Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 47
Articulus Unicus.
Quaestio III. Utrum Deus debeat mala permittere.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus debeat mala permittere. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Iob duodecimo1: Abundant tabernacula praedonum etc., Gregorius2: « Omnipotens Deus quod fieri prohibet, iustum est, ut fieri sinat ».
2. Item, Deus debet conservare ordinem quem instituit; sed cum Deus creavit hominem, dedit ei liberam voluntatem; sed libera voluntas dicitur, eo quod libere potest quidquid vult: ergo si vult malum, potest in malum: ergo cum non debeat auferre homini potentiam, quam dedit, debet ipsum permittere peccare3.
3. Item, malum frequenter est occasio maioris boni, quod non fieret, nisi malum praecessisset, ut patet in passione Christi; sed decet Deum facere et permittere illud quod est via ad melius: ergo cum non possit malum facere, saltem4 debet permittere.
4. Item, Deus omnia facit propter laudem suam; sed in malis manifestatur laus divinae iustitiae et misericordiae: ergo si non debet facere contra ampliationem suae laudis, non debet impedire, ne mala fiant: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Ad Romanos primo5: Non solum qui talia agunt digni sunt morte, sed qui consentiunt, Glossa: « Consentire est tacere, cum possis arguere »: ergo cum Deus possit corrigere et impedire malum, si permittit et tacet, consentit; sed qui consentiunt, digni sunt morte: ergo etc.
2. Item, Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo sexto: « Ad innocentis officium pertinet non solum nemini malum inferre, sed etiam a peccato cohibere »: ergo si Deus non cohibet, cum possit, Deus non est innocens.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omnes virtutes nostrae debent habere exemplar in Deo; sed in nobis est virtus zeli: ergo et in Deo. Sed zelus, quantum potest, obviat peccato6: ergo si Deus habet zelum, quantum potest, obviat: ergo etc.
4. Item, universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas7: si ergo permittit iustum peccare, aut est misericordiae aut iustitiae. Non misericordiae, constat; nec iustitiae, quia iustus non meruit cadere: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Deus ordinatissime permittit mala fieri, tum propter ordinem in universo, tum propter ordinem in finem, sive hic sit ultimus, qui est gloria divina, sive intermedius, qui est salus electorum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus permittit mala fieri, et hoc ordinatissime.
Duplex enim est ordo rerum: unus in universo, alter in finem8; et uterque exigit, quod Deus permittat mala fieri.
Ordo quippe in universo exigit, quia ad perfectionem universitatis necesse fuit, fieri creaturam arbitrio liberam et peccare potentem; sed administratio universitatis est, ut « Deus sic res conditas administret, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat », sicut dicit Augustinus septimo de Civitate Dei9. Ideo cum debuerit dare potentiam peccandi et debuerit regere, salvo ordine suae conditionis; si voluit peccare, debuit permittere, et si noluit peccare, debuit conservare: et ita debet permittere mala.
Ordo ad finem hoc exigit quia duplicem finem contingit reperire10 in universo: unus est salus electorum, alius divina laus. — Quoniam ergo permissio malorum reddit electos gloriosiores per occasionem, et Deus non curat, utrum per causam, vel per occasionem electorum gloria augeatur; ideo Deus permittit recte. Unde Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei11 dicit, « quod nullum faceret, quem malum praesciret, nisi pariter nosset, quibus bonorum usibus accommodaret ». Prosunt autem eis exercitando. Et ideo dicit12 de lapsu mundi, quod permisit plures esse malos, quia si pauci essent, non auderent exercere bonos. — Divina etiam laus hoc exigit, quia occasione mali summe manifestatur divina misericordia in electis, in Filii unigeniti donatione pro inimicis secundum tempus13. Summe etiam manifestatur Dei iustitia in aeterna punitione reproborum. Unde Augustinus vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei14: « Si omnes remanerent in poena, in nullo appareret misericordis gratia redimentis. Rursus, si omnes transferrentur ad lucem, in nullo appareret severitas ultionis ».
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod permittere est consentire; dicendum, quod permittere malum est dupliciter: aut non cohibendo manum15 vel animum nec in facto nec in retributione, et sic consentire est; vel non cohibendo manum, sed tamen puniendo transgressorem et arguendo continue, et sic non consentit; et hoc modo Deus permittit, et non consentit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad innocentem pertinet cohibere; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de cohibitione quantum ad arguitionem et punitionem, non quantum ad voluntatis coactionem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod zelus obviat peccato; dicendum, quod verum est, salvo iure iustitiae; et iustitia, prout est ordo universi, hoc exigit, Deus permittat, ut homo ire16 secundum imperium suae voluntatis.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio; quia permittere aliquem peccare est opus iustitiae, non, inquam, iustitiae, quae sit exigentia meritorum, sed condecentia divinae sapientiae et bonitatis.
I. Plura ad hanc quaestionem spectantia vide supra d. 46. q. 2-6, et d. 44. a. 1. q. 1-3, et apud Alexandrum Hal., S. p. I. q. 38. per totam, ubi plures de hac re quaestiones solvuntur. — De duplici rerum ordine, scil. in universo et ad finem, cfr. supra d. 44. a. 1. q. 3.; et de distinctione duplicis finis, scil. ultimi et principalis (laus Dei) et « finis sub fine » (salus electorum) cfr. II. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 38. a. 1. q. 3.
II. Tangitur hic quaestio, quae vulgo in doctrina de reprobatione in utramque partem discutitur, utrum permissio peccati sit in Deo actus positivus, vel negatio actus positivi. Pro prima sententia citantur a patronis ipsius Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 1, et S. Thom., S. I. q. 23. a. 3, et a Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. tom. 1. d. 6. q. 11.) etiam S. Bonav. (hic et dub. 3.), cuius tamen verba nobis ambigua esse videntur. Scotus (hic q. unica) licet utramque sententiam probabilem aestimet, tamen praefert sententiam, quod in Deo permissio sit negatio actus positivi, sed simul reflexe actus positivus.
III. Auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 10. a. 1, q. 38. m. 1. 2. — Scot., Report. hic q. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 46. a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3, et d. 46. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2.
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Sole Article.
Question III. Whether God ought to permit evils.
Thirdly, it is asked whether God ought to permit evils. And that he should, appears thus:
1. Job 121: The tents of robbers abound etc.; Gregory2: « The Almighty God, what he forbids to be done, it is just that he should allow to be done ».
2. Likewise, God ought to preserve the order which he has instituted; but when God created man, he gave him free will; and free will is so called because it can freely [do] whatever it wills: therefore if it wills evil, it can [proceed] into evil: therefore since he ought not to take away from man the power which he has given, he ought to permit him to sin3.
3. Likewise, evil is frequently the occasion of a greater good, which would not come about unless evil had preceded — as is plain in the passion of Christ; but it befits God to do and to permit that which is a way to the better: therefore, since he cannot do evil, he ought at least4 to permit [it].
4. Likewise, God does all things for the sake of his praise; but in evils the praise of divine justice and mercy is made manifest: therefore, if he ought not to act against the amplification of his praise, he ought not to impede [evils] from happening: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Romans 15: Not only those who do such things are worthy of death, but [also] those who consent, [the] Gloss: « To consent is to be silent when you can rebuke »: therefore since God can correct and impede evil, if he permits and is silent, he consents; but those who consent are worthy of death: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Augustine, 19 On the City of God, chapter 16: « It belongs to the office of an innocent [person] not only to inflict evil on no one, but also to restrain [him] from sin »: therefore if God does not restrain, when he can, God is not innocent.
3. Likewise, by reason it appears: because all our virtues ought to have an exemplar in God; but in us there is the virtue of zeal: therefore also in God. But zeal, so far as it can, withstands sin6: therefore if God has zeal, so far as he can, he withstands [sin]: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth7: if therefore he permits the just to sin, [it is] either of mercy or of justice. Not of mercy, it is plain; nor of justice, since the just one has not deserved to fall: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. God most ordinately permits evils to come about, both on account of the order in the universe, and on account of the order to the end — whether this be the ultimate [end], which is divine glory, or the intermediate [end], which is the salvation of the elect.
I respond: It must be said that God permits evils to come about, and this most ordinately.
For there is a twofold order of things: one in the universe, the other to the end8; and each requires that God permit evils to come about.
For the order in the universe requires [this], because for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there come to be a creature free in choice and able to sin; but the administration of the universe is that « God so administers the things he has founded, that he lets them act their own proper motions », as Augustine says in book seven On the City of God9. Therefore, since he had to give the power of sinning and had to govern, with the order of his constitution safe, if [the creature] willed to sin, he had to permit, and if it did not will to sin, he had to preserve [it]: and so he ought to permit evils.
The order to the end requires this, because it is possible to find10 a twofold end in the universe: one is the salvation of the elect, the other divine praise. — Since therefore the permission of evils renders the elect more glorious by occasion, and God does not care whether the glory of the elect is increased through cause or through occasion; therefore God permits rightly. Hence Augustine in 11 On the City of God11 says, « that he would make no one whom he foreknew to be evil, unless he likewise knew to what uses for good he would accommodate [him] ». For [the evil] profit [the good] by exercising [them]. And therefore he says12 On the lapse of the world, that he permitted more to be evil because, if they were few, they would not dare to exercise the good. — Divine praise also requires this, because by occasion of evil divine mercy is in the highest degree manifested in the elect, in the giving of the only-begotten Son for [his] enemies according to the time13. In the highest degree also God's justice is manifested in the eternal punishment of the reprobate. Hence Augustine in 21 On the City of God14: « If all remained in punishment, in no one would the grace of the redeeming Merciful One appear. Again, if all were translated into the light, in no one would the severity of vengeance appear ».
Replies to the arguments:
1. To that, then, which is objected — that to permit is to consent — it must be said that to permit evil [happens] in two ways: either by not restraining the hand15 or the spirit, neither in the deed nor in the requital, and thus it is to consent; or by not restraining the hand, but nevertheless punishing the transgressor and rebuking [him] continually, and thus it does not consent; and in this way God permits, and does not consent.
2. To that which is objected — that it belongs to the innocent [one] to restrain — it must be said that this is understood of restraint as regards rebuke and punishment, not as regards coercion of the will.
3. To that which is objected — that zeal withstands sin — it must be said that it is true, the right of justice being safe; and justice, inasmuch as it is the order of the universe, requires this — that God permit, that man go16 according to the rule of his will.
4. To that which is finally objected, the response is plain; for to permit someone to sin is a work of justice — not, I say, of [the] justice which is an exigency of merits, but of the becomingness of divine wisdom and goodness.
I. For more matters bearing on this question, see above d. 46 q. 2–6, and d. 44 a. 1 q. 1–3, and in Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 38 throughout, where many questions on this matter are resolved. — On the twofold order of things, namely in the universe and to the end, cf. above d. 44 a. 1 q. 3; and on the distinction of the twofold end — namely the ultimate and principal (the praise of God) and the « end under [the] end » (the salvation of the elect) — cf. II Sent. d. 15 a. 2 q. 1 and d. 38 a. 1 q. 3.
II. Touched on here is the question, which is commonly disputed on both sides in the doctrine concerning reprobation, whether the permission of sin is in God a positive act, or a negation of a positive act. For the first opinion are cited by its patrons Alexander of Hales himself, Summa p. I q. 36 m. 1, and St. Thomas, Summa I q. 23 a. 3, and by Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. tom. 1 d. 6 q. 11) also St. Bonaventure (here and dub. 3), whose words however seem to us ambiguous. Scotus (here q. unica), although he reckons each opinion probable, nevertheless prefers the opinion that in God permission is a negation of a positive act, yet at the same time reflexively a positive act.
III. Authors: Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 18 m. 10 a. 1, q. 38 m. 1. 2. — Scot., Report. here q. 2. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 46 a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3, and d. 46 q. 3. — Aegid. R., here 2 princ. q. 2.
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- Vers. 8. [?: Vulg. Iob 12, 6 legitur Abundant tabernacula praedonum; editio Quaracchi tamen "Vers. 8" allegat — fortasse ad Vetus Latinam aut ad versionem alternam respicit.]Verse 8. [?: The Vulgate of Job 12:6 reads Abundant tabernacula praedonum; the Quaracchi edition nonetheless cites "Verse 8" — perhaps referring to the Vetus Latina or to an alternate versification.]
- Dictum Gregorii habetur eius in libro XI. Moral. c. 2. n. 3, in quod dictum Vat. ante prohibet immisit non.Gregory's saying is found in his book XI Morals c. 2 n. 3; into which saying the Vatican [edition] inserted non ("not") before prohibet.
- Hic afferantur, quae August. VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. ait: Sic itaque (Deus) administrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat.Here let there be adduced what Augustine says, On the City of God VII c. 30: Thus, then, (God) administers all the things which he has created, that he lets even them themselves exercise and carry out their own motions.
- Pro quod Vat. cum cod. cc sed, et in fine argumenti solum pro saltem.For quod the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] sed, and at the end of the argument solum ("only") for saltem ("at least").
- Vers. 32, ubi Vulgata: Qui talia agunt digni sunt morte, et non solum qui ea faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. — In Glossa mox citata Vat. pro tacere substituit facere, contradicente Lyrano nec non refragantibus codd. PQT, quorum auctoritate verbum tacere restituimus; attamen cum Vat. et nonnullis codd. nec non consentiente textu originali retinuimus possis pro possit.Verse 32, where the Vulgate [reads]: Those who do such things are worthy of death; and not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those doing [them]. — In the Gloss soon afterward cited, the Vatican [edition] substituted facere ("to do") for tacere ("to be silent"), against Lyranus and against codices PQT, on whose authority we have restored the verb tacere; nevertheless with the Vatican [edition] and some codices, and consenting with the original text, we have retained possis ("you can") for possit ("he can").
- Cfr. supra pag. 23, nota 9. — Pro obviat Vat. obviare.Cf. above p. 23, note 9. — For obviat the Vatican [reads] obviare.
- Psalm. 24, 10.Psalm 24:10 [Vulg.].
- Cfr. supra d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.Cf. above d. 44 a. 1 q. 3 in the corpus.
- Cap. 30; cfr. supra pag. 843, nota 9. — Mox in cod. T ad verbum regere a secunda manu adiunctum est hominum.Chapter 30; cf. above p. 843, note 9. — Soon after, in codex T, to the verb regere ("to govern") has been added by a second hand hominum ("of men").
- Cod. H subiicit etiam. Dein pro reperire Vat. reperiri.Codex H adds etiam ("also"). Then for reperire the Vatican [reads] reperiri.
- Cap. 18; cfr. supra pag. 786, nota 7. In textu allato pro bonorum usibus non pauci codd. beatorum usibus.Chapter 18; cf. above p. 786, note 7. In the text adduced, for bonorum usibus ("uses of the good [things]") not a few codices [read] beatorum usibus ("uses of the blessed").
- Serm. 15, (de Psalm. 25, 8.) c. 9. n. 9: Nec mihi volo dicas: saltem si necesse esset propter exercitationem nostram, ut essent mali, pauci essent mali, et boni multi essent. Non attendis, quia si pauci essent, multis non nocerent? Utique considera vir prudens, quia si multi boni essent, et pauci mali essent, pauci mali multis bonis nocere non auderent. Si non auderent, non exercerent. — Codd. V X: dicit in libro de Lapsu mundi.Sermon 15 (on Psalm 25:8) c. 9 n. 9: Nor do I want you to say to me: at least, if it were necessary on account of our exercise, that there be evil [men], let there be few evil and many good. Do you not consider, that if they were few, they would not harm many? Indeed, prudent man, consider that if there were many good and few evil, few evil would not dare to harm many good. If they did not dare, they would not exercise [them]. — Codices V X [read]: he says in the book On the Fall of the World.
- Respicitur illud Rom. 5, 6: Ut quid enim Christus... secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est?Reference is to that text Rom. 5:6: For why has Christ... according to the time died for the impious?
- Cap. 12; cfr. supra pag. 733, nota 9, [?: lectio OCR confusa]. — c. 99. n. 23.Chapter 12; cf. above p. 733, note 9, [?: OCR reading garbled here]. — c. 99 n. 23.
- Plures codd. cum ed. 1 hic, et multo plures codd. etiam in secundo distinctionis membro malum pro manum.Many codices with edition 1 here, and many more codices also in the second member of the distinction, [read] malum ("evil") for manum ("hand").
- In Vat. deest ire.In the Vatican [edition] ire ("to go") is missing.