Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 38
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.
Articulus unicus. De mendacio.
Quaestio I. Utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo per definitionem mendacii, quam ponit Augustinus in libro de Mendacio1: « Mendacium, inquit, est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi »: si ergo definitio et partes definitionis sunt essentiales definito: ergo essentiale est mendacio esse falsum.
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per illud quod dicit Augustinus, contra Mendacium2: « Sicut lux opponitur tenebris, ita veritas opponitur mendacio »; sed tenebra, essentialiter loquendo, est privatio lucis: ergo mendacium est privatio veritatis. Sed veritatis privatio est falsitas: ergo a primo, essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse falsum.
3. Item, sicut se habent esse veracem et mendacem circa hominem, sic se habent circa orationem; sed ista duo sunt incompossibilia circa eundem hominem simul et semel, videlicet ipsum esse veracem et mendacem: ergo similiter erunt incompossibilia circa sermonem: ergo impossibile est, quod idem sermo sit simul verus et mendax3. Si ergo mendacium non potest se compati cum veritate, videtur, quod inseparabiliter habeat sibi annexam falsitatem.
4. Item, omne verum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a Veritate prima4; sed nullum mendacium est a Veritate prima: ergo nullum mendacium est verum. Et est verum, vel falsum: ergo essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse falsum.
Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in libro de Mendacio5 dicit, quod « ille mentitur, qui dicit verum, quod putat esse falsum »; sed qui mentitur mendacium dicit: ergo aliquis dicendo verum facit mendacium: non ergo omne mendacium necessario est falsum.
2. Item, sicut verbum discordat ab intentione, cum quis negat illud quod novit, sic etiam discordat, quando affirmat illud quod ignorat et de quo dubitat6; sed possibile est, aliquem affirmare aliquod verum, de quo dubitat; ponatur ergo, cum sit possibile; sed in tali affirmatione discordat sermo ab intentione loquentis: ergo est ibi vitium et peccatum. Sed non est nisi peccatum mendacii: ergo videtur, quod aliquid simul possit esse verum, et tamen nihilominus est mendacium.
3. Item, si intentio est recta, totum est rectum7: ergo si intentio est mendax, totum est mendax; sed aliquis potest dicere dictum verum intentione mentiendi: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis dicendo verum sit mendax. Sed non est mendax nisi in illo dicto: ergo possibile est, dictum verum esse mendacium.
4. Item, sicut se habet peccatum ad bonitatem, ita se habet mendacium ad veritatem; sed qui facit aliquod bonum opus mala intentione committit peccatum8:
ergo similiter qui dicit verum fallendi intentione incurrit mendacium: ergo idem quod prius. Si dicas, secundum quod Magister videtur dicere in littera9, quod possibile est, aliquem dicere verum et mentiri, sed non est possibile, aliquod dictum esse verum et mendacium simul; videtur esse « oppositio in adiecto »: quia, sicut se habet peccans ad peccatum, sic se habet mentiens ad mendacium; sed omnis peccans peccatum committit: ergo omnis mentiens mendacium dicit: ergo si veritas dicti non repugnat actui mentiendi, non repugnat rationi ipsius mendacii.
Conclusio.
Licet sola intentio fallendi sufficiat ad hoc, ut quis dicatur mentiri, ad completam tamen mendacii rationem requiritur duplex falsitas, scilicet respectu intentionis et rei.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod dictum exterius prolatum comparatur ad intentionem dicentis et ad ipsam rem significatam; et secundum hoc sortitur dictum illud rationem duplicis falsitatis, vel veritatis. Nam per comparationem ad rem dicitur sermo verus, per comparationem autem ad intentionem dicentis dicitur verax10. Sic etiam falsitas duplex est circa sermonem. Nam per comparationem ad rem, videlicet cum non est adaequatio rei et sermonis, dicitur sermo falsus; per comparationem vero ad intentionem dicentis, cum non est adaequatio sermonis et intentionis, dicitur sermo fallax sive mendax.
Quoniam igitur mendacium nominat ipsum dictum per comparationem ad rem et ad ipsum dicentem; hinc est, quod ad completam mendacii rationem duplex falsitas concurrit: una per comparationem ad rem, et altera per comparationem ad intentionem loquentis. Et hanc duplicem falsitatem tangit Augustinus in definitione mendacii, cum dicit: « Mendacium est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi ». Prima autem falsitas tenet in ipso mendacio rationem materialis; secunda vero rationem formalis, et ab illa secunda denominatur quis mendax. Propter hanc ergo duplicem comparationem, quam importat ipsum mendacium de ratione sui nominis, necesse est, ad eius completam rationem concurrere praedictam duplicem differentiam falsitatis. — Mentiri autem dicit actum per comparationem ad ipsum loquentem. Unde ad hoc, quod aliquis dicatur mentiri, sufficit falsitas, quae concurrit ex discordia vocis et intentionis; et hoc patet ex ipsa definitione vocabuli, quia mentiri est contra mentem ire11. Contra mentem autem vadit non solum ille qui dicit falsum scienter, sed etiam qui dicit verum quod putat esse falsum. Unde minus importatur, cum dicimus, aliquem mentiri, quam quando dicimus, aliquem dicere mendacium. Quamvis enim intentio fallendi sufficiat ad hoc, ut aliquis dicatur mentiri; non tamen sufficit ad plenam rationem mendacii, secundum quod Magister dicit in littera12, et manifeste apparet ex ipsa notificatione Augustini et rationibus ad primam partem adductis.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod ille mentitur, qui dicit verum quod putat esse falsum; iam patet responsio: quia plura requiruntur ad perfectam rationem mendacii quam ad hoc, quod aliquis dicatur mentiri.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut verbum discordat ab intentione in eo qui asserit falsum, ita etiam in eo qui asserit dubium et incertum; dicendum, quod etsi sit ibi similitudo quantum ad discordiam intentionis, dissimilitudo tamen est quantum ad discordiam sermonis et rei, quia, cum asseritur falsum scienter, non tantummodo discordat sermo ab intentione, sed etiam discordat a re; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi in assertione falsi cogniti est mendacium, quod sit propter hoc in assertione veri incerti, nisi secundum quid.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intentio recta totum rectificat, et obliqua totum falsificat; dicendum, quod etsi intentio obliqua totum dictum falsificet, non tamen falsificat secundum omnem respectum, sed13 secundum respectum, quem habet ad dicentem; et ille respectus non sufficit ad mendacii rationem, sicut tactum est.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui facit bonum mala intentione committit peccatum, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod bonum mala intentione factum non est simpliciter peccatum, sed peccatum illi qui facit, sicut, cum quis dat eleemosynam ex vana gloria, dare eleemosynam non est peccatum, sed illi qui mala intentione hoc facit. Sic etiam in proposito potest concedi. Et propterea ex hoc non habetur, quod veritas simul stet cum eo quod est mendacium simpliciter, sed solum cum eo quod est mendacium secundum quid sive alicui14. — Aliter etiam posset dici, quod non est simile: quia peccatum
dicit privationem bonitatis; bonitas autem dicit ordinationem in finem, quae quidem habet esse mediante recta intentione: et ideo, recta intentione sublata, cum simpliciter pereat ordinatio, simpliciter iudicabitur aliquid esse peccatum15. Mendacium autem dicit privationem veritatis, quae quidem non tantum consistit in comparatione ipsius sermonis ad intentionem, sed etiam ad ipsam rem.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicit consequenter, quod quicunque peccat, peccatum committit: ergo qui mentitur similiter committit mendacium. Non enim est simile, sicut iam visum est. Esto tamen, quod ista conclusio concederetur, quod iste mentiendo committeret mendacium, non tamen sequeretur, quod esset mendacium in se; immo est ibi quid et simpliciter, sicut prius explanatum est. Unde solum illud dictum, in quo est falsitas per comparationem ad rem et intentionem, est mendacium simpliciter et complete. Illud vero, in quo est falsitas solum per comparationem ad intentionem, est mendacium alicui et minus complete. Illud autem, in quo est falsitas per comparationem ad rem tantum, est mendacium secundum quid et minime complete. Unde fere omnes rationes praemissae et etiam consimiles in processu suo peccant secundum quid et simpliciter16.
I. In hoc tractatu de mendacio S. Bonav. aliique principales Scholastici presse sequuntur S. Augustinum, satisque eorum doctrina concordat. — In hac I. quaestione explanatur, quid sit mendacium; cfr. etiam hic dub. 3; et de tribus mendacii speciebus vide infra q. 5, ubi etiam de alia divisione per octo membra agitur. Quod verbis: falsa vocis significatio, exprimatur quasi materiale mendacii, sed intentio fallendi sit formale, docet etiam S. Thom. (hic a. 1; S. II. II. q. 98. a. 1, ad 3.); tamen non ab omnibus conceditur, hanc intentionem in omni casu requiri ad constituendum mendacium verum.
De mendacio simpliciter et secundum quid (quod dupliciter esse potest) cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Bene etiam S. Thom. in Summa (II. II. q. 110. a. 1.), ubi hanc nostram quaestionem tractat, dicit: « Si ergo ista tria concurrant, scilicet quod falsum sit id quod enuntiatur, et quod adsit voluntas falsum enuntiandi, et iterum intentio fallendi; tunc est falsitas materialiter, quia falsum dicitur, et formaliter propter voluntatem falsum dicendi, et effective propter voluntatem falsitatem imprimendi ». — Differentia hic assignata inter mentiri et mendacium dicere, quam S. Bonav. sumsit ex Magistro (hic c. 3.), posterioribus non probatur; qui pro eo distinguunt mendacium vel materiale tantum, vel formale tantum, vel simul formale et materiale. Attamen praedicta distinctio valde antiqua est, teste Forcellini (Lexicon etc., Mendacium § 4.), qui citat: « Nigid. apud Gellium 11. 11, et Non. 5. 80, ubi addit: Vir bonus praestare debet, ne mentiatur; prudens, ne mendacium dicat ». — In afferendis responsionis rationibus Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1.) sequitur S. Bonaventuram.
De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. II. q. 123. m. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — De hac et seqq. qq. Dionys. Carth. et Biel, hic q. unica.
II. Conclusio sequentis (2.) quaestionis quoad primam partem, scilicet quod omne mendacium de facto sit peccatum, communissime approbatur a catholicis contra errorem nonnullorum antiquorum, et praesertim haereticorum; quod facile probatur ex sacra Scriptura, ex Ss. Patribus et ex iure canonico, suffragante ipsa ratione philosophica. Sed quoad secundam eiusdem partem, quae est de possibili, utrum scilicet mendacium sit ita essentialiter et intrinsecus malum, quod nec divina quidem dispensatione fieri possit licitum, non idem est doctorum consensus. Nam responsioni affirmativae, quam tenent Alex. Hal., S. Bonav., S. Thom., Scot. aliique communiter, contradicunt Occam, Nominales, illique qui volunt, omne malum ideo tantum malum esse, quia prohibitum. — Non autem facile est afferre rationem stricte convincentem pro communi opinione. Quod nec prima nec secunda ratio hic relata satis convincat, communius conceditur. — S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 110. a. 3.) sine distinctione affert rationem hic tertio loco positam, scilicet quod mendacium est « actus cadens super indebitam materiam », quia « innaturale est et indebitum, quod aliquis voce significet id quod non habet in mente ». Hanc rationem impugnat Scotus (hic q. unica n. 4. 5.) tanquam non aptam ad evincendam impossibilitatem divinae dispensationis. Idem (n. 5.) refert etiam rationem S. Bonaventurae, quam nec approbat nec improbat, sed tantum exponit. — Quoad facta, quae Scriptura narrat de Iacob aliisque, antiqui Scholastici cum S. Bonav. approbant doctrinam S. Augustini eundem a mendacio excusantem. Sed Scot. (hic q. unica n. 13.) cum aliis posterioribus dicit de Patribus veteris Test., quod « non videtur multum rationabile negare, illos quandoque fuisse mentitos vel potuisse mentiri. Quodsi ita est, etsi laudemus bona facta eorum et illa sumamus in exemplum; mala autem nec recipimus in exemplum nec pertinaciter excusamus. Dicitur tamen, quod tales sermones possunt figuraliter intelligi, vel sub alio intellectu, quam verba primo exprimunt; sed circa tales intellectus non oportet immorari ».
De hac (2.) quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 3. q. 25.
III. Circa solutionem sequentis (3.) quaestionis non est controversia. De ea agunt: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 8. 9. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. II. II. q. 110. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Article unique. On lying.
Question I. Whether it is essential to a lie to be false.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether it is essential to a lie to be false. And that it is, it seems:
1. First, through the definition of a lie which Augustine sets down in the book On Lying1: « A lie, he says, is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving »: if therefore the definition and the parts of the definition are essential to what is defined: therefore it is essential to a lie to be false.
2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through what Augustine says, Against Lying2: « As light is opposed to darkness, so truth is opposed to a lie »; but darkness, speaking essentially, is the privation of light: therefore a lie is the privation of truth. But the privation of truth is falsity: therefore, from the first, it is essential to a lie itself to be false.
3. Likewise, as being truthful and being lying stand with respect to a man, so they stand with respect to speech; but these two are incompossible in the same man at one and the same time, namely his being truthful and lying: therefore they will likewise be incompossible in discourse: therefore it is impossible that the same discourse be at once true and lying3. If therefore a lie cannot coexist with truth, it seems that it has falsity inseparably annexed to itself.
4. Likewise, every truth, as such, is from the first Truth4; but no lie is from the first Truth: therefore no lie is true. And it is true, or false: therefore it is essential to a lie itself to be false.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the book On Lying5 says that « he lies who says what is true, which he thinks to be false »; but he who lies utters a lie: therefore someone, by saying what is true, makes a lie: not every lie, therefore, is necessarily false.
2. Likewise, just as speech is at variance with intention when one denies what he knows, so too it is at variance when he affirms what he is ignorant of and what he doubts6; but it is possible for someone to affirm some truth about which he doubts; let it be posited, then, since it is possible; but in such an affirmation the speech is at variance with the intention of the speaker: therefore there is a fault and a sin there. But it is none other than the sin of a lie: therefore it seems that something can at once be true, and yet nonetheless be a lie.
3. Likewise, if the intention is right, the whole is right7: therefore if the intention is lying, the whole is lying; but someone can say a true utterance with the intention of lying: therefore it is possible that someone, by saying what is true, be lying. But he is lying only in that utterance: therefore it is possible that a true utterance be a lie.
4. Likewise, as sin stands to goodness, so a lie stands to truth; but he who does some good work with a bad intention commits a sin8:
therefore likewise he who says what is true with the intention of deceiving incurs a lie: therefore the same as before. If you should say, according as the Master seems to say in the text9, that it is possible for someone to say what is true and to lie, but it is not possible that any utterance be at once true and a lie; it seems to be « an opposition in the adjunct »: because, as the sinner stands to sin, so the liar stands to a lie; but every sinner commits a sin: therefore every liar utters a lie: therefore if the truth of the utterance is not repugnant to the act of lying, it is not repugnant to the very account of a lie.
Conclusion.
Although the intention of deceiving alone suffices for someone to be said to lie, nevertheless for the complete account of a lie a twofold falsity is required, namely with respect to the intention and to the thing.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that an utterance outwardly brought forth is compared to the intention of the speaker and to the thing signified itself; and according to this that utterance obtains the account of a twofold falsity, or truth. For by comparison to the thing the speech is called true, but by comparison to the intention of the speaker it is called truthful10. So too falsity is twofold with respect to speech. For by comparison to the thing, namely when there is no adequation of the thing and the speech, the speech is called false; but by comparison to the intention of the speaker, when there is no adequation of the speech and the intention, the speech is called fallacious or lying.
Since therefore a lie names the utterance itself by comparison to the thing and to the speaker himself; hence it is that for the complete account of a lie a twofold falsity concurs: one by comparison to the thing, and the other by comparison to the intention of the speaker. And Augustine touches upon this twofold falsity in the definition of a lie, when he says: « A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving ». Now the first falsity holds in the lie itself the account of the material; but the second the account of the formal, and from that second [falsity] one is denominated a liar. On account of this twofold comparison, therefore, which the lie itself implies from the account of its name, it is necessary that for its complete account the aforesaid twofold difference of falsity concur. — But to lie names an act by comparison to the speaker himself. Hence for someone to be said to lie, the falsity that arises from the discord of the voice and the intention suffices; and this is plain from the very definition of the word, because to lie is to go against the mind11. Now against his mind goes not only he who knowingly says what is false, but also he who says what is true which he thinks to be false. Hence less is implied when we say that someone lies than when we say that someone utters a lie. For although the intention of deceiving suffices for someone to be said to lie; nevertheless it does not suffice for the full account of a lie, according as the Master says in the text12, and is manifestly apparent from Augustine's own description and from the reasons brought forward to the first part.
1. To that indeed which is objected to the contrary, that he lies who says what is true which he thinks to be false; the response is now plain: because more is required for the perfect account of a lie than for someone to be said to lie.
2. To that which is objected, that just as speech is at variance with intention in him who asserts what is false, so too in him who asserts what is doubtful and uncertain; it must be said that although there is there a likeness as regards the discord of intention, nevertheless there is an unlikeness as regards the discord of speech and thing, because, when what is false is knowingly asserted, the speech is at variance not only with the intention, but is also at variance with the thing; and therefore it does not follow that, if in the assertion of a known falsehood there is a lie, there should be on this account [a lie] in the assertion of an uncertain truth, except in a qualified sense.
3. To that which is objected, that a right intention rectifies the whole, and an oblique one falsifies the whole; it must be said that although an oblique intention falsifies the whole utterance, nevertheless it does not falsify it according to every respect, but13 according to the respect which it has to the speaker; and that respect does not suffice for the account of a lie, as has been touched upon.
4. To that which is objected, that he who does a good thing with a bad intention commits a sin, therefore etc.; it must be said that a good thing done with a bad intention is not absolutely a sin, but a sin to him who does it, just as, when someone gives alms out of vainglory, to give alms is not a sin, but [it is a sin] to him who does this with a bad intention. So too in the matter at hand it can be granted. And therefore from this it is not had that truth coexists with that which is a lie absolutely, but only with that which is a lie in a qualified sense or to someone14. — In another way too it could be said that it is not similar: because sin
names the privation of goodness; but goodness names an ordering to an end, which indeed has being by means of a right intention: and therefore, the right intention being removed, since the ordering perishes absolutely, something will absolutely be judged to be a sin15. But a lie names the privation of truth, which indeed consists not only in the comparison of the speech itself to the intention, but also to the thing itself.
And through this is plain the response to that which it objects consequently, that whoever sins commits a sin: therefore he who lies likewise commits a lie. For it is not similar, as has now been seen. Yet granting that that conclusion were granted, that this man by lying commits a lie, it would nevertheless not follow that it be a lie in itself; rather there is there [a lie] in a qualified way and not absolutely, as has been explained before. Hence only that utterance in which there is falsity by comparison to the thing and the intention is a lie absolutely and completely. But that in which there is falsity only by comparison to the intention is a lie to someone and less completely. But that in which there is falsity by comparison to the thing only is a lie in a qualified sense and least completely. Hence nearly all the foregoing reasons, and likewise the similar ones, fail in their procedure [by arguing] in a qualified sense and absolutely16.
I. In this treatise on lying St. Bonaventure and the other principal Scholastics closely follow St. Augustine, and their doctrine sufficiently agrees. — In this first question it is explained what a lie is; cf. also here dub. 3; and on the three species of lying see below, q. 5, where there is also treatment of another division by eight members. That by the words false signification of the voice the quasi-material of a lie is expressed, but that the intention of deceiving is the formal, St. Thomas also teaches (here a. 1; S. II-II, q. 98, a. 1, ad 3); yet it is not granted by all that this intention is required in every case for constituting a true lie.
On a lie absolutely and in a qualified sense (which can be twofold) cf. below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. St. Thomas also well, in the Summa (II-II, q. 110, a. 1), where he treats this our question, says: « If therefore these three concur, namely that what is uttered be false, and that there be present the will to utter what is false, and again the intention of deceiving; then there is falsity materially, because what is false is said, and formally on account of the will to say what is false, and effectively on account of the will to imprint falsity ». — The difference here assigned between to lie and to utter a lie, which St. Bonaventure took from the Master (here c. 3), is not approved by later authors; who in place of it distinguish a lie as either material only, or formal only, or at once formal and material. Nevertheless the aforesaid distinction is very ancient, as Forcellini testifies (Lexicon etc., Mendacium § 4), who cites: « Nigidius in Gellius 11. 11, and Nonius 5. 80, where he adds: A good man ought to take care not to lie; a prudent man, not to utter a lie ». — In bringing forward the reasons of the response, Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 1) follows St. Bonaventure.
On this question, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, Sum. p. II, q. 123, m. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following q., here q. 1. — On this and the following qq. Dionysius the Carthusian and Biel, here q. unica.
II. The conclusion of the following (2nd) question as to the first part, namely that every lie in fact is a sin, is most commonly approved by Catholics against the error of certain ancients, and especially of heretics; which is easily proved from sacred Scripture, from the holy Fathers, and from canon law, with philosophical reason itself supporting it. But as to the second part of the same [question], which is about the possible, namely whether a lie is so essentially and intrinsically evil that it cannot even by divine dispensation be made licit, the consensus of the doctors is not the same. For to the affirmative response, which Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Scotus, and others commonly hold, Occam, the Nominalists, and those who hold that every evil is evil only because it is forbidden, are opposed. — But it is not easy to bring forward a strictly convincing reason for the common opinion. That neither the first nor the second reason here reported convinces sufficiently is more commonly granted. — St. Thomas (S. II-II, q. 110, a. 3) without distinction brings forward the reason here placed in the third place, namely that a lie is « an act falling upon an undue matter », because « it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice what he does not have in his mind ». Scotus impugns this reason (here q. unica, n. 4, 5) as not apt to prove the impossibility of a divine dispensation. The same author (n. 5) also reports St. Bonaventure's reason, which he neither approves nor disapproves, but only sets forth. — As to the facts which Scripture narrates concerning Jacob and others, the ancient Scholastics with St. Bonaventure approve St. Augustine's doctrine excusing him from a lie. But Scotus (here q. unica, n. 13) with other later authors says of the Fathers of the Old Testament that « it does not seem very reasonable to deny that they sometimes lied or could have lied. But if this is so, although we praise their good deeds and take them for an example; their bad deeds we neither receive as an example nor obstinately excuse. Yet it is said that such utterances can be understood figuratively, or under another meaning than the words primarily express; but about such meanings one need not linger ».
On this (2nd) question, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; S. loc. cit. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 3, q. 25.
III. Concerning the solution of the following (3rd) question there is no controversy. Of it treat: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 8, 9. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; S. II-II, q. 110, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2.
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- Cap. 3. n. 3. seq. sententialiter, sed verbotenus in lib. contra Mendacium ad Consentium, c. 12. n. 26: Mendacium est quippe falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Aristot., II. Poster. c. 3: Definitio enim ipsius quod quid est [i. e. essentiae] esse videtur. Cfr. ibid. c. 10. (c. 9.); VI. Topic. c. 1. seqq., et VII. Metaph. text. 33. (VI. c. 10.), nec non supra pag. 501, nota 2.On Lying, c. 3, n. 3ff. in sense, but verbatim in the book Against Lying, to Consentius, c. 12, n. 26: A lie is indeed a false signification with the will of deceiving. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, c. 3: For the definition seems to be of the very what-it-is [i.e. of the essence]. Cf. ibid. c. 10 (c. 9); Topics VI, c. 1ff., and Metaphysics VII, text 33 (VI, c. 10), as also above p. 501, note 2.
- Cap. 3. n. 4: Nam sicut lux et tenebrae, pietas et impietas... ita inter se sunt veritas mendaciumque contraria. — Minorem exhibet Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 70. (c. 7.). De falsitate cfr. V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 29.).Against Lying, c. 3, n. 4: For just as light and darkness, piety and impiety... so among themselves truth and a lie are contraries. — The minor [premise] is exhibited by Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 70 (c. 7). On falsity cf. Metaphysics V, text 34 (IV, c. 29).
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia (circa finem), ubi ostendit, eandem orationem contrariorum non esse susceptibilem, scil. non posse simul esse veram et falsam. — Codd. A N U Z simul verax et mendax. In maiori post sic cod. A addit etiam, et post orationem Vat. subiungit veritas et mendacium.Cf. Aristotle, Categories, c. on Substance (near the end), where he shows that one and the same statement is not susceptible of contraries, namely cannot be at once true and false. — Codices A N U Z read at once truthful and lying. In the major, after thus codex A adds also, and after statement the Vatican edition appends truth and a lie.
- Vide supra pag. 797, nota 2. in fine, verbo August. allegata, et eius lib. 83 Qq. q. 1.See above p. 797, note 2, at the end, the words alleged from Augustine, and his book 83 Questions, q. 1.
- Cap. 3. n. 3. et 4. Videsis etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 4, ubi eadem verba ex Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6. afferuntur.On Lying, c. 3, nn. 3 and 4. See also here the text of the Master, c. 2 and 4, where the same words are brought forward from the Enchiridion, c. 18, n. 6.
- Cfr. August. loc. in praeced. nota cit.Cf. Augustine, the place cited in the preceding note.
- Matth. 6, 22: Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit. Vide II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1.Matthew 6:22: If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. See II Sent., d. 40, a. 1, q. 1.
- Cfr. August., contra Mendac. c. 7. n. 18.Cf. Augustine, Against Lying, c. 7, n. 18.
- Hic c. 4. — Dictio « oppositio in adiecto » invenitur in Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11). — Inferius pro simul cod. K sic similiter, edd. 1, 2 similiter, quod coniungunt cum videtur.Here c. 4. — The expression « opposition in the adjunct » is found in Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 2 (c. 11). — Below, for at once codex K reads thus likewise, editions 1, 2 likewise, which they join with it seems.
- De prima acceptione veritatis cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5, et Anselm., Dialog. de veritate c. 2. seq. De secunda vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 7. et IV. c. 7.On the first acceptation of truth cf. vol. I, p. 707, note 5, and Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 2ff. On the second see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 7, and IV, c. 7.
- Cfr. Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 23. c. 1. q. 2.Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa, p. III, tr. 23, c. 1, q. 2.
- Hic c. 3. et 4.Here c. 3 and 4.
- Edd. addunt solum, cod. K tantum.The editions add only, codex K merely.
- Ex cod. K supplevimus sed solum cum eo quod est mendacium secundum quid sive, quae lectio confirmatur lectione mutila plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, qua pro his verbis exhibetur tantum sive; Vat. substituit sed tantum. Paulo ante pro Et propterea Vat. Sed praeterea.From codex K we have supplied but only with that which is a lie in a qualified sense or, which reading is confirmed by the mutilated reading of very many codices and editions 1, 2, in which for these words is exhibited only or; the Vatican edition substitutes but only. A little before, for And therefore the Vatican edition reads But moreover.
- Vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. Superius pro ordinatio plures codd. incongrue ordinant, cod. K bene quod ordinat.See II Sent., d. 38, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 40, a. 1, q. 1. Above, for ordering several codices incongruously read they order, codex K well what it orders.
- Cfr. supra pag. 258, nota 2. — Codd. A N est ibi secundum quid et simpliciter.Cf. above p. 258, note 2. — Codices A N read there is there [a lie] in a qualified sense and absolutely.