Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 47
Quaestio IV. Utrum Deus possit mala praecipere.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit mala praecipere. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia praecepit Oseae primo1, ut duceret uxorem fornicariam, et Bernardus exponit ad litteram. Quod si dicas, ad litteram non esse intelligendum; obiicitur tunc: quia praecepit non tantum ducere uxorem, sed etiam facere filios fornicationis; quodsi esset uxor legitima, non essent filii fornicationis.
2. Item, Exodi duodecimo2 praecepit facere furtum filiis Israel; sed furtum est malum et contra legem naturae: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non est malum secundum se, et ideo potest fieri bene; obiicitur: quia praecepit Abrahae occidere filium innocentem et quem sciebat innocentem, Genesis vigesimo secundo3; et hoc est malum secundum se: ergo videtur, quod Deus possit praecipere malum.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia Deus est super omnem legem: ergo in omni mandato potest dispensare: ergo potest omnium praeceptorum et prohibitionum contraria praecipere.
4. Item, plus distat non-ens ab ente quam malum a bono; sed Deus solo imperio voluntatis ex non-ente facit ens: ergo solo imperio voluntatis ex malo facit bonum: ergo potest praecipere mala, ut videtur.
Contra:
1. Praeceptum est signum divinae voluntatis: ergo aut est falsum signum, cum significet, Deum velle quod praecipit4, aut Deus vult illud. Sed si Deus vult malum, est malus; si non vult, et praecipit, est falsus; et utrumque est impossibile apud Deum: ergo etc.
2. Item, nullus obediens divino praecepto debet puniri: ergo si Deus potest malum praecipere, potest malum impune fieri. Sed malum remanere impunitum est contra divinam iustitiam: ergo Deus
potest facere contra se, ergo sibi adversari. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.
3. Item, Deus praecipit mala non fieri: si ergo praecipit fieri, praecipit duo opposita5; sed duo opposita fieri est impossibile: ergo Deus praecipit impossibile. Sed ad nullum tale praeceptum obligamur: ergo Deo possumus non obedire; quod absurdum est. Et iterum, omnis praecipiens impossibile est stultus, vel impius: ergo Deus esset stultus, vel impius, quorum utrumque est impossibile. Et ideo dicit Hieronymus6: Qui dicit Deum praecepisse impossibile, anathema sit.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Deus nullatenus potest praecipere malum, quod remanet sub ratione mali, et ideo nunquam id quod est malum secundum se; tamen id quod est malum in se, potest praecipere et praecipiendo facere bonum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus possit praecipere malum, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi: aut malum manens malum, aut ita, quod praecipiendo faciat bonum. Primum simpliciter est impossibile; secundum vero aliquo modo est possibile, licet non omnino.
Est enim aliquid malum in se, aliquid malum secundum se. Malum in se potest fieri bene7; malum secundum se nullo modo potest fieri bene, immo hoc intelligere quod fiat bene, est intelligere, quod idem sit malum et bonum. Potest ergo dici, quod Deus potest praecipere malum in se, et non malum secundum se; quia nihil potest praecipere, quin bonum sit, postquam praeceptum est; et illud est malum in se, non autem secundum se; ideo potest illud praecipere et non aliud.
Et hinc habet ortum quod dicit Bernardus in libro de Dispensatione et praecepto8, quod Deus potest dispensare in praeceptis secundae tabulae et non primae. Et ratio huius est, quia in praeceptis secundae tabulae, quantum est de ratione praecepti, tangitur sive praecipitur ordinatio ad proximum, et prohibetur deordinatio ad eundem. Deordinatio autem respectu proximi, nisi sit deordinatio respectu Dei, malum est in se; si autem respectu Dei, malum est secundum se: sicut cognoscere non suam malum est in se, sed cognoscere alienam ex libidine sive non suam malum est secundum se. Sed Deus in praeceptis secundae tabulae dispensat et dispensare potest, et contra illa potest praecipere, ratione praedicta. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod praecipiat contraria, quia mandatum speciale absolvit a communi, sicut privilegium speciale9.
In praeceptis autem primae tabulae non potest Deus dispensare, quia eorum opposita sunt mala secundum se; ipsa enim praecepta dicunt ordinationem ad Deum sive in finem de sua ratione, et eorum opposita deordinationem. Et ideo, si contrarium praeciperet, praeciperet contra se; contra se autem non potest facere. Et si illa praeciperet — cum illa sint mala secundum se, ita quod nullo modo possunt bene fieri — aut Deus vellet malum, quod est inconveniens; aut impune fieret malum; aut idem esset bonum et malum, quorum utrumque est inconveniens simpliciter.
Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes probantes, quod Deus non potest omne10 malum praecipere, ut puta malum manens malum, et hoc est malum secundum se. — Tamen ultima ratio de hoc quod praecipit11 malum, non valet, et iam soluta est.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Osea, dicendum, quod illud fuit malum in se, scilicet cognoscere non suam, et divino praecepto factum est ei bonum. Sed secundum quod fornicatio dicit actum libidinosum et cognoscere aliquam ex libidine, hoc Dominus nunquam praecepit.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Exodi, quod praecepit filiis Israel furtum; dicendum, quod illud similiter praecepit, in quantum fuit malum in se, scilicet accipere rem alienam; et hoc potuit facere, quia, cum sit Dominus omnium, dominium potuit transferre. Sed nunquam praecepit, quod ex libidine hoc facerent; illud enim est malum secundum se.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo quod praecepit Abrahae de Isaac; dicendum, quod illud non erat malum secundum se, quia Isaac, quamvis non esset reus mortis sibi infligendae ab homine, tamen ratione peccati originalis reus erat mortis temporalis sibi infligendae a Deo, ad quam habebat necessitatem; et ideo Deus habebat auctoritatem, et ita de iure potuit illam Abrahae ex causa committere. — Tamen aliqui volunt dicere, quod non praecepit occidere, sed offerre. Sed contra hoc est Glossa12
et textus, quia dicitur, quod portavit ignem et gladium.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest super omnem legem datam; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest, quia potest imponere, sed non potest destruere iam positam. Quoniam enim ordinationem ad ipsum dicunt aliqua mandata, sicut non potest contra suam iustitiam facere, sic nec contra illa praecipere.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de non-ente potest facere ens; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest facere, sed hoc non potest facere, quod aliquid sit simul13 ens et non-ens; et quia non-ens non habet necessitatem ad hoc, quod sit non-ens, ideo potest fieri ens. Sed aliqua sunt mala, quae si sunt, de necessitate sunt mala, sicut mentiri et odire Deum. Et ideo non est simile, quia si faceret ista esse bona, faceret, quod idem simul esset bonum et malum.
I. Manifestum est, Deum non posse praecipere malum, quatenus manet malum. Quaeri tantum potest, utrum Deus rebus prohibitis praecepto suo auferre possit rationem mali per quandam dispensationem. — Distinctionem inter malum in se et malum secundum se, suffragantibus Alexandro Hal. (S. p. 1. q. 37. m. 2. 3.) et S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 4.), S. Bonav. explicat reducendo eam ad duplicem ordinem rerum, scil. in universo et ad finem ultimum (cfr. hic q. praeced.). Deordinatio contra primum ordinem, qui est unius rei ad alteram, est malum in se et prohibitum praeceptis secundae tabulae; sed malum secundum se est contra secundum ordinem, in quo est etiam ratio primi ordinis.
II. Distinctio decalogi in praecepta primae et secundae tabulae, ita ut tria prima praecepta primae tabulae attribuantur, septem alia vero secundae, iuxta S. Doctorem (III. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 3.) intelligenda est secundum sensum mysticum, non autem litteralem seu historicum, cum (ut vult Iosephus) in unaquaque tabula scripta essent quinque praecepta. Quod Deus in praeceptis secundae tabulae possit dispensare, approbatur etiam a S. Thoma in Commentario (hic q. 1. a. 4.). Hoc tamen intelligendum est cum illa restrictione, quae a Seraphico insinuatur hic ad 1. Quae restrictio si attenditur, conciliari potest doctrina eius cum verbis S. Thomae in Summa (I. II. q. 100. a. 8.), ubi dicitur etiam quoad praecepta secundae tabulae, quod « sunt omnino indispensabilia ». Sed haec verba intelligenda sunt cum ulteriore explicatione, quae ibi ad 3. ponitur. Idem fere docet Scotus (III. Sent. d. 37. q. unica), licet opinetur, non omnia praecepta secundae tabulae esse stricte de iure naturali, et per consequens, ea esse dispensabilia. — Facta Oseae et Abrahae (de quo vide hic dub. 3.) et spoliatio Aegyptiorum eodem modo explicantur ab Alexandro et S. Thoma, locis citt.
III. Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 46. a. 9; S. p. 1. tr. 20. q. 80. a. 3. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica. — Biel, hic q. unica.
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Question IV. Whether God can command evils.
Fourth and last it is asked, whether God can command evils. And that he can, it seems:
1. Because he commanded Hosea in chapter one1 that he should take a fornicating wife, and Bernard expounds [this] according to the letter. But if you say that it is not to be understood according to the letter; it is objected then: that he commanded not only to take a wife, but also to beget sons of fornication; but if she were a legitimate wife, they would not be sons of fornication.
2. Likewise, in Exodus chapter twelve2 he commanded the sons of Israel to commit theft; but theft is evil and contrary to the law of nature: therefore etc. If you say, that it is not evil in itself, and therefore can be done well; it is objected: because he commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and one whom he knew to be innocent, Genesis chapter twenty-two3; and this is evil in itself: therefore it seems that God can command an evil.
3. Likewise, by reasoning it seems so: because God is above every law: therefore in every commandment he can dispense: therefore he can command the contraries of all precepts and prohibitions.
4. Likewise, non-being is more distant from being than evil from good; but God by the sole command of his will makes being out of non-being: therefore by the sole command of his will he makes good out of evil: therefore he can command evils, as it seems.
On the contrary:
1. A precept is a sign of the divine will: therefore either it is a false sign, since it signifies that God wills what he commands4, or God wills it. But if God wills evil, he is evil; if he does not will it, and yet commands it, he is false; and both are impossible with God: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, no one obeying a divine precept ought to be punished: therefore if God can command an evil, an evil can be done with impunity. But for an evil to remain unpunished is against divine justice: therefore God
would be able to act against himself, and so to be opposed to himself. But this is impossible: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, God commands evils not to be done: if then he commands them to be done, he commands two opposites5; but for two opposites to be done is impossible: therefore God commands the impossible. But to no such precept are we bound: therefore we can disobey God; which is absurd. And again, everyone commanding the impossible is foolish or impious: therefore God would be foolish or impious, both of which are impossible. And therefore Jerome says6: Whoever says that God has commanded the impossible, let him be anathema.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. God can in no way command an evil which remains under the ratio of evil, and therefore never that which is evil according to itself; nevertheless that which is evil in itself he can command, and by commanding [can] make [it] good.
Respondeo: It must be said that when it is asked, whether God can command an evil, this can be understood in two ways: either as an evil remaining an evil, or in such a way that by commanding [it] he makes [it] good. The first is simply impossible; the second, however, is in some way possible, though not entirely.
For there is something evil in itself (in se), and something evil according to itself (secundum se). What is evil in itself can be done well7; what is evil according to itself can in no way be done well, but rather to understand that it be done well is to understand that the same thing be evil and good. It can therefore be said, that God can command an evil in itself, and not an evil according to itself; because he can command nothing which is not good once it has been commanded; and that is evil in itself, but not according to itself; therefore he can command this and not the other.
And from this arises what Bernard says in his book On Dispensation and Precept8, namely that God can dispense in the precepts of the second table and not [in those] of the first. And the reason for this is that in the precepts of the second table, as far as the ratio of the precept is concerned, an ordering to the neighbor is touched upon or commanded, and disorder toward the same is prohibited. But disorder with respect to the neighbor, unless it is a disorder with respect to God, is evil in itself; if, however, [it is] with respect to God, it is evil according to itself: just as to know a woman not one's own is evil in itself, but to know another's [woman] out of lust, or one not one's own [out of lust], is evil according to itself. But in the precepts of the second table God dispenses, and can dispense, and against them he can command, for the aforesaid reason. Nor does it follow from this, that he commands contraries, because a special mandate releases from a common one, just as a special privilege [does]9.
In the precepts of the first table, however, God cannot dispense, because their opposites are evils according to themselves; for the precepts themselves bespeak an ordering to God or to [him as] end by their very ratio, and their opposites [bespeak] disorder. And therefore, if he commanded the contrary, he would command against himself; but he cannot act against himself. And if he were to command those things — since they are evils according to themselves, such that in no way can they be done well — either God would will evil, which is unfitting; or evil would be done with impunity; or the same thing would be good and evil, both of which are unfitting absolutely.
And therefore the reasonings are to be conceded which prove, that God cannot command every10 evil, namely an evil remaining an evil, and this is what is evil according to itself. — Yet the last argument, about [God's] commanding11 evil, does not hold, and has already been answered.
To the arguments:
To 1. To that which is objected concerning Hosea, it must be said, that that was evil in itself, namely to know a woman not one's own, and by the divine precept it became for him a good. But insofar as fornication denotes a lustful act and to know some woman out of lust, this the Lord never commanded.
To 2. To that which is objected from the authority of Exodus, that he commanded the sons of Israel to commit theft; it must be said, that he commanded that likewise, insofar as it was evil in itself, namely to take another's property; and this he was able to do, because, since he is Lord of all, he was able to transfer dominion. But he never commanded that they should do this out of lust; for that is evil according to itself.
To that which is objected concerning what he commanded Abraham regarding Isaac; it must be said, that that was not evil according to itself, because Isaac, although he was not guilty of a death to be inflicted on him by a man, nevertheless by reason of original sin he was guilty of a temporal death to be inflicted on him by God, to which he was bound by necessity; and therefore God had the authority, and so by right he could commit [the doing of] it to Abraham for a [just] cause. — Yet some wish to say that he did not command [him] to kill, but to offer. But against this is the Gloss12
and the text, because it is said, that he carried fire and a sword.
To 3. To that which is objected, that he can [act] above every given law; it must be said, that it is true, that he can, because he can impose [law], but he cannot destroy [a law] already laid down. For since certain commandments bespeak an ordering to himself, just as he cannot act against his own justice, so neither [can he] command against them.
To 4. To that which is objected, that out of non-being he can make being; it must be said, that it is true that he can do this, but he cannot do this, that anything be at the same time13 being and non-being; and because non-being does not have any necessity that it be non-being, therefore it can become being. But some [things] are evils which, if they are, are of necessity evils, such as to lie and to hate God. And therefore the case is not similar, because if he were to make these things to be good, he would bring it about that the same thing would at once be good and evil.
I. It is manifest that God cannot command an evil, insofar as it remains an evil. It can only be asked, whether God can take away the ratio of evil from things prohibited, by his precept, through a certain dispensation. — The distinction between evil in itself and evil according to itself, with the support of Alexander of Hales (Summa p. 1, q. 37, m. 2, 3) and St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 4), St. Bonaventure explains by reducing it to a twofold order of things, namely [the order] within the universe and [the order] to the ultimate end (cf. here, the preceding question). Disorder against the first order, which is of one thing to another, is evil in itself and is prohibited by the precepts of the second table; but evil according to itself is [disorder] against the second order, in which there is also the ratio of the first order.
II. The distinction of the decalogue into precepts of the first and second table, in such a way that the first three precepts are attributed to the first table and the other seven to the second, according to the Holy Doctor (III Sent., d. 37, a. 2, q. 3) is to be understood according to the mystical sense, not the literal or historical, since (as Josephus holds) five precepts were written on each tablet. That God can dispense in the precepts of the second table is approved also by St. Thomas in the Commentary (here q. 1, a. 4). This, however, is to be understood with the restriction which is hinted at by the Seraphic [Doctor] here in Ad 1. If this restriction is attended to, his doctrine can be reconciled with the words of St. Thomas in the Summa (I-II, q. 100, a. 8), where it is said also concerning the precepts of the second table, that « they are altogether indispensable ». But these words are to be understood with the further explanation which is given there in ad 3. Almost the same is taught by Scotus (III Sent., d. 37, q. unica), although he is of opinion that not all precepts of the second table are strictly of natural right, and consequently that they are dispensable. — The deeds of Hosea and of Abraham (concerning which see here dub. 3) and the spoliation of the Egyptians are explained in the same manner by Alexander and St. Thomas, in the places cited.
III. Besides those praised: B. Albert, I Sent., d. 46, a. 9; Summa p. 1, tr. 20, q. 80, a. 3, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 6. — Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ., q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. unica. — Biel, here q. unica.
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- Vers. 2: « Vade, sume tibi uxorem fornicationum et fac tibi filios fornicationum ». S. Bernardi expositio in hunc locum habetur in eius libro de Praecepto et dispensatione c. 3. n. 6, ubi S. Doctor etiam de furto a filiis Israel in Aegypto facto, quod in seq. argumento commemoratur, dicit: « Quorum utique alterum [factum] quid nisi grave furti facinus, alterum quid nisi flagitii turpitudo reputaretur, si non excusasset utrumque factum auctoritas imperantis? » Secundum August., XXII. contra Faustum, c. 89, illa verba apud Oseam significant vocationem gentilium ad fidem, et ab eodem S. Doctore ibid. c. 41 etiam illud factum furti mystice explicatur. — Circa finem argumenti pro filios fornicationis Vat. cum cod. cc filios fornicariae.Verse 2: « Go, take to thyself a wife of fornications and beget for thyself sons of fornications ». St. Bernard's exposition of this passage is found in his book On Precept and Dispensation, c. 3, n. 6, where the Holy Doctor, also concerning the theft by the sons of Israel in Egypt, which is mentioned in the following argument, says: « Of which two [deeds], the one would be reckoned a grave act of theft, the other nothing but the shamefulness of disgrace, had not the authority of the One commanding excused both deeds? » According to Augustine, XXII Against Faustus, c. 89, those words in Hosea signify the calling of the Gentiles to the faith, and by the same Holy Doctor ibid. c. 41, that deed of theft is likewise explained mystically. — Near the end of the argument, for filios fornicationis, the Vatican edition with cod. cc reads filios fornicariae.
- Vers. 36.Verse 36.
- Vers. 2.Verse 2.
- In Vat. cod. cc hic et paulo post praecepit.In the Vatican edition, cod. cc, here and a little later, [reads] praecepit.
- Cod. V verbo opposita praefigit contradictorie. Immediate ante, Vat. cum cod. cc ter praecepit pro praecipit.Cod. V prefixes contradictorie to the word opposita. Immediately before, the Vatican edition with cod. cc three times has praecepit in place of praecipit.
- Symboli Explic. ad Damasum (quod opusculum, etsi inter opera S. Hieronymi habetur, alius auctoris est, scil. Pelagii, ut dicunt): « Execramur etiam eorum blasphemiam, qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo praeceptum esse ». Cfr. etiam Comment. in Matth. 6, 44. — Nota, quod S. Doctor hoc argumentum reprobat in fine corp. quaest.Explanation of the Creed addressed to Damasus (which little work, even though it is found among the works of St. Jerome, is by another author, namely Pelagius, as they say): « We curse also the blasphemy of those who say that something has been commanded by God to man as impossible ». Cf. also Commentary on Matthew 6:44. — Note that the Holy Doctor refutes this argument at the end of the corpus quaestionis.
- Pro bene, quod ter in hac propositione occurrit, codd. L ter bonum.For bene, which occurs three times in this proposition, the codd. L three times [read] bonum.
- Cap. 3. n. 6. seq., ubi quoad sensum invenitur. Cfr. supra pag. 843, nota 3.Chapter 3, n. 6 ff., where it is found as to the sense. Cf. above p. 843, note 3.
- Ed. addit derogat generali.The edition adds derogates from the general.
- In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur omne.In the Vatican edition and cod. cc, omne is wanting.
- Ed. 1 praecepit.Edition 1 [reads] praecepit.
- Glossa ad Genesis 22, et textus ipse Vulgatae, qui memorat Abraham portasse ignem et gladium (cfr. v. 6).The Gloss on Genesis 22, and the text itself of the Vulgate, which records that Abraham carried fire and a sword (cf. v. 6).
- OCR garble in raw line 42612: « quod aliquid sit simul ens et non-ens » read as printed; no codex variant noted in apparatus.Editorial note: the OCR at raw line 42612 reads « that anything be at the same time being and non-being » as printed; no codex variant is noted in the apparatus.