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Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
p. 407

Quaestio II. Utrum necesse sit conteri de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis teneatur homo conteri, aut possit de talibus sine poenitentia salvari.

Et quod teneatur conteri, videtur:

1. Quia, si aliquis peccet et post cadat in furiam ante poenitentiam1, non potest postmodum iustificari2; et huius ratio est, quia non potest de peccatis poenitere: ergo si furiosus non excusatur, nec obliviosus.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios quarto47: Nihil mihi conscius sum etc.; Glossa: « Quia potest latere quod nescio »: ergo latentia peccati impedit iustificationem; sed hoc non esset, nisi de illo teneretur poenitere: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod in generali tenetur; hoc non solvit, quia in generali non latet, immo quilibet debet reputare, se fuisse peccatorem.

3. Item, quod teneatur in speciali, videtur: quia si non esset oblitus, teneretur poenitere in speciali: ergo esto, quod ex culpa inciderit in oblivionem et ex negligentia, si non reportat commodum de malitia3, adhuc tenetur.

Item, quaero, quid sit conteri sive poenitere in generali. Si sub conditione, ut: doleo, si feci; similiter potest homo poenitere de his quae non fecit, sicut de his quae fecit.

Contra:

1. Aliquis ita oblitus est, quod non potest recordari, quia memoria non est in nostra potestate: ergo si non tenetur ad impossibile2, non tenetur ad recordari; sed non potest poenitere nisi de malis, quae recordatur: ergo nec de his.

2. Item, si facit homo quod in se est, Deus facit quod in se est: sed possibile est, istum facere quod in se est sine recordatione: ergo possibile est facere quod in se est sine poenitentia: ergo possibile est iustificari sine poenitentia: ergo non tenetur poenitere.

3. Item, aliquis est paratus dolere de omnibus et non dolet vel poenitet de his, nisi quia non recordatur: ergo oblivio introducta est impedimentum: si ergo dolet de oblivione, removetur impedimentum: ergo iustificatur.

p. 408

4. Item, esto quod totum oblitus sit in generali et particulari, quia nunquam recordatur, se offendisse; talis non potest poenitere nec in generali nec in speciali, et tamen potest iustificari, quia est viator et potest demereri: ergo non oportet, quod de illis poeniteat.

Conclusio. De peccatis commissis et oblitis necesse est conteri in generali, non autem in speciali.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod oblitus aut est oblitus omnino4, ita quod non recordatur nec in generali nec in speciali, aut est oblitus in speciali, sed tamen in generali recordatur. Quando est oblitus in speciali, tamen recordatur in generali; dico, quod tenetur poenitere et conteri in generali de negligentia sua, propter quam venit in illam oblivionem; et tenetur facere quod in se est, ut recordetur in speciali vel per recogitationem, vel per orationem. — Si autem sit omnino oblitus, adhuc tenetur conteri in generali. — Et voco conteri in generali non sub conditione, sed sub existimatione probabili. Debet enim homo probabiliter credere, quod in multis offendit3, quorum non recordatur; et si ex hac existimatione doleat, sicut si certus esset, contritus est et poenitens1. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes monstrantes, quod non est necesse conteri in speciali sive poenitere. — Nec valet illud quod ultimo opponitur, quod nec in generali tenetur, quia totum est oblitus. Dico enim, quod totum, quod est oblitus certitudinaliter, potest cognoscere probabiliter.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod oportet specialiter, per simile de furioso; responsio est, quod5 furiosus nec generaliter nec specialiter potest poenitere; et nullus iustificatur sine poenitentia vel in generali, vel in speciali.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum latens impedit iustificationem; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo certitudinem iustificationis, quia non est certus de iustitia, eo quod non est certus de culpa.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod reportat commodum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia debet dolere in generali de illis et praeterea de oblivione; et iterum, gravius punitur a Deo, quam si non fuisset oblitus, tamen via salutis non praecluditur.

Ultimum de generalitate patet: quia poenitere in generali non est per conditionem, sed per certitudinem de peccatis commissis, quia scit, se aliquando peccasse, sed tamen non recolit, quo peccato; aut per praesumtionem probabilem, quae aliquando tantum dolorem generat in homine, sicut certitudo peccati, et tantundem valet5.

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English Translation
p. 407

Question II. Whether it is necessary to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterwards forgotten.

Secondly it is asked whether a man is bound to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterwards forgotten, or whether he can be saved with respect to such sins without penitence.

And that he is bound to be contrite seems so:

1. Because, if someone sins and afterwards falls into madness before penitence1, he cannot afterwards be justified2; and the reason for this is that he cannot repent of his sins: therefore if the madman is not excused, neither is the forgetful man.

2. Likewise, in the fourth chapter of First Corinthians47: I am conscious to myself of nothing etc.; the Gloss: « Because what I do not know can lie hidden »: therefore the latency of a sin impedes justification; but this would not be so unless one were bound to repent of it: therefore etc. If you say that one is bound in a general way, this does not resolve it, because in a general way it does not lie hidden — indeed everyone ought to reckon that he has been a sinner.

3. Likewise, that one is bound in particular seems so: because if he had not forgotten, he would be bound to repent in particular: therefore granted that he should have fallen into forgetfulness through fault and through negligence, if he does not derive an advantage from his malice3, he is still bound.

Likewise, I ask what it is to be contrite or to repent in a general way. If under a condition, as: I grieve, if I did it; then likewise a man can repent of those things which he has not done, just as of those which he has done.

On the contrary:

1. Someone has so forgotten that he cannot remember, because memory is not in our power: therefore if he is not bound to the impossible2, he is not bound to remember; but he cannot repent except of the evils which he remembers: therefore neither of these.

2. Likewise, if a man does what is in him, God does what is in Him: but it is possible for this man to do what is in him without remembering: therefore it is possible to do what is in him without penitence: therefore it is possible to be justified without penitence: therefore he is not bound to repent.

3. Likewise, someone is prepared to grieve over all things, and he does not grieve or repent of these except because he does not remember: therefore the forgetfulness that has come in is an impediment: if therefore he grieves over the forgetfulness, the impediment is removed: therefore he is justified.

p. 408

4. Likewise, granted that he has wholly forgotten both in a general and in a particular way, because he never remembers that he has offended; such a one cannot repent either in a general or in a particular way, and yet he can be justified, because he is a wayfarer and can earn demerit: therefore it is not required that he repent of those things.

Conclusion. Concerning sins committed and forgotten it is necessary to be contrite in a general way, but not in particular.

I respond: It must be said that the forgetful man is either wholly forgetful4, so that he remembers neither in a general nor in a particular way, or he is forgetful in particular, but nevertheless remembers in a general way. When he is forgetful in particular, yet remembers in a general way; I say that he is bound to repent and to be contrite in a general way over his negligence, on account of which he came into that forgetfulness; and he is bound to do what is in him, that he may remember in particular, whether by recollection or by prayer. — But if he is wholly forgetful, he is still bound to be contrite in a general way. — And I call being contrite in a general way not under a condition, but under a probable estimation. For a man ought probably to believe that he has offended in many things3 of which he does not remember; and if from this estimation he grieves, just as if he were certain, he is contrite and penitent1. — Therefore the arguments showing that it is not necessary to be contrite in particular, or to repent, are to be conceded. — Nor does that hold which is objected last, that he is not bound even in a general way because he has wholly forgotten. For I say that the whole which he has forgotten with certainty he can know probably.

1. To that which is objected to the opposite, that it is required specially, by the likeness of the madman; the response is that5 the madman can repent neither generally nor specially; and no one is justified without penitence, either in a general or in a particular way.

2. To that which is objected, that a hidden sin impedes justification; it must be said that it is false — rather it impedes the certitude of justification, because he is not certain of his righteousness, in that he is not certain of his guilt.

3. To that which is objected, that he derives an advantage; it must be said that it is false, because he ought to grieve in a general way over those things and besides over the forgetfulness; and again, he is punished more gravely by God than if he had not forgotten, yet the way of salvation is not cut off.

The last point about generality is clear: because to repent in a general way is not by a condition, but by certainty concerning sins committed, because he knows that he has at some time sinned, yet does not recall by what sin; or by a probable presumption, which sometimes generates as much grief in a man as the certainty of sin, and is worth just as much5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Vide infra d. 21. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.
    See below, d. 21, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.
  2. 2
    Psalm. 24, 7. — Superius verbis quam fecit non pauci codd. interserunt sibi.
    Psalm 24:7. — Above, after the words which he did, not a few codices insert to himself.
  3. 3
    Dist. 22. a. 2. q. 3.
    Distinction 22, a. 2, q. 3.
  4. 4
    Ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. satis.
    Edition 1, with several codices, reads enough.
  5. 5
    Respicitur Iac. 3, 2: In multis enim offendimus omnes.
    Reference is to James 3:2: For in many things we all offend.
  6. 6
    Psalm. 18, 13. — Superius pro etiam in adulto secunda manus in cod. X substituit etiam in adulta aetate.
    Psalm 18:13. — Above, in place of also in an adult, a second hand in codex X substitutes also in adult age.
  7. 7
    Vers. 4. — De Glossa quae est apud Lyranum interlinearis, vide supra pag. 210, nota 10.
    Verse 4. — On the Gloss which is found in Lyranus as interlinear, see above, page 210, note 10.
  8. 1
    Cfr. supra pag. 103, nota 11.
    Cf. above, page 103, note 11.
  9. 2
    Secundum regulam iuris supra pag. 234, nota 6. allegatam.
    According to the rule of law cited above, page 234, note 6.
  10. 3
    Vide supra pag. 407, nota 5. verba Iacobi. — Codd. E1 S T addunt Deum. Inferius post contritus est cod. L omittit et, pro quo cod. E vel.
    See above, page 407, note 5, the words of James. — Codices E1, S, T add God. Below, after he is contrite codex L omits and, in place of which codex E reads or.
  11. 4
    Scil. in fundam. — Inferius post quod totum codd. omittunt quod est.
    Namely, in the fundament. — Below, after that the whole the codices omit which is.
  12. 5
    In cod. X secunda manus addidit non est simile, quia. — Sive: impedit solum. — Cod. U non est poenitere sub conditione. Mox post sed Vat. addit aut. Inferius pro probabilem in codd. plurimis substituitur probare, in ed. 1 potest probare. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    In codex X a second hand added it is not alike, because. — Or: it impedes only. — Codex U reads it is not to repent under a condition. Soon after but the Vatican edition adds or. Below, in place of probable in most codices to prove is substituted, and in edition 1 can prove. — See the scholion on the preceding question.
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4 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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