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Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
p. 796

Quaestio III. Utrum connexio sit in virtutibus politicis, ut necesse sit, una habita, omnes haberi.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit connexio in virtutibus politicis, ita quod, una habita, necesse sit, omnes haberi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate philosophica. Dicit enim Seneca1: « Omne quod bene fit, fit iuste, fortiter et temperate »; sed opus cuiuslibet virtutis bene fit: ergo necesse est, quod fiat iuste et fortiter et temperate: igitur ad quodlibet opus virtutis concurrunt quatuor virtutes. Sed hoc non posset esse, nisi essent connexae: ergo etc.

2. Item, Hieronymus ad Pammachium2: « Quatuor virtutes describunt Stoici ita sibi esse connexas et mutuo cohaerentes, ut qui unam non habuerit omnibus careat, et qui unam habuerit omnes habeat »: videtur ergo auctoritate philosophorum, virtutes politicas esse connexas.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Sanctorum et primo auctoritate Augustini, in libro de Quantitate animae3. Definiens enim virtutem dicit, quod « virtus est aequalitas vitae undique rationi consentiens »; sed vita non consonat undique rationi nisi per virtutum universitatem: ergo ad hoc quod habeat aliquis unam virtutem meram, necesse est, quod habeat ceteras.

4. Item, Bernardus, in primo ad Eugenium4: « Advertere etiam est suavissimum quendam concen- p. 797 tum complexumque virtutum, atque alteram pendere ex altera, sicut vides, fortitudinis matrem esse prudentiam, et non fortitudinem, sed temeritatem esse quemlibet ausum, quem non parturivit prudentia ». Et paulo post: « Iustitia quaerit, prudentia invenit, vindicat fortitudo, temperantia possidet »: ergo si haec requiruntur ad actum cuiuslibet virtutis, videtur, quod omnes virtutes necessario concurrant ad unum actum.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia, sicut se habet castitas ad esse castum, sic se habet virtus ad esse virtuosum; sed quicumque habet castitatem, est castus5: ergo quicumque habet virtutem, est virtuosus. Sed nullus est virtuosus, qui habet vitium: ergo si aliquis habet virtutem, nullum habet vitium. Sed vitia non expelluntur nisi per virtutes sibi oppositas: ergo qui habet unam virtutem habet ceteras.

6. Item, cuiuslibet virtutis est discernere, quid eligendum, et tenere medium et recte tendere in finem et negotiari circa arduum et difficile; sed primum est prudentiae, secundum temperantiae, tertium iustitiae, quartum fortitudinis6: ergo videtur, quod ad quemlibet actum virtuosum concurrant necessario istae quatuor virtutes. Hoc autem non esset, nisi haberent connexionem ad invicem: ergo videtur, quod virtutes politicae sint connexae.

Sed contra hoc est:

1. auctoritas Augustini ad Hieronymum7. Dicit enim, quod « non est divina sententia, qua dicitur, quod qui habet unam habet omnes; sed hominibus hoc visum est studiosis et ingeniosis »; sed si hoc esset verum, esset divina sententia, quia omne verum a prima Veritate procedit: ergo cum hoc intelligatur de virtutibus politicis, virtutes politicae non sunt connexae.

2. Item, secundum Philosophum8 habitus virtutum politicarum et consuetudinalium sunt ex actibus: sed actus non sunt connexi — contingit enim, hominem exercitari in actu unius virtutis, ita quod non exerceatur in actu alterius — videtur ergo, quod non omnes virtutes necessario connectantur.

3. Item, sicut scientiae habentur per acquisitionem, ita virtutes politicae; et sicut una virtus alteri adminiculatur, sic est in habitu unius scientiae respectu alterius; sed scientiae, quae sunt per acquisitionem, non habentur simul, sed una prius et altera posterius, et una potest haberi sine altera: ergo una virtus politica non videtur esse necessario alteri connexa.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per experimentum sensibile: quia multi pollent in virtute prudentiae, qui tamen non habent largitatem, aut virtutem patientiae; multi etiam iustitiam ad proximum servant, qui tamen in se ipsis non habent continentiam; et tamen illa faciunt per virtutes politicas: videtur ergo, quod inter huiusmodi virtutes non sit connexio necessario9.

Conclusio. Simpliciter loquendo, virtutes politicae non habent connexionem; habent tamen secundum statum perfectionis et secundum quasdam conditiones communes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in ista quaestione controversia fuit inter ipsos philosophos, secundum quod innuit Augustinus10 et Hieronymus. — Opinio 1. « Nam quidam philosophorum, qui Stoici dicebantur, dixerunt, virtutes necessario esse connexas, ut qui una caruerit ceteris careat ». De quorum positione videtur fuisse Seneca11. Ait enim sic: « Si unam de Corinthiis tuis dimiseris, poteris dicere, supellectilem tuam tibi salvam. Si autem unam de virtutibus amiseris, nullam te habiturum, necesse est ut confitearis ». — Opinio 2. Aliorum positio fuit, quod una potest haberi sine altera, sicut aliquis potest habere castitatem, ita quod non habeat iustitiam.

Ratio 1. secundum Stoicos. Ratio autem huius diversitatis ex hoc fuit, quia Stoici ponebant, quod virtus non esset in aliquo nisi in sapiente, pro eo quod regimen totius vitae hominis secundum regulam moris pendet a rectitudine rationis. Sapientem autem dixerunt, secundum quod dicit Augustinus de Civitate Dei12, in quo nulla cadit perturbatio. Ille enim secundum eos sapiens dicebatur, qui omnibus passionibus animae dominatur. —

Ratio 2. Praeter hoc etiam ponebant, quod cum virtus sit p. 798 circa medium13, et medium sit uno modo et indivisibile, nemo habet virtutem, nisi habeat eam in summo et perfecte. Perfecte autem virtus non habetur, ubi regnat aliquod vitium, et ubi aliae virtutes desunt. — Et propter istas duas rationes dixerunt Stoici, virtutes politicas esse connexas, videlicet quia non possidentur nisi a sapiente, cui non dominatur vitium, et sunt circa medium indivisibile, a quo per quodlibet vitium fit recessus.

Duplex error reprobatur. In huius autem positionis suae fundamento nimis excesserunt quantum ad utrumque praedictorum, tum ex hoc, quod non ponebant sapientiam in proficientibus, sed solum in perfectis; tum etiam, quia dixerunt, non referre quantum ad amissionem virtutis parum vel multum a medio punctali recedere. Et ideo reprehendit eos Augustinus, ad Hieronymum14 dicens sic: « Mihi videntur Stoici esse falsi, qui proficientem hominem in sapientia nolunt habere omnino sapientiam, sed tunc solum, cum est perfectus. Dicunt enim, quod sicut nihil interest ad praefocandum hominem, utrum aquam stadiis multis habeat supra se, vel uno palmo; sic est de illis qui sunt in gurgite erroris, ad sapientiam ». Et satis rationabiliter reprehendit eos Augustinus, propter Corollarium. hoc quod viam salutis in bono valde arctant, dum dicunt, in solis perfectis esse virtutem et sapientiam; et in malitia valde dilatant, dum dicunt, quod non refert, utrum quis magis, vel minus a medio virtutis recedat.

Opinio his contraria probatur. Et propterea aliorum philosophorum positio magis fuit rationabilis, qui posuerunt, sapientiam non solum esse in perfectis, sed etiam in illis qui proficiunt. Posuerunt etiam, medium virtutis latitudinem habere, secundum quod latitudinem habet medium sanitatis15. Quoniam ergo secundum politicam vitam virtutes paulative acquiruntur in his qui proficiunt ad sapientiam; ideo posuerunt, quod una virtus potest haberi in perfectione maiori et minori secundum diversa tempora; una etiam potest separari ab altera. Et istorum sententia secundum dicta Augustini magis est approbanda.

Conclusio generalis. Respondendum est igitur ad quaestionem propositam, quod simpliciter loquendo, videlicet quantum ad omne tempus et quantum ad ipsos habitus virtutum, non est connexio inter virtutes16 politicas, licet aliqua inter eas possit connexio reperiri ratione status alicuius determinati et quarundam conditionum communium. — Distinctio. Propter quod notandum est, quod contingit loqui de huiusmodi virtutibus politicis quantum ad propria et quantum ad appropriata. Conclusio 2. Si quantum ad appropriata; sic est in eis connexio, quia illae quatuor conditiones prius habitae, quae sunt discernere et medium tenere et huiusmodi, singillatim his quatuor virtutibus appropriantur, et tamen simul ad quamlibet virtutem requiruntur17. — Subdistinctio. Si vero loquamur quantum ad propria, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut simpliciter aut secundum statum perfectionis. Conclusio 3. Si secundum statum perfectionis; sic est adhuc necessaria in eis connexio, quia una virtus nunquam perfecte habetur, nisi ceterae habeantur. Et quantum ad hoc bene dicebant Stoici, licet non usquequaque super verum fundati essent18. — Conclusio 4. Si simpliciter sive secundum omnem statum; sic non est necessarium, connexionem esse in huiusmodi virtutibus, cum sint ab acquisitione; sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae, et ideo sunt concedendae.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Senecae, quod omne quod bene fit etc.; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de ipsis virtutibus, quantum ad appropriata, non quantum ad propria. Nam si quantum ad propria velimus loqui, actus illarum virtutum diversi sunt nec negotiantur circa idem, sed circa diversa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Stoicorum, quam introducit Hieronymus; iam patet responsio: quia Stoicis in parte ista non est usquequaque credendum. Praeterea, Stoici, sicut prius tactum est, semper loquebantur de virtutibus secundum culmen perfectionis, et quantum ad illum statum verum dicebant, quia connexio est in virtutibus non propter ipsius virtutis essentiam, sed propter perfectionem superadditam, quam una virtus non tribuit, nisi sit aliis associata.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, quod virtus est aequalitas vitae etc.; dicendum, quod per illud adverbium undique non fit Notandum. distributio pro omnibus, quae spectant ad rectitudinem totius vitae, sed pro his quae spectant ad rectitudinem actus ipsius virtutis19; possibile est autem, aliquem rectificari in actu unius virtutis, secundum p. 799 quod exigit virtus civilis, ita tamen quod non habet rectificationem in actu alterius virtutis, sicut potest manifeste per exempla videri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Bernardi, iam patet responsio: quia Bernardus loquitur de ipsis virtutibus quantum ad appropriata, non quantum ad propria. Et praeterea, loquitur de virtutibus cardinalibus, non in quantum sunt politicae, sed in quantum sunt gratuitae et per infusionem magis quam per acquisitionem. Et sic concedi potest, quod sunt connexae20; sed hoc non facit ad quaestionem propositam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod castitas denominat aliquem castum: ergo similiter virtus virtuosum; Notandum. dicendum, quod non est simile: quia nomina desinentia in osum significant plenitudinem. Unde plus dicitur, cum dico, istum esse virtuosum, quam cum dico, ipsum habere virtutem. Unde et Philosophus21 dicit, « quod a virtute non denominatur aliquis virtuosus, sed magis studiosus »; castus autem non plus importat quam habens castitatem. Et ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de illis quatuor conditionibus, secundum quas virtutes distinguuntur, quod in singulis reperiuntur; iam patet responsio. Illud enim intelligendum est per appropriationem, non per proprietatem, sicut praedictum est.

Scholion

I. In hac quaestione, circa quam Magister (hic c. 2.) duplicem refert opinionem, Scot. (hic q. unica n. 1–10.) disputat contra sententiam Henrici Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 17.) et S. Thomae, quibus in re principali assentit S. Bonav. Scot. autem tenet, virtutes morales acquisitas, etiam in genere suo perfectas, non necessario esse connexas (cfr. de hac opinione Scoti Commentator et Hier. de Montefortino, tom. II. pag. 209 seqq.). Idem (ibid. n. 11. seqq.) reiicit etiam illam rationem communiter pro opinione opposita allatam, quod virtutes perfectae connexae sint in prudentia, secundum quam rationem etiam Durand. (hic q. 3.) virtutes morales perfectas vult esse connexas, non autem per essentialem dependentiam. Opinioni Scoti assentiunt Nominales (cfr. Biel, hic q. unica). — Sed Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Dionys. Carth. concordant cum Ss. Bonaventura et Thoma. — B. Albert. (hic a. 1.) sine distinctione asserit, has virtutes connexionem non habere. — In hac quaestione a multis in medium profertur auctoritas S. Hieronymi supra pag. 789, nota 3. citata. Praeter laudatos: S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 65. a. 1; Q. disp. de Virtut. cardin. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

II. In sequenti (4.) quaestione solvenda et ratione principali omnes conveniunt. Idem dicendum de falso principio hic reprobato, quod omnia peccata sint paria; de quo cfr. hic dub. 2; II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, d. 33. dub. 2; S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 73. a. 2. De ipsa quaestione: Scot., II. Sent. d. 28. n. 6. — S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. I. II. q. 73. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 4.

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English Translation
p. 796

Question III. Whether there is a connection among the political virtues, such that, one being had, all must be had.

Thirdly it is asked whether there is a connection among the political virtues, such that, one being had, all must be had. And that there is, it seems:

1. First, by philosophical authority. For Seneca says1: « Everything that is done well is done justly, bravely, and temperately »; but the work of any virtue is done well: therefore it is necessary that it be done justly and bravely and temperately: therefore to any work of virtue four virtues concur. But this could not be, unless they were connected: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Jerome to Pammachius2: « The Stoics describe the four virtues as so connected and mutually cohering, that whoever does not have one lacks them all, and whoever has one has them all »: therefore it seems, by the authority of the philosophers, that the political virtues are connected.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by the authority of the Saints, and first by the authority of Augustine, in the book On the Quantity of the Soul3. For in defining virtue he says that « virtue is an equality of life consenting on every side to reason »; but life does not accord on every side with reason except through the totality of the virtues: therefore, in order that someone have one virtue purely, it is necessary that he have the rest.

4. Likewise, Bernard, in the first book to Eugenius4: « It is also most delightful to observe a certain harmony and interweaving p. 797 of the virtues, and that one depends on another, as you see that prudence is the mother of fortitude, and that whatever boldness prudence has not given birth to is not fortitude but rashness ». And a little after: « Justice seeks, prudence finds, fortitude avenges, temperance possesses »: therefore if these are required for the act of any virtue, it seems that all the virtues necessarily concur in one act.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by reason: for as chastity is related to being chaste, so virtue is related to being virtuous; but whoever has chastity is chaste5: therefore whoever has virtue is virtuous. But no one is virtuous who has a vice: therefore if someone has virtue, he has no vice. But vices are not expelled except by the virtues opposed to them: therefore he who has one virtue has the rest.

6. Likewise, it belongs to any virtue to discern what is to be chosen, and to hold the mean, and to tend rightly toward the end, and to deal with what is arduous and difficult; but the first belongs to prudence, the second to temperance, the third to justice, the fourth to fortitude6: therefore it seems that to any virtuous act these four virtues necessarily concur. But this would not be, unless they had a connection with one another: therefore it seems that the political virtues are connected.

On the contrary:

1. the authority of Augustine to Jerome7. For he says that « it is not a divine pronouncement by which it is said that he who has one has all; but this has seemed so to men who are studious and ingenious »; but if this were true, it would be a divine pronouncement, because every truth proceeds from the first Truth: therefore, since this is understood of the political virtues, the political virtues are not connected.

2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher8 the habits of the political and customary virtues come from acts: but acts are not connected — for it happens that a man is exercised in the act of one virtue in such a way that he is not exercised in the act of another — therefore it seems that not all the virtues are necessarily connected.

3. Likewise, just as the sciences are had by acquisition, so are the political virtues; and as one virtue assists another, so it is in the habit of one science with respect to another; but the sciences that are by acquisition are not had at once, but one earlier and another later, and one can be had without another: therefore one political virtue does not seem to be necessarily connected to another.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by sensible experience: for many are strong in the virtue of prudence who nevertheless do not have generosity or the virtue of patience; many also keep justice toward their neighbor who nevertheless do not have continence in themselves; and yet they do those things through the political virtues: therefore it seems that among virtues of this kind there is no necessary connection9.

Conclusion. Simply speaking, the political virtues do not have a connection; they do, however, according to the state of perfection and according to certain common conditions.

I respond: It must be said that in this question there was a controversy among the philosophers themselves, as Augustine10 and Jerome indicate. — Opinion 1. « For certain of the philosophers, who were called Stoics, said that the virtues are necessarily connected, such that he who lacks one lacks the rest ». Of whose position Seneca seems to have been11. For he speaks thus: « If you let go one of your Corinthian vessels, you can say that your furnishing is safe for you. But if you lose one of the virtues, you must confess that you will have none ». — Opinion 2. The position of others was that one can be had without another, just as someone can have chastity in such a way that he does not have justice.

Reasoning 1, according to the Stoics. Now the reason for this diversity was this, that the Stoics held that virtue was not in anyone except in the wise man, because the governance of a man's whole life according to the rule of conduct depends on the rectitude of reason. And they called wise, as Augustine says On the City of God12, the one into whom no disturbance falls. For according to them he was called wise who masters all the passions of the soul. —

Reasoning 2. Besides this they also held that since virtue is p. 798 about the mean13, and the mean is in one way and indivisible, no one has virtue unless he has it in the highest degree and perfectly. But virtue is not had perfectly where some vice reigns, and where the other virtues are lacking. — And on account of these two reasons the Stoics said that the political virtues are connected, namely because they are not possessed except by the wise man, over whom no vice has dominion, and they are about the indivisible mean, from which by any vice there is a falling away.

A twofold error is rebutted. But in the foundation of this position of theirs they went too far as to each of the aforesaid points, both because they did not place wisdom in those who are progressing, but only in the perfect; and also because they said that, as to the loss of virtue, it makes no difference whether one falls away from the precise mean a little or much. And therefore Augustine rebukes them, to Jerome14, speaking thus: « The Stoics seem to me to be in error, who do not wish a man progressing in wisdom to have wisdom at all, but only then, when he is perfect. For they say that just as it makes no difference for drowning a man whether he has water many furlongs above him or one palm; so it is with those who are in the gulf of error, with respect to wisdom ». And quite reasonably does Augustine rebuke them, because of Corollary. this — that they greatly narrow the way of salvation in what is good, when they say that virtue and wisdom are in the perfect alone; and greatly widen it in malice, when they say that it makes no difference whether one falls away more or less from the mean of virtue.

The opinion contrary to this is approved. And therefore the position of the other philosophers was more reasonable, who held that wisdom is not only in the perfect, but also in those who are progressing. They also held that the mean of virtue has a latitude, just as the mean of health has a latitude15. Since therefore, according to the political life, the virtues are acquired little by little in those who are progressing toward wisdom; therefore they held that one virtue can be had in a greater and a lesser perfection according to different times; and one can also be separated from another. And the opinion of these is, according to the sayings of Augustine, the more to be approved.

General conclusion. It must therefore be answered to the proposed question that, simply speaking — namely as to all time and as to the very habits of the virtues — there is no connection among the political virtues16, although some connection can be found among them by reason of some determinate state and of certain common conditions. — A distinction. On account of which it must be noted that it happens that one speaks of virtues of this kind, the political ones, as to their proper [features] and as to their appropriated [features]. Conclusion 2. If as to the appropriated; then there is a connection in them, because those four conditions previously mentioned, which are to discern and to hold the mean and the like, are appropriated singly to these four virtues, and yet are required together for any virtue17. — A subdistinction. But if we speak as to the proper, this can be in two ways: either simply or according to the state of perfection. Conclusion 3. If according to the state of perfection; then there is still a necessary connection in them, because one virtue is never had perfectly unless the rest are had. And as to this the Stoics spoke well, although they were not founded throughout upon the truth18. — Conclusion 4. If simply, or according to every state; then it is not necessary that there be a connection in virtues of this kind, since they are from acquisition; as the arguments brought forward for this part show, and therefore they are to be granted.

The solution of the opposing arguments. 1. Therefore to that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of Seneca, that everything that is done well etc.; it must be said that this is understood of the virtues themselves as to their appropriated [features], not as to their proper [features]. For if we wish to speak as to the proper, the acts of those virtues are diverse and do not deal with the same thing, but with diverse things.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Stoics, which Jerome introduces; the response is already clear: because the Stoics are not to be believed throughout in this matter. Moreover, the Stoics, as was touched on before, always spoke of the virtues according to the summit of perfection, and as to that state they spoke truly, because the connection is in the virtues not because of the essence of the virtue itself, but because of the superadded perfection, which one virtue does not confer unless it is associated with the others.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of Augustine, that virtue is an equality of life etc.; it must be said that by that adverb on every side there is not made a Note. distribution for everything that pertains to the rectitude of the whole life, but for those things that pertain to the rectitude of the act of the virtue itself19; but it is possible that someone be rectified in the act of one virtue, according to p. 799 what the civil virtue requires, in such a way nevertheless that he does not have rectification in the act of another virtue, as can be manifestly seen through examples.

4. To that which is objected from the authority of Bernard, the response is already clear: because Bernard speaks of the virtues themselves as to their appropriated [features], not as to their proper [features]. And moreover, he speaks of the cardinal virtues, not insofar as they are political, but insofar as they are gratuitous and by infusion rather than by acquisition. And thus it can be granted that they are connected20; but this does not bear on the proposed question.

5. To that which is objected, that chastity denominates someone chaste: therefore similarly virtue [denominates someone] virtuous; Note. it must be said that it is not alike: because names ending in -osus signify fullness. Hence more is said when I say that someone is virtuous than when I say that he has virtue. Hence the Philosopher also says21 « that from virtue someone is not denominated virtuous, but rather zealous »; whereas chaste imports no more than having chastity. And therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

6. To that which is objected concerning those four conditions, according to which the virtues are distinguished, that they are found in each one; the response is already clear. For that must be understood by appropriation, not by property, as was said before.

Scholion

I. In this question — concerning which the Master (here c. 2.) reports a twofold opinion — Scotus (here, the single question, nn. 1–10.) disputes against the view of Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 5. q. 17.) and of St. Thomas, with whom in the principal matter St. Bonaventure agrees. Scotus, however, holds that acquired moral virtues, even when perfect in their own kind, are not necessarily connected (cf. on this opinion of Scotus his Commentator and Hieronymus de Montefortino, vol. II, p. 209 sqq.). The same author (ibid. n. 11. sqq.) also rejects that argument commonly brought forward for the opposing opinion, namely that perfect virtues are connected in prudence, according to which reasoning Durandus too (here q. 3.) holds that perfect moral virtues are connected, but not by an essential dependence. To the opinion of Scotus the Nominalists assent (cf. Biel, here, the single question). — But Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and Dionysius the Carthusian agree with Saints Bonaventure and Thomas. — Blessed Albert (here a. 1.) asserts without distinction that these virtues do not have a connection. — In this question the authority of St. Jerome, cited above on p. 789, note 3, is brought forward by many. Besides those named: St. Thomas, here a. 1; S. I. II. q. 65. a. 1; Disputed Question on the Cardinal Virtues a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

II. In the following (4th) question, which is to be resolved, all agree also in the principal reasoning. The same must be said of the false principle here rebutted, that all sins are equal; on which cf. here dub. 2; II Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, d. 33. dub. 2; St. Thomas, S. I. II. q. 73. a. 2. On this question itself: Scotus, II Sent. d. 28. n. 6. — St. Thomas, here a. 5; S. I. II. q. 73. a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Sententia allata (non quidem ad verbum) habetur in Epist. 66. (alias 67.) n. 7. seqq., ubi Seneca ostendere nititur, omnia bona esse paria propter virtutem, quae per se una est, nec maior nec minor. Cfr. Epist. 67. (alias 68.) n. 12. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. (p.796, n.8.)
    The cited statement (though not word for word) is found in Letter 66 (alias 67), n. 7 sqq., where Seneca strives to show that all goods are equal on account of virtue, which is in itself one, neither greater nor lesser. Cf. Letter 67 (alias 68), n. 12. — On the lesser cf. above p. 470, note 8. (p.796, n.8.)
  2. Epist. 66. (alias 26.) n. 3. — Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13: Simul enim cum prudentia, quae una est, omnes existent. — In conclus. edd. omittunt auctoritate philosophorum. (p.796, n.9.)
    Letter 66 (alias 26), n. 3. — Aristotle, VI Ethics c. 13: For together with prudence, which is one, all [the virtues] will exist at once. — In the conclusion the editions omit by the authority of the philosophers. (p.796, n.9.)
  3. Cap. 16. n. 27. — In edd. desiderantur verba auctoritate Sanctorum et primo. (p.796, n.10.)
    Chapter 16, n. 27. — In the editions the words by the authority of the Saints, and first are wanting. (p.796, n.10.)
  4. Sive de Considerat. c. 8. n. 9. In loco allegato pro concentum codd. et edd., textum origin. nihil spectantes, perperam substituerunt conceptum. Seq. testimonium habetur ibid. n. 11. (p.796, n.11.)
    Or On Consideration c. 8. n. 9. In the place cited, for harmony (concentum) the codices and editions, having no regard for the original text, wrongly substituted conception (conceptum). The following testimony is found ibid. n. 11. (p.796, n.11.)
  5. August., 83 Qq. q. 23: Omne castum castitate castum est. (p.797, n.1.)
    Augustine, 83 Questions q. 23: Everything chaste is chaste by chastity. (p.797, n.1.)
  6. Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 2. arg. 5. ad oppos. (p.797, n.2.)
    Cf. above d. 33. q. 2., argument 5 to the opposite. (p.797, n.2.)
  7. Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 3. n. 10, ubi textus origin. post hoc visum est sic prosequitur: multum quidem ingeniosis, studiosis, sed tamen hominibus. — Idem in Prolog. lib. de Doctr. christ. n. 8. ait: Omne verum ab illo est qui ait: Ego sum Veritas (Ioan. 14, 6.). (p.797, n.3.)
    Letter 167 (alias 29) c. 3. n. 10, where the original text after this has seemed so continues thus: to the very ingenious and studious indeed, but nonetheless to men. — The same author in the Prologue of the book On Christian Doctrine, n. 8, says: Every truth is from him who says: I am the Truth (John 14, 6.). (p.797, n.3.)
  8. Libr. II. Ethic. c. 1. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 721, nota 6. et 7. — Mox pro consuetudinalium, cod. S cardinalium, edd. consimilium. Circa finem arg. cod. A post virtutes subdit politicae. (p.797, n.4.)
    Book II Ethics c. 1 sq. Cf. above p. 721, notes 6 and 7. — Shortly, for customary cod. S [reads] cardinal, the editions similar. Near the end of the argument cod. A adds after virtues the word political. (p.797, n.4.)
  9. Sic et Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13. fere argumentatur proferens, « quod idem ad omnes [virtutes] aptissimus minime sit, atque ideirco alias iam, alias nondum acquisierit ». — Edd. necessaria. (p.797, n.5.)
    So too Aristotle, VI Ethics c. 13, argues nearly thus, putting it forward « that the same man is by no means most apt for all [the virtues], and therefore has acquired some already, others not yet ». — The editions [read] necessary (fem.). (p.797, n.5.)
  10. Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 4. Verba Hieronymi habes supra arg. 2. ad oppos. (p.797, n.6.)
    Letter 167 (alias 29) c. 2. n. 4. You have the words of Jerome above, in argument 2 to the opposite. (p.797, n.6.)
  11. Potius Cicero, II. Tusc. Disp. c. 14: Ecquid scis igitur, si quid de Corinthiis [vasibus] tuis amiseris, posse habere te reliquam supellectilem salvam; virtutem autem si unam amiseris (etsi amitti non potest virtus); sed si unam confessus fueris te non habere, nullam te esse habiturum? — Pro Corinthiis multi codd. atque edd. 1, 2 turmis, reliqui codd. turribus, Vat. cortinis. Superius pro positione cod. A opinione, et inferius opinio pro positio. (p.797, n.7.)
    Rather Cicero, II Tusculan Disputations c. 14: Do you not know, then, that if you lose any of your Corinthian [vessels], you can have the rest of your furnishing safe; but if you lose one virtue (although virtue cannot be lost); but if you confess that you do not have one, that you will have none? — For Corinthian many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] of squadrons (turmis), the remaining codices of towers (turribus), the Vatican [edition] of curtains (cortinis). Above, for position cod. A [reads] opinion, and below opinion for position. (p.797, n.7.)
  12. Libr. XIV. c. 8. n. 1. et 3. Cfr. Cicer., III. Tusc. Disp. c. 1. seqq. et IV. per totum. Cfr. etiam Senecae, Epist. 66. (alias 67.), et supra pag. 338, nota 7. — Subinde pro in quo edd. in quem, et paulo post dominabatur pro dominatur. (p.797, n.8.)
    Book XIV c. 8. nn. 1 and 3. Cf. Cicero, III Tusculan Disputations c. 1 sqq. and IV throughout. Cf. also Seneca, Letter 66 (alias 67), and above p. 338, note 7. — Thereupon for in whom the editions [read] into whom, and a little after was master for masters. (p.797, n.8.)
  13. Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 6. in fine. Seneca, Epist. 66. (alias 67.) n. 11: Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. — Mox pro indivisibile edd. indivisibili, et paulo inferius Perfecta pro Perfecte. (p.798, n.1.)
    Cf. above p. 474, note 6, at the end. Seneca, Letter 66 (alias 67) n. 11: For right reason is one and simple. — Shortly, for indivisible the editions [read] by the indivisible, and a little lower Perfect (fem.) for perfectly. (p.798, n.1.)
  14. Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 3. n. 12. In isto testimonio post cum est perfectus text. origin. plura addit et dein post uno palmo sic pergit: sic illos qui tendunt ad sapientiam, proficere quidem dicunt, tanquam ab imo gurgitis surgentes in aerem; sed nisi totam stultitiam velut opprimentem aquam proficiendo velut emergendo evaserint, non habere virtutem nec esse sapientes; ubi autem evaserint, mox habere totam etc. — Paulo superius pro in perfectis cod. aa in provectis. (p.798, n.2.)
    Letter 167 (alias 29) c. 3. n. 12. In this testimony the original text adds more after when he is perfect and then after one palm continues thus: thus those who tend toward wisdom they say indeed progress, as if rising from the bottom of a gulf into the air; but unless by progressing they have, as it were by emerging, escaped all folly like the oppressing water, they do not have virtue nor are they wise; but when they have escaped, they soon have it whole etc. — A little above, for in the perfect cod. aa [reads] in the advanced. (p.798, n.2.)
  15. Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 3. dicit, quod « sanitas, quae, cum definita sit, admittit tamen, ut esse magis ac minus possit ». Cfr. ibid. II. c. 6. et 9. — Cod. K voci sanitatis praefigit virtutis. In edd. legitur secundum quod latitudo habet medium summitatis. Subinde pro politicam vitam edd. politicam veritatem. (p.798, n.3.)
    Aristotle, X Ethics c. 3 says that « health, which, although it is determinate, nevertheless admits of being able to be more and less ». Cf. ibid. II. c. 6 and 9. — Cod. K prefixes to the word of health [the word] of virtue. In the editions it reads according to which the latitude has a mean of the summit. Thereupon for political life the editions [read] political truth. (p.798, n.3.)
  16. Cod. F omnes virtutes. Mox pro possit, quod habent codd. AUZ, in aliis posset. (p.798, n.4.)
    Cod. F [reads] all the virtues. Shortly, for can be (possit), which codices AUZ have, in others could be (posset). (p.798, n.4.)
  17. Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 2. ad 5. (p.798, n.5.)
    Cf. above d. 33. q. 2., to [argument] 5. (p.798, n.5.)
  18. Etiam Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13. ait: Hoc siquidem [separatas esse virtutes] in naturalibus virtutibus licet; in iis vero, quibus absolute bonus vocatur quispiam, non licet; simul enim cum prudentia, quae una est, omnes existent. — Proxime post pro Si edd. Sed. (p.798, n.6.)
    Aristotle too, VI Ethics c. 13, says: This indeed [that the virtues be separate] is permissible in the natural virtues; but in those by which someone is called good without qualification, it is not permissible; for together with prudence, which is one, all [the virtues] will exist at once. — Immediately after, for If the editions [read] But. (p.798, n.6.)
  19. Vide supra d. 33. q. 2. ad 2. — Subinde pro autem edd. enim. In fine solut. cod. A voci exempla adtexit fidei. (p.798, n.7.)
    See above d. 33. q. 2., to [argument] 2. — Thereupon for however (autem) the editions [read] for (enim). At the end of the solution cod. A appends to the word examples [the word] of faith. (p.798, n.7.)
  20. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. (in hac dist.). (p.799, n.1.)
    Cf. above a. 1. q. 1. (in this distinction). (p.799, n.1.)
  21. De Praedicam. c. de Quali, ubi de denominatione agens dicit, quod in plurimis haec denominatio fit, e. g. grammaticus a grammatica; in aliquibus vero fieri nequit, « eo quod non sunt posita qualitati nomina »; « aliquando autem et posito nomine non dicitur denominative quod secundum eam [qualitatem] quale dicitur, ut a virtute studiosus [σπουδαῖος]; eo enim ipso quod virtutem habeat, studiosus dicitur, sed non denominatione a virtute; non autem in pluribus hoc tale est ». — (p.799, n.2.)
    On the Categories, the chapter On Quality, where, treating of denomination, he says that in most cases this denomination occurs — e.g. "grammarian" from "grammar"; but in some it cannot occur, « because names have not been imposed for the quality »; « but sometimes, even with a name imposed, that which is said to be of-a-certain-quality according to it [the quality] is not said denominatively, as the studious man [spoudaios] from virtue; for by the very fact that he has virtue, he is called studious, but not by denomination from virtue; but in most cases it is not so ». — (p.799, n.2.)
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