Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 32
Quaestio II. Utrum tempore dierum solemnium possit licite peti et solvi debitum.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum tempore dierum solemnium debitum possit peti licite et solvi. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Primae ad Corinthios septimo1: Nolite fraudare invicem nisi ex consensu ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi: ergo non licet abstinere etiam propter orationem, nisi utroque consentiente: ergo si non habet necesse consentire, alter potest petere, et alter debet reddere.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia concubitus coniugalis ratione debiti solvendi nullam habet de se culpam2: ergo in die solemni reddere non est peccatum.
3. Item, coniugium constitutum est in remedium concupiscentiae, ut fornicatio vitetur3; sed possibile est, quod homo infirmus magis tentetur de opere carnis in die solemni: ergo tunc licet adhibere remedium.
4. Item, si alter coniugum ex sola libidine explenda peteret debitum, ille cui4 petitur, deberet solvere, quia reddit ei quod suum est: ergo videtur multo fortius, si tempore sacro petat causa fornicationis vitandae.
Contra: 1. Quod tali tempore nec debeat peti nec reddi, ostenditur auctoritate Augustini, quae habetur in littera5: «Christiano cum uxore sua licet aliquando convenire, aliquando non propter dies processionis et ieiuniorum» etc.
2. Item, hoc videtur exemplo Gregorii in primo Dialogorum6, quod mulier, quae nocte cognovit virum, cum in die veniret ad processionem, a diabolo est accepta; sed hoc non esset, nisi grave peccatum esset: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione, scilicet quod nec sit petendum nec reddendum: quia potest esse dies solemnis, ut Pascha vel Natalis, in quo uterque tenetur communicare; sed constitutio Ecclesiae est, ut non accedat aliquis ad communionem, quando cognoscit uxorem7: ergo cum non possint simul stare, et tenetur ad faciendum unum: ergo non ad faciendum alterum.
4. Item, hoc videtur per rationem virtutis, quae considerat non solum actum, sed etiam debitas circumstantias8; sed debita circumstantia est in discernendo diem sacrum a non sacro: ergo etc.
5. Item, hoc videtur per simile: quia non licet in omni loco nec petere nec reddere debitum, utpote in ecclesia: ergo similiter videtur, quod nec in omni tempore.
6. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia maior est delectatio in coitu quam in cibo: ergo si ecclesiastica institutio quantum ad abstinentiam cibi est necessario observanda, multo fortius quantum ad coitum.
Conclusio.
Diebus solemnibus petere debitum culpa est saltem venialis, non autem reddere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister9, «debitum semper est poscenti solvendum, non tamen semper licet petere». Cuius ratio est, quia reddere est necessitatis, sed petere est voluntatis; et in sacris diebus inordinatae voluptatis est petere, quod patet sic. Coniugium enim ratione sui actus est remedium, sed non omnino curans, sed excusans; unde in actu coniugali est opus carnis, quod trahit animam deorsum et ad terrena sapiendum et etiam ad delectationem sentiendum. Quoniam igitur aliqui sunt dies, in quibus debet anima sanctificari et assurgere ad divina, utpote solemnitates praeclarae; sunt etiam, in quibus debet anima affligi, utpote ieiuniorum et processionum: ideo conveniens est in talibus temporibus ab illo actu cessare; et ideo sancti Patres instituerunt, non tamen instituerunt tanquam praeceptum, propter carnis lubricum, quod in multis est magnum. Et quia p. 739non tanquam praeceptum instituerunt nec ius petendi debitum abstulerunt; ideo, cum petitur, manet necessitas ad reddendum.
Ideo dicendum, quod reddi potest sine omni culpa10 in illis diebus, dum tamen reddat cum displicentia et dolore; peti autem non potest sine culpa; et si aspectus sit ad delectationem, gravis est culpa, si autem ad lubricum carnis et suam infirmitatem, cuius est conscius, vel conscientia vehementer timet, et propter hoc petit; veniale potest esse peccatum; attamen vix contingit, quod in praecipuis diebus non sit grave peccatum. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quod debet reddi, quia non possunt fraudare nisi ex consensu. Unde tempus orationis non sufficit ad abstinendum, nisi adsit etiam mutuus consensus, sicut innuit Apostolus11.
1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Christiano non licet convenire; dicendum, quod non dicit hoc propter hoc, quod illud sit peccatum mortale, et eius oppositum sit in praeceptum; sed quia quandam inhonestatem habet. Et hoc patet in eadem auctoritate12, quia dicit, quod in talibus diebus debent a licitis temperare; et hoc dico, nisi contemptus solemnitatis interveniat, sicut fuit in illa muliere, de qua loquitur Gregorius, quae ivit ad processionem.
3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non debet reddi propter communionem; dicendum, quod cum reddens cum dolore et invitus reddat, non arctatur nec ab ingressu ecclesiae nec a communione; tamen communio posset de consilio sacerdotis differri.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi excessus; dicendum, quod non est excessus ex parte reddentis, immo necessitas, sed ex parte petentis13; si tamen propter periculum faciat, non est excessus mortalis, sed venialis.
5. Ad aliud dicendum, quod non est simile de loco, quia in loco est consecratio Sacramenti et deputatio ad opera divina solum; ideo temeratur locus sacer, est enim mensa14 propria; sed tempus non sic omnino deputatur.
6. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod non est tantum periculum nec lubricum in gustu, sicut in tactu; et ideo institutum est de ieiunio sub praecepto, sed de cessatione ab amplexu est consilium, maxime coniugatis, qui invicem cohabitant.
Hoc sine praeiudicio sit dictum, pro eo quod Sancti videntur talem coitum aggravare, sicut auctoritates Hieronymi in littera15 videntur sentire. Sed intelligendum est, quod Sancti istud non prohibuerunt, maxime cum Apostolus dicat, quod propter orationem non debent invicem fraudare nisi ex consensu; et ideo concedendum est, istud magis esse congruitatis et honestatis quam necessitatis, nisi conscientia obliget, qua credat, illud esse prohibitum et mortale peccatum; vel nisi interveniat sacrae diei contemptus, de quo valde potest16 timere qui tunc debitum non erubescit petere.
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Question II. Whether during solemn days the debt may licitly be sought and paid.
Secondly it is asked, whether during solemn days the debt may licitly be sought and paid. And that it may, it seems.
1. In the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter seven1: Do not defraud one another, except by consent for a time, that you may have leisure for prayer: therefore it is not licit to abstain even for the sake of prayer, unless with both consenting: therefore if [one] has no need to consent, the other can seek, and the other must render.
2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because conjugal intercourse, by reason of rendering the debt, has of itself no fault2: therefore on a solemn day to render is not a sin.
3. Likewise, marriage is established as a remedy for concupiscence, that fornication may be avoided3; but it is possible that a weak man be more tempted concerning the work of the flesh on a solemn day: therefore then it is licit to apply the remedy.
4. Likewise, if one of the spouses were to seek the debt out of mere lust to be satisfied, the one from whom4 it is sought would be bound to pay, because he renders to him what is his own: therefore it seems much more strongly [licit] if in sacred time he seek [it] for the sake of avoiding fornication.
On the contrary: 1. That at such a time it ought neither to be sought nor rendered, is shown by the authority of Augustine, which is contained in the text5: «To a Christian it is licit sometimes to come together with his wife, sometimes not, on account of the days of procession and of fastings» etc.
2. Likewise, this is seen by the example of Gregory in the first [book] of the Dialogues6, that a woman who by night had known her husband, when by day she came to a procession, was seized by the devil; but this would not be, unless it were a grave sin: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this is seen by reason, namely that it ought neither to be sought nor rendered: because there can be a solemn day, such as Easter or Christmas, on which both are bound to communicate; but it is a constitution of the Church that no one should approach communion when he has known his wife7: therefore since they cannot stand together, and [each] is bound to do the one: therefore not to do the other.
4. Likewise, this is seen through the account of virtue, which considers not only the act, but also the due circumstances8; but a due circumstance is in discerning a sacred day from a non-sacred one: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, this is seen through a likeness: because it is not licit in every place to seek or render the debt, as in a church: therefore similarly it seems that [it is] not [licit] at every time either.
6. Likewise, this is seen by reason: because the delight in intercourse is greater than in food: therefore if the ecclesiastical institution as regards abstinence from food is to be necessarily observed, much more strongly [is it to be observed] as regards intercourse.
Conclusion.
On solemn days to seek the debt is a fault at least venial, but not [so] to render it.
I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says9, «the debt is always to be paid to the one requesting, yet it is not always licit to seek [it]». The reason of this is that to render is [a matter] of necessity, but to seek is [a matter] of will; and on sacred days to seek is [a matter] of disordered pleasure, which is evident thus. For marriage, by reason of its act, is a remedy, yet not altogether healing, but excusing; hence in the conjugal act there is a work of the flesh, which drags the soul downward and toward tasting earthly things and also toward feeling pleasure. Since, therefore, there are some days on which the soul ought to be sanctified and to rise up to divine things, such as the illustrious solemnities; there are also [days] on which the soul ought to be afflicted, such as [those] of fastings and processions: therefore it is fitting at such times to cease from that act; and therefore the holy Fathers instituted [this], yet they did not institute [it] as a precept, on account of the slipperiness of the flesh, which in many is great. And because p. 739they did not institute [it] as a precept nor take away the right of seeking the debt; therefore, when it is sought, the necessity of rendering remains.
Therefore it must be said that it can be rendered without all fault10 on those days, provided however that one render with displeasure and grief; but it cannot be sought without fault; and if the gaze be toward pleasure, the fault is grave, but if toward the slipperiness of the flesh and his own weakness, of which he is conscious, or [if] his conscience vehemently fears, and on account of this he seeks [it]; the sin can be venial; yet it scarcely happens that on the chief days it is not a grave sin. — The reasons are therefore to be granted, that it ought to be rendered, because they cannot defraud except by consent. Hence the time of prayer does not suffice for abstaining, unless there be present also mutual consent, as the Apostle intimates11.
1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected, that to a Christian it is not licit to come together; it must be said that he does not say this on account of this, that it be a mortal sin, and its opposite be [enjoined] in a precept; but because it has a certain unseemliness. And this is evident in the same authority12, because it says that on such days they ought to abstain from licit things; and this I say, unless contempt of the solemnity intervene, as was [the case] in that woman of whom Gregory speaks, who went to the procession.
3. To that indeed which is objected, that it ought not to be rendered on account of communion; it must be said that since the one rendering renders with grief and unwillingly, he is not constrained either from entering the church or from communion; yet communion could, by the counsel of a priest, be deferred.
4. To that which is objected, that there is there an excess; it must be said that there is no excess on the part of the one rendering, but rather necessity, but [there is] on the part of the one seeking13; if however he do it on account of danger, it is not a mortal excess, but a venial one.
5. To the other it must be said that it is not alike concerning place, because in a place there is the consecration of the Sacrament and the deputation to divine works alone; therefore the sacred place is profaned, for it is a proper table14; but time is not so wholly deputed.
6. To the last it must be said that there is not so much danger nor slipperiness in taste as in touch; and therefore [something] was instituted concerning fasting under precept, but concerning cessation from embrace there is [only] counsel, especially for the married, who dwell together with one another.
Let this be said without prejudice, for the reason that the Saints seem to aggravate such intercourse, as the authorities of Jerome in the text15 seem to hold. But it must be understood that the Saints did not prohibit this, especially since the Apostle says that on account of prayer they ought not to defraud one another except by consent; and therefore it must be granted that this is rather [a matter] of fittingness and honorableness than of necessity, unless conscience oblige, whereby one believe it to be prohibited and a mortal sin; or unless contempt of the sacred day intervene, of which he can greatly16 fear who then is not ashamed to seek the debt.
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- 1Vers. 5, ubi Vulgata post nisi addit forte.Verse 5, where the Vulgate after nisi [except] adds forte [perhaps].
- 2Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.See above, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.
- 3Cfr. I. Cor. 7, 2. — Edd. institutum pro constitutum.Cf. 1 Cor. 7, 2. — The editions [read] institutum [instituted] for constitutum [established].
- 4Edd. ille a quo.The editions [read] ille a quo [he from whom].
- 5Hic c. 3.Here, ch. 3 [i.e. in the text of the Master].
- 6Cap. 10.Chapter 10.
- 7Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.See here the text of the Master, ch. 3.
- 8Cfr. supra pag. 400, nota 1. et pag. 461, nota 6.Cf. above, p. 400, note 1, and p. 461, note 6.
- 9Hic c. 3.Here, ch. 3.
- 10Codd. R T sine omni culpa.Codices R T [read] sine omni culpa [without all fault].
- 11Hic in fundam. 1. allegatus. — Superius verbo fraudare Vat. praemittit se.Here the first fundamentum [i.e. argument 1] is cited. — Above, at the word fraudare [to defraud], the Vatican [edition] prefixes se.
- 12Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3: Quia etiam a licitis abstinendum etc. — In fine solut. pro quae ivit codd. E W quando ivit.Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 3: Because [one ought] to abstain even from licit things etc. — At the end of the solution, for quae ivit [who went] codices E W [read] quando ivit [when she went].
- 13Vat. legit: reddentis, nec etiam ex parte petentis, cum exigit necessitas.The Vatican [edition] reads: of the one rendering, nor even on the part of the one seeking, when necessity demands [it].
- 14Codd. R S mensura. Locutio est obscura.Codices R S [read] mensura [measure]. The expression is obscure.
- 15Hic c. 3. — Superius pro est consilium multi codd. institutum, quod refertur ad institutum est.Here, ch. 3. — Above, for est consilium [there is counsel] many codices [read] institutum, which refers back to institutum est [was instituted].
- 16Codd. N aa debet. — Cfr. Glossa in C. Sciatis fratres (1.), q. 4. — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.Codices N aa [read] debet [ought]. — Cf. the Gloss on the canon Sciatis fratres (1.), q. 4. — See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---