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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio I. Utrum actus doni sapientiae attendatur penes cognitionem veri, an penes affectionem boni.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de actu et obiecto ipsius doni sapientiae, utrum videlicet actus ipsius doni attendatur penes cognitionem veri, an penes affectionem boni. Et quod actus eius attendatur in cognoscendo, videtur:

1. Primo per verbum Sapientis, Proverbiorum primo1: Audiens sapiens sapientior erit; sed auditus in nobis est via ad acquirendum habitum cognitionis: si ergo per auditum crescit in nobis sapientia, secundum quod dicitur in verbo proposito et in aliis pluribus eiusdem libri auctoritatibus; videtur, quod actus doni sapientiae sit cognitivus.

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2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Augustinum in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate2, ubi definiens sapientiam dicit, quod «sapientia est rerum divinarum humanarumque cognitio», approbans notificationem philosophorum in parte illa de ipsa sapientia: si ergo definit sapientiam recte et per actum proprium, videtur, quod actus ipsius doni sapientiae sit divina et humana cognoscere.

3. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus tractans illud Iob primo3: Ventus vehemens etc.; dicit, quod donum sapientiae datum est in remedium contra stultitiam: ergo defectus stultitiae et donum sapientiae directe opponuntur; «opposita autem nata sunt fieri circa idem», secundum quod vult Philosophus: cum ergo stultitia dicat defectum in actu cognoscendi, videtur, quod actus sapientiae-doni sit potentiae cognitivae.

4. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quoniam sapientia appropriatur Filio; sed cum in imagine creata sit aliqua reperire ex parte intellectus, et aliqua ex parte affectus; quae sunt affectionis appropriantur Spiritui sancto, qui est amor, quae vero cognitionis appropriantur Filio4: cum ergo sapientia ei approprietur, videtur etc.

5. Item, nullus amans aliquid, quantumcumque circa illud afficiatur, sapiens dicitur ex hoc, nisi illud cognoscat: ergo actus doni sapientiae maxime attenditur in faciendo cognoscere.

Sed contra hoc obiicitur:

1. Primo auctoritate Sapientis, Ecclesiastici sexto5: Sapientia doctrinae secundum nomen suum est, et non in multis est manifesta: si ergo sapientia a sapore dicitur, et sapor respicit affectionem interiorem; videtur, quod proprius actus doni sapientiae sit affectivus.

2. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus super primum Iob6 dicit, quod sapientia est donum «spe et certitudine aeternorum mentem reficiens»; sed refectio spectat ad gustum et affectum: ergo et praecipuus actus ipsius doni sapientiae est affectivus.

3. Item, Dionysius dicit in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo de sapientia7: «Hanc igitur stultam et amentem sapientiam laudamus» etc.; et alia littera: «Hanc igitur irrationalem et dementem et stultam sapientiam excellenter laudantes dicimus» etc. Si ergo loquitur ibi de sapientia, quae est donum Dei, sicut patet, et hanc dicit stultam et amentem: videtur, quod actus istius doni ex parte affectionis se teneat, et nullatenus ex parte rationis.

4. Item, Bernardus in libro de Amore Dei, secundo capitulo8 dicit, quod «amor crescit in caritatem, caritas in sapientiam»: ergo cum caritas et amor et ipsius caritatis actus sint partis affectivae, videtur, quod et sapientiae actus sit affectivus, cum principalis actus non varietur ratione profectus.

5. Item, nec in dono sapientiae nec in eius actu est reperire excessum — nemo enim nimis est sapiens — sed in actu cognitionis circa divina contingit valde de facili excedere: videtur ergo, quod actus doni sapientiae omnino se teneat ex parte affectionis, et nullatenus ex parte cognitionis. — Si forte dicas, quod actus eius simul est ex parte cognitionis et affectionis; contra hoc est: quia maior est diversitas in habitibus, quam sit in potentiis; sed ratione illorum actuum, qui sunt cognoscere et affici, diversificantur potentiae animae, ita quod nunquam sunt actus eiusdem potentiae9: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod nunquam sint actus eiusdem habitus. Si tu dicas, quod non possunt esse actus eiusdem habitus principales; tunc quaeritur, quis sit eius actus principalis et praecipuus, utrum cognitivus, vel affectivus; et per primas rationes videtur, quod cognitivus; per secundas, quod affectivus: et ita redit eadem quaestio, quae prius.

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Conclusio.

Praecipuus actus doni sapientiae est ex parte affectivae, ita ut in cognitione inchoetur et in affectione consummetur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sapientia quadrupliciter accipi consuevit tam a philosophis quam a Sanctis, videlicet communiter et minus communiter et proprie et magis proprie. — Communiter accipiendo sapientiam, sic sapientia dicit cognitionem rerum generalem, secundum quod eam definit Augustinus et Philosophus, quod «sapientia est cognitio rerum divinarum et humanarum»; et Philosophus in Prima Philosophia10 dicit, quod «sapiens est qui omnia novit, secundum quod convenit».

Alio modo dicitur sapientia minus communiter; et sic sapientia dicit cognitionem non quamcumque, sed cognitionem sublimem, videlicet cognitionem rerum aeternarum. Et sic accipit eam Apostolus primae ad Corinthios duodecimo11: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae; secundum quod exponit Augustinus dicens, quod «sapientia est cognitio aeternorum, scientia vero est cognitio creatorum»; et sic etiam dicit Philosophus12, quod sapientia est «cognitio causarum altissimarum».

Tertio modo accipitur sapientia proprie; et sic nominat cognitionem Dei secundum pietatem: et haec quidem cognitio est quae attenditur in cultu latriae, quem exhibemus Deo per fidem, spem et caritatem, secundum quem modum accipit Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate13, exponens illud Iob: Ecce pietas ipsa est sapientia, — dicens ibidem, quod pietas et sapientia idem est quod theosebia, et theosebia idem est quod cultus divinus, qui consistit in tribus virtutibus, secundum quod ipse dicit in principio Enchiridii ad Laurentium.

Quarto modo dicitur sapientia magis proprie, et sic nominat cognitionem Dei experimentalem; et hoc modo est unum de septem donis Spiritus sancti, cuius actus consistit in degustando divinam suavitatem. Et quoniam ad gustum interiorem, in quo est delectatio, necessario requiritur actus affectionis ad coniungendum et actus cognitionis ad apprehendendum, secundum illud Philosophi14, qui dicit, quod «delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti cum sensu eiusdem»; hinc est, quod actus doni sapientiae partim est cognitivus, et partim est affectivus: ita quod in cognitione inchoatur et in affectione consummatur, secundum quod ipse gustus vel saporatio est experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio. Et ideo actus praecipuus doni sapientiae propriissime dictae est ex parte affectivae, ratione cuius dicit Ecclesiasticus, quod sapientia secundum nomen suum est; et Gregorius dicit, quod actus eius est reficere; et Dionysius dicit, quod istius sapientiae est amentem esse, propter hoc quod melius afficimur circa Deum praevia cognitione, quae est per ablationem et negationem, quam per affirmationem, sicut docet in libro de Mystica Theologia. Ratione etiam istius eiusdem causae dicit Bernardus, caritatem in sapientiam proficere. — Et ex hac eadem causa contingit, quod sapientia non potest esse nimia, quia excessus in experimento divinae dulcedinis potius est laudabilis quam vituperabilis, secundum quod patet in viris sanctis et contemplativis, qui prae nimia dulcedine modo elevantur in ecstasim, modo sublevantur usque ad raptum, licet hoc contingat paucissimis. — Concedendum est igitur, quod actus doni sapientiae praecipuus est ex parte affectionis. Concedendae sunt etiam rationes hoc ostendentes.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod sapientia crescit per auditum; dicendum, quod sapientia sumitur ibi communiter pro cognitione generali, quae quidem est rerum divinarum et humanarum, quae per studium et auditum suscipit incrementum; et ideo non habet hic locum.

2. Ad illud similiter quod obiicit de auctoritate Augustini, patet responsio, quia illo modo eam accipit Augustinus.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod sapientia est contra stultitiam; dici potest, quod hoc dicit non quantum ad ultimum actum sapientiae, qui attenditur in affectione, sed quantum ad primum actum sive praevium, qui consistit in cognitione; donum enim sapientiae in se complectitur utrumque.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia appropriatur Filio; dicendum, quod hoc est, in quantum dicit lumen cognitionis, non in quantum dicit saporem affectionis. Cum enim utrumque in se claudat, potest utrique personae appropriari, videlicet Filio et Spiritui sancto; et quoniam non appropriatur Filio soli, immo etiam personae Spiritus sancti: hinc est, quod ratio illa non cogit.

5. Ad illud quod ulterius obiicitur, quod nemo est sapiens ex hoc solum, quod amat, nisi etiam ulterius cognoscat; dicendum, quod illud est verum; attamen in amore Dei ipsi gustui coniuncta est cognitio. Optimus enim modus cognoscendi Deum est per experimentum dulcedinis; multo etiam excellentior et nobilior et delectabilior est quam per argumentum inquisitionis. Unde ex hoc non habetur, quod cognoscere sit actus ipsius doni sapientiae praecipuus, sed quod15 quodam modo concurrit ad eius actum praecipuum; et hoc quidem est verum, quia, sicut tactum est, sapientia in se claudit utrumque actum; unde quodam modo respicit intellectum, quodam modo respicit affectum.

Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unus habitus non potest esse respectu istorum duorum actuum, cum penes illos diversificentur potentiae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non possunt isti actus eiusdem habitus esse, ita quod uterque sit principalis; nihil tamen impedit, duos esse, ita quod unus sit primus, alter vero praecipuus; unus sicut disponens, alter vero complens, sicut in praecedentibus16 habitum fuit de fide. — Unde eisdem rationibus et responsionibus quantum ad hoc potest quis negotiari circa donum sapientiae, quae supra explanatae fuerunt circa virtutem fidei; et ideo haec ad praesens sufficiant, quia non oportet, hic illas iterum replicari.

Scholion

I. Eandem distinctionem quadruplicem sapientiae repetit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.), qui deinde (quaestiunc. 3.) in conclusione generaliter cum nostro auctore convenit; sed addit: «Sapientia amorem importat ut causam disponentem proximam, sed cognitionem essentialiter, cognitionem, dico, non tantum speculativam, sed practicam; unde duplicem habet effectum consequentem, scilicet illuminationem et delectationem». Hoc dicitur ad mentem S. Thomae, qui (S. II. II. q. 45. a. 2.) docet: «Sapientia, quae est donum, causam quidem habet in voluntate, scilicet caritatem, sed essentiam habet in intellectu» (cfr. ibid. q. 8. a. 6, et Comment. hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3.). Similiter loquitur Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 1.). Paulo aliter S. Bonav. (cfr. hic dub. 1.), qui negat (in corp. et ad 3.), quod cognoscere sit actus sapientiae praecipuus; cui doctrinae favet B. Albert. (hic a. 1.). — Cfr. praeter laudatos: Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

II. De scientia (q. seq.) atque de differentia inter sapientiam, intellectum et scientiam; cfr. etiam infra q. 3. Cum Magister (hic c. 1.) secundum Augustinum scientiae assignet quatuor actus (cfr. hic dub. 2. 3.), orta est quaestio, quis eorum sit principalis. Etiam in hac quaestione S. Thom. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 9. a. 3.) aliqualenus recedit a nostro auctore. Nam in Summa resolvit, quod «donum scientiae primo quidem et principaliter respicit speculationem, in quantum scilicet homo scit, quid fide tenere debeat; secundario autem se extendit etiam ad operationem, secundum quod per scientiam credibilium, et eorum quae ad credibilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agendis». — Quod autem praecipuus actus huius doni sit dirigere circa actionem, cum S. Bonav. tenent etiam B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 8.

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English Translation
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Question I. Whether the act of the gift of wisdom is reckoned in the cognition of the true, or in the affection of the good.

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked concerning the act and object of the gift of wisdom itself — namely whether the act of this gift is reckoned in the cognition of the true, or in the affection of the good. And that its act is reckoned in knowing seems [the case]:

1. First, by the word of the Wise Man, Proverbs, chapter one1: A wise man hearing will be wiser; but hearing is for us a way to acquiring the habit of cognition: if therefore through hearing wisdom grows in us, according to what is said in the proposed word and in many other authorities of the same book; it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom is cognitive.

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2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through Augustine in the fourteenth book On the Trinity2, where, defining wisdom, he says that "wisdom is the cognition of things divine and human," approving the philosophers' notification in that part concerning wisdom itself: if therefore he defines wisdom rightly and through its proper act, it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom is to know things divine and human.

3. Likewise, Gregory in the Morals, treating that [text] of Job, chapter one3: A vehement wind etc.; says that the gift of wisdom was given as a remedy against folly: therefore the defect of folly and the gift of wisdom are directly opposed; "but opposites are by nature apt to arise about the same thing," according to what the Philosopher holds: since therefore folly bespeaks a defect in the act of knowing, it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom belongs to the cognitive power.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] by reason, since wisdom is appropriated to the Son; but since in the created image some things are to be found on the side of intellect, and some on the side of affect; those which are of affection are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who is love, while those of cognition are appropriated to the Son4: since therefore wisdom is appropriated to him, it seems [that its act is cognitive] etc.

5. Likewise, no one loving anything, however much he is affected toward it, is called wise on that account, unless he knows it: therefore the act of the gift of wisdom is reckoned chiefly in making [one] know.

On the contrary, the following is objected:

1. First, by the authority of the Wise Man, Ecclesiasticus, chapter six5: The wisdom of doctrine is according to its name, and is not manifest to many: if therefore wisdom is named from taste (sapor), and taste regards the interior affection; it seems that the proper act of the gift of wisdom is affective.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the Morals on the first [chapter] of Job6 says that wisdom is a gift "refreshing the mind with the hope and certitude of eternal things"; but refreshment pertains to taste and affect: therefore the chief act of this gift of wisdom is affective.

3. Likewise, Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, in the chapter on wisdom7: "This foolish and senseless wisdom, therefore, we praise" etc.; and another reading: "This irrational and demented and foolish wisdom, therefore, we excellently praising do declare" etc. If therefore he speaks there of the wisdom which is a gift of God, as is clear, and calls this foolish and senseless: it seems that the act of this gift holds itself on the side of affection, and in no way on the side of reason.

4. Likewise, Bernard in the book On the Love of God, chapter two8, says that "love grows into charity, charity into wisdom": therefore since charity and love and the act of charity itself belong to the affective part, it seems that the act of wisdom too is affective, since the principal act is not varied by reason of [its] advance.

5. Likewise, neither in the gift of wisdom nor in its act is excess to be found — for no one is too wise — but in the act of cognition concerning divine things it happens very easily to exceed: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of wisdom holds itself wholly on the side of affection, and in no way on the side of cognition. — But if perhaps you say that its act is at once on the side of cognition and of affection; against this is: that there is greater diversity in habits than there is in powers; but by reason of those acts, which are to know and to be affected, the powers of the soul are diversified, such that they are never acts of the same power9: therefore by parity of reason it seems that they are never acts of the same habit. If you say that they cannot be principal acts of the same habit; then it is asked which is its principal and chief act, whether cognitive or affective; and by the first reasons it seems [to be] cognitive, by the second, affective: and thus the same question returns as before.

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Conclusion.

The chief act of the gift of wisdom is on the side of the affective [power], such that it is begun in cognition and consummated in affection.

I respond: It must be said that wisdom has customarily been taken in four ways both by the philosophers and by the Saints, namely commonly and less commonly and properly and more properly. — Taking wisdom commonly, wisdom thus bespeaks a general cognition of things, according as Augustine and the Philosopher define it, that "wisdom is the cognition of things divine and human"; and the Philosopher in the First Philosophy10 says that "the wise man is he who knows all things, according as is fitting."

In another way wisdom is called [such] less commonly; and thus wisdom bespeaks not just any cognition, but a sublime cognition, namely the cognition of eternal things. And thus the Apostle takes it in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter twelve11: To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge; according as Augustine expounds it, saying that "wisdom is the cognition of eternal things, but knowledge is the cognition of created things"; and thus too the Philosopher says12 that wisdom is "the cognition of the highest causes."

In the third way wisdom is taken properly; and thus it names the cognition of God according to piety: and this cognition indeed is the one reckoned in the worship of latria, which we render to God through faith, hope, and charity, according to which mode Augustine takes it in the fourteenth [book] On the Trinity13, expounding that [text] of Job: Behold, piety itself is wisdom, — saying in the same place that piety and wisdom are the same as theosebia, and theosebia is the same as divine worship, which consists in the three virtues, according to what he himself says at the beginning of the Enchiridion to Laurentius.

In the fourth way wisdom is called [such] more properly, and thus it names the experiential cognition of God; and in this way it is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, whose act consists in tasting the divine sweetness. And since for the interior taste, in which there is delight, there is necessarily required an act of affection for conjoining and an act of cognition for apprehending, according to that [saying] of the Philosopher14, who says that "delight is the conjunction of the suitable with the suitable with the sense of the same"; hence it is that the act of the gift of wisdom is partly cognitive and partly affective: such that it is begun in cognition and consummated in affection, according as the taste or savoring itself is an experiential cognition of the good and the sweet. And therefore the chief act of the gift of wisdom, most properly so called, is on the side of the affective [power], by reason of which Ecclesiasticus says that wisdom is according to its name; and Gregory says that its act is to refresh; and Dionysius says that it belongs to this wisdom to be senseless, on account of this, that we are better affected toward God by a prior cognition which is through removal and negation than by affirmation, as he teaches in the book On Mystical Theology. By reason also of this same cause Bernard says that charity advances into wisdom. — And from this same cause it happens that wisdom cannot be excessive, because excess in the experience of divine sweetness is rather laudable than blameworthy, according as is clear in holy and contemplative men, who from too much sweetness are now raised into ecstasy, now lifted up even to rapture, though this happens to very few. — It must therefore be conceded that the chief act of the gift of wisdom is on the side of affection. The reasons showing this are also to be conceded.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that wisdom grows through hearing; it must be said that wisdom is there taken commonly for the general cognition which is indeed of things divine and human, which receives increase through study and hearing; and therefore it has no place here.

2. To that likewise which objects from the authority of Augustine, the response is clear, because Augustine takes it in that way.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of Gregory, that wisdom is against folly; it can be said that he says this not as to the ultimate act of wisdom, which is reckoned in affection, but as to the first or prior act, which consists in cognition; for the gift of wisdom embraces both in itself.

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4. To that which is objected, that wisdom is appropriated to the Son; it must be said that this is so insofar as it bespeaks the light of cognition, not insofar as it bespeaks the savor of affection. For since it encloses both in itself, it can be appropriated to either person, namely to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; and since it is not appropriated to the Son alone, but rather also to the person of the Holy Spirit: hence it is that that reasoning is not compelling.

5. To that which is further objected, that no one is wise from this alone, that he loves, unless he also further knows; it must be said that this is true; yet in the love of God cognition is conjoined to the taste itself. For the best mode of knowing God is through the experience of sweetness; it is also far more excellent and nobler and more delightful than through the argument of inquiry. Hence from this it is not had that to know is the chief act of the gift of wisdom, but that15 in a certain way it concurs toward its chief act; and this indeed is true, because, as has been touched on, wisdom encloses both acts in itself; whence in a certain way it regards the intellect, in a certain way it regards the affect.

To that which is objected last, that one habit cannot be with respect to those two acts, since the powers are diversified by reason of them; it must be said that it is true that these acts cannot be of the same habit such that each is principal; nevertheless nothing prevents there being two, such that one is the first, the other the chief; one as disposing, the other as completing, as in the foregoing16 it was held concerning faith. — Whence by the same reasons and responses one can, as to this, treat of the gift of wisdom as those were explained above concerning the virtue of faith; and therefore let these things suffice for the present, since it is not necessary to repeat them here again.

Scholion

I. Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1, sub-question 1) repeats the same fourfold distinction of wisdom, who then (sub-question 3) in his conclusion agrees generally with our author; but he adds: "Wisdom imports love as a proximate disposing cause, but cognition essentially — cognition, I say, not only speculative but practical; whence it has a twofold consequent effect, namely illumination and delight." This is said according to the mind of St. Thomas, who (S. II. II. q. 45, a. 2) teaches: "Wisdom, which is a gift, has indeed its cause in the will, namely charity, but its essence in the intellect" (cf. ibid. q. 8, a. 6, and Commentary here q. 2, a. 1, sub-question 3). Richard speaks similarly (here a. 2, q. 1). A little differently St. Bonaventure (cf. here dub. 1), who denies (in the body and in reply to 3) that to know is the chief act of wisdom; to which doctrine Bl. Albert is favorable (here a. 1). — Cf., besides those cited: Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

II. On knowledge (the following question) and on the difference among wisdom, understanding, and knowledge; cf. also below q. 3. Since the Master (here c. 1), following Augustine, assigns four acts to knowledge (cf. here dub. 2, 3), the question arose which of them is principal. In this question too St. Thomas (here a. 3, sub-question 2; S. II. II. q. 9, a. 3) somewhat recedes from our author. For in the Summa he resolves that "the gift of knowledge first indeed and principally regards speculation, insofar namely as a man knows what he must hold by faith; but secondarily it extends itself also to operation, according as through the knowledge of things to be believed, and of those things which follow upon things to be believed, we are directed in things to be done." — But that the chief act of this gift is to direct concerning action, together with St. Bonaventure hold also Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 8.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 5. Cfr. ibid. 4, 10. seq.; 8, 33; 12, 15; 19, 20; 23, 19. — De minori cfr. Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 1, et supra d. 24. dub. 2. — Paulo ante cod. U verbo cognoscendo adiungit verum.
    Verse 5. Cf. ibid. 4:10 f.; 8:33; 12:15; 19:20; 23:19. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, On Sense and Sensibles c. 1, and above d. 24, dub. 2. — A little before, codex U adds to the word cognoscendo the word verum.
  2. Cap. 1. n. 3. Cfr. XIII. c. 19. n. 24; 1. contra Academicos, c. 6. n. 16, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 25. (c. 11.), et XI. Metaph. c. 6. (X. 7.), ubi eadem definitio sententialiter tantum profertur. Ad verbum autem habetur apud Ciceron., V. Tuscul. Disp. c. 3, et II. de Offic. c. 2; apud Clem. Alex., I. Strom. c. 5; apud Orig., III. contra Cels. n. 72. — Paulo inferius pro definit sapientiam cod. U definitur sapientia.
    Chapter 1, n. 3. Cf. XIII c. 19 n. 24; Against the Academics I c. 6 n. 16, and here the letter of the Master, c. 1. Cf. also Aristotle, Rhetoric I c. 25 (c. 11), and Metaphysics XI c. 6 (X. 7), where the same definition is given only as to sense. Word for word, however, it is found in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V c. 3, and On Duties II c. 2; in Clement of Alexandria, Stromata I c. 5; in Origen, Against Celsus III n. 72. — A little below, for definit sapientiam codex U reads definitur sapientia.
  3. Vers. 19. — De Gregorii sententia (II. Moral. c. 49. n. 77.) cfr. supra pag. 736, nota 8, et de sententia Philosophi supra pag. 515, nota 1.
    Verse 19. — On Gregory's sentence (Morals II c. 49 n. 77) cf. above p. 736, note 8, and on the sentence of the Philosopher above p. 515, note 1.
  4. Vide I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, et d. 34. q. 3. ac dub. 7.
    See I Sent. d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 34, q. 3, and dub. 7.
  5. Vers. 23. — In testimonio allato Vulgata pro suum exhibet eius et omittit in. — Isidor., X. Etymolog. n. 240: Sapiens dictus a sapore, quia, sicut gustus aptus est ad discretionem saporis ciborum, sic sapiens ad dignoscentiam rerum atque causarum, quod unumquodque dignoscat atque sensu veritatem discernat. Cui contrarius est insipiens, quod sit sine sapore nec alicuius discretionis vel sensus. Cfr. supra pag. 612, nota 3. — Pro affectionem cod. Z affectum, et in fine arg. pro affectionis codd. A K affectus, cod. bb affectionis.
    Verse 23. — In the testimony adduced the Vulgate reads eius for suum and omits in. — Isidore, Etymologies X n. 240: One is called sapiens ("wise") from sapor ("taste"), because, just as taste is fit for discerning the savor of foods, so the wise man is fit for discerning things and causes, so that he may distinguish each thing and discern the truth by sense. To whom the insipiens ("foolish") is contrary, who is without taste (sine sapore) and without any discernment or sense. Cf. above p. 612, note 3. — For affectionem codex Z [reads] affectum, and at the end of the argument for affectionis codices A K [read] affectus, codex bb affectionis.
  6. Vers. 4. — Gregor., I. Moral. c. 32. n. 44.
    Verse 4. — Gregory, Morals I c. 32 n. 44.
  7. Paragr. 1. Abbas Vercell. locum e Dionysio allegatum sic reddit: «Aeternam sapientiam irrationabilem et amentem et stultam excedenter laudantes dicimus, quod ipsa est causa omnis mentis et rationis et omnis sapientiae» etc. Scotus Erigena sic: «Hanc igitur irrationalem et mente carentem et stultam sapientiam supereminenter laudantes dicimus, quia totius est animi et rationis et totius sapientiae et intellectus causa» etc. Dionysius illam sententiam dixit relate ad illud 1. Cor. 1, 25: Quod stultum est Dei sapientius est hominibus. — In alia littera (versione) adducta pro laudantes dicimus (ὑμνοῦντες λέγομεν) codd. et edd. vitiose intuentes dicunt. — In fine arg. cod. Z ex parte cognitionis vel rationis.
    Paragraph 1. The Abbot of Vercelli renders the passage cited from Dionysius thus: "We, surpassingly praising the eternal wisdom as irrational and senseless and foolish, declare that it is the cause of all mind and reason and of all wisdom," etc. Scotus Eriugena thus: "This wisdom, therefore, as irrational and lacking mind and foolish, supereminently praising, we declare, because it is the cause of all soul and reason and of all wisdom and understanding," etc. Dionysius spoke that sentence in relation to that [text of] 1 Cor. 1:25: That which is foolish of God is wiser than men. — In another reading (version) adduced, for laudantes dicimus (ὑμνοῦντες λέγομεν) the codices and editions corruptly [have] intuentes dicunt. — At the end of the argument codex Z [reads] on the side of cognition or reason.
  8. Num. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. — Paulo inferius codd. A H L aa omittunt et ante ipsius caritatis.
    Number 3. Cf. above p. 596, note 7. — A little below codices A H L aa omit et before ipsius caritatis.
  9. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et I. in corp. Paulo ante pro quia maior cod. U quod maior. In fine arg. cod. U definitiones sapientiae adiungit, quae infra in corp. occurrunt, simulque notat, sapientiam quadrupliciter sumi posse.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and 1, in the body. A little before, for quia maior codex U [reads] quod maior. At the end of the argument codex U adds definitions of wisdom which occur below in the body, and at the same time notes that wisdom can be taken in four ways.
  10. Libr. I. Metaph. c. 2.
    Metaphysics I c. 2.
  11. Vers. 8. — Expositio August. plenius habetur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Pro cognitio creatorum cod. A cognitio creaturarum.
    Verse 8. — Augustine's exposition is found more fully here in the letter of the Master, c. 1. — For cognitio creatorum codex A [reads] cognitio creaturarum.
  12. Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et III. text. 3. (II. c. 2.). Idem dicit VI. Ethic. c. 7, sapientiam esse «scientiam rerum praestantissimarum».
    Metaphysics I c. 1 ff. and III text. 3 (II c. 2). The same he says in Ethics VI c. 7, that wisdom is "the knowledge of the most excellent things."
  13. Cap. 1. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 216, nota 4. — Pro de Trinitate, quam lectionem ex Guliel. Mara, hic q. 1, in textum recepimus, codd. et edd. exhibent de Civitate Dei; perperam, siquidem ibi nihil de Iob legitur; rectius lectorem delegassent ad Lib. X. c. 1. n. 3. istius libri Augustiniani, de quo vide supra pag. 213, nota 9. — Testimonium e libro Iob allatum habetur ibi 28, 28. Pro Ecce pietas, quae lectio est septuaginta interpretum, Vulgata Ecce timor Domini. — Locus ex August. Enchiridio mox citatus habetur ibi c. 2. seq. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 215, nota 4.
    Chapter 1, n. 1. Cf. above p. 216, note 4. — For de Trinitate, which reading we have received into the text from William of Mara, here q. 1, the codices and editions exhibit de Civitate Dei; wrongly, since nothing of Job is read there; they would more rightly have referred the reader to Book X c. 1 n. 3 of that Augustinian work, on which see above p. 213, note 9. — The testimony adduced from the book of Job is found there 28:28. For Ecce pietas, which is the reading of the seventy interpreters, the Vulgate [has] Ecce timor Domini. — The passage from Augustine's Enchiridion just cited is found there c. 2 f., n. 1. Cf. above p. 215, note 4.
  14. Praeter locc. tom. I. pag. 38, nota 1. citt.; cfr. II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 3.) et III. text. 29. (c. 7.). — Pro qui dicit edd. quo dicit, cod. A quod dicit.
    Besides the places cited in vol. I p. 38, note 1; cf. On the Soul II text. 20 (c. 3) and III text. 29 (c. 7). — For qui dicit the editions [read] quo dicit, codex A quod dicit.
  15. August., XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12: Dilectio quoque ubi nulla est, quis ullam dicat esse sapientiam? Cfr. liber de Spiritu et anima, c. 11. Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 7. ait: Iucundissima autem ex virtutis operationibus ea procul dubio est, quae secundum sapientiam sit; philosophia [i. e. amor sapientiae vel etiam ipsa sapientia] ergo mirabiles habere et puritate et nobilitate voluptates videtur. — Paulo superius pro consummatur cod. F terminatur, et pro saporatio cod. A sapor.
    Augustine, On the Trinity XV c. 7 n. 12: Where there is no love at all, who would say there is any wisdom? Cf. the book On the Spirit and the Soul c. 11. Aristotle, Ethics X c. 7, says: Of the operations of virtue the most pleasant beyond doubt is that which is according to wisdom; philosophy [i. e. the love of wisdom, or even wisdom itself] therefore is seen to have wondrous pleasures both in purity and in nobility. — A little above, for consummatur codex F [reads] terminatur, and for saporatio codex A sapor.
  16. Dist. 23. a. 1. q. 2. circa finem. Cfr. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. — Pro alter vero cod. A alter sicut.
    Distinction 23, a. 1, q. 2, near the end. Cf. d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6. — For alter vero codex A [reads] alter sicut.
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