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Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 611

Quaestio V. Utrum actus dilectionis in Deum habeat modum.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum actus dilectionis in Deum habeat modum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sapientiae undecimo1: Omnia in numero et mensura et pondere disposuisti, Domine: ergo motus caritatis in Deum mensuram habet; et omne quod habet mensuram, habet modum: ergo necesse est, motum dilectionis in Deum esse modificatum.

2. Item, omne finitum est terminatum2, et omne terminatum est mensuratum, et omne tale est modificatum: ergo a primo omne finitum habet modum; sed motus caritatis in Deum est finitus, cum sit creatus et a virtute finita: ergo necesse est, ipsum habere modum.

3. Item, sapientia est supra caritatem, sicut dicit Bernardus in libro de Amore Dei3, quod « amor proficit in caritatem, et caritas in sapientiam »; sed sapientiam oportet habere modum, secundum quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos duodecimo: Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere etc.: si ergo sapientia debet habere modum, pari ratione videtur, immo multo fortiori, quod ipsa caritas habeat modum.

4. Item, modus, species et ordo ad se invicem comparantur, sicut unum, verum et bonum4; sed bonum praesupponit verum, et verum praesupponit unum: ergo pari ratione ordo praesupponit speciem, et species praesupponit modum. Sed motus caritatis in Deum est ordinatus: ergo et modificatus.

Sed contra: 1. Bernardus de Diligendo Deo5: « Causa diligendi Deum Deus est, modus est sine modo diligere »; et iterum: « Mihi fides tanto plus dicit Deum amandum, quanto me pluris ipsum aestimandum intelligo »; sed intelligo, quod ipse pluris aestimandus est quam ego in infinitum: ergo in infinitum est diligendus. Sed nihil tale habet modum: ergo motus caritatis non habet modum.

2. Item, ratio diligendi Deum est ipsa summa Bonitas6; sed summa Bonitas est infinita, non habens modum neque mensuram: ergo et habitus, qui movere et inclinare habet secundum rationem illam: videtur ergo, quod motus dilectionis in Deum non habeat terminum neque modum.

3. Item, caritas est aequa ponderatrix, cum sit affectio ordinata; sed qui aequaliter et ordinate ponderat appretiatur et amat unumquodque, quantum est appretiandum et amandum7: si ergo summum Bonum in infinitum excedit omne bonum creatum, videtur, quod motus caritatis in Deum in infinitum excedat motum caritatis in proximum: ergo non videtur, quod habeat modum.

4. Item, omne quod habet modum per sui excessum potest vitiari: ergo si motus caritatis in Deum modum haberet, per suum excessum vitiari posset. Sed nemo vituperabilis est, quantumcumque diligat Deum affectuose et intense8: si ergo motus caritatis in Deum non potest vitiari per excessum, videtur, quod in se non habeat modum.

Conclusio. Actus dilectionis erga Deum habet modum ex virtutis limitatione et debitarum circumstantiarum additione, sed non modum ex mediatione inter superfluum et diminutum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tripliciter potest dici aliquis actus habere modum: uno modo per limitationem quantum ad se ipsum; alio modo per aggregationem circumstantiarum; tertio modo ex mediatione9 inter superfluum et diminutum. Primo modo est dicere, quod modum habet actus omnis virtutis creatae. Omnis enim virtus creata finita est et limitata; et ideo omnis actus eius finitatem habet et modum, loquendo de limitatione et finitate non secundum possibilitatem, sed secundum actum.

p. 612

— Secundo vero modo est dicere, modum esse circa actum virtutis moralis et meritoriae, quia nullus actus fit laudabiliter, nisi ad eum concurrant debitae circumstantiae10. — Tertio modo est dicere, quod modum habet actus omnis virtutis cardinalis sive politicae. Omnes enim in medietate consistunt inter superfluum et diminutum, ex hoc ipso quod habent obiectum creatum et finitum.

Quoniam ergo caritas est virtus creata et virtus gratuita et virtus theologica; hinc est, quod actus eius modum habet ex virtutis limitatione; modum etiam habet ex debitarum circumstantiarum additione, ut patet, quia modus, qui est circa actum caritatis, est, ut quis diligat Deum super omnia et propter se ex toto corde, ex tota anima et ex tota mente11. Sed modum illum, qui est ex mediatione inter superfluum et diminutum, non habet, quia obiectum eius est immensum et infinitum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam: quia motus dilectionis in Deum quodam modo accipiendi modum, modificari habet, quodam modo vero minime. — Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad oppositas partes. Nam rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, quae ostendunt, motum caritatis habere modum, concludunt de modo, qui consistit in limitatione actus quantum ad se ipsum. — Illa tamen ratio de sapientia non cogit: quia sapientia uno modo dicta est a sapere, alio modo dicta est a sapore12, ita quod uno modo consistit in cognitione, alio modo in affectione. Et secundum quod consistit in affectione, sic dicit Bernardus, quod « caritas crescit in sapientiam »; et hoc modo non habet vitiari per excessum. Secundum autem quod consistit in cognitione, sic potest vitiari per excessum et curiositatem perscrutationis13; sed hoc modo non est superior ad caritatem nec illa dignior: et ideo non sequitur, quod motus caritatis in Deum habeat modum, secundum quod modus dicit medium inter superfluum et diminutum. — Aliae vero tres rationes verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad rationes vero quae ad oppositum adducuntur, similiter plana est responsio. Nam illud Bernardi de Diligendo Deo, quod Deus diligendus est sine modo; non tollit modum debitae circumstantiae, vel finitatem virtutis creatae; sed hoc tollit, quod nemo debet sibi terminum infra14 virtutem suam praefigere, quia nemo potest superflue Deum diligere, et ita aufert modum tertio modo dictum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio diligendi Deum est Bonitas infinita; dicendum, quod licet caritas moveat conformiter illi rationi, secundum quod potest, nunquam tamen facit aequalem15; et ideo, quamvis ipsa summa Bonitas sit infinita, non tamen propter hoc oportet, quod affectio caritatis, quae movetur secundum illam, habeat infinitatem et careat omni mensura; pro eo quod, sicut lux claritatis divinae, quam sumus visuri in patria, est in se infinita, tamen finite cognoscetur a nobis, et claritas cognoscibilis in infinitum excedet claritatem nostrae cognitionis16: sic etiam intelligendum est ex parte affectionis, quod multo maior erit bonitas illius summi Boni amabilis, quam sit affectio amantis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est aequa ponderatrix; dicendum, quod verum est; hoc etiam verum est, quod in infinitum plus diligit Deum quam creaturam; sed tamen non propter hoc sequitur, quod diligat Deum omnino infinite sine mensura, quia linea in infinitum excedit punctum17, et tamen ipsa in se finita est.

4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur de excessu, patet responsio: quia obiicit de modo, qui non solum est ex parte virtutis moventis, sed etiam ex parte obiecti, qui etiam medium locum tenet respectu superflui et diminuti: et hunc non est reperire circa actum dilectionis Dei, sicut prius tactum est, propter immensitatem ipsius obiecti18.

Scholion

I. Eandem fere quaestionem Richard. a Med. (hic a. 8. q. 1.) sic proponit: « Utrum Deus diligi possit excessive » (i. e. nimis). Patet, quod ad quaestionem sic intellectam et respectu actus interioris in affectu, responderi debeat, quod e contrario, cum ratio caritatis, scilicet Bonitas divina, sit infinita, nulla creatura possit Deum diligere satis i. e. quantum meretur, et multo minus nimis. (Cfr. solut. ad 1. 2.). Et secundum hunc sensum aliis verbis resolvit S. Thomas (hic q. 3. a. 3; cfr. S. II. II. q. 27. a. 6.), quod caritas « non habeat modum, scilicet praefixum, ultra quem non oportet progredi ». — Distinctiones, quas hic adhibet S. Bonaventura, aptae sunt; quas Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 4. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) sic repetit: « Aliquis actus tripliciter dicitur habere modum: aut secundum limitationem essentiae, aut secundum determinationem debitae circumstantiae, aut secundum proportionem medii inter superfluum et diminutum. Primo modo omnis actus creatus habet modum; secundo omnis actus virtuosus, quia est ex debitis circumstantiis mensuratus; tertio modo actus virtutum cardinalium ». Praeter laudatos de hac (5.) quaestione: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 10. quaestiunc. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Question V. Whether the act of love toward God has a measure.

Fifth, it is asked whether the act of love toward God has a measure. And it seems that it does:

1. Wisdom eleven1: You have arranged all things in number and measure and weight, O Lord: therefore the motion of charity toward God has a measure; and everything that has a measure, has a mode: therefore it is necessary that the motion of love toward God be moded.

2. Likewise, everything finite is terminated2, and everything terminated is measured, and everything such is moded: therefore from the first everything finite has a mode; but the motion of charity toward God is finite, since it is created and [proceeds] from a finite power: therefore it is necessary that it have a mode.

3. Likewise, wisdom is above charity, as Bernard says in the book On the Love of God3, that « love advances into charity, and charity into wisdom »; but wisdom must have a mode, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans, chapter twelve: Not to be more wise than it behooves to be wise etc.: if therefore wisdom ought to have a mode, by like reasoning it seems, indeed by a much stronger one, that charity itself has a mode.

4. Likewise, mode, species, and order are compared to one another, as one, true, and good4; but the good presupposes the true, and the true presupposes the one: therefore by like reasoning order presupposes species, and species presupposes mode. But the motion of charity toward God is ordered: therefore also moded.

On the contrary: 1. Bernard, On Loving God5: « The cause of loving God is God, the mode is to love without mode »; and again: « Faith tells me that God is to be loved so much the more, the more I understand that He Himself is to be esteemed above me »; but I understand that He is to be esteemed above me infinitely: therefore He is to be loved infinitely. But nothing such has a mode: therefore the motion of charity does not have a mode.

2. Likewise, the ground of loving God is the supreme Goodness itself6; but the supreme Goodness is infinite, having neither mode nor measure: therefore so also is the habit, which has [the property] of moving and inclining according to that ground: it seems therefore that the motion of love toward God has neither term nor mode.

3. Likewise, charity is an equal weigher, since it is an ordered affection; but he who weighs equally and orderly esteems and loves each thing as much as it is to be esteemed and loved7: if therefore the supreme Good infinitely exceeds every created good, it seems that the motion of charity toward God infinitely exceeds the motion of charity toward the neighbor: therefore it does not seem that it has a mode.

4. Likewise, everything that has a mode can be vitiated through its own excess: therefore if the motion of charity toward God had a mode, it could be vitiated through its own excess. But no one is blameworthy, however affectionately and intensely he loves God8: if therefore the motion of charity toward God cannot be vitiated through excess, it seems that in itself it has no mode.

Conclusion. The act of love toward God has a measure from the limitation of the virtue and from the addition of due circumstances, but not a measure from a mean between the superfluous and the diminished.

I respond: It must be said that an act can be said to have a measure in three ways: in one way by limitation as regards itself; in another way by the aggregation of circumstances; in a third way from a mean9 between the superfluous and the diminished. In the first way one is to say that the act of every created virtue has a measure. For every created virtue is finite and limited; and therefore every act of it has finitude and measure, speaking of limitation and finitude not according to possibility, but according to act.

— In the second way, however, one is to say that the measure is about the act of a moral and meritorious virtue, because no act is done praiseworthily unless due circumstances concur with it10. — In the third way one is to say that the act of every cardinal or political virtue has a measure. For all of them consist in a mean between the superfluous and the diminished, from this very fact that they have a created and finite object.

Since therefore charity is a created virtue and a gratuitous virtue and a theological virtue; hence it is that its act has a measure from the limitation of the virtue; it also has a measure from the addition of due circumstances, as is plain, because the measure that is about the act of charity is this, that one love God above all and for His own sake with one's whole heart, with one's whole soul, and with one's whole mind11. But that measure which is from a mean between the superfluous and the diminished it does not have, because its object is immense and infinite.

From these things the response to the question proposed is plain: that the motion of love toward God, in a certain way of taking the measure, has [reason] to be moded, but in a certain way by no means. — And according to this the reasonings run to opposite parts. For the reasonings which are brought forward for the first part, which show that the motion of charity has a measure, conclude about the measure that consists in the limitation of the act as regards itself. — Yet that reasoning about wisdom does not compel: because wisdom in one way is named from to know (sapere), in another way from taste (sapor)12, so that in one way it consists in cognition, in another way in affection. And insofar as it consists in affection, so Bernard says, that « charity grows into wisdom »; and in this way it cannot be vitiated through excess. But insofar as it consists in cognition, so it can be vitiated through excess and the curiosity of investigation13; but in this way it is not superior to charity, nor is it more worthy than it: and therefore it does not follow that the motion of charity toward God has a measure, insofar as the measure expresses a mean between the superfluous and the diminished. — But the other three reasonings conclude what is true, and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To the reasonings, however, which are adduced for the opposite, the response is likewise plain. For that [saying] of Bernard On Loving God, that God is to be loved without mode; does not take away the measure of due circumstance, or the finitude of the created virtue; but it takes away this, that no one ought to set for himself a term below14 his own power, because no one can love God superfluously, and thus it removes the measure spoken of in the third way.

2. To that which is objected, that the ground of loving God is infinite Goodness; it must be said that although charity moves conformably to that ground, insofar as it can, yet it never makes [itself] equal15; and therefore, although the supreme Goodness itself is infinite, nevertheless it is not on this account necessary that the affection of charity, which is moved according to it, should have infinity and lack all measure; for this reason, that, just as the light of the divine brightness, which we are to see in the homeland, is in itself infinite, yet will be known finitely by us, and the knowable brightness will infinitely exceed the brightness of our cognition16: so also it is to be understood on the part of the affection, that the goodness of that supreme lovable Good will be much greater than is the affection of the one loving.

3. To that which is objected, that charity is an equal weigher; it must be said that it is true; this also is true, that it loves God infinitely more than the creature; but yet it does not follow on this account that it loves God altogether infinitely without measure, because a line infinitely exceeds a point17, and yet it is in itself finite.

4. To the last [objection], which is raised about excess, the response is plain: because it objects about the measure which is not only on the part of the moving virtue, but also on the part of the object, which also holds a middle place with respect to the superfluous and the diminished: and this is not to be found about the act of love of God, as was touched upon before, on account of the immensity of the object itself18.

Scholion

I. Richard of Mediavilla (here art. 8, q. 1) poses nearly the same question thus: « Whether God can be loved excessively » (i.e. too much). It is plain that, to the question so understood and with respect to the interior act in the affect, it must be answered to the contrary, that, since the ground of charity, namely the divine Goodness, is infinite, no creature can love God enough, i.e. as much as He deserves, and much less too much. (Cf. the solution to objections 1 and 2.). And according to this sense S. Thomas resolves [it] in other words (here q. 3, art. 3; cf. Summa II–II, q. 27, art. 6), that charity « does not have a measure, namely a fixed one, beyond which one ought not to advance ». — The distinctions which S. Bonaventure here employs are apt; which Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 4, art. 1, quaestiuncula 1) repeats thus: « An act is said to have a measure in three ways: either according to the limitation of essence, or according to the determination of due circumstance, or according to the proportion of a mean between the superfluous and the diminished. In the first way every created act has a measure; in the second, every virtuous act, because it is measured by due circumstances; in the third way the acts of the cardinal virtues ». Besides those praised on this (the fifth) question: Blessed Albert, on this and the following question, here art. 10, quaestiunculae 1–3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. (P. 611, n. 2.) Vers. 21. — In fine arg. pro esse modificatum cod. Y habere modum.
    (P. 611, n. 2.) [Wisdom 11,] verse 21. — At the end of the argument, for esse modificatum codex Y [reads] habere modum.
  2. (P. 611, n. 3.) Vide verba Ambrosii supra pag. 300, nota 6. allata.
    (P. 611, n. 3.) See the words of Ambrose cited above, p. 300, note 6.
  3. (P. 611, n. 4.) Sive de Natura et dignit. amoris, c. 2. n. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. — Seq. verbum Apostoli est Rom. 12, 3.
    (P. 611, n. 4.) Or On the Nature and Dignity of Love, ch. 2, n. 3. Cf. above, p. 596, note 7. — The following word of the Apostle is Rom. 12, 3.
  4. (P. 611, n. 5.) Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3, et II. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — De minori vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 13. m. 2, q. 15. m. 2. et q. 17. m. 1.
    (P. 611, n. 5.) Cf. Sentences I, dist. 3, p. I, dub. 3, and Sentences II, dist. 35, art. 2, q. 1 ff. — On the minor [premise] see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 13, m. 2, q. 15, m. 2, and q. 17, m. 1.
  5. (P. 611, n. 6.) Cap. 1. n. 1. — Seq. testimonium invenitur ibid. c. 5. n. 15. — In fine arg. edd. voci caritatis adiungunt in Deum.
    (P. 611, n. 6.) Chapter 1, n. 1. — The following testimony is found ibid., ch. 5, n. 15. — At the end of the argument the editions add in Deum to the word caritatis.
  6. (P. 611, n. 7.) Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro habitus, qui cod. A habitus, quia.
    (P. 611, n. 7.) Cf. above, art. 1, q. 1 ff. — Soon, for habitus, qui codex A [reads] habitus, quia.
  7. (P. 611, n. 8.) Bernard., Epist. 85. n. 3: O Domine, qui illuminas lucernam meam... illumina ipsas quoque tenebras meas, ut videam et gaudeam ordinatam in me caritatem, sciens et diligens quae diligenda sunt, et quantum et ad quid diligenda sunt etc. Cfr. de Modo bene vivendi (inter opera Bernardi), c. 5. n. 12. — Post pauca pro excedat multi codd. excedit.
    (P. 611, n. 8.) Bernard, Letter 85, n. 3: O Lord, who lightest my lamp... enlighten also my very darknesses, that I may see and rejoice in the charity ordered within me, knowing and loving the things that are to be loved, and how much and to what end they are to be loved, etc. Cf. On the Manner of Living Well (among the works of Bernard), ch. 5, n. 12. — A little after, for excedat many codices [read] excedit.
  8. (P. 611, n. 9.) Eccli. 43, 32. seq.: Glorificantes Dominum, quantumcumque potueritis; supervalebit enim adhuc... maior enim est omni laude.
    (P. 611, n. 9.) Sirach 43, 32 f.: Glorifying the Lord, as much as ever you can; for He will yet surpass [you]... for He is greater than all praise.
  9. (P. 611, n. 10.) Vat. hic, et inferius cum Vat. etiam edd. 1, 2, mediate; aliquanto inferius pro finitate eaedem edd. cum Vat. substituunt finitatione.
    (P. 611, n. 10.) The Vatican [edition] here, and below the editions 1, 2 also with the Vatican, [read] mediate; somewhat further down, for finitate the same editions with the Vatican substitute finitatione.
  10. (P. 612, n. 1.) Vide supra pag. 472, nota 2. — De tertio modo, quem aliquis actus habere potest, vide supra pag. 474, nota 6. in fine. — Pro laudabiliter edd. laudabilis.
    (P. 612, n. 1.) See above, p. 472, note 2. — On the third mode, which an act can have, see above, p. 474, note 6, at the end. — For laudabiliter the editions [read] laudabilis.
  11. (P. 612, n. 2.) Marc. 12, 30.
    (P. 612, n. 2.) Mark 12, 30.
  12. (P. 612, n. 3.) Bernard., Serm. 85. in Cantic. n. 8: Et si quis sapientiam virtutis amorem definierit, non mihi a vero deviare videtur. Ubi autem amor est, labor non est, sed sapor. Et forte sapientia a sapore denominatur, quod virtuti accedens, quoddam veluti condimentum sapidam reddat, quae per se insulsa quodam modo et aspera sentiebatur. Nec duxerim reprehendendum, si quis sapientiam saporem boni definiat. Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 1. et I. Sent. prooem. q. 3. in corp.
    (P. 612, n. 3.) Bernard, Sermon 85 on the Canticle, n. 8: And if anyone should define wisdom as the love of virtue, he does not seem to me to stray from the truth. But where there is love, there is no labor, but taste (sapor). And perhaps wisdom (sapientia) is named from taste, because, coming to a virtue, it renders savory, as it were by a certain seasoning, that which by itself was felt to be in a way insipid and harsh. Nor would I hold it blameworthy, if anyone should define wisdom as the taste of the good. Cf. below, dist. 35, q. 1, and Sentences I, proem, q. 3, in the body.
  13. (P. 612, n. 4.) Cfr. supra d. 22. dub. 5. — Paulo inferius pro secundum quod non pauci codd. secundum quem.
    (P. 612, n. 4.) Cf. above, dist. 22, dub. 5. — A little further down, for secundum quod not a few codices [read] secundum quem.
  14. (P. 612, n. 5.) Edd. iuxta.
    (P. 612, n. 5.) The editions [read] iuxta [beside].
  15. (P. 612, n. 6.) Vat. nunquam tamen potest facere aequalem affectionem ipsi; et ideo, et paulo ante conformiter ad illam rationem; edd. 1, 2 dicendum, quod licet bonitas moveat conformiter illam affectionem secundum quod potest etc.
    (P. 612, n. 6.) The Vatican [edition reads] nunquam tamen potest facere aequalem affectionem ipsi; et ideo, and a little before conformiter ad illam rationem; editions 1, 2 [read] dicendum, quod licet bonitas moveat conformiter illam affectionem secundum quod potest etc.
  16. (P. 612, n. 7.) Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 1. q. 2.
    (P. 612, n. 7.) Cf. above, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 2.
  17. (P. 612, n. 8.) Vide supra pag. 280, nota 5. — Pro diligat codd. G H I L T Z aa diligit.
    (P. 612, n. 8.) See above, p. 280, note 5. — For diligat codices G H I L T Z aa [read] diligit.
  18. (P. 612, n. 9.) Codd. M O S addunt quod est Deus.
    (P. 612, n. 9.) Codices M O S add which is God.
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