Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially ¹–¹² across the apparatus block that falls on the printed page bearing DUB. I–V (848).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de illo verbo Augustini: Ad eorum damnationem, quos iuste praedestinavit ad poenam. Videtur enim improprie loqui, quia supra quadragesima distinctione dicitur, quod praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribus. Item, Damascenus: «Non ad puniendum plasmavit nos Deus»: ergo male dicit. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum Deus sit summe iustus, sicut summe misericors: quare magis dicitur proprium Dei misereri, quam condemnare sive punire.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Damascenus distinguit voluntatem Dei in antecedentem et consequentem. Potest igitur praeparatio esse quantum ad utramque; et sic est praeparatio bonorum, et hoc modo est praeparatio simpliciter et praedestinatio proprie dicta. Alio modo praeparatio accipitur large, secundum quamcumque voluntatem; et sic est malorum et est praedestinatio large. Magister autem et Damascenus supra acceperunt proprie, sed Augustinus accipit communiter; et sic patet contrarii solutio.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de opere misericordiae, dicendum, quod magis est proprium Dei misereri, quia ad opus misericordiae non requiritur nisi Dei benignitas; sed ad hoc, quod severitatem iustitiae faciat, praesupponitur nostra iniquitas; et ideo illud magis appropriatur ipsi Deo quam hoc.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod mala fiunt praeter Dei voluntatem, sed non praeter permissionem. Videtur enim male loqui, quia cum permissio sit signum voluntatis divinae, si fiunt praeter voluntatem, ergo etiam praeter permissionem¹. Item, quaeritur, quae differentia est inter fieri praeter voluntatem et contra; et videtur quod nulla, quia Matthaei duodecimo²: Qui non est mecum, contra me est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod fieri praeter voluntatem hoc est, quia voluntas Dei nec est in hoc fieri, nec in eius oppositum; et ita praeter voluntatem fit quod nec fit secundum voluntatem nec contra, et inter haec medium est. Dominus autem in Matthaeo intelligit de praeceptis, quae qui negligit inimicus Dei efficitur. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod permissio est signum voluntatis beneplaciti; dicendum, quod non est signum, quod Deus velit illud quod permittitur, sed quod velit illud quod ex eo elicitur. Et sic patet illud³.

DUB. III.

Item, quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sed non praeter eius permissionem, quae ipse non est. Secundum hoc videtur, quod permissio non sit Deus. Contra: Deus est sua actio: ergo Deus est sua permissio, cum permissio sit actio Dei. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum ratione connotati; tunc obiicitur, quod voluntas Dei similiter aliquid connotat circa volitum.

Respondeo: Dici potest, quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum, qui dicunt, nomina sex generum non praedicare aliquid de Deo vel in Deo, sed a Deo. Sed haec opinio supra⁴ improbata est. — Et ideo potest dici, quod Magister loquitur de permissione ratione sui connotati, quod importat ratione sui nominis. Et si tu obiicias de voluntate, quod connotat; dicendum, quod verum⁵ est ex adiuncto, sed non est ita de principali significatione nominis.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Neque ideo praecepit omnibus bona pro eo, quod vellet ab omnibus bona, quae praecepit fieri. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia praeceptum Dei est signum voluntatis Dei, sicut praeceptum nostrum est signum voluntatis nostrae; sed rectus homo nunquam praecipit aliquid alicui, nisi quod vult fieri⁶: ergo multo fortius nec ipse Deus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus et Magister sequens Augustinum, quando de voluntate beneplaciti loquuntur, semper accipiunt pro voluntate, qua Deus absolute vult aliquid evenire; et de hac non est dubium illud quod dicit. Sed ulterius magistri secundum Damascenum distinguunt voluntatem antecedentem⁷ sive quantum in se est, et huius signum est praeceptum; et de hac non loquitur Augustinus nec Magister.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod praecepit et in nova et in veteri Lege, quae ab eis quibus praecepit, fieri noluit. Videtur enim male dicere, quia praeceptum est signum divinae voluntatis: ergo si praecipiebat quod nolebat, videtur quod illos decipiebat, quibus praecipiebat. Item, videtur falsum dicere, quod noluit immolationem Isaac, quia Abraham volebat⁸: ergo voluntatem suam divinae non conformabat: ergo non merebatur, ut videtur. Item, quare Abraham paravit se ad obediendum, non autem curatus in Evangelio⁹?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam praecepit¹⁰ Dominus ad faciendum, ut praecepta moralia, quaedam ad probandum, id est probatum ostendendum, quaedam ad erudiendum; et horum duorum exempla tanguntur in littera¹¹. In praecepto igitur Abrahae significatur, non quod Deus velit immolationem, sed quod vult Abraham velle; et ideo, cum voluit, se sibi¹² conformavit. In praecepto vero, quod fecit curato, significavit, se velle contemptum laudis; et ideo Abraham laudandus est in voluntate obedientiae, et curatus in hoc, quod non tacuit.

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DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: Unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment. For this seems to speak improperly, since above at the fortieth distinction it is said that predestination is concerning saving goods. Likewise, Damascene: «Not for punishing did God fashion us»: therefore he speaks ill. — Alongside this it is asked, since God is most just, just as he is most merciful: why is it rather said to be proper to God to be merciful, than to condemn or to punish.

I respond: It must be said that Damascene distinguishes the will of God into antecedent and consequent. Therefore the preparation can be as to either; and so there is a preparation of goods, and in this mode there is preparation properly and predestination strictly so called. In another mode preparation is taken broadly, according to any will whatever; and so there is [a preparation] of evils, and there is predestination broadly. The Master, however, and Damascene above took it properly, but Augustine takes it commonly; and so the solution of the contrary [argument] is plain.

To that which is asked concerning the work of mercy, it must be said that it is rather proper to God to be merciful, because the work of mercy requires nothing but God's kindness; but for this — that he should exercise the severity of justice — our iniquity is presupposed; and therefore the former is more appropriated to God himself than the latter.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that evils come about beside the will of God, but not beside his permission. For this seems ill said, because, since permission is a sign of the divine will, if they come about beside the will, then also beside the permission¹. Likewise, it is asked what the difference is between coming about beside the will and against it; and it seems there is none, because in Matthew chapter twelve²: He who is not with me is against me.

I respond: It must be said that to come about beside the will is this: that the will of God is neither in this coming about, nor in its opposite; and so it comes about beside the will, since it comes about neither according to the will nor against, and there is a middle between these. The Lord, however, in Matthew, understands [it] concerning the precepts, which whoever neglects becomes an enemy of God. — As for what is objected, that permission is a sign of the will of good pleasure: it must be said that it is not a sign that God wills that which is permitted, but that he wills that which is elicited from it. And so that is plain³.

Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: But not beside his permission, which he himself is not. According to this it seems that permission is not God. On the contrary: God is his own action: therefore God is his own permission, since permission is an action of God. If you say, this is said by reason of what is connoted; then it is objected that the will of God likewise connotes something with respect to the thing willed.

I respond: It can be said that the Master speaks according to the opinion of those who say that the names of the six genera do not predicate anything of God or in God, but from God. But this opinion has been disproved above⁴. — And therefore it can be said that the Master speaks of permission by reason of what it itself connotes, which it imports by reason of its own name. And if you object concerning the will, that it connotes [something]: it must be said that this is true⁵ from an adjunct, but it is not so concerning the principal signification of the name.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Nor did he therefore command good things to all on the ground that he willed from all the good things which he commanded to be done. For this seems false to say, since God's precept is a sign of God's will, just as our precept is a sign of our will; but an upright man never commands anything to anyone except what he wills to be done⁶: therefore much more so does not God himself.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine, and the Master following Augustine, when they speak of the will of good pleasure, always take it for that will by which God absolutely wills something to come about; and concerning this [will] there is no doubt as to what he says. But further, the masters, following Damascene, distinguish the antecedent will⁷ — or [the will] as it is in itself — and the sign of this is the precept; and concerning this Augustine does not speak, nor does the Master.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that he commanded both in the new and in the old Law things which he did not will to be done by those to whom he commanded them. For this seems ill said, because a precept is a sign of the divine will: therefore if he was commanding what he did not will, it seems that he was deceiving those to whom he was commanding [it]. Likewise, it seems false to say that he did not will the immolation of Isaac, since Abraham was willing it⁸: therefore he was not conforming his will to the divine: therefore he was not meriting, as it seems. Likewise, why did Abraham prepare himself to obey, but not the man cured in the Gospel⁹?

I respond: It must be said that some things the Lord commanded¹⁰ for doing — like the moral precepts; some for proving — that is, for showing what is proved; some for instructing; and examples of two of these are touched on in the text¹¹. In the precept to Abraham, therefore, it is signified, not that God wills the immolation, but that he wills Abraham to will it; and therefore, when he willed [it], he conformed himself to him¹². But in the precept which he made to the cured man, he signified that he wills contempt of praise; and therefore Abraham is to be praised in the will of obedience, and the cured man in this, that he did not keep silent.

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