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Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De culpa periurii.

Quaestio I. Utrum omne periurium sit mendacium.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omni periurio conveniat esse mendacium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia periurium prohibetur per quintum mandatum secundae tabulae: Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium1; sed ibi prohibetur falsitas in verbo, quae scienter non potest esse sine mendacio: ergo videtur, quod cum ibidem prohibeatur periurium, quod omne periurium includat in se mendacium.

2. Item, qui assumit summam Veritatem in testimonium veritatis recte eam assumit; et qui recte assumit non peccat: ergo quando summa Veritas adducitur ad confirmationem veritatis, nullum est periurium: ad hoc ergo, quod sit periurium, necesse est, ipsam Veritatem adduci ad confirmandum mendacium: redit ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, qui asserit quod animo sentit non peccat, quia utitur sermone ad id, ad quod institutus est2; si ergo periurans in assertione sua peccat, aliud ergo gerit in animo, aliud asserit in ore. Sed omnis talis est mendax: ergo mendacium est de esse periurii.

4. Item, periurium est peccatum linguae; sed «linguam non facit ream nisi mens rea3» et male sibi conscia: ergo ad hoc, quod committatur periurii culpa, necesse est, quod fallendi intentio praecedat. Sed illa facit hominem mentiri: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Hieronymus super Ieremiam4 Fundamenta dicit, quod «iuramentum tres habet comites, scilicet iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem»; et sicut ex defectu veritatis contingit fieri iuramentum inordinatum, ita ex defectu iudicii et iustitiae: si ergo periurium generaliter complectitur iuramentum inordinatum, videtur, quod non omne periurium sit mendacium.

2. Item, aliquis, intendens facere adulterium et homicidium, hoc iuramento confirmat; esto ita; talis autem aut recte iurat, aut periurat; constat, quod non recte5: ergo periurat, et tamen non mentitur: ergo non est essentiale omni periurio esse mendacium.

3. Item, qui iurat adducit Deum in testimonium veritatis6; esto ergo, quod iuret falsum, quod credit esse verum, talis, cum adducat Veritatem in testimonium falsitatis, periurus est; sed quia credit et intendit verum dicere, non est mendax: ergo non omnis periurus mentitur, nec omne periurium est mendacium.

4. Item, ad esse mendacii non tantummodo requiritur intentio fallendi, sed etiam falsitas sermonis7; sed contingit, aliquem incurrere periurii crimen, si verum iuret et intendat falsum iurare et per iuramentum illud proximum laedere: ergo videtur, quod alicubi reperiatur perfecta ratio periurii, ubi non reperitur plena ratio mendacii: ergo etc.

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Conclusio.

Non est essentiale omni periurio, sive assertorio sive promissorio, esse mendacium, si mendacium proprie accipitur; si autem large, tunc omne periurium includit mendacium.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est triplex modus dicendi.

Quidam namque dixerunt, quod periurium substernit sibi mendacium. Et isti dixerunt, quod si aliquis iurat falsum, quod credit esse verum, non periurat, quia non mentitur. — Sed haec positio improbatur per Augustinum8, qui dicit, quod «cum homo iurat quod putat esse verum, et tamen est falsum, temere iurat». Et ex hoc habetur, quod iuramentum illud est temerarium et inordinatum et ita periurium, et tamen non est ibi mendacium.

Ideo dixerunt alii, quod non omne periurium est mendacium, pro eo quod non solummodo contingit incurrere crimen periurii propter veritatis defectum, verum etiam propter defectum iustitiae et iudicii9. — Sed instantia ista, quae fertur, videtur magis habere locum in iuramento obligatorio quam in iuramento assertorio. In illo enim proprie reperitur iudicium et iustitia. Et ideo adhuc remanet quaestio, utrum omne periurium, quod opponitur iuramento assertorio, sit mendacium, cum sit veritatis privativum.

Propterea tertio potest adhuc responderi, quod sicut patuit ex praecedenti distinctione10, aliquid est mendacium simpliciter et secundum rationem completam; aliquid est mendacium secundum quid, videlicet quantum ad ipsius mendacii materiam; aliquid est mendacium secundum quid, quia habet ipsius mendacii formam. Mendacium simpliciter est quod habet falsitatem in voce et in intentione. Mendacium vero secundum quid et secundum materiam est quod habet falsitatem in voce, sed non in intentione. Mendacium secundum quid et secundum formam est quod habet falsitatem in intentione, sed non in voce.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum periurium oppositum iuramento assertorio universaliter claudat in se mendacium; si large accipiatur mendacium, extenso nomine ad mendacium simpliciter et secundum quid; sic omne periurium in se includit mendacium. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera11, quod «periurium est vel iurando loqui falsum cum intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui falsum sine intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui verum cum intentione fallendi». — Si autem proprie accipiatur mendacium, sic non est essentiale omni periurio, nec periurio, prout opponitur iuramento obligatorio, nec periurio, prout opponitur iuramento assertorio, sicut dicit Magister in littera12, et rationes probant prius adductae ad partem istam.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod periurium prohibetur in quinto mandato; dicendum, quod non solum ibi prohibetur, immo etiam prohibetur in secundo primae tabulae13, in quantum per ipsum periurium facit quis contumeliam summae Veritati, assumendo eam in vanum, dum assumit eam ad confirmationem falsi sciti, vel falsi opinati, vel etiam dubii. — Posset tamen dici, quod in quinto mandato prohibetur falsum testimonium non solum quantum ad falsitatem sermonis, sed etiam quantum ad falsitatem intentionis14, et coniunctim et divisim; et prout divisim prohibentur, non dicunt mendacium secundum plenam rationem, sed secundum semiplenam tantum, sicut patet ex praecedentibus.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui adducit divinam Veritatem in testimonium veritatis recte iurat; dicendum, quod illud non est semper verum15, quia potest eam adducere in testimonium veritatis, intendens eam adducere in testimonium falsitatis; et illa intentio perversa reatum periurii introducit, quamvis non habeat completam rationem mendacii. Praeterea, alius defectus est in ratione illa: quia non omne falsum est mendacium; et propterea non sequitur, quod si periurium includit falsum, quod propter hoc includat mendacium.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui asserit quod in animo sentit, non peccat; dicendum, quod verum est, si ita novit in animo, quod possit exterius asserere in sermone, et hoc est, quando est certus; sed quando falsa credulitate decipitur, si exterius audeat affirmare per iuramentum, non excusatur, quia, secundum quod conscientia erronea in moribus non excusat factum iniustum16, sic aestimatio falsa in his quae creduntur, non excusat iuramentum falsum.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lingua non est

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rea, nisi mens prius sit rea; responderi potest dupliciter: quia illud verum est in sermonibus indifferentibus, sed in sermonibus malis et inordinatis et a Deo prohibitis excessus linguae introducit reatum mentis et conscientiae. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod mens et intentio rea dicitur non solummodo, quia in iurando intendit17 fallere, sed etiam, si intendat iurare id, de quo non habet certitudinem, pro eo quod ipsi summae Veritati subtrahit debitum honorem.

Scholion

I. Supponitur hic doctrina de iuramento, de quo infra a. 2. q. 1. 2. et in dubiis 1. 2. 3. agitur. — Doctrinam S. Thomae de hac quaestione sic paucis complectitur Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.): «Sicut a proprietate completiva principaliter denominatur res completa; ita a defectu proprietatis completivae res defectiva. Unde periurium recte describitur a falsitate: aut ergo a falsitate signi et significantis, ut quando iuratur falsum intentione fallendi; aut a falsitate significantis, sed non signi, ut quando quis, putans falsum quod verum est, iurat; aut a falsitate signi, sed non significantis, ut quando quis, putans verum quod falsum est, iurat. In primo est completa ratio periurii; in secundo minus completa; in tertio minime completa. Periurium ergo secundum completam et propriam acceptionem est mendacium iuramento firmatum». Haec autem manifeste dicta sunt de iuramento assertorio et quidem large accipiendo mendacium, ut auctor noster distinguit (in fine corp.). — Communiter enim distinguitur periurium proprie et stricte sumtum, quod est mendacium iuramento firmatum (cfr. Magister, hic c. 1, et S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 98. a. 1.), a periurio latius sumto pro omni iuramento illicito, videlicet destituto una vel altera trium conditionum requisitarum ad omne iuramentum licitum, quae sunt veritas, iustitia et iudicium. De his tribus «comitibus iuramenti», ut dicit Magister (hic c. 1.), vide hic dub. 1. Quod periurium stricte sumtum non admittat parvitatem materiae nec possit a peccato mortali excusari nisi imperfectione actus, est sententia prorsus certa et pluribus s. Sedis oraculis confirmata. Inter articulos 39, de quibus mandato Martini V. (Bulla, Inter cunctas) suspecti errorum Wikleff et Huss interrogandi erant, est art. 15: «Item, utrum credat, quod periurium scienter commissum, ex quacumque causa vel occasione, pro conservatione vitae corporalis propriae vel alterius, etiam in favorem fidei, sit mortale peccatum». Item, Innocentius XI. (Decret. 2. Mart. 1679) damnavit (prop. 24.) assertionem: «Vocare Deum in testem mendacii levis non est tanta irreverentia, propter quam velit aut possit damnare hominem»; et hanc (prop. 25.): «Cum causa licitum est iurare sine animo iurandi, sive res sit gravis, sive levis» (cfr. prop. 26. 27.). — Ex altera parte constat, quod non omne periurium, sensu latiore sumtum, scilicet destitutum aliqua trium illarum conditionum, sive quod sit vel perversum, vel incautum, dummodo non sit temerarium, semper sit peccatum mortale. De causis excusantibus iuramenta incauta a mortali agit Scot. (hic q. unica n. 3.), contra quem plura obiicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 3. in fine). Plura et accuratiora de his et de iuramento promissorio quaere apud recentiores auctores de re morali tractantes, praesertim apud S. Alphonsum, Theol. moral. II. tr. 2. c. 2. De hac (1.) quaestione praeter laudatum: Scol., hic q. unica n. 8. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

II. Duas seqq. (2. 3.) quaestiones commentatores Petri Lomb. plerumque simul tractant. — De utraque (2. 3.) quaestione: Alex. Hal. (rem tangendo), S. p. III. q. 31. m. 2. a. 2. i. — Scol., loc. cit. n. 2. et 4. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 8; S. II. II. q. 98. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. On the guilt of perjury.

Question I. Whether every perjury is a lie.

Concerning the first the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it belongs to every perjury to be a lie. And that it is so seems true:

1. Because perjury is forbidden by the fifth precept of the second tablet: You shall not speak against your neighbor false testimony1; but there falsity in word is forbidden, which knowingly cannot exist without a lie: therefore it seems that, since perjury is forbidden in that very place, every perjury includes in itself a lie.

2. Likewise, he who takes the supreme Truth as witness to truth takes it rightly; and he who takes it rightly does not sin: therefore when the supreme Truth is adduced for the confirmation of truth, there is no perjury: in order, therefore, that there be perjury, it is necessary that Truth itself be adduced to confirm a lie: there returns therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, he who asserts what he holds in mind does not sin, because he uses speech for that for which it was instituted2; if then the one perjuring sins in his assertion, he therefore bears one thing in mind and asserts another with his mouth. But every such person is a liar: therefore a lie belongs to the being of perjury.

4. Likewise, perjury is a sin of the tongue; but «the tongue does not make [a man] guilty unless the mind be guilty3» and ill-conscious to itself: therefore, in order that the guilt of perjury be committed, it is necessary that an intention of deceiving precede. But that makes a man lie: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Jerome on Jeremiah4, on Foundations, says that «an oath has three companions, namely judgment and justice and truth»; and just as from a defect of truth it happens that an oath is made disordered, so [it happens] from a defect of judgment and justice: if therefore perjury generally embraces a disordered oath, it seems that not every perjury is a lie.

2. Likewise, someone, intending to commit adultery and homicide, confirms this by an oath; let it be so; but such a person either swears rightly, or perjures himself; it is agreed that he does not [swear] rightly5: therefore he perjures himself, and yet does not lie: therefore it is not essential to every perjury to be a lie.

3. Likewise, he who swears adduces God as witness to truth6; let it be then that he swears something false which he believes to be true: such a one, since he adduces Truth as witness to falsity, is a perjurer; but because he believes and intends to speak the truth, he is not a liar: therefore not every perjurer lies, nor is every perjury a lie.

4. Likewise, for the being of a lie there is required not only an intention of deceiving, but also falsity of speech7; but it happens that someone incurs the crime of perjury, if he swears what is true and intends to swear what is false and to injure his neighbor by that oath: therefore it seems that somewhere the perfect account of perjury is found where the full account of a lie is not found: therefore etc.

Conclusio.

It is not essential to every perjury, whether assertory or promissory, to be a lie, if a lie is taken properly; but if [taken] broadly, then every perjury includes a lie.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there is a threefold way of speaking.

For some have said that perjury underlies a lie to itself. And these said that if someone swears something false which he believes to be true, he does not perjure himself, because he does not lie. — But this position is refuted through Augustine8, who says that «when a man swears what he thinks is true, and yet it is false, he swears rashly». And from this it is had that that oath is rash and disordered and so perjury, and yet there is no lie in it.

Therefore others said that not every perjury is a lie, for the reason that it happens that one incurs the crime of perjury not only on account of a defect of truth, but also on account of a defect of justice and judgment9. — But this instance which is brought forward seems to have place rather in an obligatory oath than in an assertory oath. For in the former, judgment and justice are properly found. And therefore there still remains the question whether every perjury that is opposed to an assertory oath is a lie, since it is privative of truth.

Therefore in a third way it can still be answered that, as appeared from the preceding distinction10, something is a lie simply and according to the complete account; something is a lie in a certain respect, namely as to the matter of the lie itself; something is a lie in a certain respect, because it has the form of the lie itself. A lie simply is what has falsity in word and in intention. But a lie in a certain respect and according to matter is what has falsity in word, but not in intention. A lie in a certain respect and according to form is what has falsity in intention, but not in word.

When therefore it is asked whether perjury opposed to an assertory oath universally encloses a lie in itself; if a lie is taken broadly, the name extended to a lie simply and in a certain respect; thus every perjury includes a lie in itself. And this is what the Master says in the text11, that «perjury is either to speak something false while swearing with an intention of deceiving, or to speak something false while swearing without an intention of deceiving, or to speak something true while swearing with an intention of deceiving». — But if a lie is taken properly, thus it is not essential to every perjury, nor to perjury as it is opposed to an obligatory oath, nor to perjury as it is opposed to an assertory oath, as the Master says in the text12, and the reasons adduced before for this part prove it.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that perjury is forbidden in the fifth precept; it must be said that it is not only forbidden there, but rather is also forbidden in the second [precept] of the first tablet13, inasmuch as through perjury itself one does insult to the supreme Truth, taking it in vain, while he takes it for the confirmation of something falsely known, or falsely opined, or even doubtful. — Yet it could be said that in the fifth precept false testimony is forbidden not only as to falsity of speech, but also as to falsity of intention14, both conjointly and severally; and as they are forbidden severally, they do not state a lie according to the full account, but only according to the half-full [account], as is clear from the foregoing.

To 2. To that which is objected, that he who adduces the divine Truth as witness to truth swears rightly; it must be said that that is not always true15, because he can adduce it as witness to truth while intending to adduce it as witness to falsity; and that perverse intention introduces the guilt of perjury, although it does not have the complete account of a lie. Moreover, there is another defect in that reasoning: because not every falsehood is a lie; and therefore it does not follow that, if perjury includes falsehood, that on this account it includes a lie.

To 3. To that which is objected, that he who asserts what he holds in mind does not sin; it must be said that it is true, if he so knows in mind that he can outwardly assert it in speech, and this is when he is certain; but when he is deceived by a false belief, if he dares outwardly to affirm by an oath, he is not excused, because, just as an erroneous conscience in morals does not excuse an unjust deed16, so a false estimation in the things that are believed does not excuse a false oath.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the tongue is not

guilty unless the mind first be guilty; it can be answered in two ways: because that is true in indifferent utterances, but in utterances that are evil and disordered and forbidden by God, the excess of the tongue introduces guilt of mind and conscience. — Otherwise it can also be said that the mind and intention are called guilty not only because in swearing one intends17 to deceive, but also if he intends to swear something concerning which he has no certitude, for the reason that he withdraws from the supreme Truth itself its due honor.

Scholion

I. The doctrine concerning the oath is here presupposed, of which there is treatment below in a. 2, qq. 1, 2, and in doubts 1, 2, 3. — The doctrine of St. Thomas on this question Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 1) sums up briefly thus: «Just as a complete thing is principally denominated from its completive property, so a defective thing [is denominated] from a defect of the completive property. Hence perjury is rightly described from falsity: either, then, from a falsity of the sign and of the signifying, as when something false is sworn with an intention of deceiving; or from a falsity of the signifying, but not of the sign, as when someone, thinking that false which is true, swears; or from a falsity of the sign, but not of the signifying, as when someone, thinking that true which is false, swears. In the first the account of perjury is complete; in the second less complete; in the third least complete. Perjury therefore, according to the complete and proper acceptation, is a lie confirmed by an oath». But these things are manifestly said of an assertory oath, and indeed taking a lie broadly, as our author distinguishes (at the end of the body). — For perjury is commonly distinguished as taken properly and strictly, which is a lie confirmed by an oath (cf. the Master, here c. 1, and St. Thom., S. II. II. q. 98. a. 1.), from perjury taken more broadly for every illicit oath, namely one deprived of one or another of the three conditions required for every licit oath, which are truth, justice, and judgment. Concerning these three «companions of the oath», as the Master says (here c. 1.), see here dub. 1. That perjury taken strictly does not admit a smallness of matter, nor can be excused from mortal sin except by an imperfection of the act, is a sentence wholly certain and confirmed by many oracles of the holy See. Among the 39 articles, concerning which by the mandate of Martin V (Bull, Inter cunctas) those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Huss were to be interrogated, is art. 15: «Likewise, whether he believes that perjury knowingly committed, from whatever cause or occasion, for the preservation of one's own bodily life or another's, even in favor of the faith, is a mortal sin». Likewise, Innocent XI (Decree of 2 March 1679) condemned (prop. 24) the assertion: «To call God to witness a slight lie is not so great an irreverence that on its account He should will or be able to condemn a man»; and this (prop. 25): «With cause it is licit to swear without the mind to swear, whether the matter be grave or slight» (cf. prop. 26, 27). — On the other hand it is established that not every perjury, taken in the broader sense, namely deprived of some one of those three conditions, whether it be either perverse or incautious, provided it be not rash, is always a mortal sin. On the causes excusing incautious oaths from the mortal [grade] Scotus treats (here q. unica n. 3), against whom Dionysius the Carthusian objects many things (here q. 3, at the end). Seek out more things, and more accurate, concerning these matters and concerning the promissory oath among the more recent authors treating of moral matters, especially in St. Alphonsus, Theol. moral. II. tr. 2. c. 2. On this (first) question, besides the one praised: Scotus, here q. unica n. 8. — St. Thom., here a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the two following questions, here q. 2.

II. The two following (2, 3) questions the commentators on Peter Lombard for the most part treat together. — On both (2, 3) questions: Alex. Hal. (touching the matter), S. p. III. q. 31. m. 2. a. 2. i. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 2 and 4 ff. — St. Thom., here a. 8; S. II. II. q. 98. a. 2, 3. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Exod. 20, 16. Cfr. supra d. 37. dub. 8. — Mox edd. omittunt scienter.
    Exod. 20:16. Cf. above, d. 37, dub. 8. — Soon after, the editions omit scienter ("knowingly").
  2. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 5.
    See above, the text of the Master, d. XXXVIII, c. 5.
  3. Ut dicit August. hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. allegatus. — Inferius pro committatur cod. K contrahatur.
    As Augustine says, here cited in the text of the Master, c. 3. — Below, for committatur codex K reads contrahatur.
  4. Libr. 1. c. 4, 2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Book 1, c. 4, 2. See here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  5. Codd. A Z bb repetunt iurat. Cod. A peierat pro periurat. In maiori cod. K vel pro et.
    Codices A Z bb repeat iurat. Codex A reads peierat for periurat. In the larger [part], codex K reads vel for et.
  6. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. — In conclusione arg. pro periurus mentitur cod. A peierans est mentitus.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7. — In the conclusion of the argument, for periurus mentitur codex A reads peierans est mentitus.
  7. Ut ostensum est supra d. 38. q. 1. — De ipso arg. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    As was shown above, d. 38, q. 1. — On the argument itself, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  8. Serm. 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 2. n. 2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro periurat cod. A peierat, et aliquanto superius pro namque dixerunt cod. K namque dicere voluerunt. Inferius pro non est ibi cod. A illud non est.
    Sermon 180 (otherwise 28, on the Words of the Apostle), c. 2, n. 2. See here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for periurat codex A [reads] peierat, and somewhat above, for namque dixerunt codex K [reads] namque dicere voluerunt. Below, for non est ibi codex A [reads] illud non est.
  9. Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. 4. c. 5, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 1. a. 3: Assertorium iuramentum est, quando iuratur, de praesenti aliquid esse vel non esse, vel de praeterito aliquid fuisse vel non fuisse. Promissorium vero, cum iurat aliquis de futuro facturum aliquid vel non facturum.
    Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. tr. 4, c. 5, and here the text of the Master, c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 1. a. 3: «An assertory oath is when one swears that in the present something is or is not, or that in the past something was or was not. But a promissory [oath is] when someone swears concerning the future that he will do something or will not do [it]».
  10. Quaest. 1. — Superius voci tertio codd. K bb adnectunt modo, et subinde pro quod plures codd. quia.
    Question 1. — Above, to the word tertio codices K bb attach modo, and thereupon for quod many codices [read] quia.
  11. Hic c. 3. — Pro includit cod. U claudit.
    Here c. 3. — For includit codex U [reads] claudit.
  12. Hic c. 3. — Pro ultimo prout edd. cum pluribus codd. quod.
    Here c. 3. — For the last prout, the editions with many codices [read] quod.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 37. dub. 2. et 8.
    Cf. above, d. 37, dub. 2 and 8.
  14. Vat. addit et rei et sermonis, edd. 1, 2 legunt: non solum quantum ad falsitatem intentionis, sed et rei et sermonis.
    The Vatican [edition] adds et rei et sermonis; editions 1, 2 read: «not only as to falsity of intention, but also of the thing and of the speech».
  15. Cod. A non habet veritatem semper. Inferius pro et illa Vat. et sua.
    Codex A reads non habet veritatem semper. Below, for et illa the Vatican [edition reads] et sua.
  16. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 3.
  17. Codd. A G H L aa bb intendat.
    Codices A G H L aa bb [read] intendat.
← Dist. 39, Divisio TextusDist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2→