Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
Articulus III. De poenitentia post baptismum de venialibus.
Quaestio I. Utrum veniale peccatum possit fieri mortale.
Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum veniale peccatum possit fieri mortale. Et quod sic,
1. Per complacentiam specialiter, videtur: Augustinus1: «Nihil adeo est veniale, quod non fiat mortale, dum placet». — Item, quod per multitudinem: Augustinus de Poenitentia2: «Quamvis singula non letali vulnere ferire sentiantur; tamen omnia simul congregata, velut scabies, eo quod plura sunt, necant».
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia complacentia est plenus consensus; sed delectatio, quae est venialis, adveniente consensu, fit mortalis: ergo veniale per complacentiam fit mortale. Minor patet, quia delectatio morosa, quae est venialis ante consensum, postea fit mortalis3.
3. Item, placitum est quietata voluntas; sed quiescens in creatura fruitur illa, et ita peccat mortaliter4: ergo veniale fit per complacentiam mortale.
4. Item, quod per multitudinem, videtur: quia amor mortalis non excedit amorem venialis in infinitum; sed finitum aliquoties sumtum reddit esse finitum5: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod excedit in infinitum, quia hoc est supra Deum, et illud infra; contra: ab eadem virtute non exit motus in infinitum maior et minor; sed mortalis amor et venialis sunt ab eadem potentia: ergo etc.
5. Item, veniale est alicuius quantitatis, quia est maius et minus; sed omne quantum est proportionale quanto: ergo mortale, cum sit quantum, non excedit veniale improportionaliter, et sic etc.
6. Item, unum veniale disponit aliquo modo, et aliud magis; sed per maiorem dispositionem fit necessitas6: ergo necessario, ut videtur, veniale introducit mortale peccatum.
Contra: 1. Veniale et mortale specie differunt7; sed complacentia, eo quod complacentia, non mutat speciem, sed conservat: ergo unum per complacentiam non fit alterum: ergo veniale non fit mortale.
2. Item, mortale excedit veniale in infinitum, quia poena excedit poenam in infinitum8: ergo veniale infinities multiplicatum non fit mortale.
### Conclusio Peccata venialia per essentiam non fiunt mortalia, fiunt tamen interdum ratione vel pleni consensus, vel quietatae voluntatis, vel dispositionis sive pronitatis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod triplex est genus venialis peccati. Quoddam enim est ex subreptione9; et ideo veniale, quia vitari non potest tunc. Quoddam ex cogitatione sine voluntate sive consensu, et ideo veniale, quia non plene consentit homo, ut in cogitatione de muliere et delectatione citra consensum in delectationem. Quoddam est veniale cum ratione et consensu; sed tamen ideo est veniale, quia non est deordinatio contra praeceptum, ut ebrietas et mendacium iocosum.
Cum igitur quaeritur, utrum veniale fiat mortale; si intelligat10, quod haec culpa per essentiam fiat illa, nulla est quaestio, quia hoc est impossibile. — Si intelligat, quod illud quod alias erat veniale, possit esse mortale, ut mendacium iocosum et ebrietas; dico, quod quoddam non fit mortale, quoddam fit mortale per complacentiam. Primum igitur veniale, quod committitur praeter rationem, semper est veniale; sed secundo modo veniale per delectationem citra consensum fit mortale per consensum, et ita per complacentiam, secundum quod placitum dicitur consensus plenus. Tertium veniale quod est per delectationem citra Deum, potest fieri mortale per libidinem magnam, sicut mendacium iocosum; et hoc fit mortale secundum placitum, secundum quod placitum dicitur quietata voluntas. Et quia iteratio actus disponit ad libidinem et complacentiam; hinc est, quod Augustinus
dicit in pluribus locis11, quod plura venialia obruunt, non per se, sed quia disponunt ad libidinem, non dispositione necessitatis, sed pronitatis.
Ad fundamenta: Ad illud ergo quod12 probatur, quod venialia non fiunt mortalia per essentiam; dicendum, quod verum est.
Ad 1. Sed quod obiicit in contrarium de Augustino, solutum est, quomodo intelligitur. Illud enim intelligitur sive per convenientiam in genere actus, sive per dispositionem, quia multa venialia disponunt ad libidinem et contemptum; ideo Augustinus13 comparat ea bestiis minutis, comparat guttis, comparat arenae, comparat scabiei, non quia ipsa in se faciunt naufragium, sed quia ad hoc perducunt per accidens.
Ad 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de consensu et quietata voluntate, dicendum, quod quando consensus venit, novum peccatum fit, nec fit veniale mortale, sed quod alias esset veniale, fit mortale.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per multitudinem; dicendum, quod est infinita proportio, non quia motus est infinitus intensione, sed reputatione, sicut patet in eo qui diligit ex caritate: plus diligit Deum quam denarium unum et quam in infinitum multiplicatum14; unde amor infra Deum nunquam comparabilis est amori, qui est supra Deum, secundum istum modum.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veniale est quantum; dicendum, quod quemadmodum linea est in se quanta, sed comparatione superficiei non habet quantitatem15; sic veniale, etsi de se quantum sit, comparatione mortalis caret quantitate.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dispositione, dicendum, quod voluntas semper libere movetur, et ideo non disponitur dispositione, quae sit necessitas, sed tantum dispositione, quae est pronitas; non sic natura, quae ad unam partem est determinata16. — Et alia ratio est in habente caritatem, quia sustentatur a virtute infinita; et talis per nullum pondus compellitur cadere, salva sustentatione; voluntas enim semper libera est et, quamdiu est in via, vertibilis est; et ideo nunquam inevitabiliter, dum est in via, ad malum culpae disponitur. Et sic patet illud.
I. Ad quaestionem, utrum veniale possit fieri mortale, respondetur communiter, quod nec idem numero actus potest fieri ex veniali mortale, nec plura venialia per se constituunt unum mortale, nisi dispositive vel ex parte consensus; sed aliter dicendum de circumstantiis graviter speciem mutantibus. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 15. m. 3. a. 1. § 1; Scot., IV. Sent. d. 21. n. 3. seqq.; III. Sent. d. 39. q. unica n. 3. seq. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 3. a. 7; S. 1. 11. q. 88. a. 4. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 13; Sum. p. 11. tr. 18. q. 117. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.
II. Quaestio seq. (2.) intelligitur de necessitate absoluta poenitendi de venialibus, quam quidam aliquatenus sustinere voluerunt cum Alexandro Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3. a. 3. § 5, a. 4. § 2.), hoc duplici principio innixi, quod post vitam in purgatorio non remittatur culpa, sed tantum poena, et quod formalis actus poenitentiae requiratur ad deletionem peccati, etiam venialis. Sed de hac quaestione plerumque alii magistri tractant et diffuse disputant infra d. 21. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, ubi in scholio citantur ceteri auctores. Attamen hoc loco rem tractat B. Albert., a. 54. 55.
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Article III. On penance after baptism concerning venial sins.
Question I. Whether a venial sin can become mortal.
First, then, it is asked whether a venial sin can become mortal. And that it can, is shown thus:
1. By complacency specially, it seems so: Augustine1: «Nothing is so venial that it does not become mortal, while it pleases». — Likewise, that it does so by multitude: Augustine, On Penance2: «Although individually they are not felt to strike with a deadly wound; nevertheless all gathered together at once, like the itch, by the fact that they are many, kill».
2. Likewise, by reason it seems so: because complacency is full consent; but a pleasure that is venial, when consent comes, becomes mortal: therefore a venial sin becomes mortal through complacency. The minor is clear, because morose pleasure, which is venial before consent, afterward becomes mortal3.
3. Likewise, taking-pleasure is a will at rest; but one resting in a creature enjoys it, and so sins mortally4: therefore a venial sin becomes mortal through complacency.
4. Likewise, that it does so by multitude, it seems: because mortal love does not exceed venial love infinitely; but a finite thing taken several times yields a finite being5: therefore etc. If you say that it does exceed infinitely, because this is above God and that is below; on the contrary: from the same power there does not issue a motion infinitely greater and lesser; but mortal love and venial love are from the same potency: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, a venial sin is of some quantity, since it is greater and lesser; but every quantum is proportional to a quantum: therefore a mortal sin, since it is a quantum, does not exceed a venial sin disproportionately, and so etc.
6. Likewise, one venial sin disposes in some way, and another more; but by a greater disposition there arises necessity6: therefore necessarily, as it seems, a venial sin introduces mortal sin.
On the contrary: 1. Venial and mortal differ in species7; but complacency, in that it is complacency, does not change the species but preserves it: therefore one does not become the other through complacency: therefore a venial sin does not become mortal.
2. Likewise, a mortal sin exceeds a venial one infinitely, because its punishment exceeds the other's punishment infinitely8: therefore a venial sin multiplied infinitely does not become mortal.
### Conclusion Venial sins do not become mortal by essence; yet they do become so sometimes by reason of either full consent, or a will at rest, or disposition and proneness.
I respond: It must be said that there are three kinds of venial sin. For one is from surprise9; and it is therefore venial, because it cannot then be avoided. Another is from thought without will or consent, and it is therefore venial, because the man does not fully consent, as in a thought about a woman and a pleasure short of consent into the pleasure. Another is venial with reason and consent; but it is venial nonetheless, because there is no disorder against a precept, as drunkenness and a jesting lie.
When, therefore, it is asked whether a venial sin becomes mortal; if one means10 that this fault by its essence becomes that one, there is no question, because this is impossible. — If one means that what was otherwise venial can be mortal, as a jesting lie and drunkenness; I say that one kind does not become mortal, another kind becomes mortal through complacency. The first venial sin, then, which is committed apart from reason, is always venial; but the venial sin of the second mode, through pleasure short of consent, becomes mortal through consent, and thus through complacency, insofar as taking-pleasure is called full consent. The third venial sin, which is through pleasure short of God, can become mortal through great lust, like a jesting lie; and this becomes mortal according to taking-pleasure, insofar as taking-pleasure is called a will at rest. And because the repetition of the act disposes toward lust and complacency; hence it is that Augustine
says in many places11 that many venial sins overwhelm, not of themselves, but because they dispose toward lust, not by a disposition of necessity, but of proneness.
To the foundations: To that, then, which proves that venial sins do not become mortal by essence12; it must be said that it is true.
To 1. But as to what is objected on the contrary from Augustine, it has been solved how it is to be understood. For that is understood either by a fittingness in the genus of the act, or by disposition, because many venial sins dispose toward lust and contempt; therefore Augustine13 compares them to little beasts, compares them to drops, compares them to sand, compares them to the itch, not because they of themselves cause shipwreck, but because they lead to this accidentally.
To 2 and 3. To that which is objected about consent and the will at rest, it must be said that when consent comes, a new sin is made, and the venial sin does not become mortal, but what was otherwise venial becomes mortal.
To 4. To that which is objected about multitude; it must be said that the proportion is infinite, not because the motion is infinite in intensity, but in reckoning, as is clear in one who loves out of charity: he loves God more than a single penny and more than it multiplied to infinity14; whence a love below God is never comparable to the love that is above God, according to this manner.
To 5. To that which is objected, that a venial sin is a quantum; it must be said that just as a line is in itself something quantified, but in comparison with a surface it has no quantity15; so a venial sin, though of itself it be a quantum, in comparison with a mortal sin lacks quantity.
To 6. To that which is objected about disposition, it must be said that the will is always moved freely, and therefore is not disposed by a disposition that is a necessity, but only by a disposition that is a proneness; not so nature, which is determined to one part16. — And there is another reason in one who has charity, because he is sustained by an infinite power; and such a one is by no weight compelled to fall, his sustaining being preserved; for the will is always free and, as long as it is on the way, changeable; and therefore never, while it is on the way, is it inevitably disposed toward the evil of fault. And so that is clear.
I. To the question whether a venial sin can become mortal, the common answer is that neither can the numerically same act become mortal from venial, nor do many venial sins of themselves constitute one mortal sin, except dispositively or on the side of consent; but it must be said otherwise of circumstances that gravely change the species. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 15. m. 3. a. 1. § 1; Scotus, IV Sent. d. 21. n. 3. ff.; III Sent. d. 39. q. unica n. 3. f. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 24. q. 3. a. 7; S. I–II. q. 88. a. 4. — B. Albert, II Sent. d. 24. a. 13; Summa p. II. tr. 18. q. 117. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tarantasia, here a. 6. quaestiuncula 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.
II. The following question (2) is understood concerning the absolute necessity of doing penance for venial sins, which some wished to maintain to some degree with Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. m. 3. a. 3. § 5, a. 4. § 2.), relying on this twofold principle: that after this life the fault is not remitted in purgatory but only the punishment, and that a formal act of penance is required for the blotting-out of sin, even of venial sin. But on this question other masters for the most part treat and dispute at length below at d. 21. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, where in the scholion the other authorities are cited. Yet in this place B. Albert treats the matter, a. 54, 55.
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- 1Vide tom. II. pag. 376, nota 6.See vol. II, p. 376, note 6.
- 2Serm. 351. (qui est 1. de Poenitentia) c. 3. n. 5. Textus originalis quo plura pro eo quod plura. — Pro per multitudinem cod. S per multiplicationem.Sermon 351 (which is the 1st On Penance) c. 3, n. 5. The original text reads quo plura for eo quod plura. — For per multitudinem codex S reads per multiplicationem.
- 3Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. dub. 1. — Superius pro complacentia codd. R S T per complacentiam.Cf. II Sent. d. 24, p. II, dub. 1. — Above, for complacentia codices R S T read per complacentiam.
- 4Vide I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 2; II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. — Fide codd. A F G H V W aa substituimus quietata pro quieta, hic et infra in fine corp. et in solut. huius obiect., ubi etiam plures alii codd. legunt quietata.See I Sent. d. 1, a. 1, q. 2 and a. 3, q. 2; II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 1. — On the faith of codices A F G H V W aa we have substituted quietata for quieta, here and below at the end of the body and in the solution of this objection, where likewise several other codices read quietata.
- 5Sensus est: finitum, si aliquoties sumitur sive multiplicatur, non fit infinitum, sed alterum finitum. — Pro esse finitum ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. perperam esse infinitum, Vat. esse non finitum.The sense is: a finite thing, if it is taken or multiplied several times, does not become infinite, but another finite thing. — For esse finitum edition 1, with several codices, wrongly esse infinitum; the Vatican edition esse non finitum.
- 6Cfr. supra pag. 22, nota 9. — Superius pro aliud magis plures codd. et [codd. A W omittunt ad aliud magis]; edd. ad mortale, cod. R (1a secunda manu) ad mortale, et aliud magis.Cf. above, p. 22, note 9. — Above, for aliud magis several codices and [codices A W omit ad aliud magis]; the editions ad mortale, codex R (1, by a second hand) ad mortale, et aliud magis.
- 7Ut ostensum est II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. ad 6.As was shown in II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 1, ad 6.
- 8Vide II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 2. — Inferius post non fit codd. R S addunt etiam.See II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 2. — Below, after non fit, codices R S add etiam.
- 9Hoc, ut asseritur II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 1. in corp., dicitur veniale a veniendo, quia venit ex subreptione et pronitate naturae corruptae. Ibid. tertium genus venialis inferius adductum vocatur «veniale ex genere actus». Cfr. infra q. 2. et d. 17. p. II. dub. 7. — Aliquanto inferius pro citra consensum edd. circa consensum.This, as is asserted in II Sent. d. 21, a. 3, q. 1 in the body, is called venial from "coming" (veniendo), because it comes from surprise and the proneness of corrupted nature. There the third kind of venial, adduced below, is called «venial by the genus of the act». Cf. below q. 2 and d. 17, p. II, dub. 7. — Somewhat below, for citra consensum the editions read circa consensum.
- 10Codd. H K aa hic et paulo inferius intelligatur.Codices H K aa here and a little below read intelligatur.
- 11Epist. 263. (alias 108.) n. 8, et de Cantico novo, c. 2. n. 2, ubi exemplum ponitur de naufragio, proveniente ex humore paulatim intrante per rimas; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 12. n. 14, et Enarrat. in Ps. 39. n. 22, ubi exemplum de granis arenae, quae licet sint minuta in se, hominem obruere et opprimere possunt multiplicata; Serm. 9. (alias 96. de Tempore) c. 11. n. 17, ubi venialia bestiis minutis hominem necantibus comparantur, et Serm. 56. (alias 48. de Diversis) c. 9. n. 12, ubi assimilantur guttis minutis, quae flumina implent. — Superius pro secundum placitum codd. R S per placitum.Epist. 263 (alias 108) n. 8, and On the New Canticle, c. 2, n. 2, where the example is set of a shipwreck arising from moisture gradually entering through the cracks; on John's Gospel tr. 12, n. 14, and Enarrat. on Ps. 39, n. 22, where the example of grains of sand, which though small in themselves can, when multiplied, overwhelm and crush a man; Serm. 9 (alias 96 de Tempore) c. 11, n. 17, where venial sins are compared to little beasts killing a man, and Serm. 56 (alias 48 de Diversis) c. 9, n. 12, where they are likened to little drops that fill rivers. — Above, for secundum placitum codices R S read per placitum.
- 12Forlasse legendum quod.Perhaps to be read quod.
- 13Vide notam penultimam et supra pag. 409, nota 2. — In fine solut. pro istum modum codd. R S T iustum modum.See the penultimate note and above, p. 409, note 2. — At the end of the solution, for istum modum codices R S T read iustum modum.
- 14August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118, 72. serm. 17. n. 10: «Ut amplius diligat caritas legem Dei, quam diligit cupiditas aurum et argentum».Augustine, Enarrat. on Ps. 118, [v.] 72, serm. 17, n. 10: «So that charity may love the law of God more than cupidity loves gold and silver».
- 15Cfr. tom. III. pag. 280, nota o. — Inferius post comparatione edd. supplent tamen.Cf. vol. III, p. 280, note o. — Below, after comparatione, the editions supply tamen.
- 16Vide supra pag. 113, nota 10; Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 8.). — Aliquanto inferius voci vertibilis cod. aa praemittit semper.See above, p. 113, note 10; Aristotle, Metaph. IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 8). — Somewhat below, to the word vertibilis codex aa prefixes semper. ---