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Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I.

Quaestio III. Utrum bonae voluntatis sit unus solus finis, an possint esse plures.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonae voluntatis sit unus solus finis, an possint esse plures. Et quod unus solus, videtur.

1. Deuteronomii sexto: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum etc.; Glossa: «Non vult Deus suum amorem partiri, ut simul cum ipso aliud diligamus»1: ergo quicumque sibi diversos constituit fines, non facit quod Deus vult; et si non facit quod Deus vult, non habet bonam voluntatem.

2. Item, super illud ad Philippenses primo2: Sive per occasionem, sive per bonam voluntatem; Glossa: «Quisquis a Deo aliud quam Deum quaerit, non caste diligit»; sed nulla voluntas est bona, nisi illa quae eum caste diligit: ergo nulla voluntas est bona, quae aliud quam Deum quaerit.

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3. Item, sicut status est in primo principio, ita in fine ultimo; sed primum principium, in quo est status, non est nisi unicum3: ergo si finis debet respondere principio, videtur, quod bonae voluntatis non debet statui nisi finis unus: ergo si voluntas statuit sibi fines plures, non facit quod debet: ergo non est bona.

4. Item, quicumque diversos fines intendit, habet cor suum divisum; sed qui cor suum dividit non diligit Deum ex toto corde nec in toto corde quaerit Deum; et quicumque talis est, Deo non placet, qui praecipit, se ex toto corde amari4, et vult totum cor possidere: ergo non videtur, quod bona voluntas possit esse, quae sibi statuit diversos fines.

Sed contra: 1. Super illud primae ad Corinthios nono5: Quoniam debet in spe qui arat etc., Glossa: «Praedicator, qui corda aperit ad fidem, debet arare in spe stipendiorum temporalium»: ergo videtur, quod bona voluntas non tantum possit ponere sibi finem spiritualem, sed etiam temporalem: ergo videtur, quod diversos fines possit habere.

2. Item, Lucae decimo quinto6: Quanti mercenarii in domo patris mei; ibi dicit Ambrosius, quod «multi sunt mercenarii, qui abundant spe, fide et caritate»; sed mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum, videlicet aliquam mercedem, quae est beatitudo creata. Si enim solum finem increatum sibi statueret, iam non esset mercenarius, sed filius: ergo si contingit, esse bonos mercenarios, contingit, bonam voluntatem habere fines diversos.

3. Item, bonum additum bono facit maius bonum: ergo si unus bonus finis facit voluntatem bonam, ergo multo fortius multi boni fines: ergo videtur, quod tanto voluntas melior sit, quanto plures statuit sibi bonos fines: ergo non est necesse, quod bona voluntas habeat unum solum finem.

4. Item, sicut concupiscibilis appetit dulcedinem, ita irascibilis appetit celsitudinem, et rationalis appetit pulcritudinem. Si ergo pulcritudo non tantum est finis rationalis, sed etiam perfectio, et sic de aliis, et plurium perfectibilium plures sunt perfectiones7; cum sint in nobis tres vires diversae, quibus sursum convertimur, videlicet rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis: videtur, quod in omni bona actione et voluntate sit assignare diversos fines.

Conclusio. Bonae voluntatis unus solus est finis principalis, sub quo possunt esse alii fines non principales.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod bonae voluntatis unus solus est finis principalis. Propter quod intelligendum, quod plures fines statuere hoc potest esse tripliciter. Uno modo ita, quod finis sit sub fine et propter finem; alio modo ita, quod unus sit finis principalis, alter non principalis, ita tamen, quod finis non principalis non referatur ad principalem actualiter; tertio modo ita, quod uterque sit finis principalis. — Exemplum autem huius assignari potest in eo quod frequenter accidit, videlicet, cum quis vadit ad ecclesiam ad percipiendas distributiones8. Hoc enim potest facere tripliciter: aut ita, quod principaliter intendit honorem et gloriam Dei, cum vadit ibi decantare laudes; et simul cum hoc intendit obtinere pecuniam, ut pauperibus distribuat vel in alios usus licitos ad honorem Dei convertat. Alio modo potest aliquis ire ad ecclesiam, intendens Deo placere, et simul cum hoc pecuniam acquirere, ita tamen, quod eius acquisitionem ad Deum non refert, nec tamen ipsam pecuniam statuit finem principalem, pro eo quod ipsam non diligit propter se. Tertio modo vadit quis ad ecclesiam duplicata intentione, ita quod vult Deo placere, et vult obtinere pecuniam, quam sicut avarus appetit acquirere, ut possit thesaurum suum ampliare et in ea9 delectari propter se. — Primo modo statuere diversos fines est bonum et meritorium et pertinet ad bonam voluntatem. Secundo modo statuere diversos fines non est bonae voluntatis, loquendo formaliter; attamen non sic repugnat, quin possit cum ea stare; est enim ibi peccatum veniale, non mortale. Et hoc vult dicere Augustinus in libro Confessionum10, cum ait: «Minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat». Tertio vero modo statuere diversos fines non est

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bonae voluntatis, immo contra bonam voluntatem; talis enim vult duobus dominis servire; et hoc est impossibile, sicut Matthaei sexto11 dicitur. Quando enim sic principaliter duos intendit fines, verificatur illud propheticum: Coangustatum est stratum, ita ut alter decidat, et pallium breve utrumque operire non potest; et talis est voluntas hypocritarum, quibus vae damnationis aeternae comminatur Scriptura, pro eo quod terram ingrediuntur duabus viis. Et ideo dicitur Ecclesiastici primo12: Ne accesseris ad ipsum duplici corde; qui enim accedit in corde et corde, hypocrita est: et quia gaudium hypocritae ad instar puncti est, ideo dicitur Oseae decimo: Divisum est cor eorum, nunc interibunt.

Sic igitur ex dictis colligitur, quod bonae voluntatis plures possunt esse fines, ita quod unus sit finis principalis, et alter non principalis sive finis sub fine. Plures autem constituere fines principales bonae voluntati repugnat, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Cum enim unum solum sit summum et verum bonum, quod quietat humanum desiderium; necesse est, quod voluntas bona, ad hoc quod recta sit, statuat sibi finem unicum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod qui arat debet in spe arare; dicendum, quod ipsa Glossa illam obiectionem dissolvit, dum se ipsam manifestat in sequentibus; facit enim vim in hoc quod dicitur in spe, non propter spem. Nam propter dicit finem principalem; in vero non tantummodo dicit finem principalem, immo finem, qui continetur infra finem. Et ideo ex illo verbo non sequitur, quod aliquis possit sibi plures fines principales statuere, immo, si recte intelligatur, potius sequitur oppositum13.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum; dicendum, quod est bonus mercenarius et malus; et malus mercenarius in duobus differt a bono. Primo quidem, quia malus mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum, quo habito non necessario habetur Deus; bonus vero mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum, quem habere non est aliud quam habere Deum, sicut ipsam fruitionem Dei. Secundo vero differt in hoc, quod malus mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum tanquam principalem; bonus vero mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum tanquam finem sub fine; non enim amat Deum propter fruitionem, sed fruitionem propter Deum. Et ideo ex hoc non habetur, quod finis bonae voluntatis plurificetur14.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum additum bono facit maius bonum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando additio boni ad bonum fit salvo ordine. Cum enim bonitas necessario ponat ordinem15, si additio boni ad bonum tollat ordinem, bonum non anget, sed potius perimit. Quia ergo pluralitas finium principalium ordinem non servat, quia secundum rectum ordinem status debet esse in uno, et unicum debet esse ultimum; hinc est, quod pluralitas finium principalium bonitatem voluntatis non augmentat, sed potius ipsam voluntatem depravat, quia, dum vult placere uni, displicet alteri, et dum vult assequi unum, perdit reliquum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationalis appetit suam pulcritudinem, et concupiscibilis dulcedinem etc.; dicendum, quod pulcritudo16 et dulcedo potest dupliciter accipi: aut prout est perfectiva et informativa virtulis animae, aut prout est ipsius animae motiva. Primo modo tenet rationem finis sub fine, et sic plurificari potest secundum diversitatem dotum17 animae18; secundo modo, prout scilicet tenet rationem obiecti et motivi, sic unitatem habet. Nam in Deo idem est pulcritudo, celsitudo et dulcedo; et sic tenet rationem finis principalis. — Et sic patet, quod quamvis plures fines non principales contingat constituere, tamen ad hoc quod voluntas sit bona, necesse est, unum solum finem esse principalem. Nam aliter non diligitur Deus ex toto corde.

Scholion

I. Supposita distinctione inter finem ultimum (principalem) et proximum, patet, unum tantum esse finem principalem in una actione, et unum eundemque finem ultimum esse omnium bonarum actionum et voluntatum. Finis enim rei semper respondet eius principio; primum autem et supremum principium omnium bonarum voluntatum est unum, scil. Deus: ergo et unus finis ultimus. Plura autem et diversa possunt esse proxima principia motiva, et per consequens plures et diversi fines boni proximi (cfr. seq. quaest.). Pluralitas autem finium proximorum non excludit unitatem finis ultimi, quia omnia creata mediante fine proprio referuntur ad finem ultimum, omnibus communem. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 4. m. 1. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. n. 22. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 135. q. incid. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

II. Quoad seq. quaestionem omnes concedunt, respectu finis principalis aliud dicendum esse de bonis voluntatibus, aliud de malis, ut explicatur in textu. De hac (4.) quaestione specialiter agunt B. Albert., hic a. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I.

Question III. Whether a good will has one sole end, or whether there can be several.

Thirdly it is asked whether a good will has one sole end, or whether there can be several. And that there is one sole end seems [to be the case].

1. Deuteronomy 6: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.; the Gloss: «God does not will to divide His love, so that together with Him we should love something else»1: therefore whoever sets up for himself diverse ends does not do what God wills; and if he does not do what God wills, he does not have a good will.

2. Likewise, upon that text of Philippians 12: Whether by occasion, or by good will; the Gloss: «Whoever seeks from God something other than God does not love chastely»; but no will is good except that which loves Him chastely: therefore no will is good which seeks something other than God.

3. Likewise, just as there is a resting-place in the first principle, so also in the last end; but the first principle, in which there is a resting-place, is but one3: therefore if the end ought to correspond to the principle, it seems that for a good will there ought to be set up but one end: therefore if the will sets up for itself several ends, it does not do what it ought: therefore it is not good.

4. Likewise, whoever intends diverse ends has his heart divided; but he who divides his heart does not love God with his whole heart, nor seek God with his whole heart; and whoever is such does not please God, who commands that He be loved with the whole heart4, and wills to possess the whole heart: therefore it does not seem that there can be a good will which sets up for itself diverse ends.

On the contrary: 1. Upon that text of First Corinthians 95: For he that plougheth ought to plough in hope etc., the Gloss: «The preacher, who opens hearts to faith, ought to plough in hope of temporal stipends»: therefore it seems that a good will can set for itself not only a spiritual end, but also a temporal one: therefore it seems that it can have diverse ends.

2. Likewise, Luke 156: How many hired servants in my father's house; there Ambrose says that «there are many hired servants who abound in hope, faith, and charity»; but a hired servant sets up for himself a created end, namely some reward, which is a created beatitude. For if he set up for himself only the uncreated end, he would no longer be a hired servant, but a son: therefore if it happens that there are good hired servants, it happens that a good will has diverse ends.

3. Likewise, good added to good makes a greater good: therefore if one good end makes the will good, then much more several good ends: therefore it seems that the will is the better in proportion as it sets up for itself the more good ends: therefore it is not necessary that a good will have one sole end.

4. Likewise, just as the concupiscible [power] seeks sweetness, so the irascible seeks loftiness, and the rational seeks beauty. If therefore beauty is not only the end of the rational [power], but also a perfection, and so of the others, and of several perfectibles there are several perfections7; since there are in us three diverse powers by which we are turned upward, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible: it seems that in every good action and will there is to be assigned diverse ends.

Conclusion. A good will has one sole principal end, under which there can be other, non-principal ends.

I respond: It must be said that a good will has one sole principal end. On account of which it must be understood that to set up several ends can be in three ways. In one way, so that the end is under an end and for the sake of an end; in another way, so that one is the principal end, the other non-principal, yet in such wise that the non-principal end is not actually referred to the principal; in a third way, so that each is a principal end. — But an example of this can be assigned in that which frequently happens, namely, when someone goes to church to receive the distributions8. For he can do this in three ways: either so that he principally intends the honor and glory of God, when he goes there to sing praises; and together with this he intends to obtain money, that he may distribute it to the poor or convert it to other lawful uses for the honor of God. In another way someone can go to church, intending to please God, and together with this to acquire money, yet in such wise that he does not refer its acquisition to God, nor does he set up the money itself as a principal end, for the reason that he does not love it for its own sake. In a third way someone goes to church with a doubled intention, so that he wills to please God, and wills to obtain money, which like a miser he seeks to acquire, that he may enlarge his treasure and delight in it9 for its own sake. — In the first way, to set up diverse ends is good and meritorious and pertains to a good will. In the second way, to set up diverse ends does not belong to a good will, formally speaking; yet it is not so repugnant that it cannot stand with it; for there is here a venial sin, not a mortal one. And this is what Augustine wishes to say in the book of the Confessions10, when he says: «He loves Thee less who loves something together with Thee, which he does not love for Thy sake». But in the third way, to set up diverse ends does not belong

to a good will, nay rather is against a good will; for such a one wills to serve two masters; and this is impossible, as is said in Matthew 611. For when one thus principally intends two ends, that prophetic [word] is verified: The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out, and the short covering cannot cover both; and such is the will of hypocrites, against whom Scripture threatens the woe of eternal damnation, for the reason that they enter the earth by two ways. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticus 112: Come not to him with a double heart; for he who comes in heart and heart is a hypocrite: and because the joy of the hypocrite is as the size of a point, therefore it is said in Hosea 10: Their heart is divided, now they shall perish.

Thus therefore from what has been said it is gathered that a good will can have several ends, so that one is the principal end, and the other non-principal or an end under an end. But to set up several principal ends is repugnant to a good will, as the reasons show which are adduced for the first part. For since there is but one supreme and true good which quiets human desire, it is necessary that a good will, in order to be right, set up for itself one sole end.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that he who ploughs ought to plough in hope; it must be said that the Gloss itself dissolves that objection, while it manifests itself in what follows; for it lays stress on this, that it is said in hope, not for the sake of hope. For for the sake of denotes a principal end; in, however, does not only denote a principal end, but rather an end which is contained beneath an end. And therefore from that word it does not follow that one can set up for himself several principal ends, nay, if it be rightly understood, rather the opposite follows13.

2. To that which is objected, that the hired servant sets up for himself a created end; it must be said that there is a good hired servant and a bad one; and the bad hired servant differs from the good in two respects. First indeed, because the bad hired servant sets up for himself a created end, which being had, God is not necessarily had; but the good hired servant sets up for himself a created end which to have is nothing other than to have God, namely the very fruition of God. Secondly he differs in this, that the bad hired servant sets up for himself a created end as a principal one; but the good hired servant sets up for himself a created end as an end under an end; for he does not love God for the sake of the fruition, but the fruition for the sake of God. And therefore from this it is not had that the end of a good will is multiplied14.

3. To that which is objected, that good added to good makes a greater good; it must be said that this is true when the addition of good to good is made with the order preserved. For since goodness necessarily posits order15, if the addition of good to good takes away the order, it does not increase the good, but rather destroys it. Since therefore a plurality of principal ends does not preserve order, because according to right order the resting-place ought to be in one, and the last [end] ought to be one; hence it is that a plurality of principal ends does not augment the goodness of the will, but rather depraves the will itself, because, while it wills to please one, it displeases another, and while it wills to attain one, it loses the other.

4. To that which is objected, that the rational [power] seeks its own beauty, and the concupiscible sweetness etc.; it must be said that beauty16 and sweetness can be taken in two ways: either as it is perfective and informative of the virtue of the soul, or as it is motive of the soul itself. In the first way it holds the character of an end under an end, and so can be multiplied according to the diversity of the soul's endowments1718; in the second way, namely as it holds the character of object and motive, thus it has unity. For in God beauty, loftiness, and sweetness are the same; and so it holds the character of a principal end. — And so it is clear that although it may happen that several non-principal ends be set up, yet, in order that the will be good, it is necessary that one sole end be principal. For otherwise God is not loved with the whole heart.

Scholion

I. Granted the distinction between the last (principal) end and the proximate, it is clear that there is but one principal end in a single action, and one and the same last end of all good actions and wills. For the end of a thing always corresponds to its principle; but the first and supreme principle of all good wills is one, namely God: therefore also there is one last end. But there can be several and diverse proximate motive principles, and consequently several and diverse good proximate ends (cf. the following question). But a plurality of proximate ends does not exclude the unity of the last end, because all created things, by means of their proper end, are referred to the last end, common to all. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 4, m. 1. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 49, q. 2, n. 22 ff. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; Summa I-II, q. 1, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; Summa p. II, tr. 22, q. 135, incidental q. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2.

II. As to the following question, all concede that, with respect to the principal end, one thing is to be said of good wills, another of bad ones, as is explained in the text. Of this (fourth) question there treat especially Bl. Albert, here a. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4; Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 5. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum.
    Verse 5 [Deut. 6:5]. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one, is found in Strabo and Lyra.
  2. Vers. 18; ubi Vulg., quam sequitur Vat., sive per veritatem pro sive per bonam voluntatem. — Glossa, quam Lyranus exhibet, sumta est ex August., Serm. 137. (alias 49. de Verbis Domini) c. 8. n. 9. In textu origin. Glossae pro diligit legitur quaerit. — In edd., excepta 1, minor sic sonat: sed illa voluntas bona est, quae non aliud quam Deum diligit.
    Verse 18 [Phil. 1:18]; where the Vulgate, which the Vatican edition follows, reads whether by truth for whether by good will. — The Gloss, which Lyra presents, is taken from Augustine, Sermon 137 (alias 49, On the Words of the Lord), c. 8, n. 9. In the original text of the Gloss, for loves is read seeks. — In the editions, except the first, the minor [premise] runs thus: but that will is good which loves nothing other than God.
  3. Cfr. supra pag. 26, nota 11, in fine, et I. Sent. d. 2, q. 1. — De ipso arg. cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7.
    Cf. above, p. 26, note 11, at the end, and I Sent. d. 2, q. 1. — On the argument itself cf. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 7.
  4. Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37; Prov. 23, 26: Praebe, fili mi, cor tuum mihi. Oseae 10, 2: Divisum est cor eorum, nunc interibunt. Vide infra in corp. quaest. — Pro amari cod. T diligi.
    Deut. 6:5; Matt. 22:37; Prov. 23:26: Give me, my son, thy heart. Hosea 10:2: Their heart is divided, now they shall perish. See below in the body of the question. — For to be loved codex T reads to be cherished.
  5. Vers. 10. — Glossam, quae apud Lyranum ut interlinearis habetur, vide apud Petr. Lombardum in hunc locum. In Glossa pro ad fidem non pauci codd., inter quos F K T Y ee, cum primis edd. vel fidem.
    Verse 10 [1 Cor. 9:10]. — The Gloss, which in Lyra is given as interlinear, see in Peter Lombard on this passage. In the Gloss, for to faith not a few codices, among them F K T Y ee, with the first editions read or faith.
  6. Vers. 17. — Verba integra, quibus Ambrosius hunc locum exponit (VII. n. 220.) vide tom. I. pag. 34, nota 6, et S. Bonav., Commentar. in Ioan. n. 731. — Pro Ambrosius cod. C substituit Glossa Ambrosii.
    Verse 17 [Luke 15:17]. — The full words by which Ambrose expounds this passage (VII, n. 220), see vol. I, p. 34, note 6, and St. Bonaventure, Commentary on John, n. 731. — For Ambrose codex C substitutes the Gloss of Ambrose.
  7. De principiis huius arg. cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 11.) et III. c. 3, ubi locum argumentandi assignat ex appositione. — In maiori pro additum codd. F K T et alii cum ed. 1 addito.
    On the principles of this argument cf. Aristotle, Topics II, c. 4 (c. 11) and III, c. 3, where he assigns a place of arguing from juxtaposition. — In the major [premise], for added codices F K T and others, with the first edition, read with the addition.
  8. Cfr. supra pag. 225, nota 6. — Paulo superius pro ei sic cod. Y sicut, codd. F I K T ee etc. cum edd. 1, 2 sic tantum.
    Cf. above, p. 225, note 6. — A little above, for in it thus codex Y reads as, codices F I K T ee etc. with editions 1, 2 read thus only.
  9. B. Albert., hic a. 3. refert: In multis ecclesiis consuetudo est dare denarium venientibus ad matutinas, ut libentius veniant.
    Bl. Albert, here a. 3, reports: In many churches the custom is to give a denarius to those coming to matins, that they may come more willingly.
  10. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 in eo.
    The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads in it [masc.].
  11. Libr. X. c. 29. n. 40.
    [Augustine, Confessions] Book X, c. 29, n. 40.
  12. Vers. 24. — Seq. textus est Isai. 28, 20; tertius est Eccli. 2, 14: Vae duplici corde... et peccatori terram ingredienti duabus viis.
    Verse 24 [Matt. 6:24]. — The following text is Isa. 28:20; the third is Sir. 2:14: Woe to the double heart... and to the sinner who enters the earth by two ways.
  13. Vers. 36. — Seq. textus est Ps. 11, 3: In corde et corde locuti sunt; tertius est Iob 20, 5; quartus loc. cit. v. 2.
    Verse 36 [Sir. 1:36]. — The following text is Ps. 11:3: They have spoken in heart and heart; the third is Job 20:5; the fourth, the cited place, v. 2.
  14. Similis huic obiectio solvitur I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 9.
    A similar objection to this is solved in I Sent. d. 1, dubium 9.
  15. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et a. 3. q. 2. ad 5.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, and a. 3, q. 2, ad 5.
  16. De quo vide supra d. 33. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Pro necessario ponat ordinem cod. T necessario ordinet et ponat ordinem.
    On which see above, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — For necessarily posits order codex T reads necessarily orders and posits order.
  17. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt celsitudo.
    The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add loftiness.
  18. Cod. N virium.
    Codex N reads of the powers.
← Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4→