Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1
Quaestio III. Utrum solo bono creato utendum sit.
Tertio, ostenso, utrum omni creato sit utendum et1 omni alio a Deo, est quaestio, utrum solo bono creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. «Omne bonum aut est finis, aut ad finem2»; sed solo bono, quod est ad finem, est utendum, quia ratio utilis est ducere in finem: ergo cum solum bonum creatum sit ad finem, solo bono creato est utendum.
2. Item, omne bonum aut est creatum, aut increatum. Sed si contingit uti bono increato, contingit illud referre ad aliud: aut ergo ad creatum, aut3 increatum; sed non ad increatum, quia non est nisi unum increatum: ergo ad creatum. Sed sic refertur terminus ad viam et causa ad effectum; sed hoc est abusio, non usus: ergo solo bono creato sive creatura est utendum.
3. Item, Augustinus in libro octoginta trium Quaestionum4 dividit honestum contra utile: ergo nullum utile honestum vel e converso; sed Deus est honestum per essentiam: ergo Deo non est utendum.
4. Item, videtur quod non solum non sit utendum Deo sive bono increato, sed uti eo semper sit peccatum mortale, quia Augustinus in libro octoginta trium Quaestionum5 dicit: «Summa perversitas est frui utendis et uti fruendis»; sed qui utitur bono increato, utitur bono fruendo: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Contingit Deo recte servire intuitu mercedis, quia multi sunt boni mercenarii, ut dicit Ambrosius6; sed non contingit Deo servire nisi amando: ergo contingit Deum recte amare intuitu mercedis; sed sic amans utitur Deo, quia refert ad aliud: ergo etc.
2. Item, sic summa bonitas habet se ad amorem, sicut7 summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed contingit veritatem creatam cognoscere clarius sine praeiudicio summae veritatis et sine errore: ergo similiter contingit aliam bonitatem quam summam ardentius diligere sine praeiudicio summae bonitatis et deordinatione: ergo contingit amore ordinato aliud plus diligi quam Deum: ergo contingit Deum diligi propter aliud ordinate et ita uti eo.
3. Item, videtur quod nullum peccatum sit, cum quis utitur Deo propter suam salutem, quia «cuius finis bonus, ipsum bonum8»; sed huius usus bonus est, scilicet nostra salus: ergo usus Dei bonus: ergo non erit peccatum.
4. Item, usus Dei aut est bonus; et sic utendum Deo; aut est malus; et sic Deus malus, quia «cuius usus malus, ipsum malum9»; quod si Deus bonus, et eius usus bonus: ergo Deo est utendum.
Conclusio. Solo bono creato est utendum, et bono increato uti est abuti.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod solo bono creato est utendum, quia, si bono increato utimur, semper est abusus, et abusus talis est mortale peccatum propter perversitatem in finem10 cum delectatione, et propter voluntatis inordinationem, quae minus diligit ipsum quo utitur, quam propter quod utitur.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod contingit recte servire Deo intuitu mercedis; dicendum, quod illa merces aut est ipse Deus, sicut dixit Abrahae Genesis decimo quinto11: Ego merces tua; et sic intuens mercedem non utitur, quia non refert ad aliud; aut merces illa est aliud, et tunc potest eam quis intueri aut ut causam? moventem; et sic est malus mercenarius12; aut ut rationem inducentem; et sic bonus, et hoc modo non utitur.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod clarior cognitio creaturae non praeiudicat Creatori, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia claritas cognitionis non est in nostra potestate, sed ardor affectionis est in nostra potestate; ideo requiritur a nobis, quod istum ordinemus, non illam13. Aliquis tamen actus cognitionis est in nostra potestate, utpote actus fidei, quo si aliquis assentiat veritati primae propter aliud, bene praeiudicat veritati, sicut amare propter aliud, bonitati.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis usus Dei est bonus; dicendum, quod finis dicitur bonus dupliciter: aut quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad intentionem finiendi; et propositio illa intelligitur quantum ad intentionem finiendi, et haec14 consistit in recta ordinatione.
4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod illa propositio15 intelligitur de habentibus ordinationem ad finem, sed non de ipso fine. — Vel intelligitur de actu naturali ipsarum rerum et proprio, qui frequentius ab ipsa re elicitur, non de ordinatione in16 finem; et sic non valet propositio ad propositum.
I. In conclusione S. Doctor propositionem, quod bono increato uti sit abusus et peccatum, duplici ratione probat, quae sumitur tum ex parte finis ultimi, tum ex parte voluntatis. Ex parte finis ultimi est abusus, quia aversio a fine non fit sine contemtu eius et offensa Dei, uti probatur II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 2; ex parte voluntatis propter inordinationem, quia voluntas, quando Deo utitur, in aliquo creato ponit finem; sed finis est melior his quae sunt ad finem (infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.) et «quantum est de se, dicit excessum bonitatis respectu eius, quod est ad finem» (ibid. ad s.). Ex quo patet inordinatio in proposito. Voluntas enim in utendo minus diligit medium quam finem. Ad rem facit illud generalissimum principium Aristotelis, toties a S. Doctore repetitum: Propter quod unumquodque (tale) est, illud magis est. Cfr. etiam hic dub. 6, ubi dicit, quod omnis res sit aut finis, aut medium ad finem, aut perveniens ad finem. — Quoad solut. ad 1, nempe quomodo Deo servire possimus intuitu mercedis, cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Quoad axioma: Cuius finis bonus, ipsum quoque bonum (ad 3.), cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.
II. Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. III., q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. et 2, et p. II. q. 142. m. 2. — Ceteros auctores videsis in Scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem.
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Question III. Whether only a created good is to be used.
Thirdly, it having been shown whether every created thing is to be used and1 every other thing besides God, the question is whether only a created good is to be used. And that it is so, seems [the case].
1. «Every good is either an end, or [ordered] to an end2»; but use is only of the good which is to an end, since the rational character of the useful is to lead to the end: therefore, since only a created good is to an end, only a created good is to be used.
2. Likewise, every good is either created or uncreated. But if it is possible to use an uncreated good, it is possible to refer it to another: either, therefore, to a created [good], or [to an] uncreated3; but not to an uncreated, since there is only one uncreated: therefore to a created. But thus the term is referred to the way, and the cause to the effect; but this is abuse, not use: therefore only a created good or creature is to be used.
3. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Eighty-Three Questions4 divides the honorable against the useful: therefore no useful thing is honorable, or conversely; but God is the honorable by essence: therefore God is not to be used.
4. Likewise, it seems that not only is God or the uncreated good not to be used, but to use Him is always a mortal sin, since Augustine in the book On the Eighty-Three Questions5 says: «It is the highest perversity to enjoy things to be used and to use things to be enjoyed»; but he who uses an uncreated good, uses a good [meant] for enjoying: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. It is possible to serve God rightly with a view to reward, since there are many good hirelings, as Ambrose says6; but it is not possible to serve God except by loving: therefore it is possible to love God rightly with a view to reward; but the one so loving uses God, since he refers [Him] to another: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the highest goodness stands to love as7 the highest truth stands to cognition; but it is possible to know a created truth more clearly without prejudice to the highest truth and without error: therefore likewise it is possible to love some goodness other than the highest more ardently without prejudice to the highest goodness and without disorder: therefore it is possible by ordered love that another be loved more than God: therefore it is possible that God be loved on account of another in an ordered way, and so to use Him.
3. Likewise, it seems that there is no sin when someone uses God for the sake of his own salvation, since «that whose end is good, is itself good8»; but the use of this is good, namely our salvation: therefore the use of God is good: therefore it will not be a sin.
4. Likewise, the use of God either is good — and so God is to be used; or is evil — and so God is evil, since «that whose use is evil, is itself evil9»; but if God is good, His use is also good: therefore God is to be used.
Conclusion. Only a created good is to be used, and to use an uncreated good is to abuse.
I respond: It must be said that only a created good is to be used, since, if we use an uncreated good, it is always abuse, and such abuse is a mortal sin on account of the perversity toward the end10 with delectation, and on account of the disorder of the will, which loves less the very thing by which it uses than that on account of which it uses.
To the arguments:
1. To that which is objected, that it is possible to serve God rightly with a view to reward; it must be said that that reward is either God Himself, as He said to Abraham, Genesis fifteen11: I am thy reward; and so the one looking to the reward does not use [Him], since he does not refer [Him] to another; or that reward is something else, and then someone can look to it either as a cause? [or "the carnal"] moving [him]; and so he is a bad hireling12; or as a reason inducing [him]; and so [he is] good, and in this way he does not use.
2. To that which is objected, that a clearer cognition of the creature does not prejudice the Creator, therefore etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar, since the clarity of cognition is not in our power, but the ardor of affection is in our power; therefore it is required of us that we order this latter, not that former13. Some act of cognition, however, is in our power, namely the act of faith, by which if anyone assent to the first truth on account of another, he indeed prejudices the truth, just as to love on account of another [prejudices] goodness.
3. To that which is objected, that the end of the use of God is good; it must be said that the end is called good in two ways: either as to substance, or as to the intention of finalizing; and that proposition is understood as to the intention of finalizing, and this14 consists in right ordering.
4. To the last it must be said that that proposition15 is understood of things having ordering to an end, but not of the end itself. — Or it is understood of the natural and proper act of the things themselves, which is most frequently elicited from the thing itself, not of the ordering to16 an end; and so the proposition is not valid for the matter at hand.
I. In the conclusion the Holy Doctor proves the proposition, that to use an uncreated good is abuse and sin, by a twofold reason, which is drawn both on the side of the ultimate end and on the side of the will. On the side of the ultimate end it is abuse, since aversion from the end does not occur without contempt of it and offense against God, as is proved in II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, and a. 3. q. 2; on the side of the will, on account of disorder, since the will, when it uses God, places its end in some created thing; but the end is better than the things which are to the end (below, d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in the body) and «as far as itself is concerned, expresses an excess of goodness in respect of that which is to the end» (ibid. ad s.). Whence the disorder in the matter at hand is evident. For the will in using loves the medium less than the end. To the point applies that most general principle of Aristotle, so often repeated by the Holy Doctor: That on account of which each thing is (such), is itself more so. Cfr. also here dub. 6, where he says that every thing is either an end, or a medium to an end, or [something] arriving at an end. — As to the solution to 1, namely how we may serve God with a view to reward, cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. and III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — As to the axiom: Whose end is good, is itself also good (ad 3.), cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.
II. As to the question itself: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III., q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. and 2, and p. II. q. 142. m. 2. — For other authors see the Scholion to the preceding question.
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- Codd. R et W vel pro et.Codices R and W [read] vel instead of et.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1–7; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 3. et III. Topic. c. 1, ubi haec divisio diversimode insinuatur.Cfr. Aristotle, I. Ethics c. 1–7; I. Magna Moralia c. 3, and III. Topics c. 1, where this division is insinuated in various ways.
- Cod. A cum ed. 1 satis bene adiungit ad. Mox Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 4, post unum omittit increatum.Codex A with ed. 1 quite suitably adds ad. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the older mss. and ed. 4, omits increatum after unum.
- Quaest. 30: Honestum dicitur quod propter se ipsum expetendum est, utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est. — Mox ex multis codd. ut A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff cum ed. 1 posuimus vel pro et. Paulo infra Vat. ante honestum praemittit quid, quod tamen melius cum mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 omittitur, quia Deus est ipsum honestum per essentiam.Question 30: The honorable is said to be that which is to be sought on account of itself, but the useful that which is to be referred to something else. — Soon after, from many codices such as A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff with ed. 1 we have placed vel in place of et. A little below, the Vatican edition places quid before honestum, which however is better omitted with the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, since God is the honorable itself by essence.
- Quaest. 30: Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui.Question 30: Every human perversion, therefore, which is also called vice, is to wish to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used.
- In Evangel. S. Lucae c. 15, ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1748: At vero filius, qui habet Spiritus S. pignus in corde, saecularis mercedis lucella non quaerit, quibus serviat. Haeredes sunt etiam mercenarii, qui ducuntur ad vineam. Bonus mercenarius Petrus etc. — Codex autem, sub n. 507 Bibliothecae Laurentianae Florentiis, membr. in fol. saec. XI. fol. 116. recto, col. 2. ultimam partem sic exhibet: non quaerit, qui ius servat haeredis. Sunt etiam qui conducuntur ad vineam. Bonus etc. Cum quo concordat cod. m. Plut. XIV. in fol. saec. XV. libr. VII. c. 35. Lectio istius ed. in verbis et interpunctione errat.In [Commentary on] the Gospel of S. Luke c. 15, where according to the Venice edition of 1748: But truly the son, who has the pledge of the Holy Spirit in his heart, does not seek the petty gains of secular reward, that he may serve them. Heirs too are hirelings, who are led to the vineyard. Peter [is] a good hireling, etc. — But the codex under n. 507 of the Laurentian Library in Florence, parchment, in folio, of the 11th century, fol. 116 recto, col. 2, gives the last part thus: he does not seek, who preserves the right of an heir. There are also those who are hired to the vineyard. A good [hireling] etc. With which agrees cod. m. Plut. XIV., in folio, 15th century, bk. VII. c. 35. The reading of that [Venice] edition errs in wording and punctuation.
- Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, invertendo comparationem, nempe sicut summa bonitas, sic summa veritas, argumentationem, uti ex subnexis patet, perturbat. Mox cod. X post clarius satis bene addit veritate increata. Dein, faventibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, expunximus aliquam, quod Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc praemittit voci aliam. In ultima propositione huius argumenti multi codd. CFGKLRSUVW aa bb cum ed. 1 ante diligi falso repetunt plus.The Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, by inverting the comparison — namely as the highest goodness, so the highest truth — disturbs the argument, as is evident from what follows. Soon after, cod. X after clarius quite suitably adds veritate increata. Then, with the older mss. and ed. 1 in favor, we have expunged aliquam, which the Vatican edition with the more recent cod. cc places before the word aliam. In the last proposition of this argument many codices CFGKLRSUVW aa bb with ed. 1 falsely repeat plus before diligi.
- Boeth., II. de Differentiis topicis. Locus a fine: Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est. Vide supra q. 1. in corp. Propositio ista derivata esse videtur ex illa Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: Cuius finis melior, et ipsum melius. Ad normam codd. et ed. 1 omisimus est et quoque, quod Vat. cum Boethio habet.Boethius, II. On Topical Differences. The passage near the end: That whose end is good, is itself also good. See above q. 1. in the body. This proposition appears to be derived from that of Aristotle, III. Topics c. 1: That whose end is better, is itself better. According to the norm of the codices and ed. 1 we have omitted est and quoque, which the Vatican edition with Boethius has.
- Boeth., II. de Differentiis topic. — Codd. F O X addunt post malus particulam et. Immediate post ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quod loco quia, cod. R autem habet ergo si Deus.Boethius, II. On Topical Differences. — Codices F O X add the particle et after malus. Immediately after, from almost all mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted quod in place of quia, while cod. R has ergo si Deus.
- Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 reiecimus lectionem Vat. aversionem a fine tanquam minus rectam, quia talis abusus non dicit solum simplicem aversionem a fine, sed etiam directam perversionem ipsius finis, quatenus nempe ipse finis convertitur in medium. Cod. O post perversitatem addit intentionis. Cod. R totam propositionem sic exhibet: et abusus talis semper est mortale peccatum, non (forsan omissum: solum) propter perversitatem in finem cum delectatione, sed propter voluntatis etc. Mox maiorem partem codd. ut ACGIKLUVX etc. et ed. 1 secuti, bis pro utimur substituimus utitur, quod grammatice melius est; alii codd. primo loco habent utitur, secundo loco utimur. Propositio ista relativa a S. Doctore adducta, quae immediate refertur ad substantivum voluntatis, continet implicite rationem inordinationis in voluntate hic notatae; sensus enim est: voluntas ordinata minus diligit ipsum quo utitur, i. e. medium, quam propter quod utitur i. e. finem; atqui in hoc casu habetur contrarium: ergo voluntas est inordinata.On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1 we have rejected the reading of the Vatican edition aversionem a fine as less correct, since such abuse signifies not only a simple aversion from the end, but also a direct perversion of the end itself, inasmuch, namely, as the end itself is converted into a means. Cod. O after perversitatem adds intentionis. Cod. R gives the whole proposition thus: and such abuse is always a mortal sin, not (perhaps with solum omitted) on account of perversity toward the end with delectation, but on account of the will's etc. Soon after, following the greater part of the codices such as ACGIKLUVX etc. and ed. 1, we have twice substituted utitur for utimur, which is grammatically better; other codices in the first place have utitur, in the second place utimur. That relative proposition adduced by the Holy Doctor, which immediately refers to the substantive voluntatis, contains implicitly the rationale of disorder in the will here noted; for the sense is: an ordered will loves less the very thing by which it uses, i. e. the means, than that on account of which it uses, i. e. the end; but in this case the contrary obtains: therefore the will is disordered.
- Vers. 1. — Paulo ante exhibemus lectionem codd. RVWXYZ aa bb; alii codd. autem, omisso Deus, ponunt Dominus post Abrahae, a quibus non multum dissidet Vat. legendo: est ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 post utitur expunximus Deo.Verse 1. — A little before we exhibit the reading of codices RVWXYZ aa bb; but other codices, omitting Deus, place Dominus after Abrahae, from which the Vatican edition does not much differ in reading: He is Himself, as the Lord said to Abram. Soon after, on the faith of the older mss. and ed. 1, we have expunged Deo after utitur.
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit et sic utitur.The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the mss. and ed. 1, here adds et sic utitur.
- Vat. post istum addit amorem et post illam adiungit cognitionem, quae tamen auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 tanquam superflua expunximus.The Vatican edition after istum adds amorem and after illam adjoins cognitionem, which however on the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, as superfluous, we have expunged.
- Cod. cc cum ed. 1 hoc. Mox antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem, quae habetur in Vat. et cod. cc post ordinatione, scil.: et illo modo non contingit uti Deo, quia non convenit ordinari. — Fusius de hac re tractat S. Doctor II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1.Cod. cc with ed. 1 [reads] hoc. Soon after, the older codices and ed. 1 omit the proposition which is found in the Vatican edition and cod. cc after ordinatione, namely: and in that mode it is not possible to use God, since it is not fitting [for Him] to be ordered. — The Holy Doctor treats this matter more fully in II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1.
- Scilicet, cuius usus bonus, et ipsum bonum. — Vat. cum cod. cc paulo ante post ultimum praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 addit scilicet usus Dei aut est bonus aut malus etc.Namely, that whose use is good, is itself also good. — The Vatican edition with cod. cc a little before, after ultimum, contrary to the testimony of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds namely the use of God is either good or evil, etc.
- Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus in loco ad. — De hoc secundo responsionis membro vide supra q. 1. circa principium conclusionis.From the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted in in place of ad. — On this second member of the response see above q. 1. near the beginning of the conclusion.