusp301-4; hinc est, quod infinitum secundum hanc non repugnat simplici, immo necessario sequitur, quodsi aliquid est simplicissimum, quod aliquid sit infinitissimum. Clare igitur potest videri, quod in Deo secundum idem potest esse summa simplicitas et summa infinitas. Et ideo vera est positio praedicta, quod Deus totus videtur, sed tamen non comprehenditur ab aliqua creatura, nec unitap301-5 nec separata. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam.

Ad oppositorum solutionem. (Solutio oppositorum.)

Ad 1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plenitudo Divinitatis habitat in Christo, et de Damasceno, quod tota est incarnata; dicendum, quod Apostolus in illo verbo vult ostendere personalem unionem, quae est in Christo et in nullo alio, quia persona divina plena et perfecta non solum animae, sed etiam corpori Christi fuit unitap301-6. Et Damascenus hoc ipsum vult dicere: per hoc quod dicit omnem, intelligit divinam naturam ut perfectam. Ex hoc tamen non potest inferri cognitio comprehensionis, quia, sicut tactum est, in illa plenitudine est simplicitas, ratione cuius potest habitare et uniri rei finitae; est nihilominus et infinitas, ratione cuius necessario habet excedere, et impossibile est comprehendi. Et sic patet, quod illud procedit ex insufficienti; plus enim dicit comprehensio quam cognitio plenitudinis vel perfectionis. Supra enim cognitionem addit inclusionem sive conterminationem vel commensurationem quodam modo dicendi. (Notandum.)

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Isidoro, quod Trinitas nota est sibi soli et homini assumto; dicendum, quod non vult excluderep301-7 omnem cognitionem, (Notandum.) sed perfectam cognitionem Dei attribuere sibi ipsi et naturae assumtae. Ipsi namque Trinitati attribuit perfectam cognitionem simpliciter, sed homini assumto in genere creaturae. Illa enim anima creata inter ceteras creaturas cognoscit limpidissime et ita perfecte, sicut unquam potuit capere. Unde propter familiarissimam cognitionem, quam habet illa anima inter creaturasp301-8, dicit Isidorus, quod ei soli nota est Trinitas, magis auctoritate loquens quam per praecisionem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplex totum attingitur; dicendum, quod verum est, totum, id est nonp301-9 secundum partem et partem; in simplici enim non est dicere totum nisi per privationem compositionis partium. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod comprehendatur, quia, sicut dictum est, simul cum simplicitate stat infinitas, quae non patitur aliquid Dei omnino videri perfecte a creatura. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod ita deberet dici comprehensibile propter simplicitatem, sicut incomprehensibile propter immensitatem. Nam ad immensitatem de necessitate sequitur incomprehensibilitas de ipsa nominis ratione primaria, ad simplicitatemp301-10 non. Tanta enim potest esse simplicitas, quod, nedum quod ipsa faciat comprehendi, immo propter suam excellentiam reddat incomprehensibilem.

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Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquid latet de Deo etc.; dicendum, quodp302-1 non est intelligendum in Deo, sicut intelligitur in aliqua re composita, cuius una pars non apparet, et alia manifestatur; quoniam in divina essentia non est aliquid et aliquid, sed est aliquod unum, quod aequivalet infinitis. Unde quidquid illud sit, quod anima de Deo videt, sic illud videt, quod tamen comprehendere non potest; (Notandum.) unde idem ipsum latet et patet: patet quidem ad intuendum, sed latet ad comprehendendum. Sicut si quaeratur: cum Deus est in lapide, estne aliquid Dei extra lapidem, et aliquid intra? dicendum, quod non est secundum aliquid sui extra, et secundum aliquid sui intra, sed totus intra et totus extra; sic et in proposito intelligere oportet.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si non comprehendatp302-2, adhuc potest proficere in cognitione Dei; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur, pro eo quod status est in profectu cognitionis (Causa status duplex.) aliquando ex parte rei comprehensae, quae non potest melius cognosci, aliquando ex parte comprehendentis, qui non est natus melius cognoscere; et sic est status in Christo et in aliis Beatis. Sed aliter in Christo quam in aliis: quia Christus ita perfecte cognoscit, sicut unquamp302-3 capere potuit, sed alii Sancti ita perfecte, sicut dispositi fuerunt per merita gratiae; nec possunt ultra proficere, quia non sunt in statu merendi, nec ultra desiderare amplius habere, quam habeant, propter illius summi Boni sufficientiam et affectionem ordinatam secundum summae iustitiae regulam et libram; sed quiescunt quiete perfecta, quia tenent eum quem desiderabantp302-4.

Ad 7. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de comprehensione; dicendum, quod comprehendere dicitur tripliciter: (Comprehendere dicitur tripliciter.) uno modo idem quod caritate adhaerere; et sic accipit Bernardus ad Eugeniump302-5: «Si sanctus es, comprehendisti». Alio modo idem est quod clare videre et perfecte amare, sicut ad Philippenses tertio: Si quo modo comprehendam, in quo et comprehensus sum. Tertio modo comprehendere est idem quod terminos rei claudere; sic Deus est incomprehensibilis. Cum ergo dicitur, quod Sancti sunt comprehensores in patria, et quod Christus fuit comprehensor; dicendum, quod medio modo accipitur, et sic habet veritatem; nam Christus videt Dei immensitatem nec tenet hoc fide, sed certissima cognitione, hoc estp302-6, novit Deum immensum. (Quaestio incidens solvitur.) — Et si tu quaeras, utrum positive, vel privative; dicendum, quod quodam modo positive, quodam modo privative: positive, quantum se extendit capacitas suae intelligentiae; privative deinceps. Admiratur enim illam summam profunditatem immensitatis divinae, sicut dicit Prophetap302-7: Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, confortata est, et non potero ad eam. Et sic patet totum.

Scholion

I. De triplici sensu verbi comprehendere vide solut. ad 7, ubi dicitur, quod comprehendere in tertio sensu idem est quod «terminos rei claudere»; hoc non intelligitur secundum fines rei, cum Deus nec tales fines habeat nec sic ab ipso suo divino intellectu comprehendatur, sed intelligitur de mente rem intelligente secundum totam rationem, qua est intelligibilis. In hoc sensu contra Eunomianos fide constat, quod Deus est incomprehensibilis respectu cuiuslibet creaturae (cfr. Conc. Lateran. IV. c. 1, et Vatican. de Fide c. 1.). Nam, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.), «quantum res habet de entitate, tantum habet de intelligibilitate; sed Verbum aeternum est infinitae entitatis: ergo est infinitae intelligibilitatis; unde quantum est ex parte sua, intelligibile est actu infinito intensive vel in vigore. Anima autem Christi, cum sit creatura, non potest intelligere aliquid intelligibile intellectione infinita intensive». — Licet quaedam verba Ss. Patrum (cfr. hic arg. 3. ad oppos.) a communi regula excipere videntur animam Christi, et revera hoc faciant aliqui pauci theologi; tamen conclusio auctoris est communissima et certa. Opposita doctrina cuiusdam archiepisc. Augustini a Roma reprobata est a Concil. Basileensi, sess. 22. — Tota conclusionis explicatio nititur communi distinctione inter cognoscere totum et cognoscere totaliter, sive cognoscere infinitum et cognoscere infinite; quae optime ab auctore (hic et I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1. et 3.) explanantur et probantur.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 13. m. 7. — Scot., hic q. 2. n. 6. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 10. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether Christ's soul, in knowing, comprehends the Word itself united to it.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul comprehends the Word itself united to it. And that it does, it seems:

Arguments for the affirmative.

1. First, by the authority of the Apostle to the Colossians, chapter twop298-4: In whom dwells bodily the fullness of the Godhead, he speaks of Christ; but Christ's soul knows the Word united to it in the same way as it dwells in it: therefore it knows the whole fullness of it; and this is nothing other than to comprehend: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Damascene says this very thingp299-1: «In the incarnation of God the Word we say that the whole nature of the Godhead was incarnate in one of his hypostases», therefore the whole Word of God was united to the human nature in Christ; but it was capable of being known by Christ's soul in the same way as it was able to be united: therefore if the whole was able to be united, it seems that it can be known as a whole. But this is to be comprehended: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Isidore On the Trinityp299-2: «The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man»; therefore either he speaks of the cognition of some sort of vision, or of perfect comprehension. If he speaks in the first way, it is false, since the Trinity is known to many Angels and men: therefore he speaks of the cognition of comprehension: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the simple, when it is attained, is attained as a whole, since it does not have part and partp299-3: if therefore the uncreated Word is most simple, it seems that it is attained wholly and totally by Christ's soul, if it is attained in any way. But it is attained in some way: therefore it is comprehended. If you say that this does not hold, because it is infinite, and therefore incomprehensible; on the contrary: just as it is truly infinite, so that eternal Word is truly simple: therefore just as it is posited incomprehensible by reason of its immensity, so it ought to be comprehended by reason of its simplicity.

5. Likewise, Christ's soul knows the Word itself; therefore either there is something of its clarity and truth and beauty which it does not know, or nothing. If something: then in God there is something known by Christ, and something unknown: therefore something and something, and so part and part; which is not intelligiblep299-4. If there is nothing at all which it does not know, since the whole is identical there; it seems that it encloses God totally within its cognition. And this is to comprehend God: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if Christ's soul does not know the Word itself in its whole fullness, it still falls short of knowing something knowable of the Word: therefore it is capable of advancing in that cognition: therefore, since it desires to know God perfectlyp299-5, it seems that the desire of Christ's soul is not fulfilled, and that it has not arrived at the perfect state of beatitude.

7. Likewise, he alone is blessed who comprehends what we believe and hope for; but we believe the immensity itself of the Word: if therefore Christ is and was blessed, it seems that he comprehends the immensity itself of the Word.

On the contrary: 1. Damascenep299-6: «This alone is understood concerning God, that he is incomprehensible»; but if Christ's soul comprehended him, it would understand him as not incomprehensible, but comprehensible: if therefore this can be understood by no one, the uncreated Word cannot be comprehended by Christ's soul.

2. Likewise, Augustine On Seeing Godp299-7: «That is comprehended whose bounds can be circumscribed»; but the bounds of the divine immensity can be circumscribed by no one: therefore God can be comprehended by no soul.

3. Likewise, everything that is comprehended is finite to the one comprehendingp299-8, therefore what is comprehended by a finite [intellect] is finite to it, and nothing is finite to the finite except what is finite simply; but God is infinite simply; Christ's soul, since it is a creature, is finite: therefore it cannot comprehend the immensity of the Word united to it.

4. Likewise, what comprehends another is greater than it, or at least equal to it, otherwise it could not enclose it within itself; but it is impossible that a creature, neither by union nor by any other mode, be equated to the Creatorp299-9: therefore it is impossible that it comprehend the Creator: therefore Christ's soul does not comprehend the Word united to it. — By these same reasons it can be shown that no soul [comprehends it]. (Note.)

5. Likewise, the uncreated Word is so united to Christ's soul that it could be united to anotherp299-10; it so dwells in it that [it dwells] in many others: therefore it is so in the soul united to it that it is also outside, since it is everywhere: therefore it always exceeds the assumed soul itself: therefore if it is as much or more outside than inside, it seems that Christ's soul does not include it, and through this does not comprehend it.

6. Likewise, if Christ's soul could comprehend the uncreated Word, it could consequently think of something greater — for to everything whose bounds we know, we can understand something added — but

«God is that than which nothing greater can be thought», as Anselm saysp300-1: therefore the Word united to Christ's soul, if it were comprehended by it, would not be God. But it is God: therefore it is not comprehended.

Conclusion.

God is not comprehended totally by Christ's soul nor by any finite intellect, although he is known as a whole.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some wished to say that the uncreated Word and God himself can be comprehended not only by Christ's soul, but also by other blessed soulsp300-2, and is in some way incomprehensible. (Opinion 1.) For he can be comprehended as to essence, as they said, which is finite, and therefore finite because in itself simple and perfect; but he is called and is incomprehensible as to power, which regards infinite things; for it can never [reach] so many that not [reach] more. And by this they wished to resolve the authorities of the Saints and of Scripturep300-3 which seem to be mutually at odds. For sometimes it is said that God is incomprehensible; sometimes it is said that the Blessed have the cognition of comprehension and are comprehensors. — But this manner of speaking was disproved in the first bookp300-4, (Disproved.) because it is impossible that power exceed essence. Hence it is impossible that power be simply infinite, while substance and essence exist as finite. And there it is shown in many waysp300-5 that the divine being has immensity not only in relation to us, but also in itself. And therefore this manner of speaking cannot stand; and he who first said this afterward retracted it.

But others wished to say that Christ's soul, even though it is finite, is nevertheless raised by the grace of the union to something infinite; (Opinion 2.) for it has something which is above every grade of a creature, and than which nothing more excellent can be thought; and from that side it can comprehend the Word united to it; and this also is proper to it alone. And to this extent they say that Isidore said «The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man». — But neither can that stand, (Disproved.) because, although the grace of the union expresses something infinite by reason of the other extreme, nevertheless by reason of the united soul it always expresses something finite and a thing of finite powerp300-6; since Christ's soul remains within the bounds of a creature. And if it is of finite power, how can it comprehend the immensity of a thing altogether infinite and exceeding it infinitely?

And therefore there is a third mode, more common, more probable and more certain, (Opinion 3 and conclusion 1.) that neither Christ's soul nor any creature can comprehend the immensity of the uncreated Word or of God himself, and yet knows it as a whole. — And these two can stand together; indeed, (Reason.) it is necessary to posit [both], although it is difficult for our intellectp300-7 to grasp. For if we truly posit God as simple — indeed, since it is necessary so to believe and posit — if he is known, then he is not known according to part and part, but is known as a whole. Again, if we posit God as immense, since we believe and confess this; it is necessary to posit that he is never comprehended totally by a finite intellect; and thus God is known as a whole by any creature knowing him, but nevertheless not totally. (Conclusion 2.)

But if it is asked how that could be understood; it must be said that it is most difficult to understand, (Note on the explanation.) because in creatures more dissimilitude is found than similitude. — Let us nevertheless understand, by way of example, some eye (Example 1.) whose gaze is not altogether clear; and let us understand some small white object, yet intense in its luminosity and brightness of color: that eye will see the whole of that white object, yet it does not comprehend the eminence of that whiteness; so in its own way it must be understood in the case at hand. But the dissimilitude here is not slight, because in that white object quality differs from brightness, whereas in God it is altogether the same. — And therefore another example is wont to be set down in a point, (Example 2.) whichp300-8 by reason of its simplicity is attained wholly by

a single line, yet is not comprehended, because it can terminate infinite linesp301-1. But not even that is similar yet, because in a point one thing is power, another is essence; it is not so in God, in whom it is altogether the same. — And therefore a third example must be set down in a spiritual substance (Example 3.) which is the image of God: because it is wholly in one part of the body, and yet is not bounded in it, because by reason of its simplicity it is so wholly in it that it is wholly outside it in another partp301-2; so too God is in one creature wholly and wholly outside. In this manner too it is necessary to understand concerning the intellective power. (Explained by reasoning.) — But this is better understood by reasoning than by the supposition of examples. For if anyone sees that in God simplicity is not opposed to infinity, he can see how God can be known as a whole, and yet not comprehended.

On account of which note that the infinite is taken according to quantity, as the Philosopher saysp301-3; (The infinite is taken in two ways.) but Augustine says that there is «quantity of mass and quantity of power». And thus according to each the infinite can be taken, but differently. (A notable difference.) For since quantity of mass is divisible and founded upon the divisible; therefore the infinite according to this quantity has opposition to the simple, and it is impossible that anything one and the same according to the same be simple and infinite. But since quantity of power is found in simple things — indeed, the more simple a thing is, the more powerfulp301-4 — hence it is that the infinite according to this is not repugnant to the simple, but indeed necessarily follows: that if something is most simple, then something is most infinite. Clearly therefore it can be seen that in God according to the same there can be supreme simplicity and supreme infinity. And therefore the aforesaid position is true, that God is seen as a whole, but nevertheless is not comprehended by any creature, neither unitedp301-5 nor separate. — And the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

To the solution of the opposing arguments. (Solution of the opposing arguments.)

To 1 and 2. To that which is objected, that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Christ, and concerning Damascene, that the whole is incarnate; it must be said that the Apostle by that word wishes to show the personal union, which is in Christ and in no other, because the full and perfect divine person was united not only to the soul, but also to the body of Christp301-6. And Damascene wishes to say this very thing: by saying whole, he understands the divine nature as perfect. From this, however, the cognition of comprehension cannot be inferred, because, as has been touched on, in that fullness there is simplicity, by reason of which it can dwell in and be united to a finite thing; nonetheless there is also infinity, by reason of which it necessarily exceeds, and it is impossible for it to be comprehended. And thus it is plain that that [objection] proceeds from an insufficient [ground]; for comprehension expresses more than cognition of fullness or of perfection. For over and above cognition it adds inclusion or co-termination or co-measuring in a certain manner of speaking. (Note.)

To 3. To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man; it must be said that he does not wish to excludep301-7 all cognition, (Note.) but to attribute the perfect cognition of God to the Trinity itself and to the assumed nature. For to the Trinity itself he attributes perfect cognition simply, but to the assumed man within the genus of a creature. For that created soul knows most clearly among other creatures, and so perfectly as it was ever able to grasp. Hence on account of the most intimate cognition which that soul has among creaturesp301-8, Isidore says that to it alone the Trinity is known, speaking more by way of authority than by precision.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the simple is attained as a whole; it must be said that it is true, as a whole, that is notp301-9 according to part and part; for in the simple there is no [way] of saying whole except by the privation of the composition of parts. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, because, as has been said, together with simplicity there stands infinity, which does not allow anything of God to be seen altogether perfectly by a creature. — Nor does it avail that he objects that it ought thus to be called comprehensible on account of simplicity, just as incomprehensible on account of immensity. For from immensity by necessity follows incomprehensibility by the primary meaning of the name itself, [but] from simplicityp301-10 not. For so great can simplicity be that, far from making [the thing] comprehended, it rather, on account of its excellence, renders it incomprehensible.

To 5. To that which is objected, that something of God lies hidden, etc.; it must be said thatp302-1 this is not to be understood in God as it is understood in some composite thing, of which one part does not appear, and another is manifested; since in the divine essence there is not something and something, but there is some one thing, which is equivalent to infinite things. Hence whatever it is that the soul sees of God, it so sees it that it nevertheless cannot comprehend it; (Note.) whence the same thing both lies hidden and is plain: it is plain indeed for gazing upon, but lies hidden for comprehending. Just as if it be asked: since God is in a stone, is there something of God outside the stone, and something inside? it must be said that there is not according to something of him outside, and according to something of him inside, but he is wholly inside and wholly outside; so too in the case at hand it must be understood.

To 6. To that which is objected, that if it does not comprehendp302-2, it can still advance in the cognition of God; it must be said that this does not follow, since the halt in the advance of cognition is (The cause of the halt is twofold.) sometimes on the part of the thing comprehended, which cannot be better known, sometimes on the part of the one comprehending, who is not capable of knowing better; and thus there is a halt in Christ and in the other Blessed. But otherwise in Christ than in the others: because Christ knows so perfectly as he was everp302-3 able to receive, but the other Saints so perfectly as they were disposed through the merits of grace; nor can they advance further, because they are not in the state of meriting, nor [can they] further desire to have more than they have, on account of the sufficiency of that supreme Good and an affection ordered according to the rule and balance of supreme justice; but they rest in perfect rest, because they hold him whom they desiredp302-4.

To 7. To that which is lastly objected concerning comprehension; it must be said that to comprehend is said in three ways: (To comprehend is said in three ways.) in one way the same as to adhere by charity; and so Bernard takes it to Eugeniusp302-5: «If you are holy, you have comprehended». In another way it is the same as to see clearly and to love perfectly, as to the Philippians, chapter three: If by any means I may comprehend, in which I have also been comprehended. In the third way to comprehend is the same as to enclose the bounds of a thing; thus God is incomprehensible. When therefore it is said that the Saints are comprehensors in the fatherland, and that Christ was a comprehensor; it must be said that it is taken in the middle way, and so it has truth; for Christ sees the immensity of God and does not hold this by faith, but by most certain cognition, that isp302-6, he knows God to be immense. (An incidental question is resolved.) — And if you ask whether positively or privatively; it must be said that in a certain way positively, in a certain way privatively: positively, as far as the capacity of his intelligence extends; privatively thereafter. For he marvels at that supreme depth of the divine immensity, as the Prophet saysp302-7: Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me, it is high, and I cannot reach to it. And thus the whole is plain.

Scholion

I. On the threefold sense of the word comprehend see the reply to 7, where it is said that to comprehend in the third sense is the same as «to enclose the bounds of a thing»; this is not understood according to the bounds of the thing, since God has no such bounds nor is he so comprehended by his own divine intellect, but it is understood of a mind understanding the thing according to the whole formal character by which it is intelligible. In this sense, against the Eunomians, it is established by faith that God is incomprehensible with respect to any creature (cf. Lateran Council IV, c. 1, and the Vatican [Council], On Faith c. 1). For, as Richard of Mediavilla says (here a. 1. q. 4.), «as much as a thing has of entity, so much it has of intelligibility; but the eternal Word is of infinite entity: therefore it is of infinite intelligibility; whence as far as is on its own part, it is intelligible in act infinitely in intensity or in vigor. But Christ's soul, since it is a creature, cannot understand anything intelligible by an understanding infinite in intensity». — Although certain words of the holy Fathers (cf. here arg. 3 to the contrary) seem to except Christ's soul from the common rule, and indeed a few theologians do this; nevertheless the conclusion of the author is most common and certain. The opposing doctrine of a certain archbishop Augustine of Rome was reproved by the Council of Basel, session 22. — The whole explanation of the conclusion rests upon the common distinction between to know the whole and to know totally, or to know the infinite and to know infinitely; which are best explained and proved by the author (here and I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. to 1 and 3.).

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 13. m. 7. — Scotus, here q. 2. n. 6. ff. — St. Thomas, here a. 2. quaestiuncula 1; Summa III. q. 10. a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. quaestiuncula 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 9. — In initio quaest. post anima Christi edd. cum cod. cc subiiciunt in cognoscendo.
    [Colossians 2,] verse 9. — At the beginning of the question, after anima Christi the editions, with codex cc, add in cognoscendo.
  2. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Cfr. supra d. V. lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. — Edd. sic: dicit Damascenus de incarnatione Verbi Dei: Aimus omnem etc., ac si hoc testimonium sumtum esset ex Damasc. libro de Incarnatione Verbi Dei. In plurimis codd. hoc arg. habetur tertio loco. In fine arg. ante in totum edd. interserunt etiam, cod. A vero et, omisso cum cod. bb (K a secunda manu) in ante totum.
    Book III On the Orthodox Faith c. 6. Cf. above d. V, the Master's text, c. 1 at the end. — The editions read thus: Damascene says, concerning the incarnation of the Word of God: We say that the whole etc., as if this testimony were taken from Damascene's book On the Incarnation of the Word of God. In very many codices this argument is held in the third place. At the end of the argument, before in totum the editions insert etiam, but cod. A et, omitting (with cod. bb, K by a second hand) in before totum.
  3. Distinctius I. Sent. c. 3. n. 1: Sola enim Trinitas sibi integre nota est, et humanitas a Christo suscepta, quae tertia est in Trinitate persona [i. e. Verbum humanatum est una ex tribus personis]. Eadem verba occurrunt in eiusdem Comment. sive Quaestion. in Exod. c. 42. n. 3. (alias 39.), nisi quod pro humanitas a Christo suscepta legitur humanitati susceptae.
    More distinctly, I. Sent. c. 3. n. 1: For the Trinity alone is fully known to itself, and the humanity assumed by Christ, which is the third person in the Trinity [i.e. the humanated Word is one of the three persons]. The same words occur in his Commentary or Questions on Exodus c. 42. n. 3. (alias 39.), except that for humanitas a Christo suscepta is read humanitati susceptae.
  4. Aristot., de Lineis insecab., ait: Res, quae partibus caret, tangit rem partibus carentem, tota totam, ergo eundem locum possidebunt [duo puncta sese tangentia]. August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 21. n. 28, ostendit, quod quia anima simplex est, cum se novit, totaliter se novit, non secundum partem. Cfr. IX. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7.
    Aristotle, On Indivisible Lines, says: A thing which lacks parts touches a thing lacking parts, whole touching whole, therefore they will possess the same place [two points touching one another]. Augustine, VII. On Genesis according to the Letter c. 21. n. 28, shows that, because the soul is simple, when it knows itself, it knows itself totally, not according to part. Cf. IX. On the Trinity c. 4. n. 7.
  5. Dist. 43. q. 2.
    Dist. 43. q. 2.
  6. Edd. noscere.
    The editions [read] noscere ["to know"].
  7. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 4.
    Book I On the Orthodox Faith c. 4.
  8. Sive Epist. 147. (alias 112.) c. 9. n. 21: Id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur, totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.
    Or rather Epistle 147 (alias 112) c. 9. n. 21: That is seen which is in some way perceived as present, but the whole is comprehended by seeing, which is so seen that nothing of it escapes the one seeing, or whose bounds can be looked round about.
  9. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18: Quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur.
    Augustine, XII. On the City of God, c. 18: Whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the one knowing.
  10. Vide Isidor., I. Sent. c. 3. n. 2, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    See Isidore, I. Sent. c. 3. n. 2, and here the Master's text, c. 1.
  11. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. — De ubiquitate Dei cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. per totam.
    Cf. above d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. to 2. — On the ubiquity of God cf. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. throughout.
  12. Proslog. c. 4. — Paulo superius pro omni enim [codd. M O omni enim illi] edd. omnium enim.
    Proslogion c. 4. — A little above, for omni enim [codd. M O omni enim illi] the editions [read] omnium enim.
  13. Codd. K M O verbo comprehendi bene praemittunt aliquo modo. Proxime post pro incomprehensibilis edd. cum nonnullis codd. vitiose substituunt comprehensibilis, et deinde cod. T in fine propositionis seq. post et perfecta subiungit dicitur, post quod facta interpunctione, alteram propositionem sic incipit: Est autem et incomprehensibile [melius poneretur incomprehensibilis] etc.
    Codd. K M O rightly prefix aliquo modo to the word comprehendi. Immediately after, for incomprehensibilis the editions, with several codices, faultily substitute comprehensibilis, and then cod. T at the end of the following proposition, after et perfecta, adds dicitur, after which, with the punctuation made, it begins the next proposition thus: Est autem et incomprehensibile [better it would be put incomprehensibilis] etc.
  14. Ier. 32, 19: Magnus consilio et incomprehensibilis cogitatu. I. Cor. 13, 12: Nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum. Phil. 3, 12: Sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam etc. Cfr. Eph. 3, 18. — Paulo inferius pro cognitionem comprehensionis codd. K M O cognitionem comprehensoris, et subinde pro et sunt comprehensores, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A bb, alii codd. cum edd. et respectu comprehensionis.
    Jeremiah 32, 19: Great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought. 1 Cor. 13, 12: Now I know in part, but then I shall know, even as I am known. Phil. 3, 12: But I follow, if by any means I may comprehend etc. Cf. Eph. 3, 18. — A little below, for cognitionem comprehensionis codd. K M O [read] cognitionem comprehensoris, and thereupon for et sunt comprehensores, which reading codd. A bb maintain, the other codices with the editions [read] et respectu comprehensionis.
  15. Dist. 43. q. 2.
    Dist. 43. q. 2.
  16. Scil. contra eos qui contendunt, «quod tam essentia quam potentia est finita secundum veritatem, quia est finita ... Deo, qui est veritas; sed tamen utraque nobis est infinita, quia improportionaliter nos excedit». — Pro multipliciter ostenditur edd. cum nonnullis codd., quorum scriptores verbum abbreviatum multipliciter pro verbo Magistri habuerunt, exhibent Magister ostendit, quae lectio aperte falsa est, cum Magister in dist. commemorata nihil de hoc proferat. Pro in relatione ad nos, quae scriptura cod. M (N a secunda manu) procul dubio recta est, cum etiam respondeat contextui loci supra ex I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. allati, plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 in relatione ad eos, cod. bb in relatione ad res, Vat. in relatione ad Beatos. Paulo inferius pro retractavit codd. B C G H I L U aa reiteravit.
    Namely, against those who contend «that both essence and power are finite according to truth, because it is finite ... to God, who is truth; but yet each is infinite to us, because it exceeds us disproportionately». — For multipliciter ostenditur the editions, with several codices whose scribes took the abbreviated word multipliciter for the word Magister, present Magister ostendit, which reading is openly false, since the Master in the distinction cited brings forward nothing of this. For in relatione ad nos, which reading of cod. M (N by a second hand) is doubtless correct, since it also corresponds to the context of the passage cited above from I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2., very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] in relatione ad eos, cod. bb in relatione ad res, the Vatican [edition] in relatione ad Beatos. A little below, for retractavit codd. B C G H I L U aa [read] reiteravit.
  17. Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in fine, d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. Ambros., I. de Spiritu S. c. 7. n. 81. dicit, quod «omnis creatura certis naturae suae sit circumscripta limitibus». — Pro rem virtutis cod. W rationem virtutis. Paulo inferius post quomodo cod. M subiicit ergo.
    Cf. above d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. at the end, d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. in the body. Ambrose, I. On the Holy Spirit c. 7. n. 81. says that «every creature is circumscribed by the fixed limits of its own nature». — For rem virtutis cod. W [reads] rationem virtutis. A little below, after quomodo cod. M adds ergo.
  18. Cod. K intellectu. Post pauca pro si cognoscitur codd. G T U W Z bb si cognoscatur.
    Cod. K [reads] intellectu. After a few [words], for si cognoscitur codd. G T U W Z bb [read] si cognoscatur.
  19. Plurimi codd. incongrue quod.
    Very many codices incongruously [read] quod.
  20. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 7. m. 1.
    Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I. q. 7. m. 1.
  21. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.
    Cf. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.
  22. Libr. I. Phys. text. 15. (c. 2.): Infinitum enim in quanto est. Ibid. III. text. 1. (c. 1.): Infinitum autem apparet primum in continuo; et text. 63. (c. 6.): Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus, semper aliquid accipere extra est. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. — Augustini sententia habetur in eius libro de Quantit. animae, c. 3. n. 4.
    Book I Physics text 15. (c. 2.): For the infinite is in the quantum. Ibid. III. text 1. (c. 1.): But the infinite appears first in the continuous; and text 63. (c. 6.): The infinite, therefore, is that of which, for those taking according to quantity, there is always something to take beyond. Cf. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. — Augustine's opinion is found in his book On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 3. n. 4.
  23. Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 17. — Mox post hanc cod. Z supplet quantitatem.
    Cf. The Book of Causes, proposition 17. — Soon after hanc cod. Z supplies quantitatem.
  24. Simul audi: Verbo divino; cuiusmodi creatura est anima Christi.
    Understand at the same time: to the divine Word; of which sort of creature Christ's soul is.
  25. Cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 1. — Damasceni verba iam supra d. 6. dub. 3. explicata sunt. — Paulo superius voci persona cod. X praefigit una. Aliquanto inferius pro Et sic patet, quod illud cod. L Et sic patet illud, quod.
    Cf. above d. 1. dub. 1. — Damascene's words have already been explained above, d. 6. dub. 3. — A little above, to the word persona cod. X prefixes una. Somewhat below, for Et sic patet, quod illud cod. L [reads] Et sic patet illud, quod.
  26. Supple: ab aliis cognoscentibus.
    Supply: from the others knowing [it].
  27. Codd. A H (K a secunda manu) bb inter ceteras creaturas. Paulo superius pro sicut unquam codd. B C G H I K L T aa sicut nunquam. Circa finem solut. pro auctoritate edd. per auctoritatem, et deinde pro per praecisionem cod. H cum praecisione. — Fortasse hic respicitur F. Quintilian. I. Instit. orat. c. 5, ubi dicitur, quaedam vitia orationis excusari aut consuetudine aut auctoritate. Nec incredibile est, esse hic errorem librariorum et legendum esse augmentando vel augmentatione, cum Cicero, III. de Oratore, c. 53, praecisioni opponat illam figuram, qua res proposita augetur et augmentatur.
    Codd. A H (K by a second hand) bb [read] inter ceteras creaturas. A little above, for sicut unquam codd. B C G H I K L T aa [read] sicut nunquam. Near the end of the reply, for auctoritate the editions [read] per auctoritatem, and then for per praecisionem cod. H [reads] cum praecisione. — Perhaps F. Quintilian, I. Institutes of Oratory c. 5, is here regarded, where it is said that certain faults of speech are excused either by custom or by authority. Nor is it incredible that here there is a scribal error and one ought to read augmentando or augmentatione, since Cicero, III. On the Orator, c. 53, opposes to praecisio that figure by which a proposed thing is enlarged and augmented.
  28. Edd. 1, 2 quod verum est secundum totum, sed non.
    Editions 1, 2 [read] quod verum est secundum totum, sed non ["that it is true according to the whole, but not"].
  29. Cod. Q adiicit autem. Paulo ante pro de necessitate codd. V I necessario. Paulo inferius et alibi passim codd. nedum pro nedum. Deinde pro reddat codd. A U K T reddit, codd. I L N Z aa bb reddet.
    Cod. Q adds autem. A little before, for de necessitate codd. V I [read] necessario. A little below and elsewhere throughout the codices [read variants for] nedum. Then for reddat codd. A U K T [read] reddit, codd. I L N Z aa bb reddet.
  30. Cod. U addit illud. In fine solut. pro oportet codd. A K debet.
    Cod. U adds illud. At the end of the reply, for oportet codd. A K [read] debet.
  31. Codd. A G H I K L aa comprehendit.
    Codd. A G H I K L aa [read] comprehendit.
  32. Codd. G I L T V aa cognoscit quod, sicut nunquam. Paulo superius post Sed aliter codd. K M O subdunt tamen.
    Codd. G I L T V aa [read] cognoscit quod, sicut nunquam. A little above, after Sed aliter codd. K M O add tamen.
  33. Respicitur Cant. 2, 3. et 3, 4. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 6.
    Reference is made to Canticles 2, 3 and 3, 4. Cf. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 6.
  34. Sive de Consider. V. c. 14. n. 30. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Phil. 3, 12. — Paulo superius post uno modo codd. F G N Z bb repetunt dicitur, et subinde pro caritate cod. K exhibet caritati.
    Or rather On Consideration V. c. 14. n. 30. — The following scriptural passage is Phil. 3, 12. — A little above, after uno modo codd. F G N Z bb repeat dicitur, and thereupon for caritate cod. K presents caritati.
  35. Pro hoc est, cui lectioni assentiunt codd. A H Z bb, alii codd. hoc enim, codd. K M O hac enim, edd. hic enim. Proxime post pro immensum codd. G I L N T U Z aa intensum.
    For hoc est, to which reading codd. A H Z bb assent, other codices [read] hoc enim, codd. K M O hac enim, the editions hic enim. Immediately after, for immensum codd. G I L N T U Z aa [read] intensum.
  36. Psalm. 138, 6.
    Psalm 138, 6.
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