Bonaventure

Quaestio III. In quo subiecto sit beatitudo.

Le note numerate qui sotto seguono la numerazione a piè di pagina dell'edizione di Quaracchi, che ricomincia da 1 su ogni pagina stampata. Le sigle indicano la pagina: notes 7–14 of page 1004, notes 1–9 of page 1005, notes 1–2 of page 1006. Notes 1–6 of page 1004 belong to the preceding question (q. 2), and notes 3–6 of page 1006 to the following question (q. 4).

Tertio quaeritur de beatitudinis subiecto; et quaeritur, utrum homo sit subiectum beatitudinis secundum animam, an totum coniunctum. Et quod totum coniunctum, videtur.

1. Augustinus, decimo nono de Civitate Dei⁷: « Summum bonum, a quo homo beatus efficitur, ex utriusque rei bonis constat, animae scilicet et corporis ».

2. Item, de Spiritu et anima⁸ dicit, quod « Deus factus est homo, ut totum hominem beatificaret, exterius per humanitatem, interius per Divinitatem ».

3. Item, Anselmus⁹, definiens beatitudinem, dicit, quod « est sufficientia omnium bonorum »; et bona illa dividit in bona animae et corporis.

4. Item, ratione videtur: quia praemium respondet merito; sed meritum est totius coniuncti, quia anima exuta non meretur: ergo beatitudo sive praemium¹⁰.

5. Item, beatitudo opponitur miseriae; sed miseria est non tantum animae, sed etiam est totius coniuncti, maxime ratione corporis: ergo etc.

6. Item, si beatitudo omnino respiceret animam ut subiectum, ergo non necesse esset, corpus resurgere; sed necesse est resurgere¹¹: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Super illud Psalmi¹²: Beata gens, cuius Dominus Deus etc.; Glossa: « Beatitudo hominis tantum in animo est, quia animus hominis tantum capax est, valens frui illa ».

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia beatitudo consistit in Deo, quia ipse est finis ultimus, in quo standum est¹³; sed solus spiritus ad Deum videndum et amandum convertitur: ergo beatitudo est in solo spiritu.

3. Item, beatitudo gloriae respondet gratiae; sed gratia, cum sit qualitas spiritualis, est in homine ratione solius animae: ergo et beatitudo, quia, quantum se extendit dispositio ad formam, tantum se extendit forma¹⁴.

4. Item, si aliqua passio inest aliquibus subiectis, inest secundum aliquod commune¹; sed beatitudo inest Angelo et homini: ergo inest secundum aliquod commune Angelo et homini. Sed non est aliquod commune Angelo et homini nisi spiritus et potentiae spirituales: ergo beatitudo est tantum in potentia spirituali.

5. Item, si aliqua duo communicant in aliqua natura et non possunt convenire in eo quod superadditum est naturae, illud superadditum non inest secundum naturam, in qua communicant; sed homo communicat cum brutis in corpore et in potentiis sentiendi et non potest communicare in beatitudine²: ergo non inest secundum corpus.

Conclusio

Beatitudo est in sola anima ut in subiecto primo per inhaerentiam, in corpore vero propter coniunctionem per quandam redundantiam.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod beatitudo dicitur dupliciter: proprie et communiter. Proprie est gaudium de participatione Dei perfecta per cognitionem et amorem; communiter vero dicitur omnis remuneratio excludens omnem miseriam. Primo modo comprehendit praemium substantiale tantum, secundo modo accidentale; primo modo est tantum in anima, secundo modo est in anima et corpore et toto coniuncto. — Et per hoc solvunt rationes ad partes oppositas.

Sed ista solutio non videtur conveniens, quoniam, sicut dicit Augustinus³, « beate vivere est bonis veris certisque gaudere »; sed gaudium et « dolor, sicut dicit decimo quarto de Trinitate, est ipsius animae »: ergo et gaudium beatitudinis est in anima sicut in subiecto, sive sit de bono increato, quod est Deus, sive de bonis corporis.

Et ideo dicunt alii aliter, quod gaudium etiam accidentale et beatitudo accidentalis est in anima sicut in subiecto, sed huius gaudii materia est in corpore, quia gaudet anima de bonis corporis; et ideo beatitudo non est in corpore sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in materia et obiecto, non principali tamen. — Sed istud non sufficit dicere, quia similiter materia gaudii est in omnibus creaturis remanentibus post iudicium: ergo non magis diceretur secundum hoc, corpus nostrum beatificari quam aliae creaturae; quod non est conveniens dicere. — Si tu dicas, quod magis propter hoc, quod habet conditiones nobiliores; hoc non valet, quia similiter corpus solis easdem conditiones, quas corpus nostrum, habebit.

Et ideo dicendum aliter, quod beatitudo, cum sit gaudium de bonis, est in aliquo sicut in subiecto primo per inhaerentiam, et sic dico, quod est in sola anima; et est in aliquo sicut in coniuncto per quandam redundantiam, et sic, quia corpus est coniunctum animae, gaudium redundat in corpus⁴.

Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, quod beatitudo non sit in corpore tanquam in subiecto primo, sed tamen est ibi propter coniunctionem per quandam redundantiam et comparticipationem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ex utriusque bonis constat beatitudo; dicendum, quod Augustinus dicit illud secundum opinionem Tullii⁵.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, ut totum hominem beatificaret; dicendum, quod ibi est quaedam congruentia, quia etiam, etsi non esset incarnatus, homo esset beatus, dum tamen esset redemptus et ad visionem Dei perductus⁶.

3. Ad illud quod dicit Anselmus, dicendum, quod bene continet bona corporis; sed beatitudo non⁷ dicitur esse illa bona, sed gaudium de illis bonis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de merito, dicendum, quod anima non potest mereri extra corpus, non propter defectum virtutis, sed propter defectum status et temporis⁸ merendi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod miseria est ex parte corporis; dicendum, quod miseria subiective et proprie est in natura rationali; sed materialiter potest esse ratione corporis, sicut dicit Augustinus octavo de Civitate Dei⁹.

6. Ad aliud patet responsio, quod corpus necesse est resurgere, ut fiat beatum per quandam comparticipationem et redundantiam. Et est simile in gratia: quia, si gratia existens in anima secundum potentiam rationalem redundat in sensibilem, quando abundans est, et ipsam tranquillat, et quando delectatio magna est, similiter, sicut dicitur in Psalmo¹: Sitivit in te anima mea; cum in gloria sit perfecta abundantia et delectatio, non est mirum, si redundat in corpus; et hoc nemo dubitat nisi inexpertus².

---

Question III. In what subject beatitude resides.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the subject of beatitude; and it is asked whether man is the subject of beatitude according to the soul, or the whole composite. And that it is the whole composite, seems [to follow].

1. Augustine, in the nineteenth book of the City of God⁷: « The highest good, by which man is made blessed, consists of the goods of each thing, namely of soul and of body ».

2. Likewise, On the Spirit and the Soul⁸ says that « God became man, that he might beatify the whole man, exteriorly through his humanity, interiorly through his Divinity ».

3. Likewise, Anselm⁹, in defining beatitude, says that « it is the sufficiency of all goods »; and he divides those goods into goods of the soul and of the body.

4. Likewise, it seems by reason: because the reward corresponds to the merit; but merit belongs to the whole composite, since the soul stripped [of the body] does not merit: therefore [so also] beatitude, that is, the reward¹⁰.

5. Likewise, beatitude is opposed to misery; but misery belongs not only to the soul, but is also of the whole composite, chiefly by reason of the body: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if beatitude regarded the soul altogether as its subject, then it would not be necessary that the body rise again; but it is necessary that it rise again¹¹: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Upon that verse of the Psalm¹²: Blessed is the nation whose Lord is God etc.; the Gloss: « Man's beatitude is only in his mind, because only the mind of man is capable of it, being able to enjoy it ».

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because beatitude consists in God, since he is the ultimate end, in which one must come to rest¹³; but only the spirit is turned to seeing and loving God: therefore beatitude is in the spirit alone.

3. Likewise, the beatitude of glory corresponds to grace; but grace, since it is a spiritual quality, is in man by reason of the soul alone: therefore beatitude also, because, as far as the disposition to the form extends, so far does the form extend¹⁴.

4. Likewise, if some attribute is in certain subjects, it is in them according to something common¹; but beatitude is in an Angel and in a man: therefore it is in them according to something common to Angel and to man. But there is nothing common to Angel and to man except spirit and the spiritual powers: therefore beatitude is only in a spiritual power.

5. Likewise, if any two things share in some nature and cannot agree in that which is superadded to the nature, that superadded thing is not in them according to the nature in which they share; but man shares with the brutes in body and in the powers of sensing, and cannot share [with them] in beatitude²: therefore it is not in [him] according to the body.

Conclusion

Beatitude is in the soul alone as in its first subject by inherence, but in the body on account of the conjunction, by a certain redundance.

I respond: It must be said that to this some have said that beatitude is spoken of in two ways: properly and commonly. Properly it is the joy arising from a perfect participation in God through knowledge and love; commonly, however, every remuneration excluding all misery is so called. In the first way it comprehends only the substantial reward, in the second way the accidental one; in the first way it is only in the soul, in the second way it is in the soul and the body and in the whole composite. — And by this they solve the arguments for the opposite sides.

But that solution does not seem fitting, since, as Augustine says³, « to live blessedly is to rejoice in goods true and certain »; but joy and « sorrow, as he says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, belong to the soul itself »: therefore the joy of beatitude also is in the soul as in a subject, whether it be concerning the uncreated Good, which is God, or concerning the goods of the body.

And therefore others say otherwise, that accidental joy also and accidental beatitude is in the soul as in a subject, but the matter of this joy is in the body, because the soul rejoices over the goods of the body; and therefore beatitude is not in the body as in a subject, but as in matter and object, yet not a principal one. — But it does not suffice to say this, because likewise the matter of joy is in all the creatures remaining after the judgment: therefore it would no more be said on this ground that our body is beatified than the other creatures; which it is not fitting to say. — If you say that it is rather on this ground, that it has nobler conditions; this does not hold, because likewise the body of the sun will have the same conditions as our body.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that beatitude, since it is joy over goods, is in something as in a first subject by inherence, and thus I say that it is in the soul alone; and it is in something as in a composite by a certain redundance, and thus, because the body is conjoined to the soul, the joy redounds into the body⁴.

Therefore the arguments proving that beatitude is not in the body as in a first subject are to be conceded, but nevertheless it is there on account of the conjunction, by a certain redundance and comparticipation.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that beatitude consists of the goods of each; it must be said that Augustine says that according to the opinion of Tullius⁵.

2. To that which is objected, that he might beatify the whole man; it must be said that there is a certain fittingness there, because even if he had not been incarnate, man would have been blessed, provided nevertheless that he had been redeemed and led through to the vision of God⁶.

3. To that which Anselm says, it must be said that it does indeed contain the goods of the body; but beatitude is not⁷ said to be those goods, but the joy over those goods.

4. To that which is objected concerning merit, it must be said that the soul cannot merit outside the body, not on account of a defect of power, but on account of a defect of the state and of the time of meriting⁸.

5. To that which is objected, that misery is on the part of the body; it must be said that misery subjectively and properly is in the rational nature; but materially it can be by reason of the body, as Augustine says in the eighth book of the City of God⁹.

6. To the other the answer is plain, that the body must rise again, so that it may be made blessed by a certain comparticipation and redundance. And there is a like case in grace: because, if grace existing in the soul according to the rational power redounds into the sensitive power, when it is abundant, and calms it, and when the delight is great, likewise, as is said in the Psalm¹: My soul has thirsted for thee; since in glory there is perfect abundance and delight, it is no wonder if it redounds into the body; and no one doubts this except one who is inexperienced².

---