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Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio IV. Utrum quaelibet trium personarum possit incarnari per se ipsam.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum quaelibet trium personarum possit incarnari per se ipsam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Tantundem distat creatura a persona Filii, quantum a persona Patris et Spiritus sancti: igitur qua ratione persona Filii incarnari potest, distantia non impediente, eadem ratione videtur, quod et1 persona Patris et Spiritus sancti.

2. Item, posse incarnari spectat ad dignitatem, alioquin non conveniret Filio; sed quidquid potest Filius ad dignitatem spectans, potest et Pater, cum totum posse habeat Filius a Patre2: ergo si persona Filii potest incarnari et carnem sibi assumere, videtur, quod hoc possit et Pater consimili ratione.

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3. Item, ad incarnationem faciendam3 non plura exiguntur quam extrema unibilia et unitas in persona et immensitas in potentia, quae extrema illa coniungat; sed natura Patris ita est unibilis, sicut natura Filii, cum sit una et eadem, et persona Patris ita est una, sicut persona Filii, et potentia immensa: ergo etc.

4. Item, si persona Filii potest incarnari, aut eo ipso quo est Filius, aut eo ipso quo4 est persona. Non eo ipso quo est Filius, quia Filius solum dicit respectum ad Patrem, non ad creaturam: ergo si potest incarnari eo ipso quo est persona divina, ergo cum Pater et Spiritus sanctus sit persona divina, sequitur necessario, quod persona Patris et Spiritus sancti ita possit incarnari, sicut persona Filii.

Sed contra: 1. « Si persona Patris vel Spiritus sancti incarnaretur, tunc duo essent Filii in Trinitate »; sed hoc est inconveniens, « quodlibet autem inconveniens, sicut dicit Anselmus in libro: Cur Deus homo5, apud Deum est impossibile »: ergo videtur similiter esse impossibile, personam Patris incarnari vel Spiritus sancti.

2. Item, incarnari non est aliud quam in carnem mitti, sicut vult Augustinus6; sed impossibile est, Patrem mitti, cum non habeat alium, a quo sit: ergo impossibile est Patrem incarnari.

3. Item, quod est proprium unius personae impossibile est alteri convenire7; sed incarnari est proprium Filii et sibi soli convenit: ergo impossibile est, quod alteri personae conveniat.

4. Item, maiorem convenientiam habet natura assumta a Verbo cum aliis personis, quam alia natura, quae non est assumta: ergo si aliae personae non possunt illam naturam assumere, quae assumta est a Verbo; videtur, quod nec aliquam aliam. Sed illam non possunt assumere, sicut in praecedentibus8 monstratum est: ergo videtur, quod nullam aliam assumere valeant.

Conclusio.

Quaelibet divinarum personarum potuit et potest incarnari.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod nulla persona incarnari potuit nisi persona Verbi. Et rationem huius assignant: quia, si alia persona incarnaretur, nasceretur quaedam Trinitatis confusio, dum plures in Trinitate Filii dicerentur9. Nasceretur etiam quaedam aequalitatis diminutio, dum duo Filii essent in Trinitate, quorum unus haberet excellentiorem nativitatem10 quam alter. Nasceretur etiam quaedam oppositorum indistinctio, quia tunc unus et idem Filius genitus et ingenitus diceretur, si Pater incarnaretur11. Et haec omnia sunt inconvenientia; et quia nihil inconveniens potest poni in Deo et circa Deum: ideo dixerunt, quod nulla alia persona a persona Filii poterat incarnari, non propter defectum potentiae, sed propter dignitatem potentiae, quae non admittit aliquod indecens circa opus suum. — Sed licet videantur in hac positione sequi beatum Anselmum, ipsum tamen veraciter non sequuntur, pro eo quod nec Anselmus vult hoc dicere, esse impossibile apud Deum, aliam personam a Filio incarnari; sed vult hoc ostendere, quod non est ita decens de alia persona, sicut de persona Filii: et hoc verum est, sicut melius videbitur infra12.

Quod autem Pater aut Spiritus sanctus incarnari possit absque aliqua repugnantia, planum est. Posset enim formare corpus, quod sibi uniret de genere humano, non per viam generationis, sicut formavit corpus Evae, quae non dicitur esse filia Adae. — Praeterea, esto quod alia persona assumsisset

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carnem de Virgine, sicut assumsit Verbum, adhuc non esset ibi confusio nec aequalitatis diminutio secundum rem, quia ex hoc nulla fieret transmutatio circa personas divinas. Nulla enim est confusio, quando nos credimus, quod unus et idem est temporalis et aeternus, immortalis et mortuus, immensus et circumscriptus. Nullum etiam est inconveniens, cum dicimus, Filium esse aequalem Patri et minorem Patre secundum naturarum dualitatem. — Et ideo concedendum est, sicut Magister dicit in littera13, quod quaelibet trium personarum potest et potuit incarnari.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod si Pater incarnaretur, quod tunc duo essent Filii; dicendum, quod ista ratio procedit hoc supposito, quod Deus non possit aliter assumere carnem, quin eam14 assumeret de muliere tanquam ex matre. Hoc autem est falsum, quia aliter posset Deus carnem sibi assumere, si sibi placeret. — Praeterea, esto quod alia persona assumsisset carnem de Virgine et esset filius Virginis, hoc in nullo derogaret Deo, quia nihil perderet ibi divina persona; et ideo, si est inconveniens, hoc est solum propter nostram reputationem et ratiocinationem. — Cum autem dicit Anselmus, quod « quantumcumque parvum inconveniens in Deo est impossibile »; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de eo quod est inconveniens in Deo secundum se; et tale est inconveniens, quod nullo modo potest esse conveniens, et ideo est impossibile. De eo autem non habet veritatem, quod est inconveniens secundum nostram aestimationem, quia Deus posset illud facere conveniens. Unde sicut concedimus de aliquo malo, quod potest Deus facere illud, pro eo quod illud potest bene fieri, sicut est malum in se; de aliquo vero non, quod est secundum se malum15, quod nullo modo potest bene fieri; sic etiam in proposito est intelligendum, cum dicitur, quod quodlibet inconveniens in Deo est impossibile.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnatio16 non est aliud quam in carnem mitti; dicendum, quod verum est, prout incarnatio dicitur de Filio. Sed incarnari secundum suum intellectum generalem non dicit plus quam uniri carni in unitate personae. Et quamvis persona Patris non possit mitti, potest tamen uniri; et ideo ratio illa non tenet, pro eo quod procedit ab inferiori ad superius destruendo17.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnari est proprium Filii; dicendum, quod sicut, si Petrus sit unicus filius Pauli, esse filium Pauli est proprium Petri, non quia non possit convenire alii, sed quia nunc non convenit alii; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, quod incarnari dicitur esse proprium personae Filii, non quia alia persona non possit carni uniri, sed quia nulla alia persona actualiter unitur carni a persona Filii.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura assumta a Verbo plus convenit cum aliis personis quam non assumta; dicendum, quod, sicut in praecedentibus18 dictum est, etsi plus conveniat natura talis cum aliis personis ratione eminentiae et dignitatis, tamen minus convenit convenientia ordinis, quia, cum sit actualiter a persona Verbi assumta, non habet possibilitatem ad ulteriorem assumtionem. Non sic autem est de natura, quae assumta non est; et propterea illa ratio non concludit19.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether each of the three persons could be incarnate of itself.

Fourthly it is asked whether each of the three persons could be incarnate of itself. And that it can, it seems:

1. A creature is just as distant from the person of the Son as it is from the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit: therefore, by whatever ground the person of the Son can be incarnate, the distance not impeding, by the same ground it seems that the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit can be too.1

2. Likewise, to be able to be incarnate pertains to dignity, otherwise it would not belong to the Son; but whatever the Son can do that pertains to dignity, the Father can also, since the Son has his whole power from the Father:2 therefore if the person of the Son can be incarnate and assume flesh to himself, it seems that the Father can do this too by a like ground.

3. Likewise, for bringing about the incarnation3 no more is required than the extremes capable of being united and a unity in the person and an immensity in the power that may join those extremes; but the nature of the Father is just as capable of being united as the nature of the Son, since it is one and the same, and the person of the Father is just as much one as the person of the Son, and the power is immense: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if the person of the Son can be incarnate, either by the very fact that he is the Son, or by the very fact that4 he is a person. Not by the very fact that he is the Son, because "Son" states only a relation to the Father, not to a creature: therefore if he can be incarnate by the very fact that he is a divine person, then, since the Father and the Holy Spirit are a divine person, it follows necessarily that the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit can be incarnate just as the person of the Son.

On the contrary: 1. "If the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit were incarnate, then there would be two Sons in the Trinity"; but this is unfitting, "and whatever is unfitting, as Anselm says in the book Why God Became Man,5 is with God impossible": therefore it seems likewise to be impossible for the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit to be incarnate.

2. Likewise, to be incarnate is nothing other than to be sent into flesh, as Augustine holds;6 but it is impossible for the Father to be sent, since he has no other from whom he is: therefore it is impossible for the Father to be incarnate.

3. Likewise, what is proper to one person it is impossible should belong to another;7 but to be incarnate is proper to the Son and belongs to him alone: therefore it is impossible that it should belong to another person.

4. Likewise, the nature assumed by the Word has a greater agreement with the other persons than another nature that is not assumed: therefore if the other persons cannot assume that nature which is assumed by the Word, it seems that they cannot assume any other either. But they cannot assume that nature, as was shown in the foregoing:8 therefore it seems that they can assume no other.

Conclusion.

Each of the divine persons could be and can be incarnate.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that some have wished to say that no person could be incarnate except the person of the Word. And they assign the ground for this: that, if another person were incarnate, a certain confusion of the Trinity would arise, since several in the Trinity would be called Sons.9 There would also arise a certain diminution of equality, since there would be two Sons in the Trinity, of whom one would have a more excellent nativity10 than the other. There would also arise a certain non-distinction of opposites, because then one and the same Son would be called begotten and unbegotten, if the Father were incarnate.11 And all these are unfitting; and because nothing unfitting can be posited in God and about God: therefore they said that no other person than the person of the Son could be incarnate, not on account of a defect of power, but on account of the dignity of the power, which does not admit anything unbecoming about its own work. — But although in this position they seem to follow blessed Anselm, yet they do not truly follow him, because Anselm does not wish to say this, that it is impossible with God for another person than the Son to be incarnate; but he wishes to show this, that it is not as fitting concerning another person as concerning the person of the Son: and this is true, as will be better seen below.12

But that the Father or the Holy Spirit could be incarnate without any repugnance is plain. For he could form a body, which he would unite to himself, from the human race, not by way of generation, just as he formed the body of Eve, who is not said to be the daughter of Adam. — Furthermore, granted that another person had assumed

flesh from the Virgin, as the Word assumed it, even so there would not be there confusion or diminution of equality in reality, because from this no change would be made about the divine persons. For there is no confusion when we believe that one and the same is temporal and eternal, immortal and dead, immense and circumscribed. There is also nothing unfitting when we say that the Son is equal to the Father and less than the Father according to the duality of natures. — And therefore it must be conceded, as the Master says in the text,13 that each of the three persons can be and could be incarnate.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that if the Father were incarnate, then there would be two Sons; it must be said that this argument proceeds on the supposition that God could not assume flesh otherwise than by assuming it from a woman14 as from a mother. But this is false, because God could assume flesh to himself otherwise, if it pleased him. — Furthermore, granted that another person had assumed flesh from the Virgin and were the son of the Virgin, this would in no way derogate from God, because the divine person would lose nothing there; and therefore, if it is unfitting, this is only on account of our reckoning and reasoning. — But when Anselm says that "however small a thing unfitting in God is impossible"; it must be said that this is understood of that which is unfitting in God in itself; and such is the unfitting that can in no way be fitting, and therefore is impossible. But it does not hold true of that which is unfitting according to our estimation, because God could make it fitting. Hence just as we concede of some evil that God can do it, inasmuch as it can well be done, as is an evil in itself; but not of another, which is evil according to itself,15 which can in no way be done well; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood, when it is said that whatever is unfitting in God is impossible.

2. To that which is objected, that incarnation16 is nothing other than to be sent into flesh; it must be said that it is true, insofar as incarnation is said of the Son. But to be incarnate, according to its general meaning, says no more than to be united to flesh in the unity of the person. And although the person of the Father cannot be sent, yet he can be united; and therefore that argument does not hold, because it proceeds from the lower to the higher by destruction.17

3. To that which is objected, that to be incarnate is proper to the Son; it must be said that just as, if Peter is the only son of Paul, to be the son of Paul is proper to Peter, not because it could not belong to another, but because it does not now belong to another; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood that to be incarnate is said to be proper to the person of the Son, not because another person could not be united to flesh, but because no other person is actually united to flesh than the person of the Son.

4. To that which is objected, that the nature assumed by the Word agrees more with the other persons than the unassumed; it must be said that, as was said in the foregoing,18 although such a nature agrees more with the other persons by reason of eminence and dignity, yet it agrees less by the agreement of order, because, since it is actually assumed by the person of the Word, it does not have possibility for a further assumption. But it is not so concerning the nature that is not assumed; and therefore that argument does not conclude.19

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Pro et (Vat. etiam) codd. A E G L N T V aa perperam in.
    For et (the Vatican edition: etiam) the codices A E G L N T V aa wrongly read in.
  2. Cfr. Ioan. 5, 19. seqq.
    Cf. John 5:19 ff.
  3. Cod. A in incarnatione facienda.
    Codex A: in incarnatione facienda (in the incarnation that is to be brought about).
  4. Codd. N X hic et in seqq. eo ipso quod.
    Codices N X here and in what follows: eo ipso quod (by the very fact that).
  5. Libr. I. c. 20: Sed hoc est praestitum, quia quamlibet parvum inconveniens in Deo impossibile est. — Ibid. II. c. 9. etiam quod in maiori dicitur his verbis exprimitur: « Si quaelibet alia persona [quam Filius] incarnetur, erunt duo Filii in Trinitate, Filius scilicet Dei, qui et ante incarnationem filius est, et ille qui per incarnationem filius erit Virginis; et erit in personis, quae semper aequales esse debent, inaequalitas secundum dignitatem nativitatum. Digniorem namque nativitatem habebit natus ex Deo quam natus ex Virgine ». Anselm. idem docet in libro de Fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi etc., c. 5. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. I.
    Book I, c. 20: But this has been established, that any unfitting thing in God, however small, is impossible. — Likewise at Book II, c. 9, what is said in the greater [work] is expressed in these words: "If any other person [than the Son] should be incarnate, there will be two Sons in the Trinity, namely the Son of God, who is Son even before the incarnation, and the one who through the incarnation will be the Son of the Virgin; and there will be in the persons, which ought always to be equal, an inequality according to the dignity of the nativities. For one born of God will have a more worthy nativity than one born of the Virgin." Anselm teaches the same in the book On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word, etc., c. 5. Cf. also the Master's text here, c. I.
  6. In Ioan. Evang. tr. 36. n. 7. seq.; II. de Trin. c. 5. n. 7. seqq. et IV. c. 19. n. 26. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. I. — De minori vide locc. ex libro de Trin. modo citt. nec non I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3.
    On the Gospel of John, tr. 36, n. 7 f.; On the Trinity II, c. 5, n. 7 ff., and IV, c. 19, n. 26 ff. Cf. the Master's text here, c. I. — For the minor [premise] see the passages from the book On the Trinity just cited, as well as I Sent., d. 15, p. I, q. 3.
  7. Aristot., I. Topic. c. I: Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse.
    Aristotle, Topics I, c. I: "For no one states as a property that which can belong to another."
  8. Quaest. 3. — Edd. 1, 2 in fine arg. ineptam in se glossam (de quo cfr. I. Sent. d. 16. q. 3. ad 2. et 3.) et contra finem arg. addunt: sed altera persona alteram naturam assumsit, scilicet persona Spiritus sancti naturam columbae: ergo si — superius pro voluerunt aliqui codd. K Z volunt aliqui, et mox pro quod si codd. A N T V X nec non edd. 1, 2, quia si.
    Question 3. — Editions 1 and 2, at the end of the argument, [add] in themselves an inept gloss (on which cf. I Sent., d. 16, q. 3, ad 2 and 3), and near the end of the argument add: "but another person assumed another nature, namely the person of the Holy Spirit [assumed] the nature of a dove: therefore if —". Above, for voluerunt aliqui the codices K Z [read] volunt aliqui, and presently for quod si the codices A N T V X as well as editions 1 and 2 [read] quia si.
  9. Anselm., de Fide Trin. etc. c. 5: Unde quaedam nasceretur dubietatis confusio, cum de Deo Filio loqueremur: uterque enim esset Deus et Filius, quamvis alter Dei, alter hominis. — Idem dicit Bernard., Serm. 2. in Annuntiat. B. Virg. n. 2.
    Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity, etc., c. 5: "Whence a certain confusion of doubt would arise, when we spoke of God the Son: for each would be God and Son, although one [the Son] of God, the other of man." — Bernard says the same, Sermon 2 on the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin, n. 2.
  10. Ita codd. K aa bb, quo verbo etiam Anselm. utitur loc. supra nota 3. cit.; codd. C D G M N O voluntatem, cod. F notionem, alii cum edd. notabilitatem.
    So codices K aa bb, which word Anselm too uses in the passage cited above in note 3; codices C D G M N O [read] voluntatem, codex F notionem, others with the editions notabilitatem.
  11. Anselm., de Fide Trin. etc. c. 5, et II. Cur Deus homo c. 9. adhuc hanc profert inconvenientiam: Si Pater fuerit incarnatus, erunt duo nepotes in Trinitate, quia Pater erit nepos parentum Virginis per hominem assumtum; et Verbum, cum nihil habeat de homine, nepos tamen erit Virginis, quia filii eius erit filius. — Mox pro poni in Deo, quod ex codd. F N restituimus, alii codd. cum edd. in Deum. Deinde pro alia persona a persona Filii codd. F N alia persona quam persona Filii. Denique pro propter dignitatem potentiae Vat. et aliquot codd. propter dignitatem personae.
    Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity, etc., c. 5, and II Why God Became Man, c. 9, still adduces this unfitting consequence: "If the Father were incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity, because the Father will be a grandson of the Virgin's parents through the man assumed; and the Word, since it has nothing of man, will yet be a grandson of the Virgin, because it will be the son of her son." — Presently, for poni in Deo, which we have restored from codices F N, the other codices with the editions [read] in Deum. Then for alia persona a persona Filii the codices F N [read] alia persona quam persona Filii. Finally, for propter dignitatem potentiae the Vatican edition and several codices [read] propter dignitatem personae.
  12. Art. 2. q. 3. — Mox pro aut codd. A N T U V et. Paulo inferius pro de genere humano cod. F de genere humanae naturae.
    Article 2, question 3. — Presently, for aut the codices A N T U V [read] et. A little below, for de genere humano codex F [reads] de genere humanae naturae.
  13. Hic c. 2. — Superius pro cum dicimus cod. P credere.
    Here, c. 2. — Above, for cum dicimus codex P [reads] credere.
  14. Voculam eam, quae in edd. nec non in aliis codd. deest, supplevimus ex cod. Y. In codd. G H T V pro eam habetur non, in cod. A vero. Codd. B C D pro quin eam exhibent quam non.
    The little word eam, which is lacking in the editions as well as in other codices, we have supplied from codex Y. In codices G H T V, for eam there is non, but in codex A. The codices B C D, for quin eam, present quam non.
  15. S. Doctor similiter loquitur I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4: Est enim aliquid malum in se, aliquid malum secundum se. Malum in se potest fieri bene [v. g. furari i. e. clam auferre rem alienam, si Deus dominium transfert]; malum secundum se nullo modo potest fieri bene, immo hoc intelligere, quod fiat bene, est intelligere, quod idem sit malum et bonum [v. g. furari ex libidine]. — Pro malum in se Vat. malum poenae.
    The holy Doctor speaks similarly in I Sent., d. 47, q. 4: "For there is something evil in itself, [and] something evil according to itself. The evil-in-itself can be done well" [e.g. to steal, i.e. to take another's property secretly, if God transfers the ownership]; "the evil-according-to-itself can in no way be done well; rather, to understand this, that it be done well, is to understand that the same thing be evil and good" [e.g. to steal out of lust]. — For malum in se the Vatican edition [reads] malum poenae (an evil of punishment).
  16. Codd. K bb incarnari.
    Codices K bb: incarnari (to be incarnate).
  17. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Loc. topic., ubi de loco a toto agit, dicit: « Totum universale, ut hic sumitur, est quodlibet superius et substantiale sumtum ad suum inferius, ut animal ad hominem... Pars subiectiva dicitur quodlibet inferius sub toto universali sumtum. Locus a toto universali sive a genere... est semper destructivus praedicando totum... Maxima: a quocumque removetur genus sive totum universale, ab eodem removetur species sive pars subiectiva. Locus a specie sive a parte subiectiva est habitudo ipsius ad suum genus sive ad suum totum universale; et est semper constructivus et continet duo argumenta et duas maximas... Maxima (1): Quidquid praedicatur de specie vel de parte subiectiva, hoc etiam praedicatur de genere sive de toto universali..; Maxima (2): De quocumque praedicatur species sive pars subiectiva, de eodem praedicatur genus sive totum universale ». Quae regulae nituntur in eo quod Aristot., IV. Topic. c. I. seqq., de relatione generis ad speciem docet, v. g. quod species quidem participent genera, genera autem non participent species; quod nullum superiorum participet aliquod inferiorum etc.
    Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract On the Topical Places, where he treats of the place from the whole, says: "The universal whole, as it is here taken, is anything higher and substantial taken in relation to its lower, as animal to man... The subjective part is called anything lower taken under the universal whole. The place from the universal whole or from the genus... is always destructive in predicating the whole... Maxim: from whatever the genus or universal whole is removed, from the same the species or subjective part is removed. The place from the species or from the subjective part is its relation to its genus or to its universal whole; and it is always constructive and contains two arguments and two maxims... Maxim (1): Whatever is predicated of the species or of the subjective part, this is also predicated of the genus or of the universal whole; Maxim (2): Of whatever the species or subjective part is predicated, of the same the genus or universal whole is predicated." These rules rest on what Aristotle teaches in Topics IV, c. I ff., concerning the relation of genus to species, e.g. that species indeed participate in genera, but genera do not participate in species; that none of the higher participates in any of the lower, etc.
  18. Quaest. 1. et 3. — Paulo inferius pro tamen minus codd. A E G H N T U aa quod minus (plures codd. unus pro minus), edd. tamen non plus.
    Questions 1 and 3. — A little below, for tamen minus the codices A E G H N T U aa [read] quod minus (several codices [read] unus for minus), the editions [read] tamen non plus.
  19. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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