Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk. The first three are picked up from the p.863 footer band (which opens beneath a1-q1's scholion).

Quaestio II. Utrum omne periurium sit peccatum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit peccatum, et ostenditur, quod aliquis possit periurare sine peccato.

1. Esto enim, quod aliquis iuret falsum, quod putat esse verum, propter utilitatem proximi; iuramentum illud non est in divinae Veritatis contemptum nec est in proximi nocumentum: ergo non repugnat mandato primae tabulae nec secundae: igitur non est peccatum; et tamen est periurium, sicut in praecedentibus¹ fuit ostensum: ergo non omne periurium est peccatum.

2. Item, nullus venerando et amando Deum peccat; sed Augustinus² dicit, quod «illud, per quod quis iurat, veneratur et amat»: cum ergo aliquis iurat falsum per Deum, veneratur et amat ipsum Deum: ergo non committit peccatum; et tamen committit periurium: ergo periurium non est peccatum.

3. Item, sicut peccatum opponitur bonitati, sic periurium opponitur veritati; sed veritas spectat ad intellectum, bonitas ad affectum³; sic etiam falsum et malum differunt: cum ergo vitium et peccatum dicat oppositum virtuti et bonitati, quae se tenent ex parte affectus, et periurium sit oppositum veritati, quae se tenet ex parte intellectus, non videtur, quod aliquod periurium sit peccatum.

4. Item, possibile est, aliquem cogi ad hoc, quod iuret falsum; sed necessitas non habet legem, immo quae alias sunt illicita necessitas facit licita, sicut patet de eo qui furatur et est in extrema necessitate⁴: ergo videtur, quod saltem in tali casu periurium sit licitum, et sic non est essentiale ei esse peccatum.

Sed contra: 1. Gravius vitium et magis deforme est periurium quam simplex mendacium; sed «necesse est, omne mendacium esse peccatum» secundum quod Augustinus dicit, et habitum est in praecedentibus⁵: videtur ergo, quod similiter sit circa ipsum periurium, immo, multo fortius.

2. Item, quicumque peierat, iurat inordinate, et qui iurat inordinate iurat iniuste vel temerarie⁶; et omnis talis peccat: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis qui peierat, assumit nomen Dei in vanum⁷, et omnis talis facit contumeliam divinae Veritati; hoc autem est peccatum et malum secundum se: ergo necesse est, omne periurium malum esse.

4. Item, omne illud est malum, cui debetur poena; sed omni periurio debetur poena, secundum quod dicitur Proverbiorum decimo nono⁸: Testis falsus non erit impunitus: ergo si periurium est falsa testificatio, videtur necessario, quod omne periurium sit peccatum.

Conclusio.

Periurium est malum non solummodo in se, sed etiam secundum se.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio periurium est malum non solummodo in se, sed etiam secundum se, ita quod nullo modo potest fieri bene. — Ratio autem huius est duplex: una propter hoc, quod plerumque periurium claudit in se mendacium, quod est secundum se malum; alia vero ratio est generalis, quia omnis periurans contumeliam facit summae Veritati, dum eam adducit⁹ ad eius confirmationem, ad quod non deberet assumi. Et ideo, quia non tantum deordinat hominem ad proximum, sed etiam deordinat hominem ad Deum; inde est, quod semper est malum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de eo qui iurat falsum, quod putat esse verum, propter utilitatem proximi; dicendum, quod talis peccat propter Veritatis contemptum; quamvis enim non contemnat ipsam Veritatem ex certa scientia, adducendo eam in testimonium falsitatis, contemnit tamen ex ipsa temeritate. Adeo enim est nomen Domini terribile et venerabile¹⁰, quod nullus debet ipsum in testimonium assumere, nisi noverit, quid loquatur. Unde ignorantia non excusat in tali iuramento. Hoc enim debet unusquisque scire, quod non debet iuramento aliquid firmare, nisi de illo sit certus. Unde etsi talis ignoret rem, de qua iurat, hoc ipso scit, se male iurare, si eam iuramento affirmat; et ideo non excusatur a culpa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud, per quod quis iurat, veneratur et amat; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando recte et ordinate per illud iurat; sed quando falso et inordinate per ipsum iurat, etsi videatur venerari per credulitatem, potius contemnit et contumeliam sibi facit per inordinatam locutionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod periurium opponitur veritati, quae est in intellectu; dicendum, quod secundum quod duplex est cognitio, speculativa et practica, sic dupliciter contingit loqui de ipsa veritate: aut prout est regula merae speculationis, aut prout est regula ipsius locutionis et operationis. Veritas enim fidei et prudentiae dictat, qualiter loquendum, et quid agendum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod mendacium et periurium opponitur veritati, hoc non intelligitur de veritate primo modo, sed de veritate secundo modo. Et ista veritas secundo modo dicta iuncta est bonitati et tenet rationem virtutis, et actus eius est in praecepto, secundum quod dicitur ad Ephesios quarto¹¹: Loquimini unusquisque veritatem cum proximo suo. Ipse autem obiicit de veritate, prout consistit in mera speculatione; ideo ratio illa non valet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui peierat, necessitate compulsus, quod non peccat; dicendum, quod falsum est. Est enim necessitas naturae et necessitas coactionis. Necessitas, inquam, naturae legem non habet et potest a toto excusare; necessitas vero coactionis non excusat a toto in his quae secundum se mala sunt, sed excusat solum a tanto, quia voluntas sufficienter cogi non potest¹². Et propterea, quia periurium secundum se malum est, quantumcumque quis compellitur ad illud, non omnino a peccato excusatur, immo sibi a canone poena imponitur. Dicit enim canon¹³, quod «si quis

peierat pro vita corporis servanda, quia magis dilexit corpus quam animam, ieiunet tres quadragesimas». Nec est simile de furto; quia furtum non est malum nisi propter rerum appropriationem; extrema autem necessitas omnia facit communia, nulla autem necessitas tollit periurii deformitatem, eo quod nulla necessitate licitum sit nomen Dei in vanum assumere: et ita non est simile hinc et inde. — De obligatione tamen iuramenti coacti infra¹⁴ determinabitur magis plane.

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Question II. Whether all perjury is a sin.

Secondly it is asked whether all perjury is a sin; and it is shown that someone can perjure himself without sin.

1. For suppose that someone swears what is false, which he thinks to be true, for the benefit of his neighbor; that oath is not in contempt of the divine Truth nor is it to the harm of the neighbor: therefore it does not conflict with the precept of the first table nor of the second: therefore it is not a sin; and yet it is perjury, as was shown in the preceding¹: therefore not all perjury is a sin.

2. Likewise, no one sins by venerating and loving God; but Augustine² says that «that by which one swears, he venerates and loves»: when therefore someone swears what is false by God, he venerates and loves God himself: therefore he commits no sin; and yet he commits perjury: therefore perjury is not a sin.

3. Likewise, just as sin is opposed to goodness, so perjury is opposed to truth; but truth pertains to the intellect, goodness to the affection³; so too the false and the evil differ: since therefore vice and sin name what is opposed to virtue and goodness, which hold by the side of the affection, and perjury is opposed to truth, which holds by the side of the intellect, it does not seem that any perjury is a sin.

4. Likewise, it is possible that someone be compelled to swear what is false; but necessity has no law, indeed necessity makes licit things which are otherwise illicit, as is plain of the one who steals and is in extreme necessity⁴: therefore it seems that at least in such a case perjury is licit, and so it is not essential to it to be a sin.

On the contrary: 1. Perjury is a graver vice and more deformed than a simple lie; but «it is necessary that every lie be a sin» according as Augustine says, and as was had in the preceding⁵: it seems therefore that it is similar concerning perjury itself, indeed, much more strongly.

2. Likewise, whoever perjures himself swears inordinately, and he who swears inordinately swears unjustly or rashly⁶; and everyone such sins: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everyone who perjures himself takes the name of God in vain⁷, and everyone such does outrage to the divine Truth; but this is a sin and an evil in itself: therefore it is necessary that all perjury be evil.

4. Likewise, everything is evil to which a penalty is due; but a penalty is due to all perjury, according as it is said in Proverbs the nineteenth⁸: A false witness shall not be unpunished: therefore if perjury is a false testimony, it seems of necessity that all perjury is a sin.

Conclusion.

Perjury is an evil not only in itself, but also of itself.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt perjury is an evil not only in itself, but also of itself, so that in no way can it be done well. — Now the reason of this is twofold: one on account of this, that for the most part perjury includes in itself a lie, which is of itself an evil; but the other reason is general, namely that everyone who perjures himself does outrage to the supreme Truth, while he adduces it⁹ for his confirmation, to which it ought not to be summoned. And therefore, because it not only disorders man toward his neighbor, but also disorders man toward God; hence it is that it is always evil. — Whence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary concerning the one who swears what is false, which he thinks to be true, for the benefit of his neighbor; it must be said that such a one sins on account of the contempt of the Truth; for although he does not contemn the Truth itself out of certain knowledge, by adducing it as testimony of a falsehood, he yet contemns it out of his very rashness. For so terrible and venerable¹⁰ is the name of the Lord, that no one ought to summon it as testimony, unless he know what he is saying. Whence ignorance does not excuse in such an oath. For this each one ought to know, that he ought not to affirm anything by an oath, unless he be certain of it. Whence even if such a one is ignorant of the matter about which he swears, by this very fact he knows that he swears ill, if he affirms it by an oath; and therefore he is not excused from fault.

2. To that which is objected, that that by which one swears, he venerates and loves; it must be said that that is true, when he swears by it rightly and in order; but when he swears falsely and inordinately by it, even though he may seem to venerate by his belief, he rather contemns and does outrage to it by his inordinate utterance.

3. To that which is objected, that perjury is opposed to truth, which is in the intellect; it must be said that, according as cognition is twofold, speculative and practical, so it happens in two ways to speak of truth itself: either as it is the rule of mere speculation, or as it is the rule of utterance and action itself. For the truth of faith and of prudence dictates how one must speak, and what must be done. When therefore it is said that a lie and perjury are opposed to truth, this is not understood of truth in the first way, but of truth in the second way. And this truth said in the second way is joined to goodness and holds the character of a virtue, and its act is under precept, according as it is said to the Ephesians the fourth¹¹: Speak, every one, the truth with his neighbor. But he objects concerning truth as it consists in mere speculation; therefore that reasoning is not valid.

4. To that which is objected concerning the one who perjures himself, compelled by necessity, that he does not sin; it must be said that it is false. For there is a necessity of nature and a necessity of coercion. Necessity of nature, I say, has no law and can excuse from the whole; but necessity of coercion does not excuse from the whole in those things which are of themselves evil, but excuses only from so much, because the will cannot be sufficiently coerced¹². And therefore, because perjury is of itself an evil, however much one is compelled to it, he is not altogether excused from sin, but rather a penalty is imposed on him by the canon. For the canon¹³ says, that «if anyone

perjures himself for the saving of the life of the body, because he loved the body more than the soul, let him fast three Lents». Nor is the case alike concerning theft; because theft is not evil except on account of the appropriation of things; but extreme necessity makes all things common, whereas no necessity removes the deformity of perjury, because by no necessity is it licit to take the name of God in vain: and so the case is not alike on the one side and the other. — But concerning the obligation of a coerced oath it will be determined more fully below¹⁴.

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