Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 21, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum liceat aliquid in confessione addere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum liceat aliquid in confessione addere. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia Augustinus dicit in libro de Poenitentia, et habetur in littera¹: « Si causa humilitatis mentiris, efficeris quod vitasti »: si ergo aliquis causa humilitatis accusat se amplius, quam meruit; videtur ex hoc culpam incurrere.

2. Item², iniquus testis est qui accusat alium in eo, in quo non est culpabilis, quantumcumque faciat bona intentione; sed homo in confessione contra se testificatur: ergo si se accusat in eo, in quo non peccavit; videtur, quod inique agat.

3. Item, nihil obiiciendum est in iudicio manifesto, quod non possit manifeste probari: ergo pari ratione nihil imponendum est in iudicio poenitentiali, quod non possit per testem rectum probari; testis autem est conscientia: ergo nihil dicendum est, nisi de quo accusat conscientia: ergo etc.

4. Item, confessio est ad dirigendum medicum spiritualem, sicut cognitio carnalis infirmitatis est ad dirigendum medicum carnalem; sed ita facit errare medicum qui dicit, se habere morbum, quem non habet, sicut qui dicit, se non habere, quem habet: ergo sicut peccat ille qui dimittit³, ita ille qui addit.

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Contra: 1. Gregorius⁴: « Bonarum mentium est ibi culpam agnoscere, ubi culpa non est »: ergo si potest et debet se homo accusare, secundum quod agnoscit se; et bona mens potest se magis culpabilem reputare, quam sit secundum veritatem: videtur, quod magis possit se accusare, quam sit in re.

2. Item, qui conteritur plus, quam meruit, et satisfacit puniendo se ultra, quam meruit, iuste et⁵ laudabiliter et bene facit: ergo pari ratione qui se accusat ultra, quam peccavit, bene facit.

3. Item, confessio est ad humiliationem confitentis, et hoc per accusationem; sed nemo potest se nimis humiliare, etiam si se subiiciat omnibus propter Deum⁶: ergo pari ratione nemo potest se nimis accusare.

4. Item, ponatur, quod aliquod peccatum commisit quis, de quo dubitat, utrum sit mortale, vel veniale; quaero, qualiter debeat illud confiteri; et videtur, quod sicut mortale, quia « in dubiis securior pars est eligenda⁷ »; alioquin, si sicut veniale confitetur, discrimini se committit; sed possibile est, quod istud peccatum non sit nisi veniale: ergo potest veniale confiteri ut mortale: ergo ad confessionem addere ad se accusandum.

Conclusio

In confessione nihil licet addere, refragante testimonio conscientiae; tamen additio ultra rei veritatem, conscientia autem linguae concordante, potest esse meritoria.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam praenotandum est, quod differt mentiri et falsum dicere. Mentiri enim est, quando aliud exprimit vox, quam sentiat mens, etiam si per vocem verum dicatur in re; falsum dicere est, quando vox discordat a re significata⁸. Mentiri quidem, quia semper importat abusum signi et obliquationem hominis quantum ad vim intellectivam et exteriorem, inter quas est discordia, semper est malum et ita secundum se malum, quod nulla potest bona circumstantia vestiri, ut bene fiat, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro contra Mendacium⁹. Falsum vero dici potest frequenter meritorie, cum mens decipitur et ita credit esse, ut loquitur, sicut dixit Apostolus, se in Hispaniam profecturum, ad Romanos decimo quinto¹⁰.

Si ergo tu quaeras, utrum liceat addere ad confessionem; respondendum est, quod aut tu loqueris quantum ad testificationem conscientiae, aut quantum ad conformitatem veritatis in re. Si quantum ad conscientiam, ut conscientia minus accuset, et vox amplius; sic est peccatum et mendacium, et perditur confessionis meritum, in qua debuit esse verbum verax, secundum illud Ecclesiastici trigesimo septimo¹¹: Ante omnia verbum verax praecedat te. Verbum verax est, quando id exprimit lingua, quod sentit conscientia. Si autem intelligas de additione quantum ad rei veritatem, ita quod conscientia non discordat a lingua; dicendum tunc, quod talis additio potest esse meritoria. Qui enim in parvis se credit graviter offendisse, et sic confitetur, quasi graviter offenderit; multum absque dubio profecit¹².

Rationes igitur ad primam partem procedentes concludunt, quod non potest nec debet addere ultra testimonium conscientiae. — Rationes ad secundam partem procedunt, secundum quod in additione lingua consonat cum conscientia; et sic licet addere, quia nullum fit veritati praeiudicium, dum simul iungitur veritas mentis et oris cum humilitate cordis.

1. 2. Et sic intelligitur illud Gregorii: « Bonarum mentium » etc.; similiter et sequens de contritione et punitione et additione. — Posset tamen dici, quod non est simile de contritione et punitione et de confessione: quoniam confessio est actus veritatis et contra hanc non potest aliquis dicere aliquid, quod non sit falsum et praeiudicium veritatis; non sic est de punitione, quia iuste potest aliquis sustinere poenam, etiam quam non meruit, in gloriam Dei, vel propter salutem proximi, vel in ampliorem profectum sui; et hoc est abundantis iustitiae. Veritas vero non debet nec deficere nec superabundare, quia est rectitudo intellectus¹³, et haec rectitudo est indivisibilis; sed rectitudo voluntatis habet latitudinem, ideo plus et minus factum est iustum; sed non plus et minus dictum est verum, nisi dicatur verius quod est durabilius, ut necessarium et perpetuum quam contingens et momentaneum.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod confessio est ad humiliationem; dicendum, quod non omnimodo est ad humiliationem, sed per¹⁴ accusationem, quae veritatem debet habere principium vel comitem ad hoc, quod recta sit. Et non sequitur, quod si humilitas non habet excessum in reputatione, quod veritas non habeat excessum in locutione.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur de peccato dubio, dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in decimo quinto de Trinitate¹⁵, non solum est mendacium dicere scienter falsum, sed etiam asserere dubium, quia lingua a corde discordat. Quando ergo dubitat, utrum sit mortale; dicendum, quod sicut dubitat, ita dubitando debet confiteri; tamen debet conteri et poenam sustinere, ac si esset mortale, et tunc mens assecuratur, et in nullo veritati praeiudicatur. Et sic patet responsio ad obiecta.

Ad illud tamen, quod ultimo obiicitur ad partem oppositam, quod facit medicum errare etc.; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia aggravatio poenitentiae non aggravat naturam, sed alleviat; non sic est in temporali et corporali medicina; nocet enim, si non adsit morbi materia. Sed ista est ratio, quia lingua discordat a conscientia; et illud¹⁶ praecipue exigitur in illa confessione recte et ordinate facta.

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English Translation

p. 562

Question II. Whether it is licit to add anything in confession.

Secondly it is asked whether it is licit to add anything in confession. And that it is not, seems [shown]:

1. Because Augustine says in the book On Penitence, and it is contained in the text [of the Master]¹: « If for the sake of humility you lie, you become what you avoided »: if therefore someone for the sake of humility accuses himself more than he deserved; it seems that from this he incurs a fault.

2. Likewise², he is an unjust witness who accuses another in that in which he is not culpable, however good an intention he may have; but a man in confession testifies against himself: therefore if he accuses himself in that in which he has not sinned; it seems that he acts unjustly.

3. Likewise, nothing is to be alleged in a public judgment which cannot be manifestly proved: therefore by parallel reasoning nothing is to be imposed in the penitential judgment which cannot be proved by a right witness; but the witness is conscience: therefore nothing is to be said except that of which conscience accuses: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, confession is for directing the spiritual physician, just as the knowledge of bodily sickness is for directing the bodily physician; but he makes the physician err who says that he has a disease which he does not have, just as much as one who says that he does not have one which he has: therefore just as he sins who omits³, so [does] he who adds.

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On the contrary: 1. Gregory⁴: « It belongs to good minds to acknowledge a fault there where there is no fault »: therefore if a man can and ought to accuse himself according as he acknowledges himself; and a good mind can reckon itself more culpable than it is in truth: it seems that he can accuse himself more than [the matter] is in reality.

2. Likewise, he who is contrite more than he deserved, and makes satisfaction by punishing himself beyond what he deserved, acts justly and⁵ laudably and well: therefore by parallel reasoning he who accuses himself beyond what he sinned acts well.

3. Likewise, confession is for the humiliation of the confessing one, and this through accusation; but no one can humble himself too much, even if he subject himself to all for God's sake⁶: therefore by parallel reasoning no one can accuse himself too much.

4. Likewise, suppose that someone has committed some sin, about which he doubts whether it is mortal or venial; I ask in what manner he ought to confess it; and it seems [he should confess it] as mortal, because « in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen⁷ »; otherwise, if he confesses it as venial, he commits himself to risk; but it is possible that this sin is only venial: therefore he can confess a venial sin as mortal: therefore [it is licit] to add to the confession in accusing himself.

Conclusion

In confession it is not licit to add anything, when the testimony of conscience opposes; yet an addition beyond the truth of the matter, conscience however being in accord with the tongue, can be meritorious.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted beforehand that to lie and to say what is false differ. For to lie is when the voice expresses something other than the mind perceives, even if through the voice the truth is said in reality; to say what is false is when the voice is at variance with the thing signified⁸. To lie indeed, because it always implies an abuse of the sign and a deviation of the man as to the intellective and the exterior power, between which there is discord, is always evil and so evil in itself, that it can be clothed by no good circumstance so that it be done well, as Augustine says in the book Against Lying⁹. But to say what is false can frequently be meritorious, when the mind is deceived and so believes [it] to be as it speaks, as the Apostle said that he was about to set out for Spain, in Romans fifteen¹⁰.

If therefore you ask whether it is licit to add to the confession; it must be answered that either you are speaking with respect to the testimony of conscience, or with respect to the conformity of truth in the thing. If with respect to conscience, so that conscience accuses less, and the voice more; thus it is a sin and a lie, and the merit of the confession is lost, in which there ought to have been a truthful word, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus thirty-seven¹¹: Before all things let a true word go before thee. A word is truthful when the tongue expresses that which conscience perceives. But if you understand of the addition with respect to the truth of the thing, in such a way that conscience is not at variance with the tongue; it must then be said that such an addition can be meritorious. For he who believes himself to have gravely offended in small matters, and so confesses, as though he had gravely offended; has without doubt profited¹² much.

The arguments, therefore, proceeding to the first part conclude that one cannot nor ought to add beyond the testimony of conscience. — The arguments to the second part proceed insofar as in the addition the tongue agrees with conscience; and thus it is licit to add, because no prejudice is done to the truth, while the truth of the mind and of the mouth is joined together with the humility of the heart.

1. 2. And thus is understood that [saying] of Gregory: « of good minds » etc.; similarly also the following [argument] about contrition and punishment and addition. — Yet it could be said that contrition and punishment and confession are not alike: because confession is an act of truth and against this no one can say anything which is not false and a prejudice to the truth; it is not so concerning punishment, because one can justly bear a punishment, even one he did not deserve, for the glory of God, or for the salvation of the neighbor, or for his own greater progress; and this belongs to abundant justice. But truth ought neither to fall short nor to superabound, because it is the rectitude of the intellect¹³, and this rectitude is indivisible; but the rectitude of the will has latitude, therefore [a thing] done is more and less just; but [a thing] said is not more and less true, unless that be called truer which is more lasting, as the necessary and perpetual [is truer] than the contingent and momentary.

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3. To that which is objected, that confession is for humiliation; it must be said that it is not in every way for humiliation, but through¹⁴ accusation, which ought to have truth as its origin or companion to this end, that it be right. And it does not follow that if humility has no excess in self-estimation, that truth has no excess in speech.

4. To that which is asked about the doubtful sin, it must be said that, as Augustine says in the fifteenth [book] On the Trinity¹⁵, it is not only a lie to say knowingly what is false, but also to assert a doubtful thing [as certain], because the tongue is at variance with the heart. When therefore he doubts whether it is mortal; it must be said that just as he doubts, so doubtingly ought he to confess; yet he ought to be contrite and to bear the punishment, as if it were mortal, and then the mind is reassured, and in nothing is the truth prejudiced. And thus the response to the objections is evident.

To that, however, which is objected last on behalf of the opposite part, that it makes the physician err etc.; it must be said that it is false, because the aggravation of penance does not aggravate nature, but relieves it; it is not so in temporal and bodily medicine; for it harms, if the matter of the disease be not present. But this is the reason: because the tongue is at variance with conscience; and that¹⁶ is required above all in that confession made rightly and in orderly fashion.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Hic c. 8, ubi secundum textum originalem (non in libro de Poenitentia, sed in Serm. 181. c. 4. n. 5.), quem sequitur Vat., post mentiris plura adduntur.
Here c. 8, where, according to the original text (not in the book On Penitence, but in Sermon 181, c. 4, n. 5), which the Vatican edition follows, after mentiris [you lie] more is added.
2
Cod. aa Item, in foro iudiciali. — Cfr. August., I. de Civ. Dei, c. 20, ubi docet, nulli licere falsum testimonium dicere adversus se ipsum.
Codex aa [reads] Item, in foro iudiciali [Likewise, in the judicial forum]. — Cf. Augustine, City of God book I, c. 20, where he teaches that it is licit to no one to give false testimony against himself.
3
Codd. V W diminuit, cod. bb dimidiat.
Codices V W [read] diminuit [he diminishes], codex bb dimidiat [he halves].
4
Vide supra pag. 30, nota 1.
See above, page 30, note 1.
5
Pro iuste et codd. I K certe.
For iuste et [justly and] codices I K [read] certe [surely].
6
Eccli. 7, 19: Humilia valde spiritum tuum. Cfr. Bernard., Serm. 37. in Cantic. n. 7.
Ecclesiasticus 7:19: Humble thy spirit very much. Cf. Bernard, Sermon 37 on the Canticle, n. 7.
7
Innocent. III. in C. Illud Dominus (5.), X. de Clerico excommun. (lib. V. tit. 27.): In dubiis via est eligenda tutior. — Pro pars cod. bb via. In fine arg. pro ad confessionem in cod. E secunda manus substituit in confessione.
Innocent III in the chapter Illud Dominus (5), [Decretals] X, On the Excommunicated Cleric (book V, title 27): In doubtful matters the safer way is to be chosen. — For pars [part] codex bb [reads] via [way]. At the end of the argument, for ad confessionem [to the confession] in codex E a second hand has substituted in confessione [in confession].
8
In cod. aa additur solum, ita quod non a mente.
In codex aa is added solum, ita quod non a mente [only, in such a way that [it does] not [proceed] from the mind].
9
Ostendit enim August. in hoc libro, Priscillianistas errasse asserentes, pro occultanda religione religiosos debere mentiri (cfr. III. Sent. d. 38. q. 1. seq.).
For Augustine shows in this book that the Priscillianists erred in asserting that, for the sake of concealing religion, the religious ought to lie (cf. III Sentences, d. 38, q. 1 ff.).
10
Vers. 24. et 28. Vide III. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. — Inferius post loqueris in cod. X secunda manus supplevit de additione.
Verses 24 and 28 [Romans 15]. See III Sentences, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5. — Below, after loqueris [you speak] in codex X a second hand supplied de additione [concerning the addition].
11
Vers. 20: Ante omnia opera verbum etc.
Verse 20 [Ecclesiasticus 37]: Before all works a word etc.
12
Edd. cum aliquot codd. proficit. Inferius pro testimonium cod. N testificationem.
The editions with some codices [read] proficit [profits]. Below, for testimonium [testimony] codex N [reads] testificationem [testification].
13
Vide Anselm., Dialog. de veritate, c. 2. seqq. Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.
See Anselm, Dialogue On Truth, c. 2 ff. Cf. also tom. I, page 707, note 5.
14
Vat. propter.
The Vatican edition [reads] propter [on account of].
15
Colligi potest ex c. 11. n. 20. Clarius habetur in Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6. et de Mendacio, c. 3. n. 3. seq. (cfr. III. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 3. seq., et Comment. q. 1.). — Inferius post utrum sit mortale cod. bb supplet aut non. Subinde pro conteri Vat. cum non paucis codd. perperam confiteri.
It can be gathered from c. 11, n. 20. It is found more clearly in the Enchiridion c. 18, n. 6, and On Lying, c. 3, n. 3 ff. (cf. III Sentences, the text of the Master, d. XXXVIII, c. 3 ff., and the Commentary, q. 1). — Below, after utrum sit mortale [whether it is mortal] codex bb supplies aut non [or not]. Then for conteri [to be contrite] the Vatican edition with not a few codices wrongly [reads] confiteri [to confess].
16
Scilicet, quod lingua non discordet a conscientia. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
Namely, that the tongue should not be at variance with conscience. See the scholion to the preceding question. ---