Dist. 31, Dubia
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 31
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: Nam bonum prolis dicitur non ipsa proles etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia per matrimonium non generatur proles sancta, sed culpam habens: ergo si proles non est bonum Sacramenti in quantum proles, sed in quantum sancta; cum in principio ortus sit non sancta, non debet dici bonum, sed malum. — Item, p. 727 quid est quod dicitur1, quod bonum prolis dicitur «spes ac desiderium, quo proles quaeritur, ut religiose informetur»? Cum enim hoc habeant steriles, videtur etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod proles potest quaeri triplici intentione: primo, ut educetur ad cultum Dei; secundo, ut in hereditate succedat; tertio, ut quis in prolis multitudine et pulcritudine gloriosus appareat. Primum est bonum sub ratione boni; secundum est sub ratione indifferentis, et tertium est bonum deformatum sive ad malum tractum. Bonum igitur matrimonii, quod est bonum simpliciter, iudicandum est prolis cum tali intentione et cum tali ordinatione. Si autem aliis duobus modis habeatur, habetur quidem aliquod bonum, sed non sicut institutum est et competit huic Sacramento, quod institutum est ad procreandam prolem ad cultum divinum.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ubi vero non inter legitimas personas contrahitur coniugium, potest solvi talium copula etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nunquam fuit ibi matrimonium, ergo nunquam fuit copula: ergo nunquam solvitur, quia non solvuntur nisi copulati.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui copulantur secundum veritatem, aliqui copulantur de facto et secundum apparentiam. Si sint matrimonialiter copulati, non solvuntur, quia vere fuit ibi copula et vinculum; si secundum apparentiam, solvuntur; sed illud solvere nihil aliud est quam ostendere, prius non fuisse.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si ambo tales non sint, aut illa meretrix est mariti. Videtur enim male dicere, quia matrimonium est vinculum, quod importat relationem, sicut similitudo; sed etiam in relativis necessaria est convertentia2: ergo si ista non est uxor, nec ille est vir: ergo si ista est adultera, et ille similiter.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod esse adulterum est duobus modis: aut ratione actus, aut ratione intentionis. Si ratione actus; sic dico, quodsi ista est adultera, quod ille qui eam cognoscit, est adulter. Si ratione intentionis; sic dico, quod potest bene esse, quod una persona intendat cognoscere affectu maritali, et alia affectu libidinis. Et sic loquitur Augustinus3 in proposito: quia, si matrimonialiter coniuncti sunt, ita quod talis pactio non intercedit, sed postmodum in altero, vel in utroque fit intentio extra generandi prolem; est adulterium non ratione generis actus, sed ratione intentionis, pro eo quod facit contra bonum prolis; et ita adversatur matrimonio, non4 excusatur. — Quod ipse obiicit tenet de adulterio, quod est ratione generis actus.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Informe puerperium animam non habet, ideoque multatur pecunia; quaeritur ergo, utrum talis peccet mortaliter, et utrum sit irregularis. Et quod non, videtur: quia non punitur nisi solummodo pecunia, non poena mortis: ergo videtur leve peccatum esse, quia mortalia peccata in Lege5 puniebantur poena mortis. — Item, si est peccatum mortale; quaero: sub quo genere? Sed non sub genere homicidii: ergo si non est homicidium, de quo magis videtur: videtur, quod non sit mortale peccatum. — Contra: videtur, quod gravius peccat quam ille qui procurat aborsum6, puerperio iam formato, quia plus nocet qui maius bonum impedit; sed maius bonum impedit qui impedit animae procreationem, quam qui impedit corporis vegetationem: ergo magis peccat ille qui aborsum procurat, quam ille qui animam a corpore separat. — Item, ex hac ratione videtur, quod magis peccat qui interficit puerum non baptizatum, quam qui interficit puerum christianum, quia facit7 perire in anima et in corpore. — Item, peccatum procurantis aborsum aut pensatur secundum quantitatem bonitatis rei, quae est, vel quae futura est. Si rei, quae est; tunc nullum videtur peccatum, quia non est nisi quaedam superfluitas in ventre. Si rei, quae futura est; sed futurus est homo vivens: ergo talis iudicandus est homicida.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod talis non est iudicandus homicida quantum ad factum, quia non p. 728 occidit, nec aliquis moritur ante puerperium formatum; tamen quantum ad voluntatem perversam iudicandus est homicida, non ratione homicidii, sed maleficii; unde talis inter maleficos8 computatur, et tale crimen grave est.
Quod ergo obiicitur, quod non sit mortale, quia non punitur morte; ratio non valet, quia multa sunt mortalia, quae morte non plectebantur; tamen illud gravius scelus est, dum ex certa scientia operatur contra naturam; contra enim naturam bestiarum est, quae prolem exspectant.
Quod quaeritur, sub quo genere peccati sit; dicendum quod spectat ad maleficium.
Quod obiicitur, quod plus nocet; dicendum, quod non consideratur quantitas nocumenti secundum id quod potest esse, sed secundum id quod est: quia secundum id quod potest esse, cum unus homo per successionem possit esse origo mille, qui occideret unum, occideret mille, quod falsum est; et ideo, quia nondum est anima, necdum est tantum bonum, quamvis esse possit: ideo non sic graviter peccat. Et sic patent obiecta9.
Dub. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non propter illud malum culpabile est hoc bonum. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia primae ad Corinthios quinto10 dicitur, quod modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit: ergo videtur, quod modicum malum foedat bonum potius quam e converso.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod «malum est corruptio boni11»; dico igitur, quod malum dupliciter potest iungi bono: aut ut corruptibili, aut in quantum medicinali. Si in quantum corruptibili, sic malum foedat bonum; si ut medicinali, sic curatur et expellitur. Et est exemplum: quia morbus iunctus naturae sanae eam vitiat et infirmat; morbus vero iunctus medicinae non reddit medicinam morbidam, sed potius curatur ab ipsa. Et quoniam matrimonium est bonum medicinale, ideo non foedatur a malo, sed potius curat malum.
Dub. VI.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod admixtio coniugis sine carnis voluptate fieri non potest; et iterum dicit: Carnalis voluptas sine culpa nullatenus esse potest. Hoc videtur falsum: quia tunc nullum coitum contingeret esse sine peccato; et hoc est contra Gregorium12, qui excipit eum qui gratia prolis coit sive pro generanda prole; et tamen est carnis admixtio.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo, quia non dicitur carnis admixtio quilibet actus coniugalis, sed ille qui fit ad delectationem carnis, vel ad eius excitationem13, in qua quidem semper est aliqua culpa.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which the Master says: For the good of offspring is called not offspring itself etc. For it seems to be ill said, because through matrimony offspring is not begotten holy, but as having guilt: therefore if offspring is not the good of the Sacrament insofar as it is offspring, but insofar as it is holy; since at the beginning of its birth it is not holy, it ought not to be called good, but evil. — Likewise, p. 727 what is it that is said1, namely that the good of offspring is called "the hope and desire by which offspring is sought, so that it may be religiously formed"? For since barren persons have this, it seems etc.
I respond: It must be said that offspring can be sought with a threefold intention: first, that it may be brought up for the worship of God; second, that it may succeed in the inheritance; third, that one may appear glorious in the multitude and beauty of offspring. The first is good under the account of the good; the second is under the account of the indifferent, and the third is a good deformed or drawn toward evil. Therefore the good of matrimony, which is a good simply, is to be judged that of offspring with such an intention and with such an ordering. But if it is had in the other two ways, some good is indeed had, but not as it is instituted and belongs to this Sacrament, which is instituted for procreating offspring for the divine worship.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: But where marriage is not contracted between legitimate persons, the union of such persons can be dissolved etc. For it seems to be ill said, because there was never matrimony there, therefore there was never a union: therefore it is never dissolved, because none are dissolved except those who are united.
I respond: It must be said that some are united according to truth, some are united in fact and according to appearance. If they are matrimonially united, they are not dissolved, because there truly was a union and bond there; if [they are united] according to appearance, they are dissolved; but that dissolving is nothing else than to show that previously it was not.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: If both are not such, either she is a harlot of the husband. For it seems to be ill said, because matrimony is a bond, which carries a relation, like likeness; but even in relatives a mutual conversion is necessary2: therefore if she is not the wife, neither is he the husband: therefore if she is an adulteress, he likewise.
I respond: It must be said that being an adulterer is in two ways: either by reason of the act, or by reason of intention. If by reason of the act; then I say that if she is an adulteress, he who knows her is an adulterer. If by reason of intention; then I say that it can well be that one person intends to know with a marital affection, and the other with an affection of lust. And thus Augustine3 speaks in the matter at hand: because, if they are matrimonially joined, such that no such pact intervenes, but afterward in one, or in both, there arises an intention beyond begetting offspring; it is adultery not by reason of the kind of the act, but by reason of intention, for the reason that it works against the good of offspring; and so it is opposed to matrimony, and is not4 excused. — What he objects holds of adultery which is by reason of the kind of the act.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: An unformed birth does not have a soul, and therefore is punished with a money-fine; therefore it is asked whether such a one sins mortally, and whether he is irregular. And that he does not, it seems: because he is not punished except only with money, not with the penalty of death: therefore it seems to be a light sin, because mortal sins in the Law5 were punished with the penalty of death. — Likewise, if it is a mortal sin; I ask: under what genus? But not under the genus of homicide: therefore if it is not homicide, concerning which it more seems [so]: it seems that it is not a mortal sin. — On the contrary: it seems that he sins more gravely than he who procures an abortion6 when the birth is already formed, because he harms more who impedes a greater good; but he impedes a greater good who impedes the procreation of the soul, than he who impedes the vegetation of the body: therefore he who procures the abortion sins more than he who separates the soul from the body. — Likewise, from this reasoning it seems that he sins more who kills an unbaptized child than he who kills a christian child, because he causes7 [it] to perish in soul and in body. — Likewise, the sin of him who procures an abortion is weighed either according to the quantity of the goodness of the thing which is, or which is to be. If of the thing which is; then no sin seems [present], because it is nothing but a certain superfluity in the womb. If of the thing which is to be; but a living man is to be: therefore such a one is to be judged a homicide.
I respond: It must be said that such a one is not to be judged a homicide as regards the deed, because he does not p. 728 kill, nor does anyone die before the birth is formed; yet as regards the perverse will he is to be judged a homicide, not by reason of homicide, but of maleficium; whence such a one is counted among the makers of maleficence8, and such a crime is grave.
Therefore, as to what is objected, that it is not mortal because it is not punished with death; the reasoning is not valid, because there are many mortal [sins] which were not punished with death; yet that is the graver wickedness, when one acts against nature out of certain knowledge; for it is against the nature even of beasts, which await [their] offspring.
As to what is asked, under what genus of sin it is; it must be said that it pertains to maleficium.
As to what is objected, that it harms more; it must be said that the quantity of the harm is not considered according to that which can be, but according to that which is: because according to that which can be, since one man through succession can be the origin of a thousand, he who would kill one would kill a thousand, which is false; and therefore, because there is not yet a soul, there is not yet so great a good, although it can be: therefore he does not sin so gravely. And thus the objections are answered9.
Doubt V.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: This good is not culpable on account of that evil. For it seems to be false to say, because in the first [Epistle] to the Corinthians, chapter five10, it is said that a little leaven corrupts the whole mass: therefore it seems that a little evil defiles the good rather than the reverse.
I respond: It must be said that «evil is the corruption of the good11»; therefore I say that evil can be joined to a good in two ways: either as to something corruptible, or insofar as something medicinal. If insofar as something corruptible, then evil defiles the good; if as something medicinal, then it is cured and expelled. And there is an example: because a disease joined to healthy nature vitiates and weakens it; but a disease joined to medicine does not render the medicine diseased, but rather is cured by it. And since matrimony is a medicinal good, therefore it is not defiled by evil, but rather cures the evil.
Doubt VI.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that the union of a spouse cannot come about without pleasure of the flesh; and again he says: Pleasure of the flesh can in no way be without fault. This seems false: because then no intercourse would happen to be without sin; and this is against Gregory12, who excepts him who has intercourse for the sake of offspring or for the begetting of offspring; and yet it is a union of the flesh.
I respond: It must be said that force must be put on the word, because union of the flesh is not said [of] any conjugal act whatever, but [of] that one which is done for the pleasure of the flesh, or for its excitation13, in which indeed there is always some fault.
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- 1Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Superius pro ortus cod. U coitus, cod. X actus.Here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — Above, for ortus ("birth") codex U [reads] coitus, codex X actus.
- 2Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Iis quae ad aliquid (relativis): Omnia autem, quae sunt ad aliquid, ad convertentia [alias ad convertentiam, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα] dicuntur, ut servus domini servus, et dominus servi dominus esse dicitur etc. — Cod. L omittit etiam.Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter On Those Things Which Are Relative to Something (relatives): But all things which are relative to something are said with a mutual conversion [otherwise toward a conversion, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα], as the servant is said to be servant of the master, and the master master of the servant etc. — Codex L omits etiam.
- 3In verbis, de quibus agitur in hoc dubio. — Superius fide codd. R T (bb a secunda manu) supplevimus potest bene esse, quod, pro quo in cod. F secunda manus substituit possibile est, quod, cod. K (1 a secunda manu) si, subinde post libidinis addito unus potest esse adulter, et non alius (cod. U una est adultera, alia non).In the words which are treated in this doubt. — Above, on the faith of codices R and T (bb by a second hand) we have supplied potest bene esse, quod ("it can well be, that"), for which in codex F a second hand substituted possibile est, quod, codex K (1 by a second hand) si, and thereupon, after libidinis, adding one can be an adulterer, and not the other (codex U one is an adulteress, the other not).
- 4Cod. aa et non. — Idem dub. solvit Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.Codex aa [reads] et non. — The same doubt is resolved by Richard of Middleton, here on the text.
- 5Cfr. Exod. 21, 12. seqq.; Lev. 20, 2. et 9. seqq. — Pro puniebantur codd. A E plectebantur, codd. I K Z multabantur.Cf. Exodus 21:12 ff.; Leviticus 20:2 and 9 ff. — For puniebantur ("were punished") codices A, E [read] plectebantur, codices I, K, Z multabantur.
- 6Edd. cum paucis codd. hic et in seqq. abortum. Subinde pro maius bonum codd. communissime bis magis bonum.The editions with a few codices, here and in what follows, [read] abortum. Thereupon, for maius bonum ("greater good") the codices most commonly [read], twice, magis bonum.
- 7Codd. R T Z supplent eum, codd. I K quem facit pro quia facit.Codices R, T, Z supply eum, codices I, K [read] quem facit for quia facit.
- 8Secundum Du Cange, Glossarium etc., maleficium significat quandoque peccatum quodvis, quandoque membri mutilationem, vel enormem laesionem (Mahamium), et malefici dicuntur incantatores, divini, mathematici, magi. Hieron., in Comment. in Ierem. 28, 9: Maleficos, quos vel veneficos possumus appellare vel daemonum phantasmatibus servientes. Cfr. Iustinian., C. IX. de Maleficis etc. (tit. 18.). — Post sed edd. pluresque codd. non bene addunt etiam.According to Du Cange, Glossarium etc., maleficium signifies sometimes any sin whatever, sometimes the mutilation of a limb, or an enormous injury (Mahamium), and malefici are called enchanters, diviners, astrologers, magicians. Jerome, on the Commentary on Jeremiah 28:9: The malefici, whom we can call either poisoners or servants of the phantasms of demons. Cf. Justinian, Codex IX, On the Malefici etc. (title 18). — After sed the editions and several codices not well add etiam.
- 9Codd. R T addunt: Quod enim quaerebatur de interfectore pueri christiani, et quis magis peccet; dicendum, quod secundum diversas considerationes plus potest peccare in isto, et plus in illo; unde secundum considerationem, quae in argumento tangitur, concedo, quod plus peccat occidendo non baptizatum; sed si ob reverentiam christianitatis parceret potius baptizato, minus peccaret; tamen illud argumentum nihil facit ad propositum, sicut patet.Codices R, T add: For as to what was asked concerning the killer of a christian child, and who sins more; it must be said that according to diverse considerations one can sin more in the one, and more in the other; whence according to the consideration which is touched on in the argument, I grant that one sins more by killing the unbaptized; but if out of reverence for christianity one should rather spare the baptized, he would sin less; yet that argument makes nothing for the matter at hand, as is clear.
- 10Vers. 6.Verse 6.
- 11Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20; August., contra Epist. Manichaei, c. 35. n. 39, et de Natura boni etc. c. 4. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. per totam.According to Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 20; Augustine, Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, c. 35, n. 39, and On the Nature of the Good etc., c. 4. Cf. II Sentences, d. 35, throughout.
- 12Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. circa finem.See here the text of the Master, c. 8, near the end.
- 13Edd. cum pluribus codd. exercitationem.The editions with several codices [read] exercitationem. ---