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Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De comparatione voluntatis ad suum finem.

Quaestio I. Utrum voluntas sit bona et commendabilis ratione boni finis.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum voluntas sit bona et commendabilis ratione boni finis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei sexto1: Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum luminosum erit. Si ergo oculus est intentio, per quam voluntas ordinatur in finem, secundum quod ibi exponitur, et corpus est congeries operum; videtur, quod si finis bonus sit, quod omnis operatio voluntatis sit bona et commendabilis.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit in undecimo de Trinitate2: « Rectae sunt omnes voluntates, si bona est illa, ad quam cunctae ordinantur »; sed illa, ad quam cunctae ordinantur, est voluntas finis: si ergo finis bonus est, restat, quod voluntas finis et omnis voluntas ad eam ordinata sit bona et recta.

3. Item, maxima est Philosophi3: « Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est »: ergo si actus voluntatis finis bonus est, ergo et ipsa bona est.

4. Item, in actione naturali, in qua forma est finis, bonitas generationis et operationis attenditur penes finem et formam4: ergo cum intentio finis aeque sit essentialis morali actui, ut naturali, et bonitas actus voluntatis pertineat ad mores; videtur, quod bonitas voluntatis et rectificatio penes bonitatem finis habeat attendi et cognosci.

Sed contra: 1. « Finis bonorum est beatitudo », sicut Magister dicit in littera5; sed « omnes appetunt beatitudinem », sicut dicit Augustinus, et « omnes eam finaliter intendunt, sicut dicit Boethius in libro de Consolatione, quamvis diverso tramite ad eam currant »: ergo si omnes voluntates communicant in illo fine, ergo omnes erunt bonae, et nulla mala.

2. Item, Dionysius6 dicit, quod « nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens », ergo omnis operans finaliter aspicit ad aliquod bonum; unde Philosophus etiam dicit, quod « bonum et finis est idem »: ergo si omnis voluntas intendit aliquod bonum, videtur, quod aut omnis voluntas est bona, aut quod bonitas non inest voluntati ex fine.

3. Item, quantumcumque aliquis finaliter appetit bonum, tamen nunquam operatio eius erit meritoria, nisi sit caritate informata, et anima sit Deo grata et accepta7: ergo videtur, quod bonitas voluntatis in actu potius veniat ex principio quam ex fine.

4. Item, si bonitas voluntatis venit ex fine, cum finis omnis bonae voluntatis sit Deus et sit aequaliter bonus; videtur, quod omnes bonae voluntates sint aequaliter bonae. Si igitur omnes voluntates non sunt aequaliter bonae, videtur, quod bonitas voluntatis non sit eis ex fine8.

5. Item, manducare bonum est: ergo si quis finaliter praedicat, ut manducet, cum operatio ista habeat bonum finem, videtur, quod sic praedicare sit bonum et laudabile. Si igitur talis actio iudicatur esse mala, videtur, quod voluntas non sit bona ex voluntate finis.

6. Item, si aliquis mentitur propter salutem proximi, cum salvare proximum sit bonum, mendacium illud esset bonum et meritorium, si opus voluntatis bonitatem haberet ex fine; sed constat, quod « mendacium nunquam est bonum », sicut dicit Augustinus9: ergo videtur, quod bonitas finis non sufficiat ad bonitatem voluntatis.

Quaeritur ergo, unde causetur rectitudo et bonitas in voluntate, utrum ex fine, sicut videtur dicere Magister10, an aliunde.

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Conclusio

Voluntas est bona ex fine, si adsunt duae conditiones ex parte finis, et duae ex parte ordinationis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur voluntas esse bona ex bonitate finis, hoc est dicere, quod voluntas est bona ex ordinatione ad bonum finem. — Ad hoc autem, quod sit recta ordinatio ad bonum finem, requiritur, quod finis sit bonus duobus modis, videlicet secundum id quod est, et sub ratione finiendi. Aliquid enim est bonum in se, quod tamen non recte ordinatur ad alterum in ratione finis; sicut minus bonum, quamvis sit bonum, non tamen est bonus finis maioris boni, pro eo quod « finis melior debet esse his quae sunt ad finem1 ». — Similiter ex parte ordinationis duo requiruntur, videlicet idoneitas ex parte ordinabilis, et actualis conversio ex parte voluntatis ordinantis. — Et cum ista concurrunt, tunc absque dubio voluntas bona ex fine bono iudicatur. Cum autem horum aliquid deficit, bonitas finis non sufficit ad bonitatem voluntatis, utpote si sit finis bonus in se, non tamen sufficit ad finiendum vel ad complendum illud quod fit propter ipsum; sicut manducatio, quamvis sit bonum in se, non tamen habet completam rationem finiendi respectu praedicationis2. Similiter mendacium non est ordinabile ad bonum, cum sit secundum se malum; et ideo quantumcumque quis mentiatur propter aliquod bonum, mendacium non est bonum, quia deficit ibi rectitudo ordinationis propter defectum idoneitatis ex parte actus, quem voluntas refert ad illum finem. — Et sic patet responsio ad veritatem quaestionis, quoniam concedendum est, sicut Magister dicit, voluntatem esse bonam et rectam ex fine; hoc enim intelligitur sub praedictis conditionibus. Et secundum hunc modum rationes ad primam partem concedendae sunt.

Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad illa duo, quae ultimo opponuntur, videlicet de praedicatione et mendacio.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod beatitudo est finis bonarum voluntatum et etiam omnium; dicendum, quod aliter est finis bonarum voluntatum, et aliter malarum. Nam beatitudo, quae est finis bonarum voluntatum, est beatitudo vera; beatitudo vero, quae est finis malarum, non est beatitudo vera, sed simulata. Avarus enim aestimat, beatitudinem esse in divitiis, et superbus, in honoribus3, et sic in aliis vitiis: unde sicut finis malarum voluntatum quandam habet imaginem finis vere boni, utpote beatitudinis, sic etiam malae voluntates praetendunt speciem virtutis. Quando ergo dicitur, quod omnis voluntas tendit ad beatitudinem; hoc intelligitur de beatitudine in sua generalitate considerata, in cuius appetitu omnes, ut dicit Augustinus4, communicant; sed prout beatitudo determinate accipitur pro illa quae consistit in visione Dei, nec ab omnibus appetitur, nec omnes in illam tendunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens; dicendum, quod illud quod movet, aliquando est bonum secundum veritatem, aliquando est bonum secundum aestimationem; et ad hoc, quod affectus moveatur, sufficit sola aestimatio bonitatis; et sine hac aestimatione non movetur voluntas ad aliquid appetendum, ad minus deliberativo5 appetitu. Et ideo dicit Dionysius, quod « nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens », quia nulla est voluntatis operatio, quam non praecedat boni aestimatio. Sed quia illud quod aestimatur esse bonum, frequenter est malum, ideo frequenter male operatur, etsi nunquam aspiciat ad malum sub ratione mali. Cum ergo dicitur, quod voluntas est bona ex intentione boni finis; hoc non intelligitur de fine, qui est bonus tantum in aestimatione appetentis6, sed etiam de bonitate reali.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est actus voluntatis bonus, nisi qui est ex caritate; dicendum, quod caritas non reddit opus bonum, nisi ex hoc, quod ipsum bonum refert in summum bonum. Nec sufficiens relatio alicuius effectus vel operis ad summum bonum est nec esse potest nisi ex adiutorio caritatis, quae facit, finem illum omnibus aliis praeponderare et prae ceteris carius reputari, et in eo quiescere tanquam in fine ultimo. Et hinc est, quod bonitas omnis voluntatis attribuitur caritati. Nihilominus etiam attribuitur bonitati finis, quia ubi unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum7; unde qui tenet equum per frenum non dicitur tenere nisi unum. Et sic in proposito intelligendum est.

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis est aequaliter bonus; dicendum, quod etsi finis aequaliter sit bonus, non tamen omnes voluntates aequaliter ordinantur et approximant illi fini, quia bonitas finis non redundat in voluntatem nisi ratione

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ordinationis voluntatis ad illum finem. Et ideo, licet finis sit aequaliter bonus, tamen propter gradus repertos in approximatione et ordinatione voluntatum ad illum finem, voluntates non sunt aequaliter bonae. — Ad duo ultima iam patet responsio ex praedictis.

Scholion

I. Voluntatem humanam omnemque eiusdem actionem, quatenus est actio, bonam esse in genere naturae, in praecedente distinctione dictum est. Hic agitur de bonitate actuum in genere moris, et explicatur doctrina Magistri, quod bonum morale in actibus humanis resultat ex ordine ad finem, et malum principaliter ex defectu ordinis ad finem. — De fine in genere cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 1-5, a. 1. q. 3, a. 2. 3; II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 28. passim, et alibi. Praeter alias finium distinctiones, de quibus agitur in philosophia, hic supponitur distinctio finis in ultimum et intermedium et proximum, et in finem operis et operantis.

De recto ordine actus ad finem dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.): « Tunc autem est sufficiens ordo [ad debitum finem], quando est ex parte volentis, referentis suum actum in debitum finem, et ex parte actus volendi, qui, quantum est ex se, ordinabilis est in illum finem ». Ex utraque autem parte duo requiruntur, secundum nostrum Doctorem, cuius doctrinam Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.) sic contrahit: « Ad perfectionem ordinis quatuor requiruntur: duo ex parte actus ordinabilis, et duo ex parte finis, ad quem fit ordinatio. Ex parte actus requiritur primo, quod ipse sit de genere bonorum et ex natura propria ordinabilis ad talem finem, ita quod per talem actum talis finis possit acquiri; secundo requiritur, quod actus ordinetur in finem secundum intentionem operantis. Ex parte etiam finis duo requiruntur, scilicet, quod finis sit debitus, secundum id quod est, id est bonus; et quod sit debitus, in quantum finis, scilicet magis bonus, quam id quod fit propter ipsum, quia finis melior est iis quae sunt ad finem ». — S. Thom. (hic a. 5; cfr. S. 1. II. q. 18. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 17.) in hac quaestione procedit ab illa distinctione, quod actus voluntatis dupliciter possit ferri in finem, vel immediate in ipsum finem, vel in finem mediante eo quod est ad finem; hac autem via probat easdem conclusiones, quas tenent S. Bonaventura aliique communiter. Tamen Henr. Gand. in quaestione, unde actio volitionis moralis speciem moris sortiatur (Quodl. 13. q. 10.), ab aliis doctoribus recedit, et quintuplex bonum distinguens, de volitione morali dicit: « Speciem moris et bonitatem atque rationem virtutis moralis habet non ab obiecto, nec ut est principium operationis sicut finis in intellectu practico, neque ut principium eius est a voluntate et operationem suam adeptum, sed potius ab agentis libero arbitrio ». Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 1. § 2. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 7. n. 11. seqq., et in utroque Scripto, d. 40. q. unica. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 133. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 40. q. unica.

II. Sequens (2.) quaestio explanat verbum Magistri (vel potius s. Scripturae), quod caritas est finis et praecepti et omnium voluntatum (cfr. hic dub. 1. 2.). Praeter distinctionem triplicis caritatis hic adhibetur distinctio communis inter beatitudinem (finem) obiectivam sive ipsam rem beatificantem, et beatitudinem formalem sive ipsum actum, quo obiectum beatificans apprehenditur et possidetur. Eadem distinctio exprimitur etiam terminis: finis in quo et finis quo (hic et dub. 4.), vel ut dicitur ab aliis, finis cuius et finis quo (S. Thom., S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 8.). Hac distinctione supposita, facile intelligitur, qua ratione non tantum Deus, sed etiam caritas et beatitudo finis ultimus esse possint; tamen caritas est finis ultimus non omnium rerum, sed omnium voluntatum. — De caritate cfr. III. Sent. d. 28; de tota quaestione I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. 3. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 4. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. n. 19. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 7, q. 2. a. 8, cfr. etiam S. 1. q. 44. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. loc. cit. q. incid. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

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English Translation
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Article I. On the comparison of the will to its end.

Question I. Whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Matthew six1: If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome. If, then, the eye is the intention by which the will is ordered to the end, according to the exposition given there, and the body is the aggregate of works; it seems that, if the end is good, every operation of the will is good and praiseworthy.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the eleventh book of On the Trinity2: « All wills are right, if that one is good to which all are ordered »; but that to which all are ordered is the will of the end: if, then, the end is good, it remains that the will of the end and every will ordered to it is good and right.

3. Likewise, there is a maxim of the Philosopher3: « That whose end is good is itself also good »: therefore if the act of the will of the end is good, then it too is good.

4. Likewise, in a natural action, in which the form is the end, the goodness of the generation and of the operation is regarded according to the end and the form4: therefore, since the intention of the end is equally essential to the moral act as to the natural one, and the goodness of the act of the will pertains to morals; it seems that the goodness of the will and its rectification must be regarded and known according to the goodness of the end.

On the contrary: 1. « The end of good [persons] is beatitude », as the Master says in the text5; but « all desire beatitude », as Augustine says, and « all finally intend it, as Boethius says in the book On Consolation, although they run to it by diverse paths »: therefore if all wills share in that end, then all will be good, and none evil.

2. Likewise, Dionysius6 says that « no one acts looking toward evil », therefore everyone who acts finally looks toward some good; whence the Philosopher also says that « the good and the end are the same »: therefore if every will intends some good, it seems that either every will is good, or that goodness does not belong to the will from the end.

3. Likewise, however much someone finally desires good, nevertheless his operation will never be meritorious unless it is informed by charity, and the soul is pleasing and acceptable to God7: therefore it seems that the goodness of the will in act comes rather from the principle than from the end.

4. Likewise, if the goodness of the will comes from the end, since the end of every good will is God and is equally good; it seems that all good wills are equally good. If therefore all wills are not equally good, it seems that the goodness of the will is not theirs from the end8.

5. Likewise, to eat is good: therefore if someone finally preaches in order that he may eat, since that operation has a good end, it seems that to preach thus is good and laudable. If therefore such an action is judged to be evil, it seems that the will is not good from the will of the end.

6. Likewise, if someone lies for the salvation of his neighbor, since to save one's neighbor is good, that lie would be good and meritorious, if the work of the will had goodness from the end; but it is established that « a lie is never good », as Augustine says9: therefore it seems that the goodness of the end does not suffice for the goodness of the will.

It is asked, then, whence rectitude and goodness are caused in the will, whether from the end, as the Master seems to say10, or from elsewhere.

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Conclusio

The will is good from the end, if two conditions are present on the side of the end, and two on the side of the ordering.

I respond: It must be said that when the will is said to be good from the goodness of the end, this is to say that the will is good from being ordered to a good end. — But for there to be a right ordering to a good end, it is required that the end be good in two ways, namely according to that which it is, and under the formal character of ending [finiendi]. For something is good in itself which nevertheless is not rightly ordered to another under the formal character of an end; just as a lesser good, although it is good, is nevertheless not a good end of a greater good, for the reason that « the better end ought to be [superior] to those things which are toward the end1 ». — Likewise on the side of the ordering two things are required, namely suitability on the side of what is orderable, and actual conversion on the side of the ordering will. — And when these concur, then without doubt the will is judged good from a good end. But when any of these is lacking, the goodness of the end does not suffice for the goodness of the will, as for instance if the end is good in itself, yet does not suffice for ending or for completing that which is done for its sake; just as eating, although it is good in itself, nevertheless does not have the complete formal character of ending with respect to preaching2. Likewise a lie is not orderable to good, since it is of itself evil; and therefore, however much one may lie for the sake of some good, the lie is not good, because there is lacking there the rectitude of ordering on account of the defect of suitability on the side of the act, which the will refers to that end. — And thus the response to the truth of the question is plain, since it must be conceded, as the Master says, that the will is good and right from the end; for this is understood under the aforesaid conditions. And according to this mode the arguments for the first part are to be conceded.

And through this also the response to those two [arguments] which are last opposed, namely concerning preaching and lying, is plain.

1. But to that which is first objected, that beatitude is the end of good wills and indeed of all; it must be said that the end of good wills is one thing, and of evil wills another. For beatitude, which is the end of good wills, is true beatitude; but beatitude, which is the end of evil [wills], is not true beatitude, but a simulated one. For the avaricious man estimates that beatitude is in riches, and the proud man, in honors3, and so in the other vices: whence just as the end of evil wills has a certain image of the truly good end, namely of beatitude, so also evil wills hold forth an appearance of virtue. When, therefore, it is said that every will tends to beatitude; this is understood of beatitude considered in its generality, in the desire for which all share, as Augustine says4; but as beatitude is taken determinately for that which consists in the vision of God, it is neither desired by all, nor do all tend toward it.

2. To that which is objected, that no one acts looking toward evil; it must be said that that which moves [the will] is sometimes good according to truth, sometimes good according to estimation; and for the affection to be moved, the estimation of goodness alone suffices; and without this estimation the will is not moved to desire anything, at least by a deliberative5 appetite. And therefore Dionysius says that « no one acts looking toward evil », because there is no operation of the will which the estimation of good does not precede. But because that which is estimated to be good is frequently evil, therefore one frequently acts evilly, even though one never looks toward evil under the formal character of evil. When, therefore, it is said that the will is good from the intention of a good end; this is not understood of an end which is good only in the estimation of the one desiring6, but also of real goodness.

3. To that which is objected, that no act of the will is good except that which is from charity; it must be said that charity does not render a work good except from this, that it refers the good itself to the highest good. Nor is a sufficient relation of any effect or work to the highest good, nor can it be, except from the help of charity, which makes that end outweigh all others and be reckoned more dear than the rest, and [makes the will] rest in it as in the ultimate end. And hence it is that the goodness of every will is attributed to charity. Nevertheless it is also attributed to the goodness of the end, because where one [is] for the sake of another, there is only one7; whence he who holds a horse by the bridle is not said to hold but one. And so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that the end is equally good; it must be said that even if the end is equally good, nevertheless not all wills are equally ordered to and approach that end, because the goodness of the end does not redound into the will except by reason

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of the will's ordering to that end. And therefore, although the end is equally good, nevertheless, on account of the degrees found in the approach and ordering of the wills to that end, the wills are not equally good. — To the two last [arguments] the response is already plain from what has been said.

Scholion

I. That the human will and every action of the same, insofar as it is an action, is good in the genus of nature, was stated in the preceding distinction. Here the matter treated is the goodness of acts in the genus of morals, and the doctrine of the Master is explained, namely that moral good in human acts results from the ordering toward the end, and evil principally from the defect of ordering toward the end. — On the end in general cf. I Sent. d. 1, dub. 1-5, a. 1. q. 3, a. 2. 3; II Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 1; III Sent. d. 28. passim, and elsewhere. Besides the other distinctions of ends, which are treated in philosophy, here is presupposed the distinction of end into ultimate and intermediate and proximate, and into the end of the work and of the worker.

On the right ordering of the act to the end Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1. q. 1.) says: « There is a sufficient ordering [to the due end] when it is on the side of the one willing, referring his act to the due end, and on the side of the act of willing, which, so far as it lies in itself, is orderable to that end ». But on each side two things are required, according to our Doctor, whose doctrine Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1. a. 1.) condenses thus: « For the perfection of the ordering four things are required: two on the side of the orderable act, and two on the side of the end to which the ordering is made. On the side of the act it is required first that it itself be of the genus of goods and of its own nature orderable to such an end, so that through such an act such an end can be acquired; secondly it is required that the act be ordered to the end according to the intention of the worker. On the side also of the end two things are required, namely, that the end be due according to that which it is, that is, good; and that it be due insofar as it is the end, namely more good than that which is done for its sake, because the end is better than the things which are toward the end ». — St. Thomas (here a. 5; cf. S. 1. II. q. 18. a. 4; S. against the Gentiles III. c. 17.) in this question proceeds from that distinction, that the act of the will can be borne toward the end in two ways, either immediately into the end itself, or into the end by means of that which is toward the end; and by this way he proves the same conclusions which St. Bonaventure and others commonly hold. Yet Henry of Ghent in the question whence the action of moral volition takes its moral species (Quodl. 13. q. 10.) departs from the other doctors, and, distinguishing a fivefold good, says of moral volition: « It has the moral species and goodness and the formal character of moral virtue not from the object, nor as it is the principle of the operation as an end in the practical intellect, nor as its principle is from the will and is attained by its operation, but rather from the free will of the agent ». Besides those mentioned: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 1. § 2. — Scotus, II Sent. d. 7. n. 11. seqq., and in both Writings, d. 40. q. unica. — B. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 133. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, II Sent. d. 40. q. unica.

II. The following (2.) question explains the word of the Master (or rather of holy Scripture), that charity is the end both of the precept and of all wills (cf. here dub. 1. 2.). Besides the distinction of the threefold charity, there is here employed the common distinction between objective beatitude (the end), or the beatifying thing itself, and formal beatitude, or the act itself by which the beatifying object is apprehended and possessed. The same distinction is also expressed in the terms: the end in which and the end by which (here and dub. 4.), or as it is said by others, the end whose and the end by which (St. Thomas, S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 8.). This distinction being supposed, it is easily understood by what reason not only God, but also charity and beatitude can be the ultimate end; yet charity is the ultimate end not of all things, but of all wills. — On charity cf. III Sent. d. 28; on the whole question I Sent. d. 1. a. 2. 3. Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 4. m. 3. — Scotus, in both Writings, I Sent. d. 1. q. 1, and IV Sent. d. 49. q. 2. n. 19. seqq. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 7, q. 2. a. 8, cf. also S. 1. q. 44. a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 2; S. loc. cit. q. incid. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q. here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 22. — Expositio huius loci, quae sequitur, est secundum Augustinum, qui II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 13. n. 45. ait: Qui locus sic intelligendus est, ut noverimus, omnia opera nostra tunc esse munda et placere in conspectu Dei, si fiant simplici corde i. e. intentione superna fine illo caritatis, quia et plenitudo Legis caritas (Rom. 13, 10.). Oculum ergo hic accipere debemus ipsam intentionem, qua facimus quidquid facimus; quae si munda fuerit et recta et illud aspiciens quod aspiciendum est, omnia opera nostra, quae secundum eam operamur, necesse est bona sint. Quae omnia opera totum corpus appellavit etc. Fere idem August. dicit IV. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 33.
    Verse 22 [of Matthew 6]. — The exposition of this passage, which follows, is according to Augustine, who in On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount II, c. 13, n. 45, says: This passage is to be understood thus, that we should know all our works to be clean and pleasing in the sight of God if they are done with a simple heart, that is, with that supernal intention of charity as their end, since the fullness of the Law is charity (Rom. 13:10). By eye, therefore, we ought here to understand the very intention by which we do whatever we do; and if it be clean and right and looking to that which is to be looked at, all our works which we do according to it must necessarily be good. All which works he called the whole body, etc. Augustine says almost the same in Against Julian the Pelagian IV, c. 3, n. 33.
  2. Cap. 6. n. 10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Ch. 6, n. 10. See here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  3. Boeth., II. de Differ. topic.; Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: Cuius finis melior, et ipsum melius. — Paulo inferius post bonus est cod. T sic prosequitur: ipsum quoque bonum est i. e. et ipsa actio bona est.
    Boethius, On Topical Differences II; Aristotle, Topics III, c. 1: That whose end is better is itself also better. — A little below, after is good, codex T continues thus: it too is good, that is, the action itself is good.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 81. seqq. (c. 8.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 81 seqq. (c. 8).
  5. Hic c. 1. — De sententia August. vide supra pag. 517, nota 2. — Verba propria Boethii, III. de Consol. prosa 2, sunt: Omnis mortalium cura, quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet, diverso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur pervenire... Hunc, ut diximus, diverso tramite mortales omnes conantur adipisci.
    Here c. 1. — On the opinion of Augustine see above p. 517, note 2. — The proper words of Boethius, On Consolation III, prose 2, are: Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold pursuits exercises, proceeds indeed by a diverse path, yet strives to arrive at one same end of beatitude... This, as we have said, all mortals endeavor to attain by a diverse way.
  6. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. et 31; vide supra pag. 808, nota 2. De sententia Philosophi mox memorata vide pag. cit. nota 5.
    On the Divine Names c. 4, §§ 19 and 31; see above p. 808, note 2. On the opinion of the Philosopher just mentioned see the cited page, note 5.
  7. Ut habetur supra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et infra d. XL.
    As held above, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 and following. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 1, and below, d. 40.
  8. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi etiam seq. arg. insinuatur. — Pro eis ex fine cod. cc et ed. 1 ei ex fine.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 3, where the following argument is also intimated. — For theirs from the end codex cc and edition 1 [read] its from the end.
  9. Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6, et de Mendacio, c. 21. n. 42. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XL.
    Enchiridion c. 18, n. 6, and On Lying c. 21, n. 42. See below the text of the Master, d. 40.
  10. Hic c. 1. seqq. et infra d. XL.
    Here c. 1 seqq. and below, d. 40.
  11. Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. de Bono maiore et utili; III. Topic. c. 1; I. Ethic. c. 7; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 3. (c. 2.) — Pro non tamen est bonus finis maioris boni cod. cc et ed. 1 non tamen ratione finis respectu maioris boni. Paulo inferius pro indicatur codd. I V W X Z et alii vocatur.
    Aristotle, Rhetoric I, c. on the greater and the useful good; Topics III, c. 1; Ethics I, c. 7; Greater Morals I, c. 3 (c. 2). — For is nevertheless not a good end of a greater good codex cc and edition 1 [read] is nevertheless not by reason of an end with respect to a greater good. A little below, for is regarded codices I V W X Z and others [read] is called.
  12. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 23. (c. 2.) ait: Vult enim [Poëta], non omne ultimum esse finem, sed optimum.
    Aristotle, Physics II, text 23 (c. 2), says: For [the Poet] holds that not every last thing is the end, but the best.
  13. Edd., excepta 1, et superbiis et honoribus. Codd. I W cum edd. 2, 3 in deliciis pro in divitiis.
    The editions, except edition 1, [read] and the proud and in honors. Codices I W with editions 2, 3 [read] in delights for in riches.
  14. Locis supra pag. 517, nota 2. citt. Cfr. infra dub. 1.
    At the places cited above on p. 517, note 2. Cf. below, dub. 1.
  15. Codd. K ee et ed. 1. deliberato.
    Codices K ee and edition 1 [read] deliberated.
  16. Cod. N operantis. Deinde cod. cc. et ed. 1 prosequuntur sed etiam de fine, qui est bonus bonitate reali.
    Codex N [reads] of the one working. Then codex cc and edition 1 continue but also of an end which is good with real goodness.
  17. Verba Aristot. vide supra pag. 639, nota 2. De hac solutione cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 36. q. 6. — Pro ibi cod. T (F a secunda manu) substituit utrobique, quae vox in hoc axiomate communis est.
    For the words of Aristotle see above p. 639, note 2. On this solution cf. III Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 36. q. 6. — For there codex T (F by a second hand) substitutes in both cases, which word is the common one in this axiom. ---
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