Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 31
Articulus II. Qualiter bona matrimonii excusent coitum.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de excusatione actus coniugalis per bona matrimonii. Et cum contingat coire cum uxore causa concupiscentiae implendae, causa fornicationis vitandae et causa prolis procreandae; circa hoc secundum haec tria tria quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum coitus propter prolem possit esse sine omni culpa.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum coitus propter fornicationem vitandam possit esse sine omni peccato veniali.
Tertio, utrum coire cum uxore causa concupiscentiae satiandae sit semper peccatum mortale.
Quaestio I. Utrum coitus propter prolem possit esse sine omni culpa.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod possit esse sine omni culpa.
1. Augustinus dicit de Bono coniugali, et habetur in littera1: «Coniugalis concubitus generandae prolis gratia non habet culpam».
2. Item, ratione videtur: matrimonium est sanctum et bonum; quod patet, quia a Deo est institutum et confirmatum per praesentiam suam ad nuptias, secundo Ioannis2, et approbatum per responsionem suam, Matthaei decimo nono; sed re sancta potest homo sancte uti et sine peccato: ergo cum hoc sit maxime causa prolis, patet etc.
3. Item, omne quod Deus praecipit, potest fieri sine peccato; sed Deus praecepit prolem procreare, Genesis octavo3, post lapsum: ergo possibile est hoc facere sine peccato.
4. Item, nulla potentia est mala de se, ergo omni potentia bene possumus uti; sed potentia gep. 722nerandi est potentia nobis data: ergo possumus ea bene uti. Sed bene uti sive melius non est aliter quam ad id, ad quod est et secundum quod ad illud est; hoc autem est, cum cognoscit uxorem propter prolem: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Omnis delectatio immoderata est peccatum, quia, ubi est defectus modi, est malum culpae4; sed in coitu est delectatio immoderata, etiam quando coit quis causa prolis procreandae: ergo est ibi peccatum.
2. Item, omnis delectatio, in qua pervertitur rectus ordo, est peccatum; sed in coitu coniugali est delectatio, in qua anima absorbetur a carne, etiam cum coit propter hoc: ergo etc.
3. Item, omnis actus, in quo rationabiliter homo erubescit, est peccatum, vel foeditatem habet — ut purgare ventrem: attamen non ita rationabiliter de hoc erubescit quis, quia non debet homo erubescere de poena, sed de culpa — sed in coitu coniugali ratione vel amore prolis erubescit et nullo modo coram aliis faceret: ergo est peccatum.
4. Item, omnis actus, in quo regnat libido, est peccatum; sed in actu coniugali pro generanda prole regnat libido, quia dicit Augustinus5, quod «peccatum non transmittit ad posteros propagatio, sed libido»: ergo etc.
5. Item, omnis actus, qui est necessario ordinatus ad culpam, est peccatum; sed hoc est in coitu ratione prolis, quia contrahit peccatum proles: ergo in actu coniugali semper est peccatum.
6. Item, ubicumque est actus coniugalis, necesse est, praecedere motus in carne; sed primi motus sunt peccata, saltem venialia: ergo semper coitus propter prolem est peccatum veniale.
7. Item, si matrimonium excusat coitum propter prolis bonum, aut excusat a peccato, quod est, aut a peccato, quod non est. Non a peccato, quod non est nec fuit6! Si a peccato, quod est: ergo aliquid est ibi peccatum.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, pro quanto dicatur matrimonium excusare coitum, cum omnis ordinatio, quae cum uxore habetur, possit etiam haberi cum alia muliere, et ita sit libido et pruritus et carnalis actus in cognoscendo uxorem, sicut etiam aliam mulierem, vel pene.
Conclusio. Actus coniugii excusatur per Sacramentum, et quidem ab omni culpa, quando fit prolis generandae gratia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt dicentes, quod in actu generativae non est culpa nisi per excessum, sicut in actu nutritivae. — Alii erraverunt dicentes, semper esse peccatum et nullo modo excusari, immo propter peccatum matrimonium vitiari, non vitium excusari; malum enim iunctum bono ipsum vitiat, non e converso bonum malum excusat. — Et primi quidem non intellexerunt morbum, quomodo scilicet infecta est vis generativa. Secundi vero non intellexerunt, Sacramentum esse remedium et medicamentum, quod non vitiatur a morbo, sed econtra morbum sedat7. — Et ideo qui recte credunt, videntes morbum et remedium, dicunt, actum coniugii per Sacramentum excusari tanquam morbum per remedium.
Si quis autem velit rationem morbi et remedii intueri, potest patere sic. Primum quidem omnis actus, in quo regnat pruritus libidinis adeo, quod absorbetur ratio, et homo efficitur totus caro, est actus deordinatus et actus, in quo, quantum est de se, pervertitur regnum animae et ordinatio8, quae est in viribus animae; secundum quam ordinationem attenditur iustitia quaedam, quae non tantum est in ordinatione ad alterum, sed in ordinatione virium animae ad se. Sed hoc est in actu coniugali, sicut experimento patet, et Sancti dicunt, maxime Augustinus et Origenes, et in Glossa tangitur, primae ad Corinthios sexto9: Qui fornicatur in corpus suum peccat; Glossa: «Hic proprie servit anima corpori in tantum, ut ipso momento et experimento huius flagitii nihil cogitare homini liceat aut intendere, quia mentem captivam subdit ipsa submersio et absorbitio libidinis». — In huius autem deordinationis arbitrium plurimum facit erubescentia naturae, quae mendax esse non potest; erubescit autem motum illorum membrorum et actum tanto plus, quanto est melius ordinata. Et sic patet, quod actus ille de se est morbidus, quia sine tanta deordinatione exerceri non potest, sicut in eap. 723dem Glossa tangitur. — Ecce igitur, qualiter possumus videre morbum.
Remedium autem intueri sic possumus. Quidam enim est actus, qui dicit deordinationem mentis ad Deum, ut idololatrare et periurare; quidam est, qui dicit deordinationem creaturae ad creaturam, sive unius ad alterum, sive eiusdem ad se. Primus est malus et morbidus secundum se et nullo modo potest fieri bene, nec divino mandato nec aliter. Secundus vero, quia non habet essentialem deordinationem, potest per divinum imperium ordinari, utpote cum Deus praecipit occidere hominem, cum etiam praecipit rem alienam accipere, cum etiam inspirat se ipsum occidere, sicut Samson, in quem irruit Spiritus Domini, Iudicum decimo quarto10; per hunc modum ordinavit coitum Osee cum muliere, quae non erat sua uxor, scilicet per Dei mandatum. Sed quoniam actus iste coniugalis non omnibus debebat praecipi; providit divina dispositio illam deordinationem ordinare non per mandatum, sed per aliquod statutum, et per statutum, quod esset signum illius coniunctionis, quae erat ordinata ad concupiscentiae remedium, et ita per Sacramentum matrimonii, quod quia habet rationem medicinae, potius excusat, quam vitietur; sicut, cum Dominus praecepit Hebraeis, ut vasa Aegyptiorum asportarent11, asportatio non facit praeceptum malum, sed potius econtra praeceptum, quod est potentius et superius, fecit asportationem bonam et meritoriam, quae alias esset culpabilis et mala. — Sancti igitur et omnes Catholici dicunt, coitum per Sacramentum matrimonii excusari a culpa mortali, maxime quando gratia prolis fit.
Sed de modo excusandi est duplex opinio: quia quidam voluerunt dicere, quod excusatur a culpa mortali, sed non a veniali, quia mortale fit ibi veniale. Alii dixerunt, et hoc videtur sentire Augustinus12, quod cum Deus perfectum det remedium contra morbum, quod quando gratia prolis coitur, potest esse sine omni culpa; et hoc est magis consonum rationi et pietati fidei. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, si tamen haec intentio duret a principio usque in finem, ut non deflectatur ad aliud mens; quod tamen est valde difficile13.
Ad obiecta:
1. 2. 3. 4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est ibi immoderatio, deordinatio, erubescentia et libido; dicendum, quod haec quatuor possunt esse circa actum rationis, aut sensualitatis14. Si circa actum rationis, semper faciunt culpam, quia faciunt malum secundum se. Si autem sunt circa actum sensualitatis, existente ordinatione circa actum rationis; tunc ista cedunt in poenam; et sic est in proposito. Nam per virtutem Sacramenti ratio ordinatur, ut moderate velit et ordinate et honeste; nec de illo actu erubescit homo, quia vult filios procreare, nec improba voluntate appetit, sed casta. Sed nisi interveniret remedium matrimonii, tunc esset inordinatio non solum in sensualitate, sed etiam in ratione; et sic semper esset peccatum. Unde istis quatuor mediis ostendi potest, quod actus generativae est peccatum, nisi excusetur.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est causa peccati; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia actus ille secundum se non est causa nisi prolis, sed ratione primae transgressionis prolem generari non contingit sine culpa sua, non generantis, quia non propter culpam generantis, sed propter culpam primi parentis nascitur proles peccatrix.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de primis motibus, potest dici, quod antecedunt actum coniugalem nec semper sunt peccata, ut puta quando surgunt ex cogitatione ordinata, utpote si Abraham cogitaret cognoscere uxorem, ut acciperet prolem; et tunc, si caro moveretur, non peccaret15.
7. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur: a quo peccato excusat? dicendum, quod a peccato, non quod est, sed quod alias esset, nisi matrimonium interveniret. — Unde differenti modo est remedium Sacramentum matrimonii et alia Sacramenta. Hoc enim est in remedium, quia facit vitare peccatum, quod incurreretur; alia vero liberant a peccato, in quod iam quis est lapsus; pro tanto autem praestat remedium, quia actus de se inordinatus ordinatur per divinum statutum16.
I. Cum S. Bonav. duos errores sibi extreme oppositos reprobet, viam sibi sternit ad communem illius aetatis doctrinam stabiliendam. Secundus igitur error, qui usum matrimonii generaliter non esse sine peccato asseruit, a Manichaeis secundum pessima eorum principia pessime traditus est (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.); habuit tamen etiam inter Catholicos, alia principia adhibentes et sententiam mitigantes, suos defensores (cfr. Estius, IV. Sent. d. 31. § 6.). Primum autem errorem, qui actum nutritivae potentiae et generativae parem esse quoad corruptionem iudicat, eadem ac S. Bonav. ratione improbat S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. I. ad I; Suppl. q. 49. a. I. ad I.) scilicet «quia vis generativa, per quam originale traducitur, est infecta et corrupta; nutritiva autem, per quam non traducitur, est corrupta et non infecta» etc. Hanc formulam antiquis magistris commup. 724nem speciali quaestione confirmat S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 3; et quo sensu intelligatur, vide ibi in scholio. Idem docet S. Thom. S. I. II. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 23. a. 6. Haec Augustini doctrina fundamentum est assertionis iam tactae, quod actus generativae non possit fieri absque peccato, «nisi excusetur per bona coniugii» (Petr. Lombard., II. Sent. d. XXXI. c. 4, et hic c. 5.); quod disertis verbis docet etiam S. Thom. locis primo citt. — Haec antiqua doctrina praedictae erroneae Catholicorum quorundam opinioni ansam praebuit; unde Guliel. Antissiod. et Alex. Hal. in eadem confutanda multam operam conferunt. — Cum iisdem principiis cohaerere videtur etiam antiquorum Patrum et Scholasticorum de usu matrimonii doctrina paulo severior, quam ea est, quae nunc passim docetur, ut ad seq. quaestionem continuo dicitur.
De 1. quaestione praeter S. Thom.: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 35. m. 8. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 1. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 21. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1, et supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
II. Quoad 2. conclusionem quaestionis 2. observandum est, quod nostra aetate plerique moralistae a peccato etiam veniali excusant usum matrimonii, quando fit tantum ob periculum incontinentiae etiam in se ipso vitandum, ita ut praeter tres intentiones prorsus excusantes, quas concedit S. Bonav., ipsi adiiciant hanc quartam. Eandem sententiam etiam S. Alphonsus (Theolog. moralis, libr. VI. tr. 6. c. 1. n. 882, c. 2. n. 924) probabiliorem esse censet et argg. S. Thomae evertere nititur. Quaestio praecipue versatur de usu matrimonii tempore praegnationis, et secluso periculo abortus et officio debiti reddendi. — Attamen conclusio S. Bonaventurae usque ad saec. XVI. vel XVII, exceptis paucis doctoribus, in scholis communiter tenebatur, saltem ut probabilior et securior. Hanc tenent Magister (hic c. 5. seqq. et in seq. dist. c. 1.); et fere omnes eius commentatores, non excluso Estio (IV. d. 31. § 7. 8.), hanc sententiam verbis plus minusve explicitis approbant tanquam sententiam multorum Patrum, praesertim Augustini, Fulgentii, Hieronymi, Chrysostomi, Gregorii, Bedae etc.; quorum testimonia collegit Estius (loc. cit.). Porro ita docent Hug. a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. 11. c. 7. 9; Sum. Sent. tr. 7. c. 3; Guliel. Parisien., de Matrim. c. 3. seqq.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 149. m. 1; p. III. q. 35. m. 8. (sed in utroque loco non satis distincte); S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2, et Suppl. q. 49. a. 5; B. Albert. (de tempore praegnationis), hic a. 22, cfr. a. 21.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, et a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2, ubi etiam aliam opinionem cum suis argumentis affert, sed illam, quam communem appellat, praefert; Scot., supra d. 26. n. 20, sed non satis clare; Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica, et plurimi canonistae illius aetatis cum S. Raymundo de Pennafort. Hinc non est mirandum, quod plurimi alii ex schola S. Thomae et Scoti eandem doctrinam vel simpliciter, vel saltem ut magis probabilem profiteantur, ut S. Antoninus (Sum. p. III. tit. 1. c. 20.) et ex recentioribus Gotti et Scotista Henno. Fuerunt tamen ante S. Bonaventuram aliqui canonistae et theologi, qui favebant mitiori sententiae. Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. p. IV. tr. 9. c. 4. q. 2.) generatim dicit, uti matrimonio vitandae incontinentiae causa nullum peccatum esse; sed postea hanc restrictionem addit: «Si aliquis vir sanctus cognoscit ex caritate uxorem suam, et nullo modo placet ei delectatio, quae ibi est, immo odiosa sit ei; tunc ille concubitus est sine omni peccato; sed hoc raro contingit»; et ante dixerat, hoc esse cum peccato veniale, «si ex caritate vir sanctus cognoscit uxorem suam, et aliquantum placet ei delectatio, quae ibi est». Durand. autem (hic q. 4. n. 6.) opinionem illa aetate communem disertis verbis dubiam esse dicit. Etiam Capreolus (hic a. 3.) favet recentiori opinioni, sed cum quadam distinctione a Paludano accepta et, ut videtur, parum apta, quod scilicet non semper careat omni peccato, sed solummodo tunc, quando non possit per alia media vitari periculum incontinentiae meliori modo, et «ita quod voluptas in nullo movet, sed solum amore vitandae fornicationis». Pro mitiore sententia citatur etiam Caietanus cum fere omnibus recentioribus. — Utraque sententia libere potest defendi, omnesque debent approbare verba Catechismi Romani (de Matrim. n. 33): «Duo illa maxima docendi sunt fideles: primum quidem, non voluptatis aut libidinis causa matrimonio operam dandam esse, sed eo utendum esse intra illos fines, qui a Domino... praescripti sunt. Meminisse etiam convenit, quod Apostolus hortatur (I. Cor. 7, 29.): Qui habent uxores tanquam non habentes sint» etc. Et cum tot horrendis peccatis mortalibus sanctitas matrimonii passim profanetur, non facile quis negabit, in materia tam lubrica venialia saepe committi, cum contra alia praecepta quotidie etiam a bonis non raro venialiter peccetur. Ipsi perfecti Christiani non possunt ordinarie omnia peccata venialia vitare (Concil. Trident. Sess. VI. can. 23.); sed imperfecti continuo in multa incidunt venialia, ut cum non paucis antiquis docet S. Bonav. (supra d. 17. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.), inter alia dicens: «Strepitus vitiorum et peccatorum venialium semper insonant auribus cordis nostri».
III. In 3. quaestione opinionem 1. recte improbant S. Bonav. aliique communiter ut nimis duram, immo falsam; etiam conclusiones eiusdem sunt certae, et secunda confirmatur reprobatione prop. 9. ab Innocentio XI. damnatae: «Opus coniugii ob solam voluptatem exercitum omni penitus caret culpa ac defectu veniali»; ubi similia in prop. 8. de actu comedendi et bibendi dicuntur.
De 3. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; Suppl. q. 49. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 25. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.
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Article II. In what way the goods of marriage excuse intercourse.
Consequently, as regards the second article, inquiry is made concerning the excusing of the conjugal act through the goods of marriage. And since it may happen that one has intercourse with one's wife for the sake of fulfilling concupiscence, for the sake of avoiding fornication, and for the sake of procreating offspring; concerning this, according to these three, three [questions] are asked.
First it is asked, whether intercourse for the sake of offspring can be without all fault.
Second it is asked, whether intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication can be without all venial sin.
Third, whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin.
Question I. Whether intercourse for the sake of offspring can be without all fault.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that it can be without all fault.
1. Augustine says, in On the Good of Marriage, and it is contained in the text1: «Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generating offspring does not have fault».
2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: marriage is holy and good; which is evident, because it is instituted by God and confirmed by his presence at the wedding, in the second [chapter] of John2, and approved by his answer, in the nineteenth [chapter] of Matthew; but a holy thing a man can use in a holy manner and without sin: therefore since this is chiefly for the sake of offspring, it is evident, etc.
3. Likewise, everything that God commands can be done without sin; but God commanded to procreate offspring, in the eighth [chapter] of Genesis3, after the fall: therefore it is possible to do this without sin.
4. Likewise, no power is evil of itself, therefore we can use every power well; but the power of genep. 722rating is a power given to us: therefore we can use it well. But to use well, that is, better, is nothing other than [to use it] toward that for which it is and according as it is [ordered] to it; and this is [the case] when a man knows his wife for the sake of offspring: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Every immoderate pleasure is a sin, because, where there is a defect of measure, there is the evil of fault4; but in intercourse there is immoderate pleasure, even when one has intercourse for the sake of procreating offspring: therefore there is sin there.
2. Likewise, every pleasure in which right order is perverted is a sin; but in conjugal intercourse there is pleasure in which the soul is absorbed by the flesh, even when one has intercourse for the sake of this: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, every act at which a man reasonably blushes is a sin, or has foulness — as to purge the belly: yet a man does not so reasonably blush at this, because a man ought not to blush at the penalty, but at the fault — but in conjugal intercourse, by reason or love of offspring, one blushes and would by no means do it before others: therefore it is a sin.
4. Likewise, every act in which lust reigns is a sin; but in the conjugal act, for the generating of offspring, lust reigns, because Augustine says5 that «propagation does not transmit sin to posterity, but lust [does]»: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, every act that is necessarily ordered to fault is a sin; but this is [the case] in intercourse by reason of offspring, because the offspring contracts sin: therefore in the conjugal act there is always sin.
6. Likewise, wherever there is a conjugal act, it is necessary that movements in the flesh precede; but the first movements are sins, at least venial: therefore intercourse for the sake of offspring is always a venial sin.
7. Likewise, if marriage excuses intercourse for the sake of the good of offspring, either it excuses from a sin that is [real], or from a sin that is not. Not from a sin that is not, nor was6! If from a sin that is [real]: therefore there is some sin there.
Alongside this it is asked, in what measure marriage is said to excuse intercourse, since every ordering that is had with one's wife could also be had with another woman, and thus there would be lust and titillation and a carnal act in knowing one's wife, just as [with] another woman, or even [more].
Conclusion. The conjugal act is excused through the Sacrament, and indeed from all fault, when it is done for the sake of generating offspring.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this some have erred, saying that in the act of the generative [power] there is no fault except through excess, as in the act of the nutritive [power]. — Others have erred, saying that it is always a sin and can in no way be excused, but rather that on account of the sin the marriage is vitiated, not the vice excused; for evil joined to good vitiates it, and not conversely does good excuse the evil. — And the first indeed did not understand the disease, namely, in what way the generative power is infected. But the second did not understand that the Sacrament is a remedy and a medicine, which is not vitiated by the disease, but on the contrary calms the disease7. — And therefore those who rightly believe, seeing the disease and the remedy, say that the conjugal act is excused through the Sacrament as a disease [is healed] through a remedy.
But if anyone wishes to consider the account of the disease and the remedy, it can be made clear thus. First indeed, every act in which the itching of lust so reigns that reason is absorbed, and man is made wholly flesh, is a disordered act, and an act in which, so far as depends on itself, the reign of the soul and the ordering8 which is in the powers of the soul is perverted; according to which ordering a certain justice is regarded, which is not only in the ordering toward another, but in the ordering of the powers of the soul toward itself. But this is [the case] in the conjugal act, as is evident by experience, and the Saints say, especially Augustine and Origen, and it is touched upon in the Gloss, on the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter six9: He who fornicates sins against his own body; the Gloss: «Here the soul properly serves the body to such a degree that at the very moment and experience of this disgrace it is not permitted to a man to think or intend anything, because the submersion and absorption of lust itself subjects the mind as a captive». — And in the judgment of this disorder the blushing of nature contributes very much, [nature] which cannot be a liar; and it blushes at the movement of those members and at the act so much the more, the better ordered it is. And thus it is evident that that act is of itself diseased, because it cannot be exercised without such great disorder, as is touched upon in the samep. 723 Gloss. — Behold, therefore, in what way we can see the disease.
The remedy, however, we can consider thus. For there is a certain act which bespeaks a disorder of the mind toward God, as to commit idolatry and to perjure; there is a certain [act] which bespeaks a disorder of creature toward creature, whether of one toward another, or of the same toward itself. The first is evil and diseased in itself and can in no way be done well, neither by divine command nor otherwise. But the second, because it does not have an essential disorder, can be ordered by divine authority, as when God commands to kill a man, when also he commands to take another's property, when also he inspires [one] to kill himself, as Samson, upon whom the Spirit of the Lord rushed, in the fourteenth [chapter] of Judges10; in this manner he ordered the intercourse of Hosea with the woman who was not his wife, namely by God's command. But since this conjugal act ought not to be commanded to all, the divine disposition provided to order that disorder not by a command, but by a certain statute, and by a statute that would be a sign of that union which was ordained for the remedy of concupiscence, and thus through the Sacrament of marriage, which, because it has the character of a medicine, rather excuses than is vitiated; just as, when the Lord commanded the Hebrews to carry off the vessels of the Egyptians11, the carrying-off does not make the command evil, but rather, on the contrary, the command, which is more powerful and higher, made the carrying-off good and meritorious, which otherwise would be culpable and evil. — The Saints, therefore, and all Catholics say that intercourse is excused from mortal fault through the Sacrament of marriage, especially when it is done for the sake of offspring.
But concerning the manner of excusing there is a twofold opinion: for some wished to say that it is excused from mortal fault, but not from venial, because the mortal there becomes venial. Others said, and this Augustine seems to hold12, that since God gives a perfect remedy against the disease, [then] when intercourse is had for the sake of offspring, it can be without all fault; and this is more consonant with reason and with the piety of faith. — And the reasons for this are to be granted, provided however that this intention endure from beginning to end, so that the mind be not deflected toward something else; which however is very difficult13.
To the objections:
1. 2. 3. 4. To that, therefore, which is objected, that there is there immoderation, disorder, blushing, and lust; it must be said that these four can be about the act of reason, or of sensuality14. If about the act of reason, they always cause fault, because they cause evil in itself. But if they are about the act of sensuality, an ordering existing about the act of reason; then these pass into penalty; and so it is in the case at hand. For through the power of the Sacrament reason is ordered, so that it may will moderately and in an ordered and honorable way; nor does a man blush at that act, because he wishes to procreate children, nor does he seek [it] with a wicked will, but a chaste one. But unless the remedy of marriage intervened, then there would be disorder not only in sensuality, but also in reason; and so it would always be a sin. Hence by these four means it can be shown that the act of the generative [power] is a sin, unless it be excused.
5. To that which is objected, that it is the cause of sin; it must be said that it is false, because that act of itself is not the cause of anything but offspring, but by reason of the first transgression offspring cannot be generated without its own fault — not [the fault] of the one generating, because it is not on account of the fault of the one generating, but on account of the fault of the first parent that sinful offspring is born.
6. To that which is objected concerning the first movements, it can be said that they precede the conjugal act and are not always sins, as for instance when they arise from an ordered thought, as if Abraham should think of knowing his wife in order to obtain offspring; and then, if the flesh were moved, he would not sin15.
7. To that which is asked last: from what sin does it excuse? it must be said that [it excuses] from a sin, not one that is [real], but one that would otherwise be, unless marriage intervened. — Hence in a different manner the Sacrament of marriage is a remedy and [so are] the other Sacraments. For this one is unto a remedy, because it makes [one] avoid a sin that would be incurred; but the others free [one] from a sin into which one has already fallen; and it furnishes a remedy in this measure, because an act of itself disordered is ordered through a divine statute16.
I. Since St. Bonaventure reproves two errors extremely opposed to each other, he prepares for himself the way to establish the common doctrine of that age. The second error, therefore, which asserted that the use of marriage is generally not without sin, was handed down by the Manichees, according to their most wicked principles, most wickedly (cf. above a. 1. q. 1.); yet it had, even among Catholics who employed other principles and mitigated the opinion, its defenders (cf. Estius, IV. Sent. d. 31. § 6.). But the first error, which judges the act of the nutritive power and [that] of the generative to be equal as regards corruption, St. Thomas reproves by the same reasoning as St. Bonaventure (here q. 1. a. 1. ad 1; Suppl. q. 49. a. 1. ad 1.), namely «because the generative power, through which original [sin] is transmitted, is infected and corrupt; but the nutritive, through which it is not transmitted, is corrupt and not infected» etc. This formula, common to the ancient masters, St. Bonaventure confirmsp. 724 by a special question, II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 3; and in what sense it is to be understood, see there in the scholion. The same is taught by St. Thomas, Summa I. II. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 23. a. 6. This doctrine of Augustine is the foundation of the assertion already touched upon, that the act of the generative [power] cannot be done without sin, «unless it be excused through the goods of marriage» (Peter Lombard, II. Sent. d. XXXI. c. 4, and here c. 5.); which St. Thomas also teaches in express words (in the places first cited). — This ancient doctrine gave occasion to the opinion of certain of the aforesaid erring Catholics; whence William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales expend much labor in refuting it. — With the same principles there seems to cohere also the doctrine of the ancient Fathers and Scholastics concerning the use of marriage, somewhat more severe than that which is now commonly taught, as will be said continuously at the following question.
On the first question, besides St. Thomas: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 35. m. 8. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 1. seqq. — B. Albert, here a. 21. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 1, and above d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. unica.
II. As regards the second conclusion of the second question, it must be observed that in our age most moralists excuse the use of marriage even from venial sin, when it is done only on account of the danger of incontinence to be avoided even in oneself, so that, besides the three intentions entirely excusing which St. Bonaventure grants, they themselves add this fourth. The same opinion St. Alphonsus also (Moral Theology, book VI. tr. 6. c. 1. n. 882, c. 2. n. 924) judges to be more probable, and strives to overthrow the arguments of St. Thomas. The question is chiefly concerned with the use of marriage in the time of pregnancy, the danger of abortion being set aside and [also] the duty of rendering the debt. — Nevertheless the conclusion of St. Bonaventure, until the sixteenth or seventeenth century, with a few doctors excepted, was commonly held in the schools, at least as more probable and safer. This the Master holds (here c. 5. seqq. and in the following distinction c. 1.); and nearly all his commentators, Estius not excepted (IV. d. 31. § 7. 8.), approve this opinion in words more or less explicit as the opinion of many Fathers, especially Augustine, Fulgentius, Jerome, Chrysostom, Gregory, Bede, etc.; whose testimonies Estius collected (loc. cit.). Furthermore, thus teach Hugh of St. Victor, II. On the Sacraments p. 11. c. 7. 9; the Summa Sententiarum tr. 7. c. 3; William of Paris, On Marriage c. 3. seqq.; Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 149. m. 1; p. III. q. 35. m. 8. (but in both places not distinctly enough); St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2, and Suppl. q. 49. a. 5; B. Albert (on the time of pregnancy), here a. 22, cf. a. 21.; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, and a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 2, where he also brings forward another opinion with its arguments, but prefers the one which he calls common; Scotus, above d. 26. n. 20, but not clearly enough; Denis the Carthusian, here q. unica, and very many canonists of that age with St. Raymond of Peñafort. Hence it is not surprising that very many others of the school of St. Thomas and Scotus profess the same doctrine either simply, or at least as more probable, as St. Antoninus (Sum. p. III. tit. 1. c. 20.) and among more recent [writers] Gotti and the Scotist Henno. There were, however, before St. Bonaventure some canonists and theologians who favored the milder opinion. William of Auxerre (Sum. p. IV. tr. 9. c. 4. q. 2.) says generally that to use marriage for the sake of avoiding incontinence is no sin; but afterward he adds this restriction: «If some holy man knows his wife out of charity, and the pleasure which is there in no way pleases him, but rather is odious to him; then that intercourse is without all sin; but this rarely happens»; and he had said before that this is [attended] with venial sin, «if out of charity a holy man knows his wife, and the pleasure which is there pleases him somewhat». But Durandus (here q. 4. n. 6.) says in express words that the opinion common in that age is doubtful. Capreolus also (here a. 3.) favors the more recent opinion, but with a certain distinction taken from Paludanus and, as it seems, not very apt, namely that it is not always free from all sin, but only then, when the danger of incontinence cannot be avoided by other means in a better way, and «so that pleasure moves in nothing, but only the love of avoiding fornication». For the milder opinion Cajetan too is cited, with nearly all the more recent [writers]. — Either opinion can be freely defended, and all ought to approve the words of the Roman Catechism (on Marriage n. 33): «Two things, those greatest, are to be taught to the faithful: first indeed, that pains are not to be spent on marriage for the sake of pleasure or lust, but it is to be used within those limits which have been prescribed by the Lord... It is also fitting to remember that the Apostle exhorts (I Cor. 7, 29.): Let those who have wives be as though not having [them]» etc. And since, with so many horrible mortal sins, the holiness of marriage is commonly profaned, no one will easily deny that in a matter so slippery venial [sins] are often committed, since against other precepts too there is daily, not rarely, venial sin even by the good. The perfect Christians themselves cannot ordinarily avoid all venial sins (Council of Trent, Sess. VI. can. 23.); but the imperfect continually fall into many venial [sins], as St. Bonaventure teaches with not a few of the ancients (above d. 17. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.), saying among other things: «The din of vices and of venial sins always sounds in the ears of our heart».
III. In the third question the first opinion is rightly reproved by St. Bonaventure and others commonly as too harsh, indeed false; also the conclusions of the same are certain, and the second is confirmed by the reprobation of proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI: «The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without any fault or venial defect»; where similar things are said in proposition 8 concerning the act of eating and drinking.
On the third question: St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3; Suppl. q. 49. a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 25. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. unica.
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- 1Hic c. 5.Here, ch. 5.
- 2Vers. 2. — Seq. locus est Matth. 19, 4. seqq. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 5. — In fine arg. post prolis codd. E R T bb addunt procreandae.Verse 2. — The following passage is Matthew 19, 4. and following. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. XXVI. c. 5. — At the end of the argument, after offspring codices E R T bb add to be procreated.
- 3Vers. 17. Cfr. ibid. 9, 1.Verse 17. Cf. the same [book], 9, 1.
- 4August., de Natura boni etc. c. 4. ait, quod malum «nihil aliud est quam corruptio vel modi, vel speciei, vel ordinis naturalis».Augustine, On the Nature of the Good etc. c. 4. says that evil «is nothing other than the corruption either of measure, or of form, or of natural order».
- 5Potius Fulgentius, de Fide ad Petrum (inter opera August.), c. 2. n. 16, ubi textus originalis in parvulos pro in posteros. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. — In maiori ex codd. I L Y substituimus actus pro coitus.Rather Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter (among the works of Augustine), c. 2. n. 16, where the original text has unto little ones for unto posterity. Cf. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. — In the major premise, on the authority of codices I L Y, we have substituted act for intercourse.
- 6Pro nec fuit cod. K (I a secunda manu) hoc planum est. Inferius pro et ita sit libido multi codd. et edd. et ita fit libido.For nor was codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] this is plain. Below, for and so there would be lust many codices and editions [read] and so there comes to be lust.
- 7Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 2-4. — Cod. F sanat, codd. R T fugat.Cf. above a. 1. q. 1. ad 2-4. — Codex F [reads] heals, codices R T puts to flight.
- 8Edd. inordinatio. Pro regnum codd. aa bb regimen.The editions [read] disorder. For reign codices aa bb [read] rule.
- 9Vers. 18. — Glossa, quam exhibet Petr. Lombard. in hunc loc. (in Lyrano cfr. Glossa interlinearis et ordinaria), sumta est ex August., Serm. 162. (alias Fragment. 3.) de verbis Apostoli I. Cor. 6, 18. n. 2. — Cfr. Origen., Homil. 6. in Num. n. 3. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXII. c. 3. in fine. — Inferius pro arbitrium (i. e. testimonium, secundum Forcellini Lexicon) edd. argumentum.Verse 18. — The Gloss, which Peter Lombard sets forth on this passage (in Lyra cf. the interlinear and ordinary Gloss), is taken from Augustine, Serm. 162. (otherwise Fragment 3.) on the words of the Apostle, I Cor. 6, 18. n. 2. — Cf. Origen, Homily 6. on Numbers n. 3. See below the text of the Master, d. XXXII. c. 3. at the end. — Below, for judgment (i. e. testimony, according to Forcellini's Lexicon) the editions [read] argument.
- 10Vers. 6. et 19: Irruit itaque in eum Spiritus Domini. Codd. allegant c. 16, in quo de morte Samsonis. — Osee 1, 2.Verses 6. and 19: And the Spirit of the Lord rushed upon him. The codices allege c. 16, in which [it treats] of the death of Samson. — Hosea 1, 2.
- 11Exod. 3, 21. seq.; 11, 2. seq. et 12, 35. seq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4. — Pro vitietur edd. vitiet. Cfr. infra dub. 5.Exodus 3, 21. and following; 11, 2. and following, and 12, 35. and following. Cf. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4. — For is vitiated the editions [read] vitiates. Cf. below dub. 5.
- 12Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seqq.See here the text of the Master, c. 5. and following.
- 13Cfr. August., de Bono coniugali, c. 13. n. 15.Cf. Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, c. 13. n. 15.
- 14Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. per totam.Cf. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. throughout.
- 15Vide II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 4.See II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 4.
- 16Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 2. et q. 3. ad 4. pro parte negativa.Cf. above d. 26. a. 2. q. 2. and q. 3. ad 4. on the negative side. ---