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Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Quis sit ille finis, ex cuius bonitate voluntas est bona, et ad quem debent referri nostrae voluntates, ut sint rectae.

Secundo quaeritur, quis sit ille finis, ex cuius bonitate voluntas est bona, et ad quem debent referri nostrae voluntates ad hoc, quod sint rectae. Et quod huiusmodi finis sit caritas, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum primo1: Finis praecepti est caritas; sed ad illum finem referendae sunt voluntates2, ad quem referuntur praecepta; si ergo caritas est finis praecepti, caritas est finis bonae voluntatis.

2. Item, ad Romanos decimo tertio3: Qui diligit proximum legem implevit; et iterum: Plenitudo legis est dilectio; sed ad illud referendae sunt voluntates, in quo consistit plenitudo et consummatio legis; si ergo caritas et dilectio est huiusmodi, patet etc.

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3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Omnis bona voluntas ad hoc ordinatur, ut homo fruatur Deo, et ad hoc, quod habeat Deum; sed nos non fruimur Deo nec habemus ipsum nisi per caritatem; ergo habere caritatem non est aliud quam habere Deum; si ergo omnis bona voluntas est ordinata ad hoc, quod habeat Deum; videtur, quod finis omnis bonae voluntatis sit ipsa caritas4.

4. Item, natura in operando finaliter intendit formam perficientem in esse naturae5: ergo voluntas in operando principaliter intendit formam perfectivam in esse moris; sed forma vel habitus perfectivus voluntatis in esse moris est ipsa caritas: ergo caritas est finis principalis omnis bonae voluntatis.

Sed contra: 1. Ad Romanos decimo6: Finis legis Christus; sed idem est finis legis et bonae voluntatis: ergo videtur, quod Christus sit principalis finis bonae voluntatis: non ergo caritas.

2. Item, Bernardus in libro de Diligendo Deo7: «De amore venitur in caritatem, et de caritate venitur ad sapientiam»: ergo sapientia est excellentius quam caritas; sed illud debet poni finis bonae voluntatis, quod est excellentissimum: ergo finis bonae voluntatis non est caritas, sed sapientia.

3. Item, finis est illud quo fruendum est; sed caritate non est fruendum, quia solo bono increato est fruendum8: ergo videtur, quod caritas non sit finis principalis bonae voluntatis. Si tu dicas, quod finis bonae voluntatis non est caritas creata, sed increata; contra, Apostolus9: Finis praecepti est caritas procedens de corde puro etc.; sed caritas procedens de corde puro et fide non ficta non est nisi caritas creata: ergo etc.

4. Item, finis bonae voluntatis est illud, quo habito, voluntas nihil ultra quaerit10; sed habita caritate, adhuc voluntas ultra quaerit aliquid, videlicet ipsum Deum; immo quanto maiorem habet caritatem, tanto magis quaerit: ergo videtur, quod caritas non habeat rationem finis.

5. Item, «quod est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus11»; sed pondus in corporibus nullo modo dicitur esse finis motus localis: ergo amor in spiritibus nullo modo dicetur esse finis appetitus rationalis, ergo nec voluntatis.

6. Item, finis et principium sunt distincta; sed caritas est radix omnium bonarum affectionum12: si ergo finis consequitur illud quod est ad finem, et caritas est radix; videtur, quod nullo modo debeat dici finis bonae voluntatis.

Conclusio

Caritas est finis omnis bonae voluntatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister13 recte dicit in eo, quod finem omnis bonae voluntatis caritatem assignat; secutus est enim in hoc doctrinam Apostoli et beati Augustini. Nam Apostolus expresse dicit, quod caritas est consummatio praecepti, et plenitudo legis. Augustinus etiam dicit in Enchiridio, quod «omnia praecepta divina referuntur ad caritatem». Et in libro de Doctrina christiana14 ostendit, quod ad caritatis mandatum commendandum ordinatur tota Scriptura; et ita caritas non tantummodo est finis bonae voluntatis, sed etiam totius sacrae Scripturae et cognitionis secundum pietatem. — Licet autem Deus, vel beatitudo, sive Christus possit dici finis bonae voluntatis; maluit tamen Magister dicere, quod caritas sit finis, pro eo quod completa ratio finiendi15 competit ipsi caritati. Cum enim tripliciter dicatur finis, videlicet finis, in quo quiescitur, et finis, quo quiescitur; et finis, quo quiescitur, dicitur dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel ut nunc; quolibet istorum modorum caritas est finis bonae voluntatis. Nam caritas increata, quae Deus est, de qua dicitur primae Canonicae Ioannis16: Deus caritas est, est finis, in quo quiescitur. Caritas vero creata et consummata, utpote caritas patriae, est finis, quo quiescitur simpliciter in Deo. Caritas vero inchoata, utpote caritas viae, est finis, quo quiescitur in Deo ut nunc. Sicut enim locatum non quiescit in loco nisi mediante pondere, sic anima in Deo non habet quietari, qui est eius locus et finis ultimus nisi mediante dilectione, quae habet considerare bonum sub ratione boni. Bonum autem sub ratione boni simul tenet rationem finis et amabilis17; et propterea intentio finis potissime attribuitur caritati. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

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Ad argumenta in oppositum:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Christus est finis praecepti; dicendum, quod per hoc non excluditur, quin caritas sit finis. Nam etsi Christus sit finis, in quo quiescitur, nihilominus caritas potest esse finis, quo quiescimus in Christo. Rursus, caritas, secundum quod est finis, in quo quiescimus, convenit toti Trinitati; et ideo simul possunt haec duo stare, quod Christus sit finis legis et caritas similiter18.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de caritate pervenitur ad sapientiam, ergo sapientia est excellentior; dicendum, quod secundum quod Bernardus loquitur ibi de sapientia, sapientia non dicit aliud donum quam caritas, sed novum statum eiusdem doni, ita quod caritas communiter accepta distinguitur contra caritatem dictam appropriate. Prout tamen caritas describitur communiter, sic continet et amorem et sapientiam; et hoc modo ponitur esse finis praecepti19.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis est illud quo fruendum est; dicendum, quod secundum quod finis dicitur dupliciter, scilicet quo quiescitur, et in quo quiescitur, sic frui aliquo dicitur dupliciter: aut sicut obiecto, aut sicut dispositivo; et utroque modo caritate fruimur. Nam caritate, quae Deus est, fruimur sicut obiecto; caritate, quae habitus est, fruimur sicut dispositivo; et sic patet, quod illud non obviat proposito20.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas habito fine suo quiescit; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando habet finem suum complete; caritas autem, etsi in via habeatur, non tamen habetur complete; Ignis enim est in Sion, et caminus in Ierusalem21. Cum autem habebitur in patria, nihil ultra quaeretur, pro eo quod per eam habebitur bonum increatum, in quo consistit finis et quietatio omnium nostrorum desideriorum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pondus in corporibus non est finis motus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia pondus reperitur in corporibus, tam in absentia loci debiti quam in praesentia; caritas autem nunquam est in anima, nisi Deo praesente. Unde omnis qui habet caritatem, habet Deum; et propterea, dum omnis nostra operatio ad habendum Deum ordinatur, ordinatur ad habendam caritatem. Non sic autem est de pondere, quia non quodlibet corpus habens pondus habet locum sibi debitum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis et principium sunt diversa; respondent aliqui, quod caritas differenti modo est principium et finis; nam principium est boni operis secundum esse inchoatum, et finis est secundum esse consummatum et perfectum. Ad hoc enim unusquisque bene operatur, ut in eo Dei amor et caritas augeatur22. — Aliter potest dici et probabilius, quod sicut modus, species et ordo super idem fundantur, et tamen modus dicit comparationem ad efficiens, et species ad exemplar, et ordo dicit comparationem ad finem23; sic caritas respectu boni operis potest habere et rationem efficientis et finis secundum diversas comparationes. Caritas enim continuat voluntatem nostram ipsi Deo ut principio moventi, et conformat ut regulae dirigenti, et coniungit ut fini quietanti; et ideo, sicut ipse Deus habet rationem efficientis, in quantum movet, et formalis, in quantum dirigit, et finalis, in quantum quietat: sic et ipsa caritas respectu operis rationem habet istius triplicis causae; nec est inconveniens, quia secundum Philosophum24 tria genera causarum possunt in unum coincidere. Et sic patet, quod etsi caritas sit principium boni operis, nihilominus potest esse finis secundum diversas comparationes. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quare caritas dicitur radix et forma virtutum et finis. Hoc enim dicitur secundum diversas comparationes nostrae voluntatis ad divinam voluntatem; dicitur etiam super hoc vinculum perfectionis25 in comparatione ad proximos, qui nobis iunguntur vinculo caritatis.

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English Translation
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Question II. What is that end from whose goodness the will is good, and to which our wills ought to be referred so that they may be right.

Secondly it is asked, what is that end from whose goodness the will is good, and to which our wills ought to be referred so that they may be right. And that such an end is charity is shown.

1. First to Timothy, chapter one1: The end of the precept is charity; but those wills are to be referred to that end2 to which the precepts are referred; if therefore charity is the end of the precept, charity is the end of the good will.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter thirteen3: He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law; and again: The fullness of the law is love; but wills are to be referred to that in which consists the fullness and consummation of the law; if therefore charity and love are of this kind, it is evident, etc.

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3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. Every good will is ordered to this, that man may enjoy God, and to this, that he may have God; but we do not enjoy God nor have him except through charity; therefore to have charity is nothing other than to have God; if therefore every good will is ordered to this, that it may have God; it is seen that the end of every good will is charity itself4.

4. Likewise, nature in acting intends finally the form perfecting in the being of nature5: therefore the will in acting principally intends the form perfective in the being of morals; but the form or perfective habit of the will in the being of morals is charity itself: therefore charity is the principal end of every good will.

On the contrary: 1. To the Romans, chapter ten6: Christ is the end of the law; but the end of the law and of the good will is the same: therefore it seems that Christ is the principal end of the good will: therefore not charity.

2. Likewise, Bernard in the book On Loving God7: «From love one comes into charity, and from charity one comes to wisdom»: therefore wisdom is more excellent than charity; but that ought to be set as the end of the good will which is most excellent: therefore the end of the good will is not charity, but wisdom.

3. Likewise, the end is that which is to be enjoyed; but charity is not to be enjoyed, because only the uncreated good is to be enjoyed8: therefore it seems that charity is not the principal end of the good will. If you say that the end of the good will is not created charity, but uncreated; on the contrary, the Apostle9: The end of the precept is charity proceeding from a pure heart, etc.; but charity proceeding from a pure heart and unfeigned faith is nothing but created charity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the end of the good will is that which, once had, the will seeks nothing beyond10; but once charity is had, the will still seeks something beyond, namely God himself; nay, the greater the charity it has, the more it seeks: therefore it seems that charity does not have the character of an end.

5. Likewise, «what weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits11»; but weight in bodies is in no way said to be the end of local motion: therefore love in spirits will in no way be said to be the end of the rational appetite, therefore neither of the will.

6. Likewise, end and principle are distinct; but charity is the root of all good affections12: if therefore the end follows upon that which is toward the end, and charity is the root; it seems that it ought in no way to be called the end of the good will.

Conclusion

Charity is the end of every good will.

I respond: It must be said that the Master13 rightly says, in that he assigns charity as the end of every good will; for in this he followed the doctrine of the Apostle and of blessed Augustine. For the Apostle expressly says that charity is the consummation of the precept and the fullness of the law. Augustine also says in the Enchiridion that «all the divine precepts are referred to charity». And in the book On Christian Doctrine14 he shows that the whole of Scripture is ordered to commending the commandment of charity; and thus charity is not only the end of the good will, but also of all sacred Scripture and of the knowledge that is according to piety. — But although God, or beatitude, or Christ can be called the end of the good will; the Master nevertheless preferred to say that charity is the end, because the complete character of ending15 belongs to charity itself. For since "end" is said in three ways, namely the end in which one rests, and the end by which one rests; and the end by which one rests is said in two ways: either simply, or as for now; in each of these ways charity is the end of the good will. For uncreated charity, which is God, of which it is said in the first Canonical [Epistle] of John16: God is charity, is the end in which one rests. But created and consummated charity, such as the charity of the homeland, is the end by which one rests simply in God. But inchoate charity, such as the charity of the way, is the end by which one rests in God as for now. For just as the thing located does not rest in its place except through the mediation of weight, so the soul cannot be brought to rest in God, who is its place and ultimate end, except through the mediation of love, which has to consider the good under the character of good. But the good under the character of good holds at once the character of end and of the lovable17; and therefore the intention of the end is most chiefly attributed to charity. — The reasons therefore which show this are to be conceded.

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To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that which is objected, that Christ is the end of the precept; it must be said that by this it is not excluded that charity is the end. For although Christ is the end in which one rests, nonetheless charity can be the end by which we rest in Christ. Again, charity, insofar as it is the end in which we rest, belongs to the whole Trinity; and therefore these two can stand together, that Christ is the end of the law and charity likewise18.

2. To that which is objected, that from charity one arrives at wisdom, therefore wisdom is more excellent; it must be said that according as Bernard speaks there of wisdom, wisdom does not name a different gift than charity, but a new state of the same gift, so that charity taken commonly is distinguished from charity called [such] by appropriation. Yet according as charity is described commonly, so it contains both love and wisdom; and in this way it is set as the end of the precept19.

3. To that which is objected, that the end is that which is to be enjoyed; it must be said that according as "end" is said in two ways, namely that by which one rests, and that in which one rests, so to enjoy something is said in two ways: either as an object, or as a disposition; and in both ways we enjoy charity. For by charity, which is God, we enjoy as an object; by charity, which is a habit, we enjoy as a disposition; and thus it is evident that this does not oppose the proposition20.

4. To that which is objected, that the will rests once its end is had; it must be said that this is true when it has its end completely; charity, however, although it is had in the way, is nevertheless not had completely; for the fire is in Sion, and the furnace in Jerusalem21. But when it shall be had in the homeland, nothing further will be sought, because through it the uncreated good will be had, in which consists the end and quieting of all our desires.

5. To that which is objected, that weight in bodies is not the end of motion; it must be said that it is not alike, because weight is found in bodies both in the absence of their due place and in its presence; but charity is never in the soul except when God is present. Hence everyone who has charity has God; and therefore, while all our action is ordered to having God, it is ordered to having charity. But it is not so with weight, because not every body having weight has its due place.

6. To that which is objected, that end and principle are diverse; some answer that charity is principle and end in a different way; for it is the principle of the good work according to inchoate being, and the end according to consummated and perfected being. For to this each one acts well, that in him the love and charity of God may be increased22. — Otherwise it can be said, and more probably, that just as mode, species, and order are founded upon the same thing, and yet mode names a comparison to the efficient [cause], and species to the exemplar, and order names a comparison to the end23; so charity in respect of the good work can have both the character of efficient [cause] and of end according to diverse comparisons. For charity continues our will to God himself as to the moving principle, and conforms it as to the directing rule, and joins it as to the quieting end; and therefore, just as God himself has the character of efficient [cause], insofar as he moves, and of formal, insofar as he directs, and of final, insofar as he quiets: so charity too in respect of the work has the character of this threefold cause; nor is it unfitting, because according to the Philosopher24 three genera of causes can coincide in one. And thus it is evident that although charity is the principle of the good work, nonetheless it can be the end according to diverse comparisons. — And by this is evident the response to that which was lastly asked, why charity is called the root and form of the virtues and the end. For this is said according to the diverse comparisons of our will to the divine will; it is also called upon this the bond of perfection25 in comparison to our neighbors, who are joined to us by the bond of charity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Primae ad Timotheum 1, 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    First to Timothy 1:5. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  2. Cod. D adiicit ut est; in codd. K Q a secunda manu additum est ut ducit; edd., excepta I, omissa voce voluntatis, exhibent quae ducit, codd. B H ut ducit.
    Codex D adds ut est; in codices K Q, by a second hand, is added ut ducit; the editions, except the first, omitting the word voluntatis, give quae ducit; codices B H ut ducit.
  3. Ad Romanos 13, 8. — Sequens textus est ibid. v. 10.
    To the Romans 13:8. — The following text is in the same place, v. 10.
  4. Principia, quibus hoc arg. innititur, habentur I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2; d. 17. p. I. q. 1. et supra d. 26. q. 2, praecipue ad I. — Paulo superius edd., excepta I, cum paucis codd. pro ergo habere substituunt similiter habere.
    The principles on which this argument rests are found in I Sent. d. 1, a. 3, q. 2; d. 17, p. I, q. 1; and above, d. 26, q. 2, especially in reply to 1. — A little above, the editions, except the first, with a few codices, substitute similiter habere for ergo habere.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 11 (c. 1.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 11 (c. 1).
  6. Ad Romanos 10, 4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    To the Romans 10:4. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  7. Pressius in libro de Natura et dignitate amoris (inter opera Bernardi), c. 2. n. 5, ubi legitur: De amore [erigitur voluntas]... in caritatem, de caritate proficit in sapientiam. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. fundam. 4. Ibid. d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ostenditur, sapientiam praestantissimum esse donorum Spiritus sancti.
    More closely in the book On the Nature and Dignity of Love (among the works of Bernard), c. 2, n. 5, where it reads: From love [the will is raised]... into charity; from charity it advances into wisdom. Cf. III Sent. d. 35, q. 1, fundamentum 4. In the same place, d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, it is shown that wisdom is the most excellent of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
  8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 1, a. 3, q. 2.
  9. Epist. I. Tim. 1, 5. — De caritate increata et creata vide supra d. 26. q. 2. et I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1.
    Epistle, First to Timothy 1:5. — On uncreated and created charity see above, d. 26, q. 2, and I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 1.
  10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  11. Secundum Augustinum; cfr. supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Paulo inferius codd. T bb dicitur pro dicetur.
    According to Augustine; cf. above p. 76, note 6. — A little below, codices T bb read dicitur for dicetur.
  12. Vide hic dub. 2. et supra d. XXVI. lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    See here dubium 2, and above, d. XXVI, the text of the Master, c. 4.
  13. Hic c. 1, ubi etiam verba Apostoli et Augustini (Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32.) habentur.
    Here, c. 1, where also are found the words of the Apostle and of Augustine (Enchiridion c. 121, n. 32).
  14. Libr. I. c. 22-40. De cognitione secundum pietatem cfr. Enchirid. c. 2. n. 1. et XII. de Trin. c. 14. n. 22, ubi August. hanc cognitionem, iuxta illud Iob 28, 28: Ecce pietas est sapientia (Vulgata: Ecce timor Domini, ipsa est sapientia), vocat sapientiam eamque in cultu Dei (θεοσέβεια) se manifestare docet. Item, Apostolus 1. Tim. 6, 3 loquitur de eis qui non acquiescunt ei quae secundum pietatem est doctrina.
    Book I, cc. 22–40. On knowledge according to piety cf. Enchiridion c. 2, n. 1, and On the Trinity XII, c. 14, n. 22, where Augustine, in accordance with that text of Job 28:28: Behold, piety is wisdom (Vulgate: Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom), calls it wisdom and teaches that it manifests itself in the worship of God (θεοσέβεια). Likewise, the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:3, speaks of those who do not consent to that doctrine which is according to piety.
  15. Edd. I, 2, 3, 4 et plurimi codd., saltem a prima manu, minus apte fruendi. Vat. mox dupliciter pro tripliciter. Paulo inferius pro vel ut nunc codd. C F K O R S T eo etc. vel non. De locutione finis, in quo quiescitur et finis, quo quiescitur, vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Editions 1, 2, 3, 4 and most codices, at least by a first hand, less aptly fruendi [for finiendi]. The Vatican edition shortly dupliciter for tripliciter. A little below, for vel ut nunc codices C F K O R S T [read] eo etc. vel non. On the expression the end in which one rests and the end by which one rests, see the scholion on the preceding question.
  16. Cap. 4, 16.
    Chapter 4:16.
  17. Vide Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 2. — August., II. Enarrat. in Ps. 30. serm. 3. n. 8: Vilescat totum quidquid praeter Deum est. Qui nos tuetur in loco vitae huius, ipse post istam vitam sit locus noster.
    See Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 2. — Augustine, Enarrations on Psalm 30, sermon 3, n. 8: Let all become worthless that is besides God. May he who guards us in the place of this life be, after this life, our place.
  18. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo superius pro quiescimus in Christo cod. bb quiescamus in Christo, Vat. cum edd. 4 quiescitur in Christo.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little above, for we rest in Christ codex bb [reads] we may rest in Christ; the Vatican edition with the editions, one rests in Christ.
  19. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 4.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. I, dubium 4.
  20. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 16.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 1, dubium 16.
  21. Isai. 31, 9.
    Isaiah 31:9.
  22. Vide infra dub. 2.
    See below, dubium 2.
  23. Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paululo superius codd. C L O S (F T a prima manu) infundantur pro fundantur; dein pro ad exemplar edd. 2, 3 ad formam, Vat. ad formam vel exemplar.
    Cf. above, d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, and following. — A little above, codices C L O S (F T by a first hand) [read] infundantur for fundantur; then for ad exemplar editions 2, 3 [read] ad formam; the Vatican edition ad formam vel exemplar.
  24. Libr. II. Phys. text. 70 (c. 7.).
    Physics II, text 70 (c. 7).
  25. Coloss. 3, 14. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Colossians 3:14. — See the scholion on the preceding question.
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