Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 31
Quaestio III. Utrum coire cum uxore ratione concupiscentiae satiandae sit semper peccatum mortale.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum coire cum uxore ratione concupiscentiae satiandae sit semper mortale peccatum. Et quod non, videtur.
1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera1: «Coniugalis concubitus gratia concupiscentiae satiandae, sed tamen cum coniuge, propter tori fidem venialem habet culpam».
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia delectari in coitu coniugali ratione boni matrimonii non est peccatum: ergo nec velle delectari, quia, si actus bonus, et voluntas actus bona: ergo videtur etc.
3. Item, qui delectatur in cibo non propter Deum, sed propter ipsum cibum, quia boni saporis est, non peccat mortaliter: ergo pari ratione, cum delectatio coniugalis non sit mortalis, si vult delectari, non peccat mortaliter.
Contra: 1. Dicit auctoritas, et habetur in littera2: «Vehemens amator uxoris est adulter»; sed qui amat uxorem propter hoc, ut delectetur in ipsa, est vehemens amator: ergo etc.
2. Item, Hieronymus3: «Voluptates, quae de meretricum amplexibus capiuntur, in uxore damnandae sunt».
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia velle coire sive appetere sola delectatione est peccatum etiam ante consensum: ergo cum progreditur in consensum et actum, cum comedat vir4, tunc, cum comedere viro fiat mortale, erit mortale.
4. Item, qui cognoscit propter hoc, ut delectetur, fruitur creatura, quia ibi ponit finem suae quietis; sed «summa perversitas est frui utendis5»: ergo etc.
CONCLUSIO. Cognoscere uxorem concupiscentiae satiandae causa est veniale, mortale autem, si fiat ita, ut ponatur ibi finis ultimus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod qui finaliter cognoscit uxorem, ut habeat illam miseram delectationem, quae dicitur esse in coitu, peccat semper mortaliter, quando illam ponit tanquam finem principalem, sicut si aliquis propter vanam gloriam6 praedicaret; qui autem cognoscit aliqua alia causa principali, sed tamen quasi a latere placet ei delectatio, quae est ibi, sicut est de aliquo, qui finaliter praedicat propter Deum, sed tamen quasi a latere placet ei delectatio laudis; dicunt, quod peccat venialiter. Ad hoc enim, quod coniugalis coitus sit sine omni peccato, necesse est, quod illa delectatio non placeat, immo displiceat rationi. Tanta enim est, ut auferat usum rationis et spiritum prophetiae secundum illud tempus7; et ideo non potest tunc referri in Deum, et ideo ea non potest quis bene uti volendo, sed nolendo; non sic est de aliis delectationibus, quarum sensus possunt a ratione actu referri in Deum. Unde secundum hos aliud est delectationem quaerere, aliud est oblatam acceptare, aliud eam tolerare. Primum est peccati mortalis, secundum est venialis, tertium est perfectionis. — Et haec positio, licet probabilis videatur, tamen nimis dura est; licet enim viris cum uxoribus iocari et etiam delectari, et veniale est, ita tamen, quod faciant8 affectu maritali; nec oportet omnem delectationem referre in Deum, peccant tamen venialiter. Nec semper frui creatura est mortale, nisi ita ponat ibi finem, quod etiam faceret, si contra Deum esset; tunc enim ponit finem ultimum ibi. Unde non est simile de praedicatione, quae est opus privilegiatum.
Et propter hoc est alia opinio, quod qui cognoscit uxorem propter delectationem finalem, aut movetur in delectationem tanto impetu, ut cognoscat uxorem sicut meretricem; et hoc tunc est, quando eam cognosceret, si non esset uxor; et tunc peccat mortaliter, quia tunc ponit ibi finem ultimum, et tunc vere et proprie fruitur et nimis vehementer amat. — Si autem in ea vult delectari, quia uxor, et nullo modo eam cognosceret, si uxor non esset, tunc non est omnimoda inordinatio; et tunc est peccatum veniale, quia excusatur per bonum matrimonii, ut non sit mortale.
In hoc casu dicunt locutum fuisse Augustinum. — Tamen illa ratio non valet: delectari non est malum: ergo nec velle. Quamvis enim laudari non sit malum, tamen velle laudari malum est. — Et secundum has duas vias procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas. Illae enim, quae probant, quod sit mortale libidinis ardore et creaturae fruitione, procedunt, secundum quod coitus fit secundum impetum voluptatis. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt, secundum quod habetur respectus ad matrimonii Sacramentum, quia cognoscit eam, quia uxor, nec aliter delectaretur in ea, nisi esset matrimonialiter coniuncta9.
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Question III. Whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin.
Thirdly it is asked whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin. And that it is not, is shown thus.
1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text1: "Conjugal intercourse for the sake of satisfying concupiscence, yet with one's spouse, on account of fidelity to the marriage-bed has a venial fault."
2. Likewise, this same thing seems [true] by reason: because to take delight in conjugal intercourse for the sake of the good of marriage is not a sin: therefore neither is it [a sin] to will to take delight, because, if the act is good, the will of the act is also good: therefore it seems [so], etc.
3. Likewise, one who takes delight in food not for the sake of God, but for the sake of the food itself, because it is of good flavor, does not sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning, since conjugal delight is not mortal, if one wills to take delight, one does not sin mortally.
On the contrary: 1. An authority says, and it is contained in the text2: "A vehement lover of his wife is an adulterer"; but one who loves his wife on account of this, that he may take delight in her, is a vehement lover: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Jerome3: "The pleasures which are seized from the embraces of harlots are to be condemned in a wife."
3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: because to will to have intercourse or to seek it by delight alone is a sin even before consent: therefore when it advances into consent and act, since a man may eat4, then, since to eat becomes mortal for the man, it will be mortal.
4. Likewise, one who has knowledge [of his wife] on account of this, that he may take delight, enjoys a creature, because he places therein the end of his rest; but "it is the highest perversity to enjoy the things to be used5": therefore etc.
CONCLUSION. To know one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is venial, but mortal if it is done in such a way that the ultimate end is placed therein.
I respond: It must be said that some say that one who finally knows his wife in order to have that wretched delight which is said to be in intercourse, sins always mortally, when he places it as the principal end, just as if someone were to preach for the sake of vainglory6; but one who has knowledge [of his wife] for some other principal cause, yet as it were incidentally the delight which is therein pleases him, as is [the case] with someone who finally preaches for the sake of God, yet as it were incidentally the delight of praise pleases him; they say that he sins venially. For, in order that conjugal intercourse may be without any sin, it is necessary that that delight not please [him], but rather displease his reason. For it is so great that it takes away the use of reason and the spirit of prophecy for that time7; and therefore it cannot then be referred to God, and therefore of it one cannot make good use by willing [it], but [only] by not willing [it]; it is not so with the other delights, whose objects of sense can be actually referred to God by reason. Whence according to these [thinkers] it is one thing to seek delight, another to accept it when offered, another to tolerate it. The first belongs to mortal sin, the second to venial, the third to perfection. — And this position, although it may seem probable, nevertheless is too harsh; for it is permitted to men to sport with their wives and even to take delight, and it is venial, provided nonetheless that they do so8 with marital affection; nor is it necessary to refer every delight to God, yet they sin venially. Nor is enjoying a creature always mortal, unless one places therein an end in such a way that he would do it even if it were against God; for then he places the ultimate end therein. Whence it is not similar with preaching, which is a privileged work.
And on account of this there is another opinion, that one who knows his wife for the sake of final delight, either is moved into delight with such great impetus that he knows his wife as [he would] a harlot; and this is then [the case], when he would know her [even] if she were not his wife; and then he sins mortally, because he then places therein the ultimate end, and then he truly and properly enjoys [her] and loves [her] too vehemently. — But if he wills to take delight in her because [she is his] wife, and would in no way know her if she were not his wife, then there is not complete disorder; and then it is a venial sin, because it is excused through the good of marriage, so that it is not mortal.
In this case they say that Augustine spoke. — Nevertheless that reasoning does not hold: to take delight is not evil: therefore neither is it [evil] to will [it]. For although to be praised is not evil, nevertheless to will to be praised is evil. — And according to these two ways the arguments proceed to the opposite sides. For those [arguments] which prove that it is mortal by the ardor of lust and by the enjoyment of a creature, proceed insofar as intercourse is done according to the impetus of pleasure. But the arguments [proceeding] to the opposite proceed insofar as regard is had to the Sacrament of marriage, because he knows her because [she is his] wife, nor would he take delight in her otherwise, unless she were joined [to him] in marriage9.
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- 1Hic c. 5.Here, c. 5.
- 2Hic c. 5.Here, c. 5.
- 3Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.See here the text of the Master, c. 5.
- 4De hac Augustini locutione figurativa, in qua respicitur illud Gen. 2, 6, vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq. — Mox edd. omittunt viro fiat mortale.On this figurative expression of Augustine, in which reference is made to that [text] of Gen. 2:6, see 2 Sent., text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 6ff. — Presently the editions omit viro fiat mortale.
- 5Secundum August., 83 Qq. q. 30. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 34, nota 5.According to Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 30. For the words see vol. I, p. 34, note 5.
- 6Cod. Y addit finaliter.Codex Y adds finaliter.
- 7Guliel. Antissiod., IV. Sum. tr. 9. c. 4. q. 2, pro hoc adducit Origen. (Homil. 6. in Num. n. 3.) infra in lit. Magistri d. XXXII. c. 3. allegatum. Cfr. supra q. 1. — Aliquanto inferius pro acceptare plures codd. accipere.William of Auxerre, Summa bk. IV, tr. 9, c. 4, q. 2, adduces for this Origen (Homily 6 on Numbers, n. 3), cited below in the text of the Master, d. XXXII, c. 3. Cf. above, q. 1. — Somewhat further below, for acceptare several codices [read] accipere.
- 8Cod. aa fiat, multi codd. faciat et paulo inferius peccat, incongrue.Codex aa [reads] fiat, many codices faciat, and a little below peccat, incongruously.
- 9Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---