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Dist. 34, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. De comparatione donorum ad virtutes quantum ad praecellentiam.

Utrum virtutes sint excellentiores donis, an e converso.

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione donorum ad virtutes quantum ad praecellentiam, et est quaestio, utrum virtutes sint excellentiores donis, an e converso. Et quod habitus virtutum sint excellentiores, videtur:

1. Primo per Apostolum, primae ad Corinthios duodecimo1: Adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro; ibi Glossa: « Demonstro vobis viam eundi ad Deum, id est caritatem, quia maius omnibus donum est ». Si ergo caritas virtus est, videtur, quod virtutes sint excellentiores quam dona.

2. Item, Philosophus2 definiens virtutem dicit, quod « virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum »; et alibi dicit, quod « perfectum est cui non potest fieri additio »; sed si aliqui habitus essent perfectiores ultra habitus virtutum, esset additio ad perfectum: restat ergo, quod dona non sunt virtutibus perfectiora.

3. Item, alibi3 Philosophus dicit, quod « virtus est ultimum de potentia »; sed eo quod est ultimum in potentia, nihil est maius neque excellentius: ergo non videtur, quod ultra habitus virtutum possint esse aliqui habitus in anima maioris perfectionis et dignitatis.

4. Item, tanto habitus est excellentior et perfectior, quanto actus eius magis appropinquat ad medium; sed habitus virtutum maxime in medietate consistunt quantum ad suos actus4: ergo non videtur, quod ultra virtutes sint aliqui habitus excellentiores.

5. Item, nobilitas habituum attenditur quantum ad rationem gratuiti et meritorii; sed habitus virtutum maxime appropinquant ad gratiam, quia immediate fluunt ab ea, et circa actus virtutum maxime attenditur meritum, unde et caritas dicitur esse merendi principium5: ergo videtur, quod habitus virtutum excellentiores sint inter omnes alios habitus.

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6. Item, sicut se habet imago creationis ad esse naturae ipsius animae, sic se habet imago recreationis ad esse gratiae; sed imago creationis attenditur quantum ad id quod est excellentissimum in anima in esse naturae6: ergo imago recreationis attenditur quantum ad id quod est excellentissimum in anima in esse gratiae; imago autem recreationis attenditur quantum ad habitus virtutum theologicarum: videtur ergo, quod nulli habitus sint excellentiores illis habitibus.

Sed contra: 1. Bernardus in libro de Amore Dei, capitulo secundo7: « Amor proficit in caritatem, caritas proficit in sapientiam »; sed non est profectus nisi per progressum ad aliquid excellentius: ergo donum sapientiae est excellentius caritate: ergo simpliciter dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, per considerationem Philosophi, quia, « si optimum in uno genere melius est optimo in alio genere, et simpliciter hoc illo melius ».

2. Item, nobilitas et dignitas habituum dignoscitur per actus; sed actus donorum sunt excellentiores quam actus virtutum, sicut ex praecedentibus8 patet, quia virtutes sunt ad actus primos, dona vero ad actus medios: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod se habet ex additione ad alterum in genere boni excellentius est illo, sicut « bene vivere melius est quam vivere9 »: cum ergo dona se habeant per additionem ad virtutes, quia virtutibus sunt posteriora et sunt ad agendum expedite; ergo dona sunt perfectiora et excellentiora quam virtutes.

4. Item, illi habitus sunt excellentiores, qui faciunt hominem magis similem statui gloriae et perfectioni, quae fuit in Christo; sed dona sunt huiusmodi, quia omnia fuerunt in Christo et sunt in statu gloriae, quod non potest dici de virtutibus10: ergo videtur, quod dona sint excellentiora virtutibus.

Conclusio. Dona et virtutes quoad gratiam informantem sunt aequalis dignitatis; quoad actus egredientes unus habitus est nobilior altero; quoad status consequentes dona sunt virtutibus excellentiora.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de habitibus virtutum et donorum sub ratione dignitatis est loqui tripliciter secundum triplicem istorum habituum comparationem: aut in comparatione ad gratiam ipsos habitus informantem et gratuitos facientem, aut in comparatione ad actus egredientes, aut in comparatione ad status consequentes. Si in comparatione ad gratiam ipsos habitus informantem; cum ipsa sit una, reddens aequaliter animam acceptam Deo et eius potentiam et habitus et opera11; sic aequalis dignitatis et meriti sunt ceteri habitus existentes in eadem anima. — Si autem loquamur de ipsis in comparatione ad actus egredientes; sic unus habitus est nobilior altero, sicut virtutes theologicae sunt excellentiores cardinalibus, cum actus earum immediate tendant in Deum, et inter theologicas caritas est excellentissima. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad status consequentes; cum usus virtutum habeantur in statu imperfectionis, usus vero donorum promoveant12 hominem ad statum perfectionis; sic dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, sicut status proficientium perfectior est statu incipientium; et hoc est, quia status ille secundus praesupponit statum praecedentem. Unde sicut bene esse melius est quam esse, quia bene esse dicit esse et adhuc amplius; sic habitus reddentes potentias expeditas ad actus medios excellentiores sunt habitibus reddentibus eas expeditas13 ad actus primos, non ratione eius quod addunt solum, sed ratione eius quod addunt et praesupponunt. — Unde concedendum est, quod hoc modo dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, et rationes concedendae sunt, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas excellentior est omnibus donis; dicendum, quod Apostolus comparat caritatem ad illa quae possunt sine caritate haberi, sicut fides et spes et aliae virtutes, quae possunt sine caritate haberi14. Sed quia dona Spiritus sancti caritatem praesupponunt et ultra habitum caritatis aliquid addunt, sicut habitus sapientiae addit aptitudinem et promptitudinem ad faciliter degustandum, quam suavis est Dominus; hinc est, quod comparatio illa non habet hic locum, pro eo quod alterum in altero clauditur.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dicendum, quod est perfectio sufficientiae et perfectio excellentiae et perfectio superabundantiae15. Prima est perfectio in genere et secundum quid; ultima vero est perfectio simpliciter.

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Huic autem perfectioni, scilicet primae, aliquid potest addi, quia ultra sufficientiam necessitatis est excellentia supererogationis, quae illi potest superaddi. Cum ergo dicitur, quod perfecto non potest fieri additio: hoc non intelligitur de perfecto primo modo dicto, sed ultimo. Cum vero dicitur, quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; hoc intelligitur primo modo, sed non ultimo; quia sic perficit, quod ad optimum disponit.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est ultimum potentiae; dicendum, quod illa definitio data est de virtute naturali16; et ideo non habet hic locum. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod sicut habitus virtutum dicitur in medietate consistere, non quia sit medium punctale, sed quia ad medium punctale appropinquat17; sic etiam virtus dicitur ultimum de potentia, non quia ponat ipsam potentiam in summo, sed quia facit ipsam appropinquare ad summum. Et propterea ex hoc haberi non potest, quod ultra habitum virtutis non sit ponere alium habitum excellentiorem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus virtutis maxime consistit in medietate; dicendum, quod illud est verum in eis habitibus, in quorum actibus18 potest esse excessus; hoc autem non est verum in omnibus actibus nec in omnibus virtutibus, sicut patet in virtutibus theologicis; et propterea ratio illa non cogit, sicut patet: quia melius est servare continentiam virginalem, quae omnino videtur ad extremum declinare, quam continentiam coniugalem;

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ille habitus dignior est, qui plus habet gratuiti et meritorii; respondendum est per interemptionem minoris: quia caritas, quae est in anima respectu habituum existentium in eadem, aequaliter influit et aequaliter eos reddit gratos et in actibus suis meritorios. Et si obiiciat, quod meritum primo attribuitur caritati; dicendum, quod hoc non obstat, quia, sicut dictum est, dona in actibus suis praesupponunt caritatem et eius actum, ac per hoc et meriti complementum.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago recreationis, quae est nobilissima in esse gratiae, attenditur in virtutibus; dicendum, quod illud est verum quantum ad primum esse gratiae; verumtamen quantum ad maiorem profectum in bono non tantum consistit imago recreationis in anima in habitibus virtutum19, sed etiam quantum ad habitus donorum et beatitudinum; quod patet, quia nostra cognitiva primo reparatur ad habitum fidei, et deinde amplius reparatur per donum intellectus, et post per munditiam cordis, quae disponit ad Deum contemplandum20.

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English Translation

Question III. On the comparison of the gifts to the virtues, as to pre-eminence.

Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts, or the reverse.

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the comparison of the gifts to the virtues as to pre-eminence, and the question is whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts, or the reverse. And that the habits of the virtues are more excellent, it seems:

1. First, through the Apostle, First to the Corinthians, chapter twelve1: And yet I show you a more excellent way; there the Gloss: « I show you the way of going to God, that is, charity, because it is the greatest gift of all ». If therefore charity is a virtue, it seems that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher2, defining virtue, says that « virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best »; and elsewhere he says that « the perfect is that to which no addition can be made »; but if any habits were more perfect beyond the habits of the virtues, there would be an addition to the perfect: it remains, therefore, that the gifts are not more perfect than the virtues.

3. Likewise, elsewhere3 the Philosopher says that « virtue is the utmost of a power »; but than that which is the utmost in a power, nothing is greater or more excellent: therefore it does not seem that beyond the habits of the virtues there can be any habits in the soul of greater perfection and dignity.

4. Likewise, a habit is the more excellent and more perfect, the more its act approaches the mean; but the habits of the virtues consist most of all in the mean as regards their acts4: therefore it does not seem that beyond the virtues there are any more excellent habits.

5. Likewise, the nobility of habits is reckoned according to the character of the gratuitous and the meritorious; but the habits of the virtues approach grace most of all, because they flow immediately from it, and about the acts of the virtues merit is most of all reckoned, whence also charity is said to be the principle of meriting5: therefore it seems that the habits of the virtues are more excellent than all other habits.

6. Likewise, as the image of creation stands to the being of the soul's own nature, so the image of recreation stands to the being of grace; but the image of creation is reckoned according to that which is most excellent in the soul in the being of nature6: therefore the image of recreation is reckoned according to that which is most excellent in the soul in the being of grace; but the image of recreation is reckoned according to the habits of the theological virtues: it seems therefore that no habits are more excellent than those habits.

On the contrary: 1. Bernard in the book On the Love of God, chapter two7: « Love advances into charity, charity advances into wisdom »; but there is no advance except by progress toward something more excellent: therefore the gift of wisdom is more excellent than charity: therefore the gifts are simply more excellent than the virtues, by the consideration of the Philosopher, because, « if the best in one genus is better than the best in another genus, it is simply better than it ».

2. Likewise, the nobility and dignity of habits is recognized through their acts; but the acts of the gifts are more excellent than the acts of the virtues, as is plain from what precedes8, because the virtues are for first acts, the gifts for intermediate acts: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, what is constituted by addition to another in the genus of good is more excellent than it, as « to live well is better than to live9 »: since therefore the gifts are constituted by addition to the virtues, because they are posterior to the virtues and are for acting readily; therefore the gifts are more perfect and more excellent than the virtues.

4. Likewise, those habits are more excellent which make a man more like the state of glory and the perfection that was in Christ; but the gifts are of this kind, because they all were in Christ and are in the state of glory, which cannot be said of the virtues10: therefore it seems that the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

Conclusion. The gifts and the virtues, as regards the grace informing them, are of equal dignity; as regards their acts going forth, one habit is nobler than another; as regards the states following upon them, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

I respond: It must be said that concerning the habits of the virtues and of the gifts under the character of dignity one must speak in three ways, according to the threefold comparison of these habits: either in comparison to the grace informing the habits themselves and making them gratuitous, or in comparison to the acts going forth, or in comparison to the states following upon them. If in comparison to the grace informing the habits themselves; since it is one, rendering equally the soul acceptable to God and its power and habits and works11; thus the other habits existing in the same soul are of equal dignity and merit. — But if we speak of them in comparison to the acts going forth; thus one habit is nobler than another, as the theological virtues are more excellent than the cardinal, since their acts tend immediately into God, and among the theological [virtues] charity is the most excellent. — But if we speak as regards the states following upon them; since the uses of the virtues are had in the state of imperfection, but the uses of the gifts promote12 a man to the state of perfection; thus the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, as the state of those advancing is more perfect than the state of those beginning; and this is because that second state presupposes the preceding state. Whence, as well-being is better than being, because well-being states being and still something more; so the habits rendering the powers ready for intermediate acts are more excellent than the habits rendering them ready13 for first acts, not by reason of that which they add alone, but by reason of that which they add and presuppose. — Whence it must be conceded that in this manner the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, and the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

To 1. To that which is objected, that charity is more excellent than all the gifts; it must be said that the Apostle compares charity to those things which can be had without charity, such as faith and hope and the other virtues, which can be had without charity14. But because the gifts of the Holy Spirit presuppose charity and add something beyond the habit of charity, as the habit of wisdom adds an aptitude and promptitude for tasting readily how sweet the Lord is; hence it is that that comparison has no place here, for the reason that the one is enclosed in the other.

To 2. To that which is objected, that virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best; it must be said that there is a perfection of sufficiency and a perfection of excellence and a perfection of superabundance15. The first is a perfection in a genus and in a certain respect; but the last is a perfection simply.

To this perfection, namely the first, something can be added, because beyond the sufficiency of necessity there is the excellence of supererogation, which can be superadded to it. When therefore it is said that no addition can be made to the perfect: this is not understood of the perfect said in the first manner, but in the last. But when it is said that virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best; this is understood in the first manner, but not in the last; because it so perfects that it disposes toward the best.

To 3. To that which is objected, that virtue is the utmost of a power; it must be said that that definition is given of natural virtue16; and therefore it has no place here. — It can also be said otherwise, that as the habit of the virtues is said to consist in the mean, not because it is a punctual mean, but because it approaches the punctual mean17; so too virtue is said to be the utmost of a power, not because it places the power itself at the summit, but because it makes it approach the summit. And therefore from this it cannot be had that beyond the habit of virtue there is no positing of another, more excellent habit.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the act of virtue consists most of all in the mean; it must be said that this is true in those habits in whose acts18 there can be excess; but this is not true in all acts nor in all virtues, as is plain in the theological virtues; and therefore that reason does not compel, as is plain: for it is better to keep virginal continence, which seems altogether to incline toward the extreme, than conjugal continence;

To 5. To that which is objected, that that habit is worthier which has more of the gratuitous and the meritorious; the answer is to be made by destroying the minor [premise]: for charity, which is in the soul with respect to the habits existing in the same, equally influences and equally renders them gracious and meritorious in their acts. And if it be objected that merit is first attributed to charity; it must be said that this is no obstacle, because, as has been said, the gifts in their acts presuppose charity and its act, and through this also the completion of merit.

To 6. To that which is objected, that the image of recreation, which is the noblest in the being of grace, is reckoned in the virtues; it must be said that this is true as regards the first being of grace; nevertheless as regards the greater advance in good the image of recreation consists not only in the soul in the habits of the virtues19, but also as regards the habits of the gifts and the beatitudes; which is plain, because our cognitive [power] is first repaired unto the habit of faith, and then further repaired through the gift of understanding, and afterward through cleanness of heart, which disposes one toward contemplating God20.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 31. — Glossa, sicut hic affertur, invenitur apud Petr. Lombard. (in hunc loc.), additis tamen post caritatem verbis excellentiorem praedictis. Apud Lyranum prima pars Glossae habetur ut Glossa interlinearis, secundo ut ordinaria; apud Strabum tertia pars tantum habetur, pariter ut Glossa ordinaria.
    Verse 31 [1 Cor. 12:31]. — The Gloss, as it is here adduced, is found in Peter Lombard (on this passage), with the words more excellent added, however, after charity, as aforesaid. In Lyra the first part of the Gloss is given as an interlinear Gloss, the second as ordinary; in Strabo only the third part is found, likewise as an ordinary Gloss.
  2. Libr. VII. Phys. text. 17. (c. 3.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — De altero dicto Philosophi vide supra pag. 95, nota 10.
    Book VII of the Physics, text 17 (c. 3). Cf. II Sent., d. 27, dub. 3. — On the other saying of the Philosopher see above, p. 95, note 10.
  3. Libr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. ult. (c. 11.). Vide tom. I. pag. 564, nota 1, et tom. II. pag. 671, n. 6.
    Book I On the Heavens and the World, last text (c. 11). See vol. I, p. 564, note 1, and vol. II, p. 671, n. 6.
  4. Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Mox pro ultra virtutes edd. aliud habitus virtutum.
    See Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6 ff. — Presently, for beyond the virtues the editions read another, the habits of the virtues.
  5. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 33. q. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 33, q. 3.
  6. Vide August., XIV. de Trin. c. 4. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — De imagine recreationis cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. in corp., et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.
    See Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 4, n. 6, and c. 8, n. 11. — On the image of recreation cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, in the body, and II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
  7. Num. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. — Sententia Philosophi invenitur III. Topic. c. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 740, nota 8.
    N. 3. Cf. above, p. 596, note 7. — The opinion of the Philosopher is found in Topics III, c. 2. Cf. above, p. 740, note 8.
  8. Quaest. I. — De maiori vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.
    Question I. — On the major [premise] see above, p. 470, note 8, at the end.
  9. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. — De proposit. seq. vide quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro expedite edd. expedita.
    Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2. — On the following proposition see the preceding question. — A little below, for readily the editions read ready.
  10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et supra d. XXVII. c. 1. — Subinde pro sint codd. A G H K bb sunt.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 3, and above, d. XXVII, c. 1. — Thereafter, for should be codices A G H K bb read are.
  11. Vide II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro ceteri edd. cuncti; cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 1. Inferius voci cardinalibus cod. A praemittit virtutibus.
    See II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Presently, for the other the editions read all; cf. above, p. 680, note 1. Below, before the word cardinal codex A prefixes virtues.
  12. Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 promovent, Vat. promoveat; et etiam paulo ante cum pluribus codd. habeatur pro habeantur.
    Many codices and editions 1, 2 read promote [indic.], the Vatican may promote [subj.]; and likewise a little before, with several codices, should be had [sing.] for should be had [plur.].
  13. Edd. subiungunt primo.
    The editions add first.
  14. Petr. Lombard. in I. Cor. 12, 31: Et adhuc [excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro], gradatim illos ad utiliora provehit ostendens, praedictas gratias non semper ad meritum pertinere, sed ad honorificentiam Dei... Unde in fine his qui dicent: Domine, in nomine tuo prophetavimus... dicet Dominus: Recedite a me etc. — Paulo inferius respicitur illud Ps. 33, 9: Gustate et videte, quoniam suavis est Dominus. Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 1.
    Peter Lombard on 1 Cor. 12:31: And yet [I show you a more excellent way], showing that he advances them step by step toward more useful things, that the aforesaid graces do not always pertain to merit, but to the honoring of God... Whence at the end, to those who will say: Lord, in thy name we have prophesied... the Lord will say: Depart from me, etc. — A little below there is reference to that of Ps. 33:9: Taste and see that the Lord is sweet. Cf. below, d. 35, q. 1.
  15. Cfr. supra pag. 654, nota 7. Vide etiam Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).
    Cf. above, p. 654, note 7. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).
  16. Vide II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — Pro et ideo codd. G L T aa et iam.
    See II Sent., d. 27, dub. 3. — For and therefore codices G L T aa read and now.
  17. Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. — Paulo inferius post sed quia facit codd. omittunt ipsam.
    See Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6. — A little below, after but because it makes the codices omit it.
  18. Cod. Z habitus virtutum. Post pauca pro in quorum actibus Vat. in quorum actus.
    Codex Z reads the habits of the virtues. After a few words, for in whose acts the Vatican [reads] in which the act.
  19. Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et 2. nec non d. 27. a. 2. q. 5.
    Cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and 2, as well as d. 27, a. 2, q. 5.
  20. Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 6.
    Cf. above, p. 570, note 6.
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