Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum dona Spiritus sancti sint connexa.

Secundo quaeritur de connexione donorum, et est quaestio, utrum dona Spiritus sancti sint connexa. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo, quia, sicut habitus virtutum sunt gratuiti et procedunt ex munere divinae largitatis, sic et habitus donorum: cum ergo propter unitatem gratiae informantis et munificentiam largitatis dispensantis ponatur connexio in virtutibus gratuitis¹, eadem ratione videtur, quod ponenda est et in donis.

2. Item, sicut una virtus alteri adminiculatur et eam adiuvat in actu suo, sic unum donum se habet respectu alterius: ergo qua ratione una virtus indiget altera et non potest ab ea separari, eadem ratione videtur necessarium esse, unum donum connecti alteri².

3. Item, quicumque habet caritatem, habet unde possit delectari et gustare, quoniam suavis est Dominus³; sed donum sapientiae consistit in gustu illius summae dulcedinis: igitur quicumque habet caritatem, habet donum sapientiae. Sed donum sapientiae est supremum inter omnia dona et praesupponit omnia dona inferiora: ergo quicumque habet caritatem, habet omnia Spiritus sancti dona: ergo videtur, quod dona sint connexa.

4. Item, aliquis homo existens in gratia ex ipso primo munere gratiae sine alterius doni appositione potest pervenire ad salutem: ergo videtur, quod possit in usu donorum et gratiae semetipsum exercere; sed hoc non esset, nisi dona essent connexa: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios duodecimo⁴ dicit Apostolus: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii datur sermo scientiae; ubi diversitatem donorum dicit distribui secundum diversitatem personarum: ergo non videtur, quod necessario oporteat, omnia dona in una et eadem anima esse connexa.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Sermone Domini in monte⁵ ponit gradus inter dona, ita quod ab uno paulative fit processus ad alterum; sed hoc

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non esset, si omnia infunderentur aequaliter et simul: ergo non videtur, quod dona Spiritus sancti invicem connectantur.

3. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus⁶ dicit, quod «minor est sapientia, si intellectu careat»; ergo donum sapientiae potest haberi sine dono intellectus.

4. Item, supra habitum fuit distinctione proxima⁷, et est verbum Augustini, de Trinitate decimo quarto, quod «dono scientiae non pollent plures fideles, quamvis polleant ipsa fide»: ergo videtur, quod donum scientiae non necessario concomitetur infusionem gratiae.

5. Item, habitus donorum secundum suam generalitatem dantur ad expediendum⁸: ergo si dona essent necessario connexa, videtur, quod uno dono habito, sanarentur omnia symptomata, et expeditus esset homo ad omnia opera meritoria; quod manifeste esse falsum, deprehendit ipsa experientia.

6. Item, dona ut plurimum ordinant ad ea quae sunt supererogationis, sicut patet in dono consilii et fortitudinis⁹; ea autem, quae supererogationis sunt, non concomitantur inseparabiliter ea quae sunt necessitatis: ergo videtur, quod inter ipsa dona gratuita non sit connexio necessaria.

Conclusio. Dona Spiritus sancti respectu originis habent connexionem, non autem ita respectu usus et perfectionis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de habitibus donorum gratuitorum est loqui dupliciter, videlicet quantum ad ipsorum originem et quantum ad usum consequentem. Si loquamur de ipsis quantum ad ipsorum originem; cum origo omnium habituum gratuitorum consistat quasi materialiter in natura et completive et formaliter in gratia¹⁰; quando Spiritus sancti gratia infunditur, ita sufficienter datur, quod omnes habitus gratuiti ex ipsa possunt oriri, si nos velimus susceptae gratiae cooperari, non solum habitus virtutum, sed etiam habitus donorum et beatitudinum. Ideo quantum ad originem indubitanter verum est, dona Spiritus sancti habere connexionem.

Aliter est loqui de ipsis habitibus donorum quantum ad usum, secundum quem modum isti habitus reddunt potentiam facilem et expeditam ad proprios actus, qui non tantum sunt necessitatis et sufficientiae, sed etiam cuiusdam supererogationis et excellentiae; et quantum ad hoc non est necessarium in his esse connexionem, immo vix, aut nunquam usus istorum habituum reperitur perfectus in aliquo, sicut innuit Gregorius super illud Iob¹¹: Nunquid coniungere poteris micantes stellas Pleiadas? dicens, quod usus Spiritus septiformis in solo Christo fuit perfecte. — Usus enim donorum ponit hominem in statu perfectionis, sed origo non necessario ponit in statu perfectionis, sed in statu inchoationis. Unde sicut puer parvulus, sicut dicit Augustinus¹², habet in ratione quidquid postmodum habiturus est in mole, licet magnitudinem molis nondum habeat in actu; sic concedi potest, quod habitus donorum non necessario connectuntur quantum ad usum et ipsorum esse completum, secundum quod potentias facilitant et ad actus excellentes expediunt. Tamen¹³ in infusione gratiae habentur radicaliter et virtualiter et implicite, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem inductae.

Attamen illud quod obiicit de similitudine virtutum et donorum, non valet. Habitus enim virtutum, pro eo quod necessitatis sunt, etiam quantum ad suos usus in his qui libero arbitrio iam utuntur, simpliciter habent ad invicem connecti, non solum ratione suae originis, sed etiam ratione usus consequentis. Nemo enim potest esse in gratia, nisi credat, speret et amet: et sic de aliis virtutibus. Non sic autem est de usibus donorum et beatitudinum, sine quibus plures salvantur. Multi enim sunt, qui fideliter credunt, et tamen illud quod credunt, nunquam intellectu comprehendunt¹⁴. Similiter est de usu ipsarum beatitudinum. Et ideo, si aliquo modo sit connexio in habitibus beatitudinum et donorum, non tamen tanta est, quanta est in ha-

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bitibus virtutum. Est tamen ibi aliqua, sicut illae rationes ostendunt.

Ad argumenta in contrarium: 1. Ad illa vero quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, satis facilis est responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Nam quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Apostoli, quod alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae¹⁵ etc.; procedit de donis gratiae gratis datae, non autem de donis gratiae gratum facientis; vel certe, si intelligit de ipsis donis, hoc dicit quantum ad usum, non quantum ad ipsorum habituum radicem sive principium.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, similiter patet responsio. Augustinus enim assignat gradus inter dona quantum ad eorum usus, quia non potest quis assuefieri in usu doni superioris, nisi primo assuefiat in usu doni inferioris, qui¹⁶ non est tantae sublimitatis.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod minor est sapientia, si intellectu careat; similiter respondendum est, hoc Gregorium intellexisse de usu doni intellectus; quo neglecto, si quis se protendat ad usum doni sapientiae, non ita proficit, sicut proficeret, si ordinato gradu procederet¹⁷.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, habita in distinctione praemissa, dicendum, quod Augustinus intelligit de usu doni scientiae; et hoc manifestum est ex ipsa auctoritate. Dicit enim, quod multi pollent fide, qui non pollent scientia. Nemo enim pollet in aliquo habitu, nisi habeat ipsum in sua completione, per quam facile sit, ipsum habitum manifestari in opere¹⁸.

Ad 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dona expediunt, et quod similiter ordinant ad ea quae sunt supererogationis et excellentiae; respondendum, sicut prius tactum est, quod hoc intelligitur de donis, quando habentur in usu, non solum in munere¹⁹, sive quando habentur quantum ad assuefactionem et facilitatem in opere, non quando habentur quantum ad causalitatem in sua origine: uno modo habentur in ipsius gratiae infusione, alio modo habentur per bonorum operum et orationum sive precum multiplicationem, secundum illud quod dicitur in Glossa, Matthaei sexto²⁰: «Quia per haec dona nos ab imis ad summa consurgimus, septem beatitudines, quae per eadem dona quaeruntur, de imis gradatim ad summa perveniunt. In precibus ergo est, ut impetremus dona, in donis, ut operemur mandata, de operatione beatitudines consequuntur». Haec autem intelligenda sunt quantum ad usum, sicut prius fuit explanatum²¹.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected.

Secondly there is asked about the connection of the gifts, and the question is whether the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected. And that they are, it seems:

1. First, because, just as the habits of the virtues are gratuitous and proceed from the gift of the divine bounty, so also are the habits of the gifts: since therefore, on account of the unity of the informing grace and the munificence of the dispensing bounty, a connection is posited in the gratuitous virtues¹, by the same reasoning it seems that one must be posited in the gifts as well.

2. Likewise, just as one virtue supports another and aids it in its act, so one gift is disposed with respect to another: therefore by the reasoning by which one virtue needs another and cannot be separated from it, by the same reasoning it seems necessary that one gift be connected to another².

3. Likewise, whoever has charity has whereby he can take delight and taste, since the Lord is sweet³; but the gift of wisdom consists in the tasting of that highest sweetness: therefore whoever has charity has the gift of wisdom. But the gift of wisdom is the supreme among all the gifts and presupposes all the lower gifts: therefore whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the gifts are connected.

4. Likewise, a man existing in grace can, from the first gift of grace itself, without the addition of another gift, attain to salvation: therefore it seems that he can exercise himself in the use of the gifts and of grace; but this would not be, unless the gifts were connected: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. In the first to the Corinthians, the twelfth chapter⁴, the Apostle says: To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge; where he says that the diversity of the gifts is distributed according to the diversity of persons: therefore it does not seem that it must necessarily be the case that all the gifts are connected in one and the same soul.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount⁵ posits degrees among the gifts, such that there is a gradual progression from one to another; but this

would not be the case if all were infused equally and at once: therefore it does not seem that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are mutually connected.

3. Likewise, Gregory in the Morals⁶ says that «wisdom is the less, if it lacks understanding»; therefore the gift of wisdom can be had without the gift of understanding.

4. Likewise, it was held above in the preceding distinction⁷—and it is a saying of Augustine, On the Trinity, book fourteen—that «many of the faithful are not strong in the gift of knowledge, though they are strong in faith itself»: therefore it seems that the gift of knowledge does not necessarily accompany the infusion of grace.

5. Likewise, the habits of the gifts, according to their generality, are given for expediting⁸: therefore if the gifts were necessarily connected, it seems that, with one gift had, all the symptoms would be healed, and a man would be expedited unto all meritorious works; which experience itself plainly detects to be false.

6. Likewise, the gifts for the most part order one toward those things that are of supererogation, as is plain in the gift of counsel and of fortitude⁹; but those things that are of supererogation do not inseparably accompany those that are of necessity: therefore it seems that among the gratuitous gifts there is no necessary connection.

Conclusion. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, with respect to their origin, have a connection; but not so with respect to their use and perfection.

I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of the habits of the gratuitous gifts, namely with respect to their origin and with respect to the use that follows. If we speak of them with respect to their origin; since the origin of all the gratuitous habits consists as it were materially in nature and completively and formally in grace¹⁰; when the grace of the Holy Spirit is infused, it is given so sufficiently that all the gratuitous habits can arise from it, if we are willing to cooperate with the grace received, not only the habits of the virtues but also the habits of the gifts and of the beatitudes. Therefore with respect to origin it is undoubtedly true that the gifts of the Holy Spirit have a connection.

It is otherwise to speak of these habits of the gifts with respect to use, according to which mode these habits render the power facile and expedited unto their proper acts, which are not only of necessity and sufficiency, but also of a certain supererogation and excellence; and as to this it is not necessary that there be a connection among them, nay rather the use of these habits is scarcely, or never, found perfect in anyone, as Gregory intimates upon that text of Job¹¹: Canst thou join together the shining stars the Pleiades? saying that the use of the sevenfold Spirit was perfectly in Christ alone. — For the use of the gifts sets a man in the state of perfection, but the origin does not necessarily set him in the state of perfection, but in the state of inchoation. Hence, just as a little child, as Augustine says¹², has in reason whatever he is afterward going to have in bulk, although he does not yet have the magnitude of the bulk in act; so it can be granted that the habits of the gifts are not necessarily connected with respect to use and their complete being, according as they make the powers facile and expedite them unto excellent acts. Yet¹³ in the infusion of grace they are had radically and virtually and implicitly, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

Nevertheless, that which is objected about the likeness of the virtues and the gifts does not hold. For the habits of the virtues, for this reason that they are of necessity, even as to their uses in those who already make use of free will, are simply held to be connected to one another, not only by reason of their origin, but also by reason of the use that follows. For no one can be in grace unless he believe, hope, and love: and so of the other virtues. But it is not so of the uses of the gifts and of the beatitudes, without which many are saved. For there are many who faithfully believe, and yet what they believe they never comprehend with the understanding¹⁴. Likewise it is concerning the use of the beatitudes themselves. And therefore, if in some way there is a connection in the habits of the beatitudes and of the gifts, yet it is not so great as is the one in the ha-

bits of the virtues. Yet there is some connection there, as those reasons show.

To the arguments on the contrary: 1. To those things, indeed, which are objected on the contrary, the response is easy enough through the things that have been said. For as to what is first objected from the authority of the Apostle, that to one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom¹⁵ etc.; it proceeds concerning the gifts of grace gratuitously given, not concerning the gifts of grace making-pleasing; or certainly, if he understands it of the gifts themselves, he says this with respect to use, not with respect to the root or principle of the habits themselves.

To the 2nd. To what is objected from the authority of Augustine, likewise the response is plain. For Augustine assigns degrees among the gifts with respect to their uses, because one cannot become habituated in the use of a higher gift unless he is first habituated in the use of a lower gift, which¹⁶ is not of such great sublimity.

To the 3rd. To what is objected from the authority of Gregory, that wisdom is the less if it lacks understanding; likewise it must be responded that Gregory understood this concerning the use of the gift of understanding; which being neglected, if one stretches himself toward the use of the gift of wisdom, he does not so profit as he would profit if he proceeded by the ordered degree¹⁷.

To the 4th. To what is objected from the authority of Augustine, had in the preceding distinction, it must be said that Augustine understands it concerning the use of the gift of knowledge; and this is manifest from the authority itself. For he says that many are strong in faith who are not strong in knowledge. For no one is strong in any habit unless he have it in its completion, through which it is easy for that habit to be manifested in work¹⁸.

To the 5th and 6th. To what is objected, that the gifts expedite, and that likewise they order one toward those things that are of supererogation and excellence; it must be responded, as was touched on before, that this is understood concerning the gifts when they are had in use, not only in endowment¹⁹, or when they are had with respect to becoming habituated and to facility in work, not when they are had with respect to causality in their origin: in one way they are had in the very infusion of grace, in another way they are had through the multiplication of good works and prayers or supplications, according to what is said in the Gloss on the sixth of Matthew²⁰: «Since through these gifts we rise up from the lowest to the highest, the seven beatitudes, which are sought through these same gifts, come gradually from the lowest to the highest. It is in prayers, therefore, that we obtain the gifts; in the gifts, that we may work the commandments; from the working the beatitudes follow». But these things are to be understood with respect to use, as was explained before²¹.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. quaest. praeced.
Cf. the preceding question.
Gregor., I. Moral. c. 32. n. 45: Valde enim singula quaelibet virtus [intellige: donum] destituitur, si non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur. Minor quippe est sapientia, si intellectu careat; et valde inutilis intellectus est, si ex sapientia non subsistat etc.
Gregory, Morals bk. I, c. 32, n. 45: «For each single virtue [understand: gift] is greatly impoverished if one virtue does not support another virtue. For wisdom is the less if it lacks understanding; and understanding is very useless if it does not subsist from wisdom», etc.
Psalm. 33, 9. — De seqq. cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. et d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro quoniam suavis codd. Z bb (K a secunda manu) quam suavis.
Psalm 33:9. — On what follows cf. above, d. 35, q. 1, and d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. — For quoniam suavis (since [the Lord] is sweet) codices Z, bb (and K by a second hand) read quam suavis (how sweet).
Vers. 8. — Paulo post pro dicit distribui edd. distribuit. Deinde Vat. omittit necessario.
[I Cor. 12,] verse 8. — A little later, for dicit distribui (he says are distributed) the editions read distribuit (he distributes). Then the Vatican edition omits necessario (necessarily).
Libr. I. c. 3. n. 10. Cfr. Serm. 347. (alias 17. de Sanctis) c. 2. n. 2. seq., et II. de Doctr. christ. c. 7. n. 9. seqq.
Book I, c. 3, n. 10. Cf. Sermon 347 (otherwise 17, On the Saints), c. 2, n. 2 f., and On Christian Doctrine II, c. 7, n. 9 ff.
Libr. I. c. 32. n. 45.
Book I, c. 32, n. 45.
Lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 1. — In fine arg. cod. K communicetur infusione gratiae.
The text of the Master, d. XXXV, c. 1. — At the end of the argument codex K reads communicetur infusione gratiae (let it be communicated by the infusion of grace).
Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, ubi etiam sermo est de symptomatibus.
Cf. above, d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, where there is also discussion of the symptoms.
Vide supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia et quarta).
See above, d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third and fourth way).
Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 5. — Alanus ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regul. 88: Omnes virtutes simul et similiter dantur homini a creatione, ut sint per naturam [datur scilicet homini, ut sibi exponitur, potentia, qua naturaliter aptus sit ad hoc vel illud faciendum, e. g. ad ratiocinandum vel intelligendum]; ex recreatione vero infunduntur homini, ut sint virtutes per gratiam, pariter quidem habitu, sed dispariter usu.
Cf. above, d. 33, q. 5. — Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 88: «All the virtues are given to man at once and alike from creation, that they may be his by nature» [that is, there is given to man, as it is expounded there, the power by which he is naturally apt for doing this or that, e.g. for reasoning or for understanding]; but from re-creation they are infused into man, that they may be virtues by grace—equally indeed in habit, but unequally in use.
Cap. 38, 31, ubi Vulgata valebis pro poteris. — Gregorius, XXIX. Moral. c. 31. n. 74. sic ait: Redemptor autem noster in carne veniens Pleiades iunxit, quia operationes septiformis Spiritus simul in se et coniunctas et manentes habuit... Nullus vero hominum operationes sancti Spiritus simul omnes habuit, nisi solus Mediator Dei et hominum etc.
[Job] c. 38:31, where the Vulgate has valebis for poteris (canst thou). — Gregory, Morals XXIX, c. 31, n. 74, speaks thus: «But our Redeemer, coming in the flesh, joined the Pleiades, because he had the operations of the sevenfold Spirit at once joined and abiding in himself»... But no man among men had all the operations of the Holy Spirit at once, save only the Mediator of God and men, etc.
Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 14. — Pro habet in ratione, quemadmodum et in textu origin. legitur, Vat. habet in virtute; cod. K voci ratione adiungit seminali.
On the City of God, bk. XXII, c. 14. — For habet in ratione (has in reason), as is also read in the original text, the Vatican edition has habet in virtute (has in power); codex K adds to the word ratione the word seminali (seminal).
Vat., superius post quod inserto licet, hic post expediunt sic prosequitur: connectuntur tamen quantum ad eorum principium et originem, cum in infusione gratiae habeantur radicaliter etc. Paulo ante pro facilitant cod. P habilitant.
The Vatican edition, having above inserted licet after quod, here continues thus after expediunt: «they are nevertheless connected with respect to their principle and origin, since in the infusion of grace they are had radically», etc. A little before, for facilitant (make facile) codex P reads habilitant (make able).
Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 18. n. 1. duplicem distinguens operationem Spiritus s., unam videlicet, qua intus per virtutes solidat ad salutem, alteram, qua foris muneribus [gratis datis] nos ornat, aut illos nobis, vel nostros aliis. Verbi gratia, fides, spes, caritas nobis propter nos dantur; absque his quippe salvi esse non possumus. Porro scientiae seu sapientiae sermo, gratia curationis, prophetia similiaque, quibus carere cum integritate etiam salutis propriae possumus, proximorum procul dubio in salutem expendenda donantur.
Bernard, Sermons on the Song of Songs, serm. 18, n. 1, distinguishing a twofold operation of the Holy Spirit, namely one by which inwardly through the virtues he makes solid unto salvation, the other by which outwardly with gifts [gratuitously given] he adorns us, or them for us, or ours for others. For example, faith, hope, charity are given to us for our own sake; for without these we cannot be saved. But the word of knowledge or of wisdom, the grace of healing, prophecy and the like, which we can lack with the integrity even of our own salvation, are given without doubt to be expended for the salvation of our neighbors.
Permulti codd. scientiae.
Very many codices read scientiae (of knowledge).
Vat. quia, et paulo ante pro nisi primo codd. K Z nisi prius.
The Vatican edition reads quia (because), and a little before, for nisi primo (unless first) codices K, Z read nisi prius (unless beforehand).
Cfr. Gregor., II. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 7, ex quo nonnulla iam allata sunt supra pag. 748, nota 6.
Cf. Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, homily 7, n. 7, from which some things have already been adduced above, p. 748, note 6.
Secundum August., de Bono coniugali, c. 21. n. 25, habitus est «quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est». Averroes, III. de Anima, text. 18, de habitu intellectus dicit: Haec enim est definitio huius habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligat per ipsum illud quod est sibi proprium ex se, et quando voluerit, absque eo quod indigeat in hoc aliquo extrinseco. — Pro opere cod. A operatione. Superius pro scientiae plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 falso sapientiae.
According to Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, c. 21, n. 25, a habit is «that by which something is done when there is need; but when it is not done, it can be done, though there is no need». Averroes, On the Soul III, text 18, says of the habit of the intellect: «For this is the definition of this habit, namely that the one having the habit understands through it that which is proper to him of himself, and when he wills, without his needing in this anything extrinsic». — For opere (work) codex A reads operatione (operation). Above, for scientiae (of knowledge) very many codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly read sapientiae (of wisdom).
Respicitur Hilarii locutio, de qua vide I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. ibid. d. 15. p. II. q. 1. seqq.
A locution of Hilary is being looked back to, on which see I Sent., d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 3. Cf. ibid., d. 15, p. II, q. 1 ff.
Vers. 9. — In Glossa allegata, de qua cfr. supra pag. 739, nota 2, edd. cum aliquot codd. pro septem beatitudines, uti et in textu origin. legitur, substituerunt unde beatitudines; cfr. scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
[Matth. 6,] verse 9. — In the Gloss cited, on which cf. above, p. 739, note 2, the editions together with several codices, in place of septem beatitudines (seven beatitudes), as is also read in the original text, substituted unde beatitudines (whence the beatitudes); cf. the scholion to the preceding question.
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

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