Dist. 49, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 49
Articulus I. De corporis glorificatione.
Quaestio I. Utrum gloria corporis sit de substantia beatitudinis.
Quantum ergo ad primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod gloria corporis sit de beatitudinis substantia sive augmentet gloriam animae:
1. Et primo per auctoritatem Magistri in littera1: «Sine scrupulo, inquit, credendum est, eos habituros maiorem gloriam post iudicium quam ante, quia maius erit gaudium et amplior cognitio»; sed ista respiciunt essentiam beatitudinis: ergo etc.
2. Item, Bernardus de Diligendo Deo2: «Anima exuta tamen corpori est coniuncta, etsi non vita vel sensu, tamen affectu, ut sine eo nec possit nec valeat consummari».
3. Item, Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim3 de anima exuta dicit: «Inest ei quidam naturalis appetitus administrandi corpus, quo retardatur, ne tota intentione feratur in illud summum caelum»: ergo si quantitas praemii substantialis consistit in adhaerentia et fruitione illius summi caeli, patet etc.
4. Item, perfecta beatitudo est quies omnium desideriorum4: si ergo anima appetit naturaliter corpori uniri, et iste appetitus, cum sit naturalis, non possit terminari nisi per unionem; impossibile est, animam perfecte beatificari, quousque resumat corpus.
Contra: 1. Anima gaudet nunc de Deo, post iudicium vero non tantum gaudebit de Deo, sed etiam de bonis corporis; sed Deus est bonum infinitum, bonum corporis est bonum finitum; sed finitum additum super infinitum nihil auget5: ergo bonum corporis non auget praemium: ergo etc.
2. Item, tanta gratia est in anima exuta, quantae gratiae capax est, cum est coniuncta: ergo similiter videtur de gloria.
3. Item, cum Deus se offerat modo animae in aperta visione, sicut post iudicium, quare non est ita modo perfecta gloria, sicut post iudicium? — Si dicas, quod propter appetitum administrandi corpus; contra: Bernardus, de Diligendo Deo6, de beatis animabus dicit, «quod ita inebriantur Deo, ut obliviscantur sui»: ergo si sui obliviscuntur, multo magis corporis.
4. Item, maiores motus absorbent minores: ergo cum motus amoris in Deum improportionaliter sit maior quam in corpus, ergo totaliter absorbet illum.
5. Item, appetitus administrandi corpus impedit, ergo multo fortius administratio: si enim amor alicuius potest retrahere a Deo, cum est absens, multo fortius, cum est praesens.
6. Item, corpus nunquam fiet spiritus, quamvis fiat spirituale7: ergo liberior est spiritus a corpore absolutus quam alligatus: ergo melius dispositus ad suscipiendam beatitudinem perfectam.
Conclusio
Glorificatio corporis facit ad maius gaudium quoad extensionem et etiam quoad intensionem, quatenus removetur impedimentum, quin tamen augeatur habitus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod beatitudo dicitur gaudium per essentiam; gaudium autem potest dici maius quadrupliciter: aut quia de maiori obiecto, aut quia ex maiori habitu, aut quia de pluribus, aut quia ex eodem habitu intensius. Primo modo maius gaudium, quia de maiori8, non reperitur nec respectu eiusdem nec respectu diversorum, quia quilibet gaudet de bono infinito. — Secundo modo maius invenitur respectu diversorum, quia maiori habitu gaudet Petrus quam Linus; sed non reperitur respectu eiusdem quantum ad diversa tempora, quia non habebit maiorem habitum Petrus post iudicium, quam habet nunc. — Tertio modo maius, quia latius et de pluribus, reperitur in eodem secundum diversa tempora, quia Petrus de pluribus gaudebit post iudicium quam nunc, quia de gloria animae et corporis et de gloria omnium salvatorum.
Sed non est maius hoc modo respectu diversorum, quia de tot et eisdem gaudebit unus Sanctus parvus, sicut et maximus Sanctus. — Quarto modo maius, quia intensius, reperitur et respectu eiusdem et respectu diversorum: respectu diversorum, quia unus intensius movetur quam alter; respectu eiusdem, quia ex eodem habitu intensius movebitur anima, resumto corpore1, quia nullum habebit retardans.
Concedendum est igitur, quod glorificatio corporis facit ad maius gaudium quantum ad extensionem; facit etiam quantum ad intensionem, non augendo habitum, sed removendo impedimentum. Unde non facit ad augmentum praemii essentialis principaliter, sed ex consequenti. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
Ad 1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non gaudet de maiori; dicendum, quod ratio2 tenet bene; sed quantum ad hoc non dicitur maior, sed de eodem intensius. — Similiter, quod secundo obiicit de gratia, patet: quoniam ipsa gratia dicit habitum, et idem etiam habitus gloriae est in anima exuta, et postquam est unita; sed per illum non ita intense movetur, et hoc retardante appetitu.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obliviscitur3 sui; dicendum, quod hoc non intelligitur, quin amet se, sed quod omnis amor privatus, qui non referatur in Deum, ab anima auferetur; et certe anima non appetit corpus amore privato, sed ad gloriam Dei. — Vel dicendum, quod Bernardus loquitur de Beatis post resumtionem secundae stolae.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maiores motus absorbent minores; dicendum, quod verum est, quod absorbent, sed non ita, ut non sint, sed ut non ita intense appareant; sunt tamen et apparent aliquo modo; et ideo, quamvis parum, tamen aliquo modo minuunt motus minores ipsos maiores, licet vincantur4.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si appetitus impedit, magis praesentia; dicendum, quod appetitus duo dicit, scilicet amorem alicuius rei et carentiam illius. Quando igitur impedit, aut ratione amoris, aut carentiae. Si ratione amoris, tunc magis impedit res praesens; si ratione carentiae, tunc non impedit, cum carentia5 per praesentiam removetur.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritus absolutus est liberior; dicendum, quod est spiritus a corpore absolutus substantia et affectu; et iste est liberrimus. Et est spiritus alligatus affectu et solutus substantia; et iste non est liber, quia aliquid vult quod non habet. Et est spiritus alligatus substantia et affectu; et tunc aut corpus est inobediens, et talis non est liber, quia non potest6 quod vult; aut per omnia obediens, et talis est liber libertate sibi conveniente, quia nihil vult, nisi quod potest, et habet omne quod vult.
Numeri notarum infra positi respondent signis in textu Latino et in versione Anglica. Quaracchi numerationem in singulis paginis impressis a capite incohat; ideo notae paginae 1012 et notae paginae 1013 separatim signantur.
I. Quaestio I. a Magistro (hic c. 4.) sic ponitur: «Si maior est beatitudo Sanctorum post iudicium». — Affirmativa responsio est communis, si intelligitur, quod ipsa crescat extensive. Hoc in Concilio Florentino et Graeci et Latini se credere asseruerunt. Quod autem etiam intensive crescat, non quidem per augmentum habitus, sed per remotionem impedimenti retardantis; docuit S. August. (XII. super Gen. ad lit. c. 35.), non tamen (ut patet ex eiusdem II. Retract. c. 24.) ut omnino certum; quem secuti sunt S. Bernard., Haymo aliique antiqui cum ipso S. Bonav. Primitus etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 93. a. 1.) eandem sententiam professus est, sed postea, mutata sententia, docuit (S. I. II. q. 4. a. 5. ad 5.), quod «corpore resumto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive»; quod etiam Durand. (hic q. 7.) aliique posteriores propugnant. — Primam vero sententiam tenent Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 9. a. 2. sect. 2. n. 49, et, ut videtur, hic q. 3. n. 9. (aliqui tamen volunt, eum retractasse hanc opinionem), et Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 7.). — Propositio in principio resp. posita, quod per essentiam beatitudo sit gaudium sive delectatio, approbatur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. III. q. 23. m. 1. ad 1.) et tanquam probabilis defenditur a Richardo a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 6.). Sed Scot. (hic q. 7; I. Sent. d. 1. q. 3.) docet, quod «stricte accipiendo beatitudinem, delectatio non est de essentia eius, quia est passio, beatitudo autem consistit in operatione» (hic q. 7. n. 4.); prout tamen voluntas est receptiva, «perficitur delectatione et gaudio». Idem tenent S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 3; S. I. II. q. 4. a. 1. 2.) et Durand. (hic q. 4. n. 20.). Addit tamen Scotus (n. 6.), quod secundum absolutam potentiam Dei visio eius possit esse sine gaudio; de quo aliter loquitur S. Bonav. supra d. 48. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.
De 2. quaestione alii commentatores Lombardi non tractant specialiter, sed eam solvunt in 1. quaestione, vel potius in quaestionibus de singulis dotibus, ubi notavimus, quomodo Scotus a S. Bonav. et Thoma discedat.
De utraque quaestione praeter locos citt.: Petr. a Tar. rem breviter tangit hic q. 2. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7.
II. De sequenti articulo, qui agit de quatuor dotibus corporis in generali, alii commentatores Lombardi, exceptis B. Alberto (d. 44. a. 32.) et Richardo (hic a. 4. q. 1.), specialiter non tractant, sed principia sua ponunt disputantes de eisdem in specie, de quo vide infra sect. 2. — De tribus dotibus animae plurima profert S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1-5; Suppl. q. 95. a. 1-5.
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Article I. On the glorification of the body.
Question I. Whether the glory of the body belongs to the substance of beatitude.
As regards the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the glory of the body belongs to the substance of beatitude, or that it increases the glory of the soul:
1. And first through the authority of the Master in the text1: "Without scruple," he says, "it must be believed that they will have a greater glory after the judgment than before, because the joy will be greater and the knowledge fuller"; but these things regard the essence of beatitude: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Bernard, On Loving God2: "The soul, though stripped, is nevertheless joined to the body, if not by life or sense, still by affection, so that without it the soul can neither be nor be able to be consummated."
3. Likewise, Augustine, in the twelfth book On Genesis3, says of the stripped soul: "There is in it a certain natural appetite for administering the body, by which it is retarded, lest it be borne with its whole intention into that highest heaven": therefore, if the quantity of the substantial reward consists in adherence to and enjoyment of that highest heaven, it is evident etc.
4. Likewise, perfect beatitude is the rest of all desires4: if therefore the soul naturally desires to be united to the body, and this appetite, since it is natural, cannot be terminated except through union; it is impossible that the soul be perfectly beatified until it takes up the body again.
On the contrary: 1. The soul now rejoices in God, but after the judgment it will rejoice not only in God, but also in the goods of the body; but God is an infinite good, the good of the body is a finite good; but the finite added upon the infinite adds nothing5: therefore the good of the body does not increase the reward: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, there is as much grace in the stripped soul as it is capable of when it is joined [to the body]: therefore the same seems to hold of glory.
3. Likewise, since God offers himself to the soul now in open vision, just as after the judgment, why is the glory not now as perfect as after the judgment? — If you say that it is on account of the appetite for administering the body; on the contrary: Bernard, On Loving God6, says of the blessed souls "that they are so inebriated with God that they forget themselves": therefore, if they forget themselves, much more do they forget the body.
4. Likewise, greater motions absorb lesser ones: therefore, since the motion of love toward God is disproportionately greater than that toward the body, therefore it totally absorbs the latter.
5. Likewise, the appetite for administering the body impedes, therefore much more the administering itself: for if the love of something can draw one back from God when it is absent, much more so when it is present.
6. Likewise, the body will never become spirit, although it becomes spiritual7: therefore a spirit released from the body is freer than one bound to it: therefore it is better disposed for receiving perfect beatitude.
Conclusion
The glorification of the body makes for a greater joy as regards extension and also as regards intension, inasmuch as an impediment is removed, though the habit is not thereby increased.
I respond: It must be said that beatitude is called joy by essence; but joy can be called greater in four ways: either because it is of a greater object, or because it is from a greater habit, or because it is of more things, or because it is more intense from the same habit. In the first way a greater joy, namely because of a greater object8, is found neither with respect to the same person nor with respect to different persons, because each one rejoices in the infinite good. — In the second way a greater joy is found with respect to different persons, because Peter rejoices with a greater habit than Linus; but it is not found with respect to the same person as regards different times, because Peter will not have a greater habit after the judgment than he has now. — In the third way greater, namely because more widely and of more things, it is found in the same person according to different times, because Peter will rejoice in more things after the judgment than now, since he will rejoice in the glory of soul and body and in the glory of all the saved.
But it is not greater in this way with respect to different persons, because a small Saint will rejoice in just as many and the same things as the greatest Saint. — In the fourth way greater, namely because more intense, it is found both with respect to the same person and with respect to different persons: with respect to different persons, because one is moved more intensely than another; with respect to the same person, because from the same habit the soul will be moved more intensely once the body has been taken up again1, since it will have nothing retarding it.
It must therefore be granted that the glorification of the body makes for a greater joy as regards extension; it makes for it also as regards intension, not by increasing the habit, but by removing the impediment. Hence it does not make for an increase of the essential reward principally, but consequently. — And the reasons for this are to be granted.
To 1 and 2. To that which is objected on the contrary side, that one does not rejoice in a greater [object]; it must be said that the reasoning2 holds well; but as regards this it is not called greater, but more intense concerning the same. — Similarly, what he objects in the second place about grace is evident: for grace itself denotes a habit, and the same habit of glory is in the soul stripped and after it has been united; but through it the soul is not moved so intensely, and this because the appetite retards it.
To 3. To that which is objected, that it forgets3 itself; it must be said that this is not understood as though it did not love itself, but that every private love which is not referred to God will be taken away from the soul; and certainly the soul does not desire the body with a private love, but for the glory of God. — Or it must be said that Bernard is speaking of the Blessed after the resumption of the second robe.
To 4. To that which is objected, that greater motions absorb lesser ones; it must be said that it is true that they absorb them, but not so that they do not exist, but so that they do not appear so intensely; yet they are and they appear in some way; and therefore, although but little, still in some way the lesser motions diminish the greater ones themselves, even though they are overcome4.
To 5. To that which is objected, that if the appetite impedes, the presence [of the body] does so still more; it must be said that appetite denotes two things, namely the love of some thing and the lack of it. When therefore it impedes, it does so either by reason of love or by reason of lack. If by reason of love, then the thing present impedes more; if by reason of lack, then it does not impede, since the lack5 is removed by the presence.
To 6. To that which is objected, that a released spirit is freer; it must be said that there is a spirit released from the body in substance and in affection; and this one is most free. And there is a spirit bound in affection and loosed in substance; and this one is not free, because it wills something which it does not have. And there is a spirit bound in substance and in affection; and then either the body is disobedient, and such a spirit is not free, because it cannot do6 what it wills; or the body is obedient in all things, and such a spirit is free with the freedom befitting it, because it wills nothing except what it can, and it has everything that it wills.
I. Question I is posed by the Master (here c. 4) thus: "Whether the beatitude of the Saints is greater after the judgment." — The affirmative answer is the common one, if it is understood that beatitude grows extensively. Both the Greeks and the Latins declared at the Council of Florence that they believed this. But that it grows also intensively, not indeed by an increase of the habit, but by the removal of the retarding impediment, St. Augustine taught (XII. On Genesis, to the Letter, c. 35), yet not (as is clear from his own II. Retractions, c. 24) as something altogether certain; and him St. Bernard, Haymo, and other ancients followed, together with St. Bonaventure himself. At first St. Thomas too (here q. 1. a. 4. quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 93. a. 1) professed the same opinion, but afterwards, having changed his view, he taught (S. I. II. q. 4. a. 5. ad 5) that "once the body has been taken up again, beatitude grows not intensively, but extensively"; which Durandus also (here q. 7) and other later writers defend. — But the first opinion is held by Scotus, On the Principle of Things, q. 9. a. 2. sect. 2. n. 49, and, as it seems, here q. 3. n. 9 (some, however, hold that he retracted this opinion), and by Richard (here a. 2. q. 7). — The proposition laid down at the beginning of the response, that beatitude is by essence joy or delight, is approved by Alexander of Hales (S. III. q. 23. m. 1. ad 1) and is defended as probable by Richard of Middleton (here a. 3. q. 6). But Scotus (here q. 7; I. Sent. d. 1. q. 3) teaches that "strictly taking beatitude, delight does not belong to its essence, because it is a passion, whereas beatitude consists in operation" (here q. 7. n. 4); yet inasmuch as the will is receptive, "it is perfected by delight and joy." The same is held by St. Thomas (here q. 3. a. 4. quaestiuncula 3; S. I. II. q. 4. a. 1. 2) and by Durandus (here q. 4. n. 20). Scotus adds, however (n. 6), that according to the absolute power of God the vision of him could be without joy; concerning which St. Bonaventure speaks otherwise above, d. 48. a. 1. q. 2, at the end.
Concerning the second question the other commentators on Lombard do not treat specially, but solve it in the first question, or rather in the questions on the individual dowries, where we have noted how Scotus departs from St. Bonaventure and Thomas.
On both questions, besides the places cited: Peter of Tarantaise touches the matter briefly here, q. 2. a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7.
II. Concerning the following article, which treats of the four dowries of the body in general, the other commentators on Lombard, with the exception of B. Albert (d. 44. a. 32) and Richard (here a. 4. q. 1), do not treat of it specially, but lay down their principles while disputing about the same in particular, on which see below, section 2. — Concerning the three dowries of the soul St. Thomas offers much, here q. 4. a. 1-5; Suppl. q. 95. a. 1-5.
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- 1Hic c. 4. — Inferius ex codd. E I K L N U X Y substituimus respiciunt pro respicit.Here c. 4. — Below, from codices E I K L N U X Y, we have substituted respiciunt for respicit.
- 2Cap. 11. n. 30: Non possunt ex toto animae se ipsas exponere et transire in Deum, nimirum ligatae corporibus etiam tunc, etsi non vita vel sensu, certe affectu naturali, ita ut absque his nec velint nec valeant consummari.Ch. 11, n. 30: Souls cannot wholly lay themselves aside and pass over into God, being indeed bound to their bodies even then, if not by life or sense, certainly by natural affection, so that without them they neither will nor are able to be consummated.
- 3Cap. 35. n. 68.Ch. 35, n. 68.
- 4Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2, de beatitudine dicit, quod «est bonum, quo quis adepto, nihil ulterius desiderare queat».Boethius, III. On Consolation, prose 2, says of beatitude that "it is the good which, once obtained, leaves one able to desire nothing further."
- 5Cfr. tom. II. pag. 20, nota 7.Cf. vol. II, p. 20, note 7.
- 6Cap. 15. n. 39, ubi allato Ps. 35, 9: Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus Dei, ait: Quasi enim miro quodam modo oblitus [servus bonus in gaudium Domini introductus] sui et a se penitus velut deficiens, totus perget in Deum» etc. — Superius post administrandi, pro quo cod. O habendi (multi codd. et ed. I amittendi, sed cfr. supra fundam. 3.), Vat. addit vel regendi.Ch. 15, n. 39, where, having cited Ps. 35, 9: They shall be inebriated with the plenty of the house of God, he says: "For as though in some wondrous manner forgetful [the good servant, having been brought into the joy of his Lord] of himself and utterly failing, as it were, from himself, he will go wholly over into God" etc. — Above, after administrandi, for which cod. O reads habendi (many codices and ed. I amittendi, but cf. above, fundamentum 3), the Vatican edition adds vel regendi.
- 7Cfr. I. Cor. 15, 44.Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 44.
- 8Cod. aa supplet obiecto.Cod. aa supplies obiecto.
- 1Cod. aa addit: non quod habitus augeatur, sed.Cod. aa adds: not that the habit is increased, but.
- 2Multi codd. pro ratio ponunt non; cod. L legit: quod bene tenet, quod [codd. G I M S U quia] quantum ad hoc etc.Many codices put non for ratio; cod. L reads: quod bene tenet, quod [codd. G I M S U quia] quantum ad hoc etc.
- 3Cod. aa obliviscuntur. Inferius pro corpus edd. cum pluribus codd. corpora.Cod. aa reads obliviscuntur. Below, for corpus, the editions with several codices read corpora.
- 4Cfr. III. Sent. d. 14. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4.Cf. III. Sent. d. 14. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4.
- 5Cod. W cum carentiam... removet.Cod. W reads cum carentiam... removet.
- 6Edd. hic et paulo inferius post nihil vult addunt habere, ac vocibus et habet interserunt ideo.The editions here and a little below add habere after nihil vult, and insert ideo between the words et habet. ---