Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 49
Quaestio IV. Secundum quid beatitudo insit in anima.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: notes 3–9 and 10–12 of page 1006, and notes 1–4 of page 1007. Notes 1–2 of page 1006 anchor in the preceding quaestio (q. 3) and are rendered there; the whole footer register of page 1008 anchors in the following quaestio (q. 5) and is rendered there.
Quarto quaeritur, secundum quid insit beatitudo, utrum sit in anima primo secundum substantiam, an secundum potentiam. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur:
1. Quia beatitudo est vita; unde Augustinus3 vult, quod esse beatum est vivere in Deo et Deo; sed prius naturaliter vivit anima quam potentiae: ergo prius vivificatur a Deo.
2. Item, beatitudo in anima est una4, sed potentiae sunt plures; sed multiplicato subiecto primo, necesse est, multiplicari perfectionem: ergo etc.
3. Item, Deus est intimus ipsi animae5: ergo cum beatitudo sit in anima per influentiam a Deo, illa influentia procedit ab intimo; sed substantia rei creatae interior est quam potentia: ergo beatitudo prius influitur in substantiam.
Contra: 1. Beatitudo inest animae, secundum quod « capax est Dei et particeps esse potest6 »; sed capax est secundum imaginem, et imago secundum mentem, et mens est oculus et potentia animae: ergo beatitudo inest primo animae secundum potentiam.
2. Item, beatitudo inest animae secundum modum specialem7 unionis Dei et animae; sed modus specialis non est nisi per cognitionem perfectam et amorem, et hic est per potentias: ergo etc.
3. Item, beatitudo est habitus secundus et perfectio secunda; sed omnis secundus habitus et perfectio secunda inest secundum aliquam potentiam recipiendi, quae differt a substantia: ergo beatitudo non inest animae per substantiam immediate.
4. Item, si immediate et primo per substantiam, ergo abstractis potentiis, poterit intelligi anima gloriosa: ergo abstracto, quod Deum non videat nec amet, erit gloriosa; quod stultum est dicere et contra Sanctos8.
Conclusio
Beatitudo est in anima primo secundum potentiam, et quidem una in pluribus potentiis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod opinio quorundam est, sicut de gratia, ita de gloria, quod sicut differt gratia et virtus9, ita et beatitudo et dos. Et sicut gratia respicit animae substantiam, et ideo est una; virtus vero potentiam, et ideo plures: sic et gloria, quae animae substantiam respicit, ideo est una; sed dotes potentias, ideo plures. Et exemplum naturale est in anima humana, perficiente corpus, quae in quantum vivificans respicit complexionem, quae est una in toto corpore; in quantum motor respicit organa diversa10. — Sed credo, hic esse magis appropriationem quam proprietatem et veritatem. Corpus enim nunquam dispositum est ad vitam, qualemcumque habeat complexionem, nisi etiam habeat organizationem; unde nec influentia vitae nec motus est ab anima in corpus, nisi naturaliter praeexistat dispositio organizationis11. Similiter credo in gratia et gloria, quod anima non est capax gratiae nec gloriae nisi per mentem. Unde credo, quod tam gratia quam gloria primo est in potentia. — Sed esse aliquid in potentia, hoc est dupliciter: aut secundum dispositionem et habilitationem eius ad actum proprium, quia sic potentiae distinguuntur12; et quod sic est in potentia multiplicatur et est in potentia secundum rationem potentiae. Aliquid vero est in potentia secundum conformationem ipsius ad aliquod unum et unionem ad illud; et quod sic est in potentia non multiplicatur in potentiis, immo esse in potentia dicitur, secundum quod habet rationem substantiae; et sic1 gratia et gloria, quarum unaquaeque est deiformitas et conformitas ad Deum. Et quia uni et eidem conformatur et reformatur ipsa anima; ideo una est gratia et gloria in pluribus potentiis, sicut una anima in pluribus organis, et una sanitas in pluribus membris. Et hoc clarius in secundo disputatum est in distinctione vigesima sexta2 de gratia.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est vivificari animam quam potentias; dicendum, quod verum est de vita, quae est actus primus; sed non de vita, quae est actus secundus.
Ad 2. Ad aliud iam patet responsio: quia non est gloria in potentiis secundum id, in quo distinguuntur, sed secundum quod uniuntur in ratione imaginis, per quam capaces3 sunt unius deiformitatis.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est intimus animae, ergo procedit ab intimo; dicendum, quod influentia ista ab intimo procedit; sed non procedit, secundum quod intimum conservans in esse naturae, sed secundum quod obiectum consummans in esse gloriae; et ideo secundum hanc viam magis est intimus et immediatus potentiae quam essentiae. Unde non sequitur, quodsi divina essentia est intima, quod quaelibet eius influentia4.
I. Haec quaestio magis explicat quae dicta sunt in 1. huius articuli quaestione, simulque refellit opinionem illam Henrici Gand., quam in scholio ad 1. q. commemoravimus. Unitatem gloriae S. Doctor eodem modo tradit, quo unitatem gratiae explicat, II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5, ubi cfr. etiam scholion. — Alii auctores, qui beatitudinem ponunt in actu secundo, simul improbant positionem Henrici, quin de hac 4. quaestione specialiter tractent; cfr. Scot., hic q. 2. n. 25. seqq.; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. (praesertim ad 1.) et 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
II. In 5. quaestione S. Doctor proprie agit de perfectione status gloriosi et de dotibus animae; unde vix tangit celebrem illam controversiam scholasticam, in quo scilicet actu sive operatione formaliter consistat actus beatificus, utrum simul in plurium potentiarum actibus, an in unius potentiae actu (quod Scoto, S. Thomae pluribusque aliis placuit); et hoc supposito, utrum in actu intellectus (in visione), quod strenue docet S. Thomas, an in actu voluntatis (in fruitione per amorem amicitiae), pro quo certat Scotus cum non paucis etiam extra suam scholam. — De tribus dotibus animae S. Bonav. non agit specialiter (quod tamen faciunt alii), sed de quatuor dotibus corporis tractat infra p. II. sect. 1. et 2.
III. Praenotandum est, esse extra controversiam, 1. quod beatitudo patriae complectitur plures perfectiones et operationes, speciatim fruitionem voluntatis et visionem immediatam intellectus. Explicite hoc docet Constitutio Benedicti XII. (Benedictus Deus), ubi inter alia habetur, « quod ex tali visione et fruitione eorum animae... sunt vere beatae ». Item, Catechismus Roman. (p. 1. c. 13. n. 7.) beatitudinem illam in eo sitam esse dicit, « ut Deum videamus eiusque pulcritudine fruamur ».
2. Item, non est dubium, beatitudinem esse in voluntate sicut obiectum. Hoc concedit S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.), ubi dicit: Beatitudinem esse in voluntate « dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ita, quod sit voluntatis obiectum; et sic beatitudo, cum sit ultimus finis, et ex fine sit ratio boni, quod est voluntatis obiectum, oportet ponere, beatitudinem in voluntate esse. Alio modo ita, quod sit aliquis actus voluntatis; et sic beatitudo in voluntate esse non potest ».
3. Denique patet, quod in via generationis prius natura est Deus obiectum immediatum visionis quam immediatum obiectum fruitionis. — Controvertitur autem, utrum hoc verum sit etiam in via perfectionis; immo Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 6. ad 5.) ex illa propositione contrarium arguere vult, quia prioritas in via generationis est « prioritas, qua imperfectum est prius perfecto... quia ut in pluribus videmus, quod actuum coordinatorum inter se prior ordine naturae in via generationis minus est perfectus quam posterior. Nec hoc dicens intendo dicere, quod illa visio sit imperfecta in genere visionis, sed volo dicere, quod ipsa fruitio est actus perfectior, sicut declarabitur in quaestione sequenti ».
IV. Richard. a Med., (locis citt.), adductis multis argumentis pro utraque parte, concludit, quod beatitudo consistat tam in actu intellectus quam in actu voluntatis; principalius tamen in voluntate, « quia in visione inchoatur et in fruitione consummatur » (q. 6. ad 8.). Hanc opinionem etiam Scot. (hic q. 3. n. 5.) non improbat, si intelligatur, beatitudinem praecise et pro ultimo complemento optime essendi consistere in unica operatione, si vero pro unione vitali immediata ad obiectum beatificum, in duplici operatione intellectus et voluntatis.
Quoad sententiam S. Bonaventurae patet iam ex 1. solut. ad oppos., eum hic non tenere sententiam S. Thomae. Cum autem hoc loco proprie tractet generaliter de tribus dotibus, recurrendum est ad alios locos, praecipue ad I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica et a. 3. q. 2; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3; d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4; Breviloq. p. VII. c. 7, ubi satis declaratur, eum convenire potius cum praedicta opinione Richardi; quam etiam Petr. a Tar. tenet (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3.), docens, illam beatitudinem consistere « in actu intellectus originaliter, in actu vero voluntatis completive ».
Quoad trium dotium actus, de quibus in hac quaestione agitur, supponendum, quod S. Bonav. ipsam voluntatem rationalem dividat in concupiscibilem et irascibilem (cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. scholion), unde etiam in patria irascibili tribuit actum, scil. tentionis, quae interdum non proprie, sed per appropriationem vocatur fruitio. Hanc enim proprie et essentialiter in actu amoris amicitiae consistere, dicitur I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2. Tamen de fruitionis ratione, sicut de quibusdam connexis, iterum doctores secundum principia diversa, quae ponunt de essentia beatitudinis, diversa sentiunt, ut notatum est in scholio ad ultimo cit. locum.
V. Hae controversiae scholarum antiquae aliquo certo et omnibus explorato principio determinari non possunt, cum ipsa argumenta ab utraque parte copiose in medium prolata plerumque innitantur principiis non concessis ab adversariis; v. g. schola S. Thomae (cfr. S. 1. q. 82. a. 3.) in subsidium suae sententiae affert, quod intellectus sit potentia animae omnium nobilissima, dum Scot. (hic q. 4. later.) diffuse certat pro principatu voluntatis, cui suffragatur Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 1. q. 14), et favet etiam S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal., Richardo a Med., aliisque, ut dictum est II. Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 6. in scholio.
Hinc Estius (hic § 3.), licet praeferat sententiam S. Thomae, adductis duodecim argumentis pro sententia Scoti, pensatis omnibus, concludit, pleraque eorum « non esse ita levia, ut temere Scotum aliosque quosdam in diversam adduxerint sententiam, ut proinde non immerito inter problemata theologica numeretur haec quaestio ».
VI. De ipsa 5. quaestione praeter locos citt.: S. Thom., hic q. 1. et etiam 3. (de delectatione); S. I. II. q. 3. a. 4. 5. 8, q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 4. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
VII. Conclusio 6. quaestionis, quam negavit Iovinianus, refutatus a S. Hieronymo, confirmatur Decreto Eugen. IV. contra Graecos, ubi dicitur, Deum videre Beatos, « pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius ».
De eadem: Scot., infra d. 50. q. 5. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 5. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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Question IV. According to what beatitude is present in the soul.
Fourthly it is asked, according to what beatitude is present — whether it is in the soul first according to substance, or according to power. And that it is according to substance, it seems:
1. Because beatitude is life; whence Augustine3 holds that to be blessed is to live in God and by God; but the soul naturally lives prior to the powers: therefore it is first vivified by God.
2. Likewise, beatitude in the soul is one4, but the powers are many; but when the first subject is multiplied, the perfection must necessarily be multiplied: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, God is most inward to the soul itself5: therefore, since beatitude is in the soul through an influence from God, that influence proceeds from what is inmost; but the substance of a created thing is more interior than its power: therefore beatitude is first infused into the substance.
On the contrary: 1. Beatitude is present in the soul according to the fact that "it is capable of God and can be a partaker6"; but it is capable according to the image, and the image is according to the mind, and the mind is the eye and a power of the soul: therefore beatitude is present in the soul first according to power.
2. Likewise, beatitude is present in the soul according to a special mode7 of the union of God and the soul; but the special mode is only through perfect knowledge and love, and this is through the powers: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, beatitude is a second habit and a second perfection; but every second habit and second perfection is present according to some power of receiving, which differs from the substance: therefore beatitude is not present in the soul through the substance immediately.
4. Likewise, if it is present immediately and first through the substance, then, with the powers abstracted, the soul could be understood as glorious: therefore, with it abstracted that it neither sees nor loves God, it will be glorious; which is foolish to say and against the Saints8.
Conclusion
Beatitude is in the soul first according to power, and indeed one in many powers.
I respond: It must be said that the opinion of certain men is that, as with grace, so with glory: that just as grace and virtue differ9, so also do beatitude and dowry. And just as grace regards the substance of the soul, and therefore is one, whereas virtue regards power, and therefore they are many: so also glory, which regards the substance of the soul, is therefore one; but the dowries regard the powers, and therefore they are many. And the natural example is in the human soul perfecting the body, which, insofar as it is vivifying, regards the complexion, which is one in the whole body; insofar as it is mover, it regards diverse organs10. — But I believe that here there is rather an appropriation than a property and truth. For the body is never disposed to life, whatever complexion it may have, unless it also has organization; whence neither the influence of life nor motion is from the soul into the body, unless the disposition of organization11 naturally pre-exists. Likewise I believe concerning grace and glory, that the soul is not capable of grace nor of glory except through the mind. Whence I believe that both grace and glory are first in the power. — But for something to be in a power is twofold: either according to the disposition and fitting of that power to its proper act, since it is in this way that powers are distinguished12; and what is in a power in this way is multiplied and is in the power according to the account of the power. But something is in a power according to its conformation to some one thing and its union to that; and what is in a power in this way is not multiplied in the powers, but rather is said to be in a power according as it has the account of substance; and thus1 are grace and glory, each of which is a deiformity and conformity to God. And because the soul itself is conformed and reformed to one and the same thing, therefore grace and glory are one in many powers, just as one soul is in many organs, and one health in many members. And this was disputed more clearly in the second book, in the twenty-sixth distinction2, concerning grace.
To the arguments:
To 1. To that which is objected, that the soul is vivified prior to the powers, it must be said that this is true of the life which is first act; but not of the life which is second act.
To 2. To the other the answer is already clear: because glory is not in the powers according to that in which they are distinguished, but according as they are united in the account of the image, through which they are capable3 of one deiformity.
To 3. To that which is objected, that God is most inward to the soul, therefore [the influence] proceeds from what is inmost, it must be said that this influence does proceed from what is inmost; but it does not proceed according as He is the inmost thing conserving in the being of nature, but according as He is the object consummating in the being of glory; and therefore along this path He is more inward and immediate to the power than to the essence. Whence it does not follow that, if the divine essence is inmost, then any influence of His whatever [is so]4.
I. This question explains more fully what was said in the 1st question of this article, and at the same time it refutes that opinion of Henry of Ghent which we recalled in the scholion to q. 1. The unity of glory the holy Doctor hands down in the same way in which he explains the unity of grace, II Sent. d. 26. q. 5, where see also the scholion. — Other authors, who place beatitude in the second act, likewise disprove Henry's position, though they do not treat specially of this 4th question; cf. Scotus, here q. 2. n. 25. ff.; St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. (especially ad 1.) and 2; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
II. In the 5th question the holy Doctor properly treats of the perfection of the glorious state and of the dowries of the soul; whence he scarcely touches that celebrated scholastic controversy, namely in what act or operation the beatific act formally consists — whether at once in the acts of several powers, or in the act of one power (which pleased Scotus, St. Thomas and many others); and, this being supposed, whether in the act of the intellect (in vision), which St. Thomas strenuously teaches, or in the act of the will (in fruition through the love of friendship), for which Scotus contends together with not a few even outside his own school. — Of the three dowries of the soul St. Bonaventure does not treat specially (which others nevertheless do), but he treats of the four dowries of the body below, p. II. sect. 1 and 2.
III. It must be premised that it is beyond controversy, 1. that the beatitude of the fatherland embraces several perfections and operations, especially the fruition of the will and the immediate vision of the intellect. Explicitly the Constitution of Benedict XII (Benedictus Deus) teaches this, where among other things it is held that "from such vision and fruition their souls... are truly blessed." Likewise the Roman Catechism (p. 1. c. 13. n. 7.) says that that beatitude is situated in this, "that we may see God and enjoy His beauty."
2. Likewise, there is no doubt that beatitude is in the will as its object. St. Thomas concedes this (here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiuncula 2.), where he says: That beatitude is in the will "can be understood in two ways: in one way, that it is the object of the will; and thus beatitude, since it is the ultimate end, and since from the end comes the account of the good, which is the object of the will, one must hold that beatitude is in the will. In another way, that it is some act of the will; and thus beatitude cannot be in the will."
3. Finally it is clear that in the way of generation God is by nature prior as the immediate object of vision than as the immediate object of fruition. — But it is disputed whether this is true also in the way of perfection; indeed Richard of Middleton (here a. 1. q. 6. ad 5.) wishes to argue the contrary from that proposition, because priority in the way of generation is "a priority by which the imperfect is prior to the perfect... because for the most part we see that, of acts coordinated among themselves, the one prior in the order of nature in the way of generation is less perfect than the later one. Nor in saying this do I intend to say that that vision is imperfect in the genus of vision, but I wish to say that fruition itself is the more perfect act, as will be declared in the following question."
IV. Richard of Middleton (in the passages cited), having adduced many arguments on both sides, concludes that beatitude consists both in the act of the intellect and in the act of the will; yet principally in the will, "because it is begun in vision and consummated in fruition" (q. 6. ad 8.). This opinion Scotus also (here q. 3. n. 5.) does not disprove, if it be understood that beatitude precisely and as the ultimate complement of best being consists in a single operation, but if [taken] for the vital immediate union to the beatific object, in a twofold operation of intellect and will.
As to the mind of St. Bonaventure, it is already clear from the 1st solution to the opposing arguments that he does not here hold St. Thomas's opinion. But since in this place he properly treats generally of the three dowries, one must have recourse to other passages, especially to I Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica and a. 3. q. 2; II Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2; III Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3; d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4; Breviloquium p. VII. c. 7, where it is sufficiently declared that he agrees rather with the aforesaid opinion of Richard; which Peter of Tarentaise also holds (here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiuncula 3.), teaching that that beatitude consists "in the act of the intellect originally, but in the act of the will completively."
As to the acts of the three dowries, of which this question treats, it must be supposed that St. Bonaventure divides the rational will itself into the concupiscible and the irascible (cf. III Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. scholion), whence also in the fatherland he attributes an act to the irascible, namely of holding, which sometimes is called fruition not properly but by appropriation. For that fruition properly and essentially consists in the act of the love of friendship is stated in I Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2. Yet concerning the account of fruition, as concerning certain connected matters, the doctors again think diversely according to the diverse principles which they lay down concerning the essence of beatitude, as was noted in the scholion to the last-cited passage.
V. These ancient controversies of the schools cannot be determined by any certain principle explored by all, since the very arguments copiously brought forward on both sides for the most part rest upon principles not conceded by their adversaries; for example, the school of St. Thomas (cf. Summa I. q. 82. a. 3.) brings forward in support of its own opinion that the intellect is the noblest of all the powers of the soul, while Scotus (here q. 4. later) contends at length for the primacy of the will, whom Henry of Ghent supports (Quodl. 1. q. 14), and St. Bonaventure also favours, together with Alexander of Hales, Richard of Middleton and others, as was said in II Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 6. in the scholion.
Hence Estius (here § 3.), although he prefers St. Thomas's opinion, having adduced twelve arguments for Scotus's opinion, all things weighed, concludes that most of them are "not so slight that they rashly led Scotus and certain others into a different opinion, so that consequently this question is not undeservedly numbered among the theological problems."
VI. On the 5th question itself, besides the passages cited: St. Thomas, here q. 1. and also 3. (on delight); Summa I-II. q. 3. a. 4. 5. 8, q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 4. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
VII. The conclusion of the 6th question, which Jovinian denied and for which he was refuted by St. Jerome, is confirmed by the Decree of Eugene IV against the Greeks, where it is said that the Blessed see God, "yet according to the diversity of merits one more perfectly than another."
On the same: Scotus, below d. 50. q. 5. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 4; Summa I-II. q. 5. a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- 3Epist. 130. (alias 121.) c. 7. n. 14: Ad illam ergo unam vitam, qua cum Deo et de Deo vivitur, cetera... referenda sunt. Serm. 114. n. 2, ubi docet, secundum divina promissa nos in caelo fore Angelis aequales, « ut cum illo [Deo] et in illo et de illo sine fine vivamus ». — Pro et Deo codd. G K (I a secunda manu) et a Deo.Letter 130 (otherwise 121) c. 7. n. 14: To that one life, therefore, by which one lives with God and from God, all else... is to be referred. Sermon 114. n. 2, where he teaches that according to the divine promises we shall be equal to the Angels in heaven, "that with Him [God] and in Him and from Him we may live without end." — For et Deo codices G K (I by a second hand) read et a Deo.
- 4Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, unam gratiam esse in anima.Cf. II Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, where it is shown that there is one grace in the soul.
- 5Vide tom. II. pag. 226, nota 7.See vol. II, p. 226, note 7.
- 6Secundum August.; vide supra pag. 1000, nota 5. — Superius codd. et ed. 1 omittunt animae.According to Augustine; see above, p. 1000, note 5. — Above, the codices and edition 1 omit animae.
- 7Multi codd. spiritualem et mox spiritualis.Many codices read spiritualem, and shortly after spiritualis.
- 8Vide quaest. seq. Idem arg. recurrit II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5. fundam. 5, ubi solvitur quaestio, utrum gratia primo insit substantiae animae, vel potentiis. — Post abstracto Vat. addit vel esto.See the following question. The same argument recurs in II Sent. d. 26. q. 5. fundamentum 5, where the question is resolved whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul or in the powers. — After abstracto the Vatican edition adds vel esto.
- 9Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. — Inferius pro gloria, quae cod. L gloria, quia.Cf. II Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. — Below, for gloria, quae codex L reads gloria, quia.
- 10Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. — Subinde pro hic esse magis edd. hoc esse magis per.See I Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. — Thereupon, for hic esse magis the editions read hoc esse magis per.
- 11Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 1.): Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici, potentia vitam habentis.Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 6 (c. 1): The soul is the first act of a physical, organic body having life in potency.
- 12Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. — Codd. E G L clarius legunt: proprium, et quia sic potentiae distinguuntur, quod sic etc.According to Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4). Cf. vol. II, p. 561, note 3. — Codices E G L read more clearly: proprium, et quia sic potentiae distinguuntur, quod sic etc.
- 1Cod. P addit est de.Codex P adds est de.
- 2Quaest. 5, ubi etiam solut. ad 1. et 2. habetur. Cfr. ibid. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Exemplum de una sanitate, sumtum ex August., refertur I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3, ubi ostenditur, animam rationalem esse totam in toto corpore etc.Question 5, where the solutions to 1 and 2 are also found. Cf. ibid. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — The example of one health, taken from Augustine, is reported in I Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3, where it is shown that the rational soul is whole in the whole body, etc.
- 3Plures codd. et edd. capacitatem. Vat. voci imaginis praemittit unius.Several codices and editions read capacitatem. The Vatican edition prefixes unius to the word imaginis.
- 4Vat. addit sic sit intima. Superius pro immediatus non pauci codd. immediatius.The Vatican edition adds sic sit intima. Above, for immediatus not a few codices read immediatius. ---