Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

Quaestio II. Utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse peccatum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini, contra Mendacium¹, qui dicit sic: « Videtur mihi omne genus mendacii esse peccatum ».

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Mendacio²:

« Aut non est credendum bonis, aut credendum est eis quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri, aut non est credendum, bonos aliquando mentiri; quorum primum est pernitiosum, secundum stultum: restat ergo, ut nunquam mentiantur boni ». Si ergo aliquis mentitur, necesse est, in quantum mentitur, esse malum: ergo essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse peccatum.

3. Item, Augustinus ibidem³: « Quisquis aliquod genus mendacii, quod peccatum non sit, esse putaverit, semetipsum turpiter decipit »: ergo redit idem quod prius.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse privationem veritatis et respectu rei et respectu intentionis⁴; sed ubicumque est intentionis obliquitas, ibi necessario est culpa: ergo necessarium est, ipsum mendacium esse peccatum.

5. Item, omnis iniquitas, essentialiter loquendo, est peccatum⁵; ubicumque autem est mendacium, ibi dolositas est, quia aliud gerit homo in corde, aliud dicit ore; ubi autem dolositas est, ibi iniquitas: ergo a primo, impossibile est, aliquod mendacium non esse peccatum.

6. Item, verba instituta sunt ad hoc, quod homo exprimat per illa illud quod mente gerit⁶; sed quicumque mentitur, utitur verbis ad contrarium eius quod mente gerit: ergo quicumque mentitur, utitur verbis ad contrarium eius, ad quod instituta sunt; et omnis qui utitur re ad contrarium eius, ad quod instituta est, necessario illa abutitur; et omnis qui abutitur, peccat: ergo omnis qui dicit mendacium, peccat.

Sed contra hoc obiicitur: 1. Primo per exempla: quia, Genesis vigesimo secundo⁷, Abraham, cum intenderet puerum immolare, dixit, se cum puero reversurum ad servos; et Isaac de uxore sua dixit, quod soror eius esset, Genesis vigesimo sexto; et de Ioseph similiter habetur exemplum, Genesis quadragesimo secundo et quadragesimo quarto. Si ergo facta Patriarcharum narrat Scriptura non sicut reprehendenda, sed sicut imitanda; et ipsi mentiti fuerunt; videtur, quod mentiri possit aliquis sine peccato.

2. Item, in Scripturis proponuntur multae locutiones, quae secundum intentionem litterae falsae sunt, sicut patet de eo quod dicitur Iudicum nono⁸: quod ierunt ligna ad rhamnum etc.; et disputantes proponunt multa, quae sciunt esse falsa: cum ergo sacra Scriptura absque aliquo peccato fuerit data et scripta et inspirata, et disputatio ad veritatem inquirendam sit laudabilis et meritoria; videtur, quod aliqua mendacia dici possint absque ulla culpa: ergo non est essentiale ipsi mendacio esse peccatum.

3. Item, secundum quod dicit Ambrosius⁹, « non solum est mendacium in verbis, sed etiam in operibus simulatis »; sed contingit facere opera simulata absque aliquo peccato, sicut fecit Iosue, qui simulavit, se fugere ante habitatores Hai; et David, qui simulavit se stultum ante regem Achis; et Iehu, qui simulavit se cultorem Baal; et isti non peccaverunt, sed potius commendantur: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod possit fieri mendacium in verbis sine peccato.

4. Item, maius malum est homicidium et furtum, quam sit mendacium; sed furtum et homicidium potest bene fieri, nec est necessarium semper esse peccatum — sicut patet de his qui occidunt auctoritate legis, et furantur tempore necessitatis, vel ex praecepto Domini, sicut filii Israel¹⁰ — ergo videtur multo fortius, quod mendacium aliquod possit bene fieri: ergo non est essentiale ei esse peccatum.

5. Item, mendacium, quo quis mentitur proximo, est contra mandatum secundae tabulae; sed in mandatis secundae tabulae, ut dicit Bernardus¹¹, potest Dominus dispensare, ut bene fiant: ergo et in ipso mendacio: igitur non videtur, quod essentiale sit ei esse peccatum.

6. Item, possibile est, quod quis mentiatur propter castitatem alterius conservandam, quem diligit ex caritate; sed omne quod fit ex caritate, fit bene et meritorie¹², et tale non est peccatum: ergo si possibile est mentiri ex caritate, possibile est, mendacium non esse peccatum.

Conclusio.

Omne mendacium est peccatum; immo hoc ipsi ita est essentiale, ut nullo pacto, nullo fine, nulla dispensatione, sive humana sive divina, possit bene fieri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio omne mendacium est peccatum; et adeo est ipsi mendacio essentiale esse peccatum, ut nullo pacto, nullo fine, nulla dispensatione, nec humana nec divina, possit fieri bene. Et hoc Augustinus¹³ dicit expresse et nititur multipliciter probare; et in hoc communiter concordant doctores. Sed rationem huius difficile est assignare, et ad hoc possumus niti diversimode.

Una namque ratio reddi potest ex parte eius, contra quod est mendacium. Mendacium enim est contra Veritatem, homicidium vero et furtum contra creaturam. Deus autem contra suam veritatem non potest facere¹⁴ — nec aliquis iuste contra divinam veritatem ire — quamvis possit quamlibet creaturam alii pro voto subiicere et eam disponere et ordinare. Ideo licet possibile sit dispensare in homicidio et furto, non tamen in mendacio. — Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficere, quia non omne mendacium est contra Veritatem increatam. Sicut enim est bonitas creata et increata, ita etiam et veritas; et sicut Deus est supra creatam bonitatem, ita etiam est supra creatam veritatem: ergo sicut potest dispensare, ut aliquis destruat aliquod bonum creatum, ita tamen quod nullum fiat praeiudicium suae bonitati; ita videtur similiter de veritate.

Ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod mendacium nullo modo potest bene fieri, nec aliquo fine nec aliquo praecepto dispensativo¹⁵, quia semper manet in eo deordinatio, quae quidem est ex discordia vocis et intellectus; non sic autem est reperire in aliis — nam divinum mandatum superveniens tollit deordinationem illam quae est in homicidio et in furto — ideo magis adhaeret malitia ipsi mendacio quam furto, vel homicidio. — Sed nec adhuc videtur istud sufficere: quoniam, si Deus potest facere, duos homines discordare ab invicem sine peccato, sicut dicimus de Paulo et Barnaba¹⁶; videtur similiter, quod manente intellectus et sermonis discordia, possit ex dispensatione divina amoveri omnis culpa. Et ideo non videtur ratio sufficiens sumi ex parte discordiae intentionis et sermonis.

Et ideo adhuc est tertius modus dicendi, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse malum: aut ex genere actus, utpote cum transit actus super materiam indebitam, aut ex malitia intentionis¹⁷. Cum autem transit actus super materiam indebitam, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel respectu Dei, vel respectu proximi. Si respectu Dei; sic est malum in se et secundum se, nec ullo modo potest bene fieri, sicut est odire summum Bonum et blasphemare Deum. — Si respectu proximi, sicut est nocumentum inferre proximo in persona vel in rebus; sic est malum in se, et potest aliquo fine¹⁸ bene fieri, quia potest recta intentio supervenire ex dispensatione. — Cum autem aliquid est malum ex malitia intentionis, tunc sive sit respectu Dei, sive respectu proximi, simpliciter malum est et nullo fine potest bene fieri, quia dicit privationem debiti finis. Unde facere, hoc malum esse bonum, nihil aliud est facere, quam aliquid simul esse bonum et malum. Tale autem est mendacium. — Nam mendacium non solummodo dicit malum ex hoc, quod actus transit super materiam indebitam, sed etiam ex intentione indirecta¹⁹; quoniam ad esse mendacii ista duo concurrunt, videlicet dicere falsum et intentio fallendi. Et primum est malum in se et potest bene fieri ab eo qui ignoranter dicit falsum; ratione vero secundi est malum secundum se et nullo fine potest bene fieri, nec circa ipsum potest dispensari; sicut nullo modo potest bene fieri, quod aliquis cognoscat alienam intentione adulterandi sive ex improbitate voluntatis. — Concedendae sunt igitur secundum hoc rationes ostendentes, quod essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse peccatum, et quod ipsum mendacium est malum secundum se, sicut dicit Augustinus, quoniam de ratione sui nominis includit inordinatam intentionem, sicut ostensum est.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium per exempla veteris Testamenti, de mendacio Abrahae, Isaac et Ioseph; dicendum, quod nullus eorum mentitus est. Nam etsi Abraham vellet filium suum immolare, credebat tamen ex magnitudine fidei suae, sicut dicit Apostolus²⁰, quod Dominus eum suscitaret; sciebat enim, quod firma erat promissio, qua dictum fuerat: In Isaac vocabitur tibi semen. — Similiter nec Isaac mentitus

fuit, quia Rebecca soror erat et uxor, et dicendo, ipsam esse suam sororem, veritatem utique tacuit, sed tamen falsitatem non dixit²¹. — Similiter etiam nec Ioseph mentitus fuit, quia verba illa non dicebat affirmando, sed potius tentando, cum dicebat, eos esse exploratores. Unde potius intelligenda sunt interrogative quam affirmative. Cum autem dixit, se peritum esse in augurandi scientia; large accipitur verbum augurandi pro futurorum praevisione. Praeterea, hoc ipsum etiam interrogative dixit, potius exprimens famam populi, quam de hoc habebat, quam sibi attribuere volens famam illam²². Sic etiam et de consimilibus iudicandum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de locutionibus positis in Scriptura, dicendum, quod ea quae transumptive dicuntur, referuntur ad consequentem intellectum et pro illo intelliguntur; et quando pro illo habent veritatem, nullum est ibi mendacium. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Mendacio²³: « Quidquid figurative fit aut dicitur, non est mendacium; omnis enim enuntiatio ad id quod enuntiat, referenda est. Omne autem figurative factum aut dictum hoc enuntiat, quod significat eis quibus intelligendum prolatum est »; et sic nullum est ibi mendacium, quia non enuntiantur pro intellectu primo, sed pro secundo, qui verus est. — Sic nec in disputatione est mendacium, cum proponuntur aliqua falsa ad hoc, quod per illa deducat homo ad maius falsum, et deducendo ad maius falsum reducat ad verum. In disputationibus enim propositiones magis sunt interrogationes quam veritatis assertiones, nisi forte in doctrinalibus disputationibus, in quibus « oportet discentem credere²⁴ », ubi sola vera proponuntur, probantur et supponuntur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simulatione in facto, dicendum, quod est simulatio cautelae, et instructionis et duplicitatis. Simulatio cautelae fuit in Iehu, cum finxit se cultorem Baal, et David, qui finxit se stultum. Simulatio vero doctrinae fuit in Christo, cum finxit se longius ire, sicut dicitur Lucae ultimo²⁵; in quo erudivit discipulos officium hospitalitatis, quo coegerunt illum apud se manere, per quod meruerunt etiam illum cognoscere. Simulatio vero duplicitatis est in hypocritis, qui in signo exteriori ostendunt, se esse bonos, et interius replentur malitia²⁶. Primae duae simulationes non tenent rationem mendacii, sed tertia rationem mendacii tenet; et illa non est sine peccato. — Praeterea, non est simile de verbo et facto, quia factum non est principaliter institutum ad significandum mentis conceptum. Sermo autem ad hoc institutus est, ut sit « nuntius et interpres ipsius mentis²⁷ », et ut homo significet alteri quod est apud se, et ut constituatur veritas apud audientem, quae est apud loquentem; et ideo qui ad aliud utitur ipso sermone abutitur et incurrit peccatum mendacii. Non sic autem est semper ex parte facti.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maius peccatum est furtum et homicidium quam mendacium; dicendum, quod quamvis gravius peccatum sit utrumque eorum, quando fit mala intentione et malo fine; quia tamen contingit, illa a malo fine separari, ideo possunt fieri. Non sic autem est in mendacio reperire, quia de ipsa nominis ratione²⁸ nominat intentionis obliquationem.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est contra mandatum secundae tabulae; dicendum, quod in mandatis secundae tabulae quantum ad actum bene contingit, Deum dispensare, sed quantum ad deordinationem intentionis nunquam, ut aliquis excusetur a peccato propter divinum praeceptum, manente intentione deordinata.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui ex caritate movetur ad mentiendum; dicendum, quod caritas praesupponit veritatem, unde ad nihil movet, quod veritati repugnet, veritati dico ex parte animae. Unde dicit Bernardus²⁹, quod ad hoc, quod opus sit laudabile, necesse est, quod sit « caritas in intentione et veritas in electione ». Et quia veritas non servatur in prolatione mendacii; hinc est, quod mendacium ex caritate non potest dici. Sicut enim ex caritate non potest scienter committi malum, quod quidem maneat malum, ut inde eveniat bonum³⁰; sic etiam non potest ex caritate dici falsum,

ut inde sequatur verum aut bonum. Et est simile: quoniam, sicut vis operativa deservit affectivae, sic vis interpretativa deservit intellectivae; et sicut finis affectionis est bonum, ita finis intelligentiae est verum³¹. Sicut ergo nullum opus potest ex caritate fieri, nisi quis intendat bonum, et illud opus sit ordinabile ad bonum; sic etiam nullus sermo potest ex caritate proferri, nisi in illius sermonis prolatione primo intendat³² verum. Et quia mendacium ordinatum est ad contrarium veri, videlicet ad indicandum falsum ex ipsa intentione proferentis; ideo non potest fieri ex caritate nec meritorie, sed semper male. Et haec ratio tacta fuit in ipsa responsione facta ad quaestionem³³ 3.

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Question II. Whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin.

Secondly it is asked whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin. And that it is, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, Against Lying¹, who says thus: « It seems to me that every kind of lie is a sin ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Lying²:

« Either one must not believe good men, or one must believe that those whom we believe ought sometimes to lie, or one must not believe that good men ever lie; of which the first is pernicious, the second foolish: it remains, then, that good men never lie ». If therefore someone lies, it is necessary, insofar as he lies, that he be evil: therefore it is essential to a lie itself to be a sin.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the same place³: « Whoever shall have thought that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin, basely deceives himself »: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason: because it is essential to a lie itself to be a privation of truth both with respect to the thing and with respect to the intention⁴; but wherever there is obliquity of intention, there is necessarily fault: therefore it is necessary that the lie itself be a sin.

5. Likewise, every iniquity, speaking essentially, is a sin⁵; but wherever there is a lie, there is deceit, because a man bears one thing in his heart, says another with his mouth; but where there is deceit, there is iniquity: therefore from the first, it is impossible that any lie not be a sin.

6. Likewise, words were instituted for this, that a man should express through them what he bears in his mind⁶; but whoever lies uses words contrary to what he bears in his mind: therefore whoever lies uses words contrary to that for which they were instituted; and everyone who uses a thing contrary to that for which it was instituted, necessarily abuses it; and everyone who abuses [a thing], sins: therefore everyone who utters a lie, sins.

On the contrary, it is objected: 1. First, by examples: because, in Genesis 22⁷, Abraham, when he intended to immolate the boy, said that he would return to the servants with the boy; and Isaac said of his wife that she was his sister, in Genesis 26; and concerning Joseph likewise an example is had, in Genesis 42 and 44. If therefore Scripture narrates the deeds of the Patriarchs not as to be reprehended, but as to be imitated; and they themselves lied; it seems that someone can lie without sin.

2. Likewise, in the Scriptures many expressions are set forth which according to the intention of the letter are false, as is plain from what is said in Judges 9⁸: that the trees went to the bramble etc.; and disputants set forth many things which they know to be false: since therefore sacred Scripture was given and written and inspired without any sin, and disputation for inquiring after truth is praiseworthy and meritorious; it seems that some lies can be told without any fault: therefore it is not essential to a lie itself to be a sin.

3. Likewise, according as Ambrose says⁹, « there is a lie not only in words, but also in simulated deeds »; but it happens that one does simulated deeds without any sin, as Joshua did, who simulated that he fled before the inhabitants of Ai; and David, who simulated that he was mad before King Achish; and Jehu, who simulated that he was a worshipper of Baal; and these did not sin, but are rather commended: therefore it seems by like reasoning that a lie can be made in words without sin.

4. Likewise, homicide and theft are a greater evil than a lie is; but theft and homicide can be done well, nor is it necessary that they always be a sin — as is plain concerning those who kill by the authority of the law, and steal in time of necessity, or by the command of the Lord, as did the children of Israel¹⁰ — therefore it seems much more strongly that some lie can be done well: therefore it is not essential to it to be a sin.

5. Likewise, the lie by which one lies to a neighbor is against a commandment of the second table; but in the commandments of the second table, as Bernard says¹¹, the Lord can dispense, so that they may be done well: therefore also in the lie itself: therefore it does not seem that it is essential to it to be a sin.

6. Likewise, it is possible that someone lie for the sake of preserving the chastity of another, whom he loves out of charity; but everything that is done out of charity is done well and meritoriously¹², and such a thing is not a sin: therefore if it is possible to lie out of charity, it is possible that a lie not be a sin.

Conclusion.

Every lie is a sin; nay, this is so essential to it that by no means, by no end, by no dispensation, whether human or divine, can it be done well.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt every lie is a sin; and it is so essential to a lie itself to be a sin that by no means, by no end, by no dispensation, neither human nor divine, can it be done well. And this Augustine¹³ says expressly and strives to prove in many ways; and in this the doctors commonly agree. But the reason for this is difficult to assign, and toward this we can strive in diverse ways.

For one reason can be rendered on the part of that against which a lie is. For a lie is against Truth, but homicide and theft are against a creature. Now God cannot act against his own truth¹⁴ — nor can anyone justly go against the divine truth — although he can subject any creature to another at his pleasure and dispose and order it. Therefore although it is possible to dispense in homicide and theft, nevertheless not in a lie. — But this reason does not seem to suffice, because not every lie is against uncreated Truth. For just as there is created and uncreated goodness, so too is there created and uncreated truth; and just as God is above created goodness, so too is he above created truth: therefore just as he can dispense that someone destroy some created good, yet so that no prejudice be done to his goodness; so it seems likewise concerning truth.

Therefore there is another way of speaking, that a lie can in no way be done well, neither by any end nor by any dispensative precept¹⁵, because there always remains in it a disorder, which indeed is from the discord of voice and understanding; but it is not so to be found in the others — for a supervening divine command takes away that disorder which is in homicide and theft — therefore malice adheres more to a lie itself than to theft or homicide. — But not even this yet seems to suffice: because, if God can make two men disagree with one another without sin, as we say of Paul and Barnabas¹⁶; it seems likewise that, the discord of understanding and speech remaining, all fault could be removed by divine dispensation. And therefore a sufficient reason does not seem to be taken on the part of the discord of intention and speech.

And therefore there is still a third way of speaking, that a thing is said to be evil in two ways: either from the kind of act, as when the act passes upon an undue matter, or from the malice of the intention¹⁷. But when the act passes upon an undue matter, this can be in two ways: either with respect to God, or with respect to a neighbor. If with respect to God; thus it is evil in itself and according to itself, nor can it in any way be done well, as is to hate the highest Good and to blaspheme God. — If with respect to a neighbor, as is to inflict harm on a neighbor in person or in goods; thus it is evil in itself, and can by some end¹⁸ be done well, because a right intention can supervene from a dispensation. — But when a thing is evil from the malice of the intention, then whether it be with respect to God, or with respect to a neighbor, it is absolutely evil and can by no end be done well, because it names a privation of the due end. Hence to make this evil to be good is nothing other than to make some one thing be at once good and evil. But such is a lie. — For a lie names an evil not only from this, that the act passes upon an undue matter, but also from an indirect intention¹⁹; for to the being of a lie these two concur, namely to say what is false and the intention of deceiving. And the first is evil in itself and can be done well by one who ignorantly says what is false; but by reason of the second it is evil according to itself and can by no end be done well, nor can there be a dispensation concerning it; just as in no way can it be done well that someone know another [woman] with the intention of adultery or out of depravity of will. — One must therefore concede, according to this, the reasons showing that it is essential to a lie itself to be a sin, and that the lie itself is evil according to itself, as Augustine says, since from the account of its name it includes a disordered intention, as has been shown.

1. To that indeed which is objected first to the contrary by the examples of the Old Testament, concerning the lie of Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph; it must be said that none of them lied. For although Abraham was willing to immolate his son, nevertheless he believed, from the greatness of his faith, as the Apostle says²⁰, that the Lord would raise him up; for he knew that the promise was firm, by which it had been said: In Isaac shall thy seed be called. — Likewise neither did Isaac lie,

because Rebecca was a sister and a wife, and by saying that she was his sister, he indeed kept silent the truth, but yet did not utter a falsehood²¹. — Likewise too neither did Joseph lie, because he was not saying those words by affirming, but rather by testing, when he was saying that they were spies. Hence they are rather to be understood interrogatively than affirmatively. And when he said that he was skilled in the science of divining; the word divining is taken broadly for the foresight of future things. Moreover, this same thing too he said interrogatively, rather expressing the report of the people which he had concerning this, than willing to attribute that report to himself²². So too concerning similar matters one must judge.

2. To that which is objected concerning the expressions set down in Scripture, it must be said that the things which are said by transference are referred to the consequent meaning and are understood for that; and when they hold truth for that, there is no lie there. And this is what Augustine says in the book On Lying²³: « Whatever is done or said figuratively is not a lie; for every enunciation is to be referred to that which it enunciates. But everything done or said figuratively enunciates this, which it signifies to those for whom it has been brought forth to be understood »; and so there is no lie there, because they are not enunciated for the first meaning, but for the second, which is true. — So too neither in disputation is there a lie, when certain false things are set forth so that through them a man may lead [another] to a greater falsehood, and by leading to a greater falsehood may lead back to truth. For in disputations the propositions are rather interrogations than assertions of truth, unless perhaps in doctrinal disputations, in which « the learner must believe²⁴ », where only true things are set forth, proved, and supposed.

3. To that which is objected concerning simulation in a deed, it must be said that there is a simulation of caution, and of instruction, and of duplicity. Simulation of caution was in Jehu, when he pretended to be a worshipper of Baal, and in David, who pretended to be mad. But simulation of teaching was in Christ, when he pretended to go further, as is said in the last [chapter] of Luke²⁵; in which he instructed his disciples in the office of hospitality, by which they compelled him to remain with them, through which they merited also to recognize him. But simulation of duplicity is in hypocrites, who in an exterior sign show that they are good, and inwardly are filled with malice²⁶. The first two simulations do not hold the account of a lie, but the third holds the account of a lie; and that is not without sin. — Moreover, it is not similar concerning word and deed, because a deed is not principally instituted to signify the concept of the mind. But speech is instituted for this, that it be « the messenger and interpreter of the mind itself²⁷ », and that a man signify to another what is with him, and that truth be constituted in the hearer, which is in the speaker; and therefore he who uses speech itself for another purpose abuses it and incurs the sin of a lie. But it is not always so on the part of a deed.

4. To that which is objected, that theft and homicide are a greater sin than a lie; it must be said that although each of them is a graver sin when it is done with a bad intention and a bad end; nevertheless, because it happens that they are separated from a bad end, therefore they can be done. But it is not so to be found in a lie, because from the very account of its name²⁸ it names the obliquity of intention.

5. To that which is objected, that it is against a commandment of the second table; it must be said that in the commandments of the second table as regards the act it happens well that God dispense, but as regards the disorder of the intention never, so that someone be excused from sin on account of the divine precept, the disordered intention remaining.

6. To that which is objected concerning him who is moved out of charity to lie; it must be said that charity presupposes truth, whence it moves to nothing that is repugnant to truth — to truth, I say, on the part of the soul. Hence Bernard says²⁹ that for a work to be praiseworthy, it is necessary that there be « charity in the intention and truth in the choice ». And because truth is not preserved in the uttering of a lie; hence it is that a lie cannot be told out of charity. For just as out of charity an evil cannot knowingly be committed, which indeed would remain evil, so that good might come of it³⁰; so too out of charity what is false cannot be said,

so that truth or good might follow from it. And there is a likeness: because, just as the operative power serves the affective, so the interpretative power serves the intellective; and just as the end of affection is good, so the end of understanding is truth³¹. Just as therefore no work can be done out of charity unless one intends the good, and that work be orderable to the good; so too no speech can be uttered out of charity unless in the uttering of that speech one first intends³² the true. And because a lie is ordered to the contrary of the true, namely to the indicating of what is false from the very intention of the one bringing it forth; therefore it cannot be done out of charity nor meritoriously, but always badly. And this reason was touched upon in the very response made to question³³ 3.

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