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Dist. 10, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus
p. 238

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa distinctione, quam ponit Magister: Secundum aliquando exprimit conditionem naturae238-1, aliquando unitatem personae, aliquando habitum, aliquando causam. Videtur enim ista distinctio esse inartificialis et superflua et diminuta. Inartificialis, quia membra ista nullam videntur habere convenientiam. Superflua videtur, p. 239 quia eadem vi, qua importat proprietatem239-1 naturae, importat unitatem et proprietatem personae. Diminuta etiam videtur distinctio, quia, sicut potest importare habitum, ita etiam potest importare novem genera accidentium239-2: ergo videtur, quod his membris octo membra debuerunt adiungi. — Item quaeritur, ubi sic diversimode accipiatur, cum non videatur habere tot intellectus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec distinctio (Notandum), etsi videatur esse rudis, tamen est multum rationabilis, et hoc, si attenditur, super quid fundatur. Nam (Distinctio) prima divisione239-3 haec praepositio secundum potest importare concomitantiam, vel causam. Si causam importet, tunc est quartum membrum; si concomitantiam, sic (Subdistinctio) tripliciter potest239-4 importare: aut secundum inhaerentiam, aut secundum unionem, aut secundum adiacentiam sive assistentiam. Si secundum inhaerentiam, sic importat proprietatem naturae; nam proprietas inhaeret ei, cuius est proprietas. Si secundum unionem, sic importat proprietatem personae. Si secundum assistentiam sive adiacentiam, sic dicit habitum. — Quartum autem membrum, quod est secundum principalis divisionis, Magister non subdividit. Potest tamen dividi secundum quatuor genera causarum. — Omnibus enim modis haec dictio secundum consuevit accipi239-5, sicut (Exempla) potest per exempla monstrari. Si enim dicatur: Christus, secundum quod homo, fuit passibilis; sic importat conditionem naturae. Si dicatur: Christus, secundum quod homo, creavit stellas239-6; sic importat unitatem personae. Si dicatur: Christus, secundum quod homo, fuit vestitus et calceatus et ut homo inventus239-7; sic importat habitum. Si dicatur: Christus, secundum quod Deus, creavit mundum, et secundum quod homo, praedicavit divinum verbum; sic importat causam efficientem. Si dicatur: Christus, secundum quod Deus, est suppositum divinae naturae, et secundum quod homo, est animal rationale; sic importat causam formalem. Si dicatur: Christus, secundum quod Deus et homo, est praemium nostrum; sic importat causam finalem. — Possunt autem multa huiusmodi exempla congruentia inveniri. De causa autem materiali secundum divinam naturam non contingit invenire239-8; secundum autem humanam contingit, ut si dicatur: Christus, secundum quod homo, conceptus fuit de purissimis sanguinibus Virginis239-9.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod nos dicimur filii adoptivi, quia, cum nati fuerimus filii irae, per gratiam facti sumus filii Dei. Si enim hoc verum est, tunc Angeli beati et homo in statu innocentiae non fuissent filii adoptivi: ergo nec ius habuissent in hereditate239-10 regni; quod absurdum est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister loquitur de adoptione secundum plenam rationem; et sic ponit extraneitatem, quae secundum actum est, quae quidem extraneitas est elongatio et abalienatio a Deo per culpam; et hoc quidem modo non conveniret Angelis ratio filiationis239-11. Largius tamen accipiendo extraneitatem, sive quantum ad culpam, quae inest, sive quia potuit inesse, se extendit ad omnes filios adoptivos. Et hoc quidem modo Angeli possunt dici filii239-12.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, Christum esse filium Virginis naturaliter et per gratiam. Videtur enim, quod ista duo non sint compossibilia. Si enim hoc est naturale, iam non est gratuitum, et e converso.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod gratia unionis non repugnat nec incompossibilis est cum proprietate naturali, immo facit eam communicari. Et Magister loquitur hic de gratia unionis. — Vel potest dici (Aliter), quod gratia et natura bene possunt de eadem re dici per comparationem ad diversa; et sic est in proposito. Nam Christus, in quantum homo, est naturalis filius Virginis; in quantum autem Deus, est filius Virginis, non per naturam nec per adoptionem, sed per gratiam unionis239-13. p. 240

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius, quod ille, scilicet Christus, est filius origine, non adoptione; veritate, non nuncupatione etc. Videtur enim, quod sit ibi verborum inculcatio. Idem enim est esse filium origine et nativitate. — Item videtur, quod sit superfluitas. Nam omnis filiatio aut est naturalis, aut gratuita: ergo per originem, vel adoptionem: igitur superfluunt alia membra. — Item, quid est quod dicitur aliquis filius nuncupatione? Aut enim vera est nuncupatio, aut falsa; si vera: ergo vel per adoptionem, vel per generationem; si falsa: ergo non debet inter membra praedicta reponi. — Item, si ob240-1 creationem dicuntur filii, cum ergo asini sint a Deo creati, erunt filii Dei, quod absurdum est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in praedicto verbo (Differentiae) Hilarius innuit nobis quatuor filiationis differentias, quarum sufficientia haberi potest sic. Ille enim dicitur filius alicuius, qui ab ipso est et ei conformatur; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: aut emanatione naturali et in unitate essentiae, et sic est (Notandum) filius unigenitus Patris, quem dicit Hilarius esse filium origine, contra Photinum; veritate, contra Sabellium; nativitate, contra Arium. Et hoc in primo libro240-2 fuit expositum. Aut potest esse ab alio in diversitate substantiae; et hoc potest esse tripliciter secundum triplicem modum conformitatis. Aut enim conformatur quantum ad rationem imaginis naturalis, et sic est filius creatione; aut quantum ad rationem imaginis et similitudinis, quae attenditur in gratia et donis gratuitis, et sic est filius per adoptionem; aut conformatur in natura imaginis, sed discordat per deordinationem voluntatis, sicut homo peccator, et sic est filius nuncupatione.

Ex his patent differentiae filiationis; patent nihilominus verba praedictae distinctionis, quod non inculcantur, sed valde rationabiliter dicuntur. Patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Non enim sine causa dicuntur illa tria vocabula; et quamvis pro eodem accipi possit origo et nativitas, non tamen frustra ponitur unum cum altero; hoc enim est240-3 propter haereses elidendas.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis filius aut est filius per naturam, aut per gratiam; dicendum, quod falsum est, nisi extendatur nomen naturae et gratiae ad illud quod est ex mera Dei benevolentia, et ad illud quod habet quis ab origine. Et hoc quidem modo filiatio per creationem potest dici quodam modo esse per naturam, quodam modo per gratiam; sed non sequitur propter hoc, quod talis sit filius adoptivus, vel naturalis.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de filiatione per nuncupationem, dicendum, quod ille sic dicitur filius, qui habet conformitatem per naturam imaginis240-4, sed difformitatem per culpam; et hoc, inquam, modo nuncupatio ista quodam modo habet veritatem, quodam modo non, quia quodam modo est filius, quodam modo adversarius. Et ideo sola nuncupatione dicitur filius, sicut Abraham dixit ad divitem damnatum: Recordare, fili240-5 etc.

Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod si pater est per creationem, debet dici pater bestiarum; dicendum, quod non sequitur: quia non quaecumque creatio facit aliquem dici filium, sed creatio illa, in qua confertur insigne divinae imaginis, per quam configuratur homo Deo et idoneus efficitur ad hoc, ut sit filius adoptivus240-6.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Ambrosii in littera: Per adoptionem sumus filii, ille vero per veritatem naturae. Cum enim factum per veritatem et dictum per similitudinem non univocentur, sed aequivocentur, sicut homo pictus et homo verus in homine240-7; tunc filiatio nobis et Christo competit aequivoce. Et hoc ipsum videtur confirmari per illud quod dicitur Ioannis vigesimo240-8: Ascendo ad Patrem meum et Patrem vestrum; Gregorius ibi: « Aliter meum, et aliter vestrum ». Sed contra hoc est, quod Christus dicitur frater noster; sed non diceretur ex hoc frater, si aequivoce essemus filii: ergo etc. — Item, cum dicitur: Deus est240-9 pater Christi et pater noster, aut eadem paternitate, aut alia. Si eadem: ergo si paternitas dicitur uniformiter, pari ratione et filiatio. Si alia: ergo in persona Patris sunt duae paternitates, quod simpliciter absurdum est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nos et Christus (Notandum) dicimur filii Dei, nec omnino aequivoce, nec omnino univoce; non univoce, quia una est filiatio temporalis et gratuita, alia naturalis et aeterna; non aequivoce, quia mediante illa filiatione et per conformationem ad illam filii efficimur adoptivi. Sicut enim a Patre omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur240-10, sic a Filio omnis filiatio. — Similiter si quaeratur, utrum uniformiter dicatur Deus pater noster et Filii; dicendum, quod nec omnino uniformiter, nec omnino difformiter, quia pater dicitur p. 241 tur Filii paternitate aeternali et personali, pater vero noster ex tempore et essentialiter. Et sicut essentia non ponit in numerum cum persona, ut sint res duae; sic nec una paternitas cum alia, ut sint duae paternitates. Et sic patent rationes et obiectiones ad utramque partem. Non enim valet illa obiectio de homine picto et vero; nam homo pictus nihil habet de veritate hominis, filius autem adoptivus aliquid habet de veritate filii, quamvis non sit filius naturalis241-1.

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English Translation

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is inquiry concerning that distinction which the Master lays down: Secundum (according to) sometimes expresses a condition of nature238-1, sometimes a unity of person, sometimes a habit, sometimes a cause. For this distinction seems to be unmethodical and superfluous and defective. It is unmethodical, because these members seem to have no coherence. It seems superfluous, because by the same force by which it signifies a property239-1 of nature it signifies the unity and property of the person. The distinction also seems defective, because, just as it can signify a habit, so likewise it can signify the nine genera of accidents239-2: therefore it seems that to these members eight members ought to have been added. — Likewise it is asked where it is taken so diversely, since it does not seem to have so many senses.

I respond: It must be said that this distinction (Note), although it may seem crude, is nevertheless quite reasonable, and this if one attends to that upon which it is founded. For (Distinction) by the first division239-3 this preposition secundum can signify concomitance or cause. If it signifies cause, then it is a fourth member; if concomitance, then (Subdistinction) it can signify it239-4 in three ways: either according to inherence, or according to union, or according to adjacency or assistance. If according to inherence, then it signifies a property of nature; for a property inheres in that of which it is the property. If according to union, then it signifies a property of the person. If according to assistance or adjacency, then it states a habit. — But the fourth member, which is of the principal division, the Master does not subdivide. It can nevertheless be divided according to the four genera of causes. — For in all these ways this word secundum is wont to be taken239-5, as (Examples) can be shown by examples. For if it be said: Christ, as man, was passible; thus it signifies a condition of nature. If it be said: Christ, as man, created the stars239-6; thus it signifies unity of person. If it be said: Christ, as man, was clothed and shod and found as a man239-7; thus it signifies a habit. If it be said: Christ, as God, created the world, and as man preached the divine word; thus it signifies efficient cause. If it be said: Christ, as God, is the supposit of the divine nature, and as man is a rational animal; thus it signifies formal cause. If it be said: Christ, as God and man, is our reward; thus it signifies final cause. — But many fitting examples of this kind can be found. But concerning material cause according to the divine nature it does not happen that one finds [an example]239-8; according to the human, however, it does happen, as if it be said: Christ, as man, was conceived of the most pure blood of the Virgin239-9.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says, that we are called adopted sons, because, having been born sons of wrath, we are made through grace sons of God. For if this is true, then the blessed Angels and man in the state of innocence would not have been adopted sons: therefore neither would they have had a right in the inheritance239-10 of the kingdom; which is absurd.

I respond: It must be said that the Master speaks of adoption according to its full meaning; and thus he posits an estrangement which is according to act, which estrangement indeed is an alienation and a being-set-apart from God through fault; and in this way the account of sonship would not belong to the Angels239-11. Yet taking estrangement more broadly, whether as regards the fault which is present, or because it could have been present, it extends to all adopted sons. And in this way the Angels can be called sons239-12.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says, that Christ is the son of the Virgin naturally and through grace. For it seems that these two are not compossible. For if this is natural, then it is no longer gratuitous, and conversely.

I respond: It must be said that the grace of union is not repugnant to, nor incompossible with, the natural property, but rather causes it to be communicated. And the Master speaks here of the grace of union. — Or it can be said (Otherwise) that grace and nature can well be said of the same thing by comparison to diverse things; and so it is in the case at hand. For Christ, insofar as he is man, is the natural son of the Virgin; insofar as he is God, however, he is the son of the Virgin, not by nature nor by adoption, but by the grace of union239-13.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which Hilary says, that he, namely Christ, is son by origin, not by adoption; by truth, not by appellation, etc. For it seems that there is here a piling-up of words. For to be a son by origin and by birth is the same. — Likewise it seems that there is superfluity. For all sonship is either natural or gratuitous: therefore by origin or by adoption: hence the other members are superfluous. — Likewise, what is it for someone to be called a son by appellation? For either the appellation is true or false; if true: then either by adoption or by generation; if false: then it ought not to be placed among the aforesaid members. — Likewise, if on account240-1 of creation they are called sons, since then asses are created by God, they will be sons of God, which is absurd.

I respond: It must be said that in the aforesaid word (Differences) Hilary intimates to us four differences of sonship, the sufficiency of which can be had thus. For one is called the son of someone who is from him and is conformed to him; and this can be in two ways: either by natural emanation and in unity of essence, and thus is the (Note) only-begotten Son of the Father, whom Hilary says to be a son by origin, against Photinus; by truth, against Sabellius; by birth, against Arius. And this was expounded in the first book240-2. Or it can be from another in diversity of substance; and this can be in three ways according to the threefold mode of conformity. For either he is conformed as regards the account of the natural image, and thus is a son by creation; or as regards the account of the image and likeness, which is regarded in grace and gratuitous gifts, and thus is a son by adoption; or he is conformed in the nature of the image, but is at variance through the disorder of the will, like a sinful man, and thus is a son by appellation.

From these the differences of sonship are clear; the words of the aforesaid distinction are likewise clear, that they are not piled up, but are said very reasonably. The response to the objections is also clear. For not without cause are those three words used; and although origin and birth can be taken for the same thing, nevertheless one is not set down with the other in vain; for this is240-3 for the sake of beating down heresies.

To that which is objected, that every son is either a son by nature or by grace; it must be said that this is false, unless the name of nature and of grace be extended to that which is from the mere benevolence of God, and to that which someone has from his origin. And in this way sonship by creation can be said in one way to be by nature, in another way by grace; but it does not follow on this account that such a one is an adopted son, or a natural son.

To that which is asked concerning sonship by appellation, it must be said that one is called a son in this way who has conformity through the nature of the image240-4, but deformity through fault; and in this way, I say, that appellation has truth in one way, in another way not, because in one way he is a son, in another way an adversary. And therefore he is called a son by appellation alone, just as Abraham said to the damned rich man: Remember, son240-5, etc.

To that which is objected last, that if he is a father by creation, he ought to be called the father of beasts; it must be said that it does not follow: because not every creation makes someone be called a son, but that creation in which is conferred the mark of the divine image, by which man is configured to God and made fit for this, that he be an adopted son240-6.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of Ambrose in the text: By adoption we are sons, but he by the truth of nature. For since the made by truth and the said by likeness are not univocal but equivocal, like a painted man and a true man in [the term] man240-7; then sonship belongs to us and to Christ equivocally. And this very thing seems to be confirmed by that which is said in John, chapter twenty240-8: I ascend to my Father and your Father; Gregory there: « Mine in one way, and yours in another way ». But against this is the fact that Christ is called our brother; but he would not on this account be called brother, if we were sons equivocally: therefore, etc. — Likewise, when it is said: God is240-9 the Father of Christ and our Father, [it is] either by the same paternity or by another. If by the same: then if paternity is said uniformly, by parity of reasoning so also sonship. If by another: then in the person of the Father there are two paternities, which is simply absurd.

I respond: It must be said that we and Christ (Note) are called sons of God, neither altogether equivocally nor altogether univocally; not univocally, because one sonship is temporal and gratuitous, the other natural and eternal; not equivocally, because by the mediation of that sonship and through conformation to it we are made adopted sons. For just as from the Father all paternity in heaven and on earth is named240-10, so from the Son [comes] all sonship. — Likewise, if it be asked whether God is called our Father and the Son's uniformly; it must be said that [it is] neither altogether uniformly nor altogether differently, because he is called father of the Son by an eternal and personal paternity, but our father from time and essentially. And just as essence does not enter into number with person, so that there are two things; so neither does one paternity with another, so that there are two paternities. And thus the reasons and objections on either side are clear. For that objection concerning the painted and the true man is not valid; for a painted man has nothing of the truth of [being a] man, whereas an adopted son has something of the truth of [being a] son, although he is not a natural son241-1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra pag. 17, nota 3. et 7. — In fine arg. cod. bb addit alii personae quam personae Patris.
    Cf. above p. 17, note 3 and 7. — At the end of the argument codex bb adds to a person other than the person of the Father.
  2. Codd. M O voci proprietatem praemittunt conditionem sive.
    Codices M O prefix conditionem sive (a condition, or) to the word proprietatem.
  3. Quae secundum Aristot., de Praedicam., sunt: Quantitas, qualitas, relatio, actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, habitus. — Mox pro debuerunt cod. bb debeant.
    Which according to Aristotle, On the Categories, are: quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, position, habit. — Shortly after, for debuerunt codex bb reads debeant.
  4. Pro Nam prima divisione cod. Y Nam possumus dicere, quod.
    For Nam prima divisione codex Y reads Nam possumus dicere, quod.
  5. Cod. O hic interiicit hunc.
    Codex O here inserts hunc.
  6. Praepositivus, Sum. p. III. c. de Quatuor proposit., quae hic notandae sunt, ait, « quod hoc syncategorema secundum septem modis accipitur vel pluribus. Notat enim causam meritoriam, efficientem, formalem, vel quasi formalem, naturam, conditionem naturae, unitatem personae. Causam meritoriam, ut cum dicitur: Christus, secundum quod homo, redemit nos i. e. in humanitate fecit opera nostrae redemptionis meritoria » etc.
    Praepositivus, Summa, pt. III, the chapter On the Four Propositions which are to be noted here, says, « that this syncategorem secundum is taken in seven modes or more. For it denotes meritorious cause, efficient, formal, or quasi-formal, nature, condition of nature, unity of person. Meritorious cause, as when it is said: Christ, as man, redeemed us, i.e. in his humanity performed the meritorious works of our redemption », etc.
  7. De hoc exemplo cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XI. c. 3.
    On this example cf. below the text of the Master, d. XI, c. 3.
  8. Phil. 2, 7.
    Philippians 2:7.
  9. Cod. O supplet exemplum; Vat., omisso invenire, prosequitur sed tantum secundum humanam.
    Codex O supplies exemplum; the Vatican edition, omitting invenire, continues sed tantum secundum humanam.
  10. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. in corp.; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.
    On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. III, q. 6, m. 2, a. 2, in the body; Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Aegidius Romanus, here dub. on the text, 2.
  11. Cod. A hereditatem. Voci regni cod. U annectit caelestis.
    Codex A reads hereditatem. To the word regni codex U attaches caelestis.
  12. Edd. sic: et haec quodam modo non conveniret Angelis ratione filiationis. Paulo inferius pro sive quia potuit cod. U sive quae potuit. Post pauca pro adoptivos edd. adoptionis.
    The editions read thus: et haec quodam modo non conveniret Angelis ratione filiationis. A little below, for sive quia potuit codex U reads sive quae potuit. Shortly after, for adoptivos the editions read adoptionis.
  13. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et q. 2. ad 1. 2; Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 10. m. 6. a. 5; B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.
    Cf. above a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and q. 2, ad 1 and 2; Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. III, q. 10, m. 6, a. 5; Bl. Albert, here a. 12; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.
  14. Vide supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. et a. 3. q. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.
    See above d. 4, a. 2, q. 3, and a. 3, q. 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Aegidius Romanus, here dub. on the text, 5.
  15. Codd. I L Z aa per.
    Codices I L Z aa read per.
  16. Dist. 9. q. 2. et dub. 3. nec non d. 26. dub. 7. — Mox post substantiae cod. bb addit et conformitate rationis.
    Distinction 9, q. 2, and dub. 3, as well as d. 26, dub. 7. — Shortly after, following substantiae codex bb adds et conformitate rationis.
  17. Cod. U fit.
    Codex U reads fit.
  18. Complures codd. cum edd. qui habet per conformitatem naturam imaginis; nostram lectionem veriorem defendunt codd. A G P Q bb.
    Several codices together with the editions read qui habet per conformitatem naturam imaginis; codices A G P Q bb defend our reading as the truer one.
  19. Luc. 16, 23.
    Luke 16:23.
  20. Cfr. supra d. 4. dub. 2. seq.; B. Albert., hic a. 17; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 8-10.
    Cf. above d. 4, dub. 2 and following; Bl. Albert, here a. 17; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Aegidius Romanus, here dub. on the text, 8-10.
  21. Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1.
    According to Aristotle, On the Categories, c. 1.
  22. Vers. 17. — Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 25. n. 6. ait: Cum meum dicat et vestrum, cur non communiter dicit nostrum? Sed distincte loquens indicat, quia eundem Patrem et Deum dissimiliter habeat ipse quam nos. Ascendo ad Patrem meum, videlicet per naturam, et Patrem vestrum per gratiam etc.
    Verse 17. — Gregory, II Homilies on the Gospel, homily 25, n. 6, says: Since he says both "mine" and "yours," why does he not say "ours" in common? But speaking distinctly he indicates that he himself has the same Father and God otherwise than we do. "I ascend to my Father," namely by nature, "and your Father" by grace, etc.
  23. Codd. A T V et alii esse. In fine arg. post absurdum est cod. U subiicit dicere.
    Codices A T V and others read esse. At the end of the argument, after absurdum est, codex U subjoins dicere.
  24. Eph. 3, 15. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. seq. et d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius ante per conformationem edd. omittunt et.
    Ephesians 3:15. Cf. above a. 2, q. 2 and following, and d. 8, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, before per conformationem the editions omit et.
  25. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 10. m. 6. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 16.
    On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. III, q. 10, m. 6, a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 16. ---
← Dist. 10, Art. 2, Q. 3