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Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus
p. 629

Quaestio V. Utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per Augustinum, in libro de Trinitate1: « Qui diligit proximum ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligat »: ergo si proximum diligit ex caritate, dilectionem diligit ex caritate; sed dilectio, qua diligit proximum, est donum gratuitum: ergo dona gratuita sunt ex caritate diligenda.

2. Item, omne quod ordinat ad beatitudinem et ad eam perducit, diligendum est ex caritate; sed dona gratuita sunt huiusmodi: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate diligenda sunt.

3. Item, constans est, quod dona spiritualia sunt amanda et a Deo petenda, et qui illa diligit diligendo meretur: si ergo dilectio meritoria est dilectio caritatis, videtur, quod talia dona sint ex caritate diligenda.

p. 630

4. Item, sicut se habet dilectio gratuita ad dona gratuita, sic2 se habet dilectio naturalis ad bona naturalia; sed bona naturalia diliguntur naturali dilectione: ergo pari ratione dona gratuita diliguntur dilectione gratuita. Sed dilectio gratuita est dilectio caritatis: ergo videtur, quod dona gratuita sint ex caritate diligenda.

Contra: 1. Nulla creatura carens ratione est diligenda ex caritate3; sed huiusmodi dona gratuita rationem non habent: ergo non debent diligi ex caritate.

2. Item, « diligere est velle alicui bonum4 »; sed stultus est qui vult alicui virtuti vel caritati bonum: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi dona gratuita ex caritate non sunt diligenda.

3. Item, illud solum est ex caritate diligibile, quod est aliquo modo beatificabile; sed huiusmodi dona gratuita non sunt beatificabilia: ergo non sunt ex caritate diligenda5.

4. Item, Augustinus6 sufficienter enumerat ea quae sunt ex caritate diligenda; sed dona gratuita non sunt de illis quae Augustinus enumerat: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate diligenda non sunt.

### Conclusio. Bona gratuita ex caritate sunt diligenda, non quidem amore amicitiae, sed concupiscentiae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, dona gratuita non esse ex caritate diligenda, secundum quod diligere ex caritate est motus caritatis ut elicientis; sed si ex caritate diliguntur, hoc est secundum quod diligere est ipsius caritatis imperantis7. Nam in hoc differt caritas ab affectu naturali, quod naturalis affectus quaerit proprium commodum, « caritas vero, secundum quod dicit Gregorius8, protenditur in alterum »; et quia commodum nostrum recte et proprie consistit in spiritualibus donis, quae ordinant nos ad beatitudinem: ideo amor talium donorum est a dilectione naturali elicitive, sed a caritate imperative, cuius est imperare affectibus nostris, ut recte moveantur in suum finem. — Sed illud non sufficit dicere: primum quidem, quia caritas non semper in alterum tendit; habens enim caritatem, per ipsam frui Deo desiderat. Secundo vero, quia, quamvis sit naturae quaerere et amare commoda naturalia, spiritualia tamen dona perfecte amare, hoc non potest esse nisi dilectionis gratuitae.

Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod cum bonum sit obiectum caritatis, et actus recipiat speciem ab obiecto9; intentio actus diligendi variari habet secundum rationem boni. Bonum autem dicitur aliquid dupliciter: uno modo concretive, quia est ordinatum ad beatitudinem et in finem10; alio modo abstractive, quia est illud quo quid ordinatur in finem. Dona igitur gratuita non dicuntur esse bona primo modo, sed secundo, quia mediantibus illis substantiae rationales habent in finem ordinari; ideo, proprie loquendo, magis sunt bonitates quam bona, et magis rationes diligendi quam diligibilia. Et ideo dicunt isti, quod susceptiva horum donorum spiritualium sunt ex caritate diligenda, ipsa vero dona gratuita non sunt proprie ex caritate diligenda11, sed magis rationes diligendi ex caritate sua subiecta. Et quia accidens cum subiecto est unum, ideo dilectio istorum donorum cum dilectione creaturarum rationalium non ponit in numerum. — Sed illud adhuc calumniabile est, pro eo quod Deus, qui est ipsa summa Bonitas per essentiam, connumeratur inter ea quae sunt ex caritate diligenda. Et iterum: « Si propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis12 » — sed talia dona spiritualia sunt bona, propter quae homines diliguntur — multo fortius ex caritate diligenda ipsa videntur.

Et ideo est adhuc tertius modus dicendi, quod sicut in praecedentibus13 tactum est, duplex est caritatis motus et affectus. Est enim dilectio amicitiae et dilectio concupiscentiae. Dilectione amicitiae illa diliguntur, quibus optatur bonum; dilectione vero concupiscentiae illa dicuntur diligi, quae desiderantur. Quoniam ergo desiderium bonorum spiritualium est ipsius caritatis, secundum quod Sancti14 dicunt, quia bona spiritualia tenent rationem honesti; concedendum est, quod bona gratuita ex caritate diligenda sunt.

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Et hoc expresse dicit Augustinus in octavo de Trinitate15, cum dicit, quod « ipsa caritas ex caritate diligenda est ». Expresse etiam docet ipsa experientia viros spirituales, qui nihil tam desiderant post Deum, quam habere perfectam Dei dilectionem. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

Ad oppositorum solutionem: Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nulla creatura carens ratione diligenda est ex caritate; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de dilectione amicitiae, verum est; si vero de dilectione concupiscentiae, non est verum. Et si tu obiicias, quod tunc bona temporalia erunt16 diligenda ex caritate, cum caritas faciat, illa bona concupisci propter obsequium Dei; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia illa bona temporalia habent tantum rationem commodi, sed bona spiritualia habent rationem honesti; et ideo concupiscentia sapientiae in Scriptura17 laudatur, quamvis concupiscentia pecuniae vituperetur. Praeterea, « bona temporalia sunt minima bona », sicut dicit Augustinus18; sed dona gratuita connumerantur inter bona maxima; et ideo de his et istis non est simile.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diligere est velle alicui bonum; iam patet responsio: quia loquitur de diligere, secundum quod est actus amicitiae; secundum enim quod est actus concupiscentiae, diligere non est velle alicui bonum, sed magis est aliquod bonum desiderare vel aliquod bonum acceptare. Et quamvis non sit concedendum, quod caritas faciat sibi velle bonum; facit tamen, se desiderari et acceptari tanquam verum bonum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est amandum ex caritate nisi beatificabile; dicendum, quod illud prima fronte habet instantiam in Deo, qui est ipsa beatitudo19. Praeterea, etsi in creaturis aliquo modo habeat veritatem, hoc verum est in his quae diligenda sunt dilectione amicitiae.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod Augustinus non enumerat quaecumque diligenda, sed diligenda dilectione amicitiae. Et si tu quaeras rationem, quare; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia motus amicitiae maioris liberalitatis est quam motus concupiscentiae; et secundum illum caritas protenditur in alterum: et ideo secundum illum modum magis diligibilia distinguuntur, et quae diligenda sunt diligi praecipiuntur. Nec est diminutio, quia in illis ista includuntur20.

Scholion

I. Quae hic generaliter de donis gratuitis docentur, haec iam I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. speciatim de caritate tractata sunt, ubi etiam alii commentatores in scholio citati sunt. In responsione omnes satis conveniunt. De hac (5.) quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

II. De sufficientia diligendorum ex caritate, tractata in seq. (6.) quaestione, secundum primam viam ab auctore relatam explicite agunt: S. Thom., S. loc. cit. a. 12. (cfr. hic a. 7; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 7.). — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Item tangit Petr. a Tar., hic a. 9, ubi arg. S. ad oppos. speciali quaestione discutit. — Secundam viam sequitur Richard. a Med., qui (a. I. q. 1-4.) totam doctrinam de obiectis caritatis secundum haec quatuor membra dividit et distinctis quaestionibus absolvit; de qua divisione cfr. etiam infra d. 29. dub. 3.

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English Translation

Question V. Whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

Fifth, it is asked whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems:

1. First, through Augustine, in the book On the Trinity1: « Let him who loves his neighbor love love itself especially »: therefore if he loves his neighbor out of charity, he loves love out of charity; but the love by which he loves his neighbor is a gratuitous gift: therefore gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, everything that orders toward beatitude and leads to it is to be loved out of charity; but gratuitous gifts are of this kind: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, it is established that spiritual gifts are to be loved and sought from God, and that he who loves them merits by loving; if then a meritorious love is the love of charity, it seems that such gifts are to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, as gratuitous love stands to gratuitous gifts, so2 natural love stands to natural goods; but natural goods are loved by a natural love: therefore by parity of reasoning gratuitous gifts are loved by a gratuitous love. But gratuitous love is the love of charity: therefore it seems that gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

On the contrary: 1. No creature lacking reason is to be loved out of charity3; but gifts of this kind have no reason: therefore they ought not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, « to love is to will good to someone4 »; but he is foolish who wills good to some virtue or to charity: therefore it seems that gifts of this kind are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, that alone is lovable out of charity which is in some way capable of beatitude; but gifts of this kind are not capable of beatitude: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity5.

4. Likewise, Augustine6 sufficiently enumerates the things that are to be loved out of charity; but gratuitous gifts are not among those that Augustine enumerates: therefore it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

### Conclusion. Gratuitous goods are to be loved out of charity, not indeed with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that gratuitous gifts are not to be loved out of charity, insofar as to love out of charity is a motion of charity as eliciting; but if they are loved out of charity, this is insofar as to love belongs to charity as commanding7. For in this charity differs from natural affection, that natural affection seeks its own advantage, « but charity, as Gregory says8, reaches out toward another »; and since our advantage rightly and properly consists in spiritual gifts, which order us to beatitude: therefore the love of such gifts is from natural love eliciting, but from charity commanding, whose office is to command our affections, so that they may be rightly moved toward their end. — But it does not suffice to say this: first indeed, because charity does not always tend toward another; for one having charity desires through it to enjoy God. And second, because, although it belongs to nature to seek and love natural conveniences, yet to love spiritual gifts perfectly cannot be except of gratuitous love.

And therefore there is another way of speaking: that since good is the object of charity, and the act receives its species from the object9; the intention of the act of loving must be varied according to the account of the good. Now a thing is called good in two ways: in one way concretively, because it is ordered to beatitude and toward the end10; in another way abstractively, because it is that by which something is ordered to the end. Gratuitous gifts, therefore, are not called goods in the first way, but in the second, because through them rational substances have to be ordered to the end; therefore, properly speaking, they are rather goodnesses than goods, and rather grounds of loving than lovable things. And therefore these say that the subjects capable of these spiritual gifts are to be loved out of charity, but the gratuitous gifts themselves are not properly to be loved out of charity11, but rather are grounds of loving out of charity their subjects. And since an accident is one with its subject, therefore the love of these gifts together with the love of rational creatures does not constitute a separate count. — But this too is still open to objection, in that God, who is the very highest Goodness by essence, is counted among the things that are to be loved out of charity. And again: « If on account of which each thing [is such], then that thing more so12 » — but such spiritual gifts are the goods on account of which men are loved — much more strongly do they themselves seem to be loved out of charity.

And therefore there is yet a third way of speaking, that, as was touched on in the preceding13, the motion and affection of charity is twofold. For there is the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence. By the love of friendship those things are loved for which good is desired; but by the love of concupiscence those things are said to be loved which are desired. Since therefore the desire of spiritual goods belongs to charity itself, inasmuch as the Saints14 say that spiritual goods hold the account of the honorable; it must be granted that gratuitous goods are to be loved out of charity.

And this Augustine expressly says in the eighth book of On the Trinity15, when he says that « charity itself is to be loved out of charity ». Experience itself also expressly teaches this of spiritual men, who desire nothing so much after God as to have a perfect love of God. — Whence the reasonings that are for this part are to be granted.

To the solution of the contrary arguments: To 1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that no creature lacking reason is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that if it is understood of the love of friendship, it is true; but if of the love of concupiscence, it is not true. And if you object that then temporal goods will16 be loved out of charity, since charity causes those goods to be desired for the service of God; it must be said that it is not the same: because those temporal goods have only the account of convenience, but spiritual goods have the account of the honorable; and therefore the desire of wisdom is praised in Scripture17, although the desire of money is blamed. Moreover, « temporal goods are the least goods », as Augustine says18; but gratuitous gifts are counted among the greatest goods; and therefore there is no likeness between these and those.

To 2. To that which is objected, that to love is to will good to someone; the response is already clear: because it speaks of loving insofar as it is an act of friendship; for insofar as it is an act of concupiscence, to love is not to will good to someone, but rather is to desire some good or to accept some good. And although it is not to be granted that charity causes [a man] to will good to itself; yet it causes itself to be desired and accepted as a true good.

To 3. To that which is objected, that nothing is to be loved out of charity except what is capable of beatitude; it must be said that this at first sight has an instance in God, who is beatitude itself19. Moreover, even if it has truth in creatures in some way, this is true in those things which are to be loved with the love of friendship.

To 4. To that which is objected last, it must be said that Augustine does not enumerate whatever things are to be loved, but the things to be loved with the love of friendship. And if you ask the reason why; it must be said that this is because the motion of friendship is of greater generosity than the motion of concupiscence; and according to it charity reaches out toward another: and therefore according to that mode the more lovable things are distinguished, and the things that are to be loved are commanded to be loved. Nor is there any diminution, because in those the latter are included20.

Scholion

I. What is taught here generally concerning gratuitous gifts has already been treated specially concerning charity in I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, where also other commentators were cited in the scholion. In the response all agree well enough. On this (5th) question: St. Thomas, here a. I; S. II II q. 25, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, the single question.

II. On the sufficiency of the things to be loved out of charity, treated in the following (6th) question, the following deal explicitly according to the first way related by the author: St. Thomas, at the place cited a. 12 (cf. here a. 7; Disputed Questions on Charity, a. 7). — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise also touches on it, here a. 9, where he discusses argument 8 to the contrary in a special question. — Richard of Mediavilla follows the second way, who (a. I, q. 1-4) divides the whole doctrine of the objects of charity according to these four members and resolves it in distinct questions; on which division cf. also below d. 29, dub. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. (P. 629, n. 6.) Libr. VII. c. 7. n. 10. Cfr. in I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 9. n. 10. — Mox pro ergo si proximum diligit plures codd. ergo si proximum diligat. In conclus. post dona gratuita sunt codd. 11. interserunt similiter.
    (P. 629, n. 6.) Book VII, c. 7, n. 10. Cf. on the First Epistle of John, tract 9, n. 10. — Soon, for therefore if he loves his neighbor several codices read therefore if he should love his neighbor. In the conclusion, after gratuitous gifts are, codices 11 insert likewise.
  2. (P. 630, n. 1.) Codd. FHNT Item sic se... gratuita, sicut se etc. Post pauca pro naturali dilectione cod. Z naturali affectione.
    (P. 630, n. 1.) Codices FHNT [read] Likewise so it stands... gratuitous, as it stands etc. A little after, for natural love codex Z [reads] natural affection.
  3. (P. 630, n. 2.) Cfr. supra quaest. I.
    (P. 630, n. 2.) Cf. above, question I.
  4. (P. 630, n. 3.) De qua definitione ab Aristot. data vide supra pag. 574, nota 5.
    (P. 630, n. 3.) On this definition given by Aristotle see above p. 574, note 5.
  5. (P. 630, n. 4.) Edd. diligibilia.
    (P. 630, n. 4.) The editions [read] lovable.
  6. (P. 630, n. 5.) Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22. Vide quaest. seq. et hic lit. Magistri, c. I. — Subinde pro ea quae cod. K omnia quae.
    (P. 630, n. 5.) Book I, On Christian Doctrine, c. 23, n. 22. See the following question and here the text of the Master, c. I. — Subsequently, for those things which codex K [reads] all things which.
  7. (P. 630, n. 6.) De caritate ut eliciente et imperante vide supra quaest. I.
    (P. 630, n. 6.) On charity as eliciting and commanding see above, question I.
  8. (P. 630, n. 7.) Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 17. n. I: Dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse possit.
    (P. 630, n. 7.) Book I, Homilies on the Gospels, homily 17, n. I: Love tends toward another, that it may be able to be charity.
  9. (P. 630, n. 8.) Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Vide tom. II. pag. 361, nota 3. — Subinde pro intentio actus non pauci codd. intentio tantum.
    (P. 630, n. 8.) Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4). See vol. II, p. 361, note 3. — Subsequently, for the intention of the act not a few codices [read] the intention only.
  10. (P. 630, n. 9.) Cod. K addit ut est substantia rationalis. Mox pro quo quid codd. AK bb quo aliquid, edd. quo quis.
    (P. 630, n. 9.) Codex K adds as is a rational substance. Soon, for that by which something codices AK bb [read] that by which a certain thing, the editions that by which someone.
  11. (P. 630, n. 10.) Supple: sunt. — Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 8.) inter ea quae unum numero sunt, recenset suppositum cum accidentibus. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 7. (IV. c. 6.). — Deinde pro ideo dilectio... non ponit edd. ideo dilectionem... non est ponere.
    (P. 630, n. 10.) Supply: are. — Aristotle, Topics I, c. 6 (c. 8), among the things that are one in number, reckons the supposit together with its accidents. Cf. Metaphysics V, text 7 (IV, c. 6). — Then, for therefore the love... does not constitute the editions [read] therefore the love... is not to be constituted.
  12. (P. 630, n. 11.) Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — Edd. sic: Et iterum: Propter quod unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis; sed talia... diliguntur: ergo multo fortius etc. Pro sed talia cod. A si talia.
    (P. 630, n. 11.) Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 2. — The editions thus: And again: That on account of which each thing is such, that thing itself more so; but such things... are loved: therefore much more strongly etc. For but such things codex A [reads] if such things.
  13. (P. 630, n. 12.) Dist. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad 6; et d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, nec non I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2, ubi idem problema proponitur.
    (P. 630, n. 12.) Distinction 27, a. I, q. 2, ad 6; and d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3, as well as I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 2, where the same problem is proposed.
  14. (P. 630, n. 13.) Sufficiat citare Bedam, qui III. Expos. in Cantic. 3, 5. n. II. ait: Nec mirandum, quod somno comparetur amor, quia visibilium appetitu sensum mentis avertit atque ad invisibilia appetenda convertit etc. — Inferius nomine honesti intellige id quod propter se expetendum est. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 34, nota 4. et pag. 40, nota 5. — Pro quia bona, quod a codd. AK Z bb commendatur, alii codd. cum edd. quod bona.
    (P. 630, n. 13.) Let it suffice to cite Bede, who in Exposition on the Canticle III, on 3, 5, n. II, says: Nor is it to be wondered at that love is compared to sleep, since by the appetite of visible things it turns away the sense of the mind and converts it to the seeking of invisible things etc. — Below, by the name of the honorable understand that which is to be sought for its own sake. Cf. vol. I, p. 34, note 4, and p. 40, note 5. — For since they are goods, which is commended by codices AK Z bb, other codices with the editions [read] because they are goods.
  15. (P. 631, n. 1.) Cap. 8. n. 12. — Inferius pro qui nihil cod. A quod nihil, et pro tam... quam codd. AFW tantum... quantum.
    (P. 631, n. 1.) Chapter 8, n. 12. — Below, for who [desire] nothing codex A [reads] that nothing, and for so much... as codices AFW [read] as much... as.
  16. (P. 631, n. 2.) Cod. C essent, codd. AT erant, qui etiam cum codd. FGHIL pro diligenda exhibent diligibilia.
    (P. 631, n. 2.) Codex C [reads] would be, codices AT were, which also with codices FGHIL display lovable for to be loved.
  17. (P. 631, n. 3.) Sap. 6. 21: Concupiscentia itaque sapientiae deducit ad regnum perpetuum. Cfr. Eccli. 6, 37. De concupiscentia pecuniae vide Act. 5, 1. seqq., et I. Tim. 6, 9. Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 30. — Pro pecuniae cod. Z potentiae.
    (P. 631, n. 3.) Wisdom 6:21: The desire of wisdom therefore leads to the everlasting kingdom. Cf. Sirach 6:37. On the desire of money see Acts 5:1 ff., and I Timothy 6:9. Cf. Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 30. — For of money codex Z [reads] of power.
  18. (P. 631, n. 4.) Libr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 50. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 3. seq.
    (P. 631, n. 4.) Book II, On Free Will, c. 19, n. 50. Cf. II Sent., text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3 f.
  19. (P. 631, n. 5.) Verba qui est ipsa beatitudo desunt in edd.
    (P. 631, n. 5.) The words who is beatitude itself are absent in the editions.
  20. (P. 631, n. 6.) Verbo includuntur cod. W praemittit diligantur vel. Paulo superius pro diligibilia cod. bb diligenda.
    (P. 631, n. 6.) Before the word are included codex W prefixes are loved, or. A little above, for lovable codex bb [reads] to be loved.
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