Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 47
Quaestio II. Utrum aliquis possit facere contra voluntatem signi.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit facere contra voluntatem signi. Et quod non, videtur.
1. Quia signum et signatum conformari debent1: ergo quod fit contra unum, fit contra reliquum: ergo si non potest contra signatum, nec contra signum. Alioquin, si non fit contra signatum, et fit contra signum, tunc signum est falsum. Si enim signum ducit in signatum, significat, quod fit contra ipsum fieri contra signatum.
2. Item, minimum inter omnia signa est permissio, cum sit respectu mali, ad quod minime ordinatur beneplacitum Dei: ergo si minime accedit ad voluntatem beneplaciti, si non potest fieri contra permissionem, multo minus contra alia. Sed non potest fieri contra permissionem, sicut dicit Magister in littera et Augustinus de Civitate vigesimo2: « Sicut nullus hominum agit recte, nisi adiutus divino auxilio; sic nullus hominum atque daemonum agit inique, nisi eodem divino atque iustissimo permittatur iudicio ».
3. Item, potentior est voluntas, cui non potest resisti nec in re3 nec in signo, quam cui potest in signo saltem, etsi non in re; sed Deus est potentissimus: ergo videtur, quod nec voluntati eius nec signo voluntatis possit resisti, et sic etc.
Contra:
1. Inter omnia signa voluntatis praeceptio sive imperium videtur esse potentissimum; sed fieri potest et fit tota die contra divinum mandatum: ergo contra omnia alia.
2. Item, videtur quod specialiter contra permissionem, quia permissio non est nisi mali culpae; sed malum culpae non est malum, nisi voluntarie fiat; et si voluntarie fit, potest non fieri; ergo permittente Deo aliquem male facere, potest non facere: ergo potest facere contra permissionem.
3. Item, super illud Psalmi4: Eduxit eos cum argento et auro, Glossa dicit, quod idem fuit praeceptum et permissum, scilicet asportatio vasorum: ergo cum possit fieri contra praeceptum, pari ratione et contra permissionem et contra alia per consequens: ergo contra omnem voluntatem signi.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Contra tria signa divinae voluntatis aliquid fieri potest, contra duo vero non, quod duplici ratione probatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod contra aliquod signum divinae voluntatis potest fieri, contra aliquod non.
Et ratio huius duplex est, ex duplici modo distinguendi signa. Quaedam enim sunt signa respectu praesentis, ut impletio et permissio; quaedam respectu futuri, ut praeceptio et consilium et prohibitio. Et quoniam de praesenti quod fit impossibile est in praesenti non fieri, quoniam « omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse »5, ideo respectu signorum de praesenti non potest esse resistentia; quia si sit resistentia, iam non sunt praesentia. Quia vero futura vel facienda possunt non fieri, ideo quantum ad signa tria sequentia resistentia potest esse.
Alia ratio sumitur secundum alium modum distinguendi: quia6 quaedam sunt signa divinae voluntatis absolutae, quaedam conditionatae. Dico igitur, quod quia contra voluntatem absolutam non potest fieri, non potest etiam fieri contra signa voluntatis absolutae, ut puta sunt impletio et permissio. Quia vero contra voluntatem antecedentem sive conditionatam potest fieri, quia potest homo divertere ab ordine, ad quem ex sui institutione7 conditus est: hinc est, quod potest fieri contra voluntatem signi, quae illam significat, scilicet contra prohibitionem, praeceptionem et consilium.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod contra nullum potest fieri; patet solutio, quod non sunt falsa8.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minimum est permissio; dicendum, quod maior significatio vel minor nihil facit ad hoc, sed praesentialitas effectus, vel etiam, quia significat voluntatem absolutam, quae9 aliquid connotat absolute.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentius est illud, contra cuius signum non potest fieri; dicendum, quod10 verum est, quando voluntas vult omnino, quod nihil fiat, nisi quod ostendit se velle; sed divina voluntas non est talis, immo vult, quod unusquisque habeat propriam libertatem et faciat quod vult. Unde et potentia faciendi contra divinam voluntatem est a divina voluntate; et ideo non esset potentior propter hoc. Unde distinguendum, quod posse facere contra signum voluntatis alicuius aut est contra voluntatem, et sic attestatur impotentiae; aut illud posse est a voluntate, cuius est signum, et sic non attestatur impotentiae, sed magis potentiae.
Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:
Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contra omnia, quia fit contra praeceptionem, quae est maximum signum; solvendum est per interemptionem, quod non est maximum signum. Praeterea, hoc nihil facit ad propositum, sed praesentialitas in effectu et absolutio in signato11.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fit contra permissionem, quia peccator potest non peccare; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur permittere peccare nisi eum qui actualiter peccat, dum peccat; et tunc impossibile est, eum non peccare.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod idem fuit ibi praeceptum et permissum; dicendum, quod permittit mala, quia non cohibet; et hoc modo est signum voluntatis divinae distinctum contra praeceptum12. Alio modo, non punire temporaliter; et sic dicitur libellus repudii permitti, Matthaei decimo nono13: Moyses ad duritiam vestram permisit. Tertio modo, non prohibere, Psalmus14: Irascimini et nolite peccare, Glossa: « permittit quod necessitatis est », id est, non prohibet. Quarto modo permittere est minus bonum indulgere, super illud primae ad Corinthios septimo15: Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam etc., Glossa: permittit.
I. Notanda est distinctio inter facere contra voluntatem Dei et facere praeter voluntatem Dei, ut observat S. Bonav., hic dub. 2. In illo est actus absolutus voluntatis de opposito; in hoc vero talis actus non est nec de uno volito nec de opposito. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. (S. p. 1, q. 40, m. 1, ad 1), et S. Thom. (hic q. 1, a. 2).
II. Auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. 1, q. 40, m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Egid. R., hic q. 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 46, q. 3, circa finem.
---
Question II. Whether anyone can act against the will of sign.
Secondly it is asked, whether anyone can act against the will of sign. And that he cannot, is shown thus.
1. Because sign and thing-signified ought to be conformed1: therefore what is done against one is done against the other: therefore if it cannot [be done] against the thing-signified, neither can it [be done] against the sign. Otherwise, if it is not done against the thing-signified, and it is done against the sign, then the sign is false. For if the sign leads to the thing-signified, it signifies that what is done against it is done against the thing-signified.
2. Likewise, the least among all signs is permission, since it is in respect of evil, to which the good-pleasure of God is in no way ordered: therefore if it least approaches the will of good-pleasure, [then] if it cannot be done against permission, much less against the others. But it cannot be done against permission, as the Master says in the letter [of the text] and Augustine On the City book twenty2: « Just as no human acts rightly except aided by divine help; so no human or demon acts iniquitously, except by that same divine and most just judgment being permitted ».
3. Likewise, that will is more powerful which can be resisted neither in fact3 nor in sign, than that which can [be resisted] in sign at least, even if not in fact; but God is most powerful: therefore it seems that neither his will nor the sign of his will can be resisted, and so on.
On the contrary:
1. Among all signs of will, praeceptio or command seems to be the most powerful; but it can be done and is done all day long against the divine commandment: therefore against all the others [as well].
2. Likewise, it seems that especially against permission, because permission is only of the evil of fault; but the evil of fault is not evil unless it is done voluntarily; and if it is done voluntarily, it can not be done; therefore, when God permits someone to act badly, he can not act [so]: therefore he can act against permission.
3. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm4: He brought them forth with silver and gold, the Gloss says that the same thing was both commanded and permitted, namely the carrying-off of the vessels: therefore, since it can be done against precept, by parallel reason also against permission, and against the others by consequence: therefore against every will of sign.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. Against three signs of the divine will something can be done; against two, however, not — which is proved by a twofold reason.
Respondeo: It must be said that against some sign of the divine will it can be done, against some it cannot.
And the reason for this is twofold, from the twofold mode of distinguishing signs. For some are signs in respect of the present, as fulfillment and permission; some in respect of the future, as precept, counsel, and prohibition. And since concerning what is being done in the present it is impossible for it not to be in the present, because « whatever is, when it is, must necessarily be »5, therefore in respect of signs of the present there cannot be resistance; because if there were resistance, they would no longer be present. But because things future or to-be-done can fail to be done, therefore as regards the three following signs there can be resistance.
Another reason is taken according to another mode of distinguishing: because6 some signs are of absolute divine will, others of conditioned [will]. I say therefore, that because against the absolute will it cannot be done, neither can it be done against the signs of absolute will, as for instance fulfillment and permission. But because against the antecedent or conditioned will it can be done, since man can turn aside from the order to which by his constitution7 he was made fit: hence it is that it can be done against the will of sign which signifies that [conditioned will], namely against prohibition, precept, and counsel.
To the arguments:
To 1. To that which is objected first, that against none can it be done; the solution is plain, that [those premises] are not false8.
To 2. To that which is objected, that permission is the least; it must be said, that greater or lesser signification has nothing to do with this matter, but the presentness of the effect, or also, because it signifies the absolute will, which9 connotes something absolutely.
To 3. To that which is objected, that that is more powerful against whose sign it cannot be done; it must be said, that10 this is true when a will wills altogether that nothing be done except what it shows itself to will; but the divine will is not such, but rather wills that each one have his own liberty and do what he wills. Whence also the power of acting against the divine will is from the divine will; and therefore [the divine will] would not be more powerful on that account. Whence it must be distinguished, that to be able to act against the sign of someone's will either is against that will, and so attests impotence; or that being-able is from the will, of which it is the sign, and so it attests not impotence but rather power.
To the arguments for the negative side:
To 1. To that which is objected, that [it is done] against all [signs] because it is done against precept, which is the greatest sign; it must be solved by interception, [namely] that it is not the greatest sign. Furthermore, this is nothing to the purpose, but [what matters is] the presentness in the effect and the absoluteness in the thing-signified11.
To 2. To that which is objected, that it is done against permission, because the sinner can refrain from sinning; it must be said, that God is not said to permit to sin except him who actually sins, while he sins; and then it is impossible that he not sin.
To 3. To that which is objected last, that there [in the Psalm] the same was both precept and permission; it must be said, that he permits evils because he does not restrain [them]; and in this mode it is a sign of the divine will distinct against precept12. In another mode, not to punish in time; and so the bill of divorce is said to be permitted, Matthew nineteen13: Moses, on account of your hardness, permitted [it]. In a third mode, not to prohibit, Psalm14: Be angry, and sin not, Gloss: « he permits what is of necessity », that is, he does not prohibit. In a fourth mode, to permit is to indulge a lesser good, on that text of first Corinthians seven15: I say this, however, by way of indulgence, etc., Gloss: he permits.
I. Note the distinction between to act against the will of God and to act besides the will of God, as St. Bonaventure observes here in dub. 2. In the former there is an absolute act of the will concerning the opposite; in the latter no such act exists either concerning one willed [object] or concerning the opposite. Alex. of Hales (Summa p. 1, q. 40, m. 1, ad 1) and St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2) agree.
II. Authors: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. 1, q. 40, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 princ. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 46, q. 3, near the end.
---
- Vide supra pag. 282, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius post reliquum Vat. cum aliquot codd. et pro ergo. Dein post Alioquin si complures codd. et ed. 1 perperam omittunt non; et mox pro et contra Vat. habet sed contra.See above p. 282, note 2. — A little higher up, after reliquum, the Vatican edition with several codices has et in place of ergo. Then after Alioquin si, several codices and ed. 1 wrongly omit non; and shortly thereafter, for et contra, the Vatican edition has sed contra.
- Hic c. 2. — Locus de Civ. Dei mox citatus, est c. 1, n. 2, ubi in textu originali pro Sicut habetur Quamvis et, omissa vocula sic, bis legitur agat pro agit.Here c. 2. — The passage of de Civitate Dei shortly cited is c. 1, n. 2, where in the original text, in place of Sicut, stands Quamvis et, and with the little word sic omitted, agat is read twice for agit.
- Pro re Vat. cum cod. cc se.For re the Vatican edition with cod. cc has se.
- Psalm. 104, 37. — Glossa ordinaria hic tantum ad sensum, non ad verbum citatur.Psalm 104:37. — The Ordinary Gloss is cited here only as to sense, not verbatim.
- Hanc propositionem Aristotelis integram exhibuimus supra pag. 671, nota 3. In ipsa propositione hic allata pro omne edd. 1, 2, 3 cum textu originali habent esse. Post pauca pro si sit resistentia Vat. cum aliquibus codd. si fit resistentia.This proposition of Aristotle we have given in full above p. 671, note 3. In the very proposition here cited, for omne edd. 1, 2, 3 with the original text have esse. A little further on, for si sit resistentia, the Vatican edition with some codices has si fit resistentia.
- Pro quia cod. Z sicut.For quia cod. Z has sicut.
- Vat. cum cod. cc constitutione. — De voluntate antecedente et consequente cfr. q. praeced. et d. 46. q. 1.The Vatican edition with cod. cc reads constitutione. — On the antecedent and consequent will, cf. the preceding question and d. 46, q. 1.
- Supple cum cod. T signa. Pro quod non sunt falsa in Vat. legitur quod est falsum.Supply with cod. T signa. For quod non sunt falsa, the Vatican edition reads quod est falsum.
- Vat. cum cod. cc qua.The Vatican edition with cod. cc has qua.
- In codd. PQ (T in marg.) et ed. 1 additur hoc. Paulo inferius post Unde Vat. cum cod. cc omittit et.In codd. PQ (T in margin) and ed. 1 hoc is added. A little lower, after Unde, the Vatican edition with cod. cc omits et.
- Sive, ut supra in solut. ad 2 dicebatur, quia significat voluntatem absolutam, quae aliquid connotat absolute. — Pro signato Vat. significato, quae et paulo superius post maximum signum, paucis suffragantibus codd., addit quia impletio maius est. — De solutione per interemptionem cfr. supra pag. 87, nota 4.Or, as was said above in the solution Ad 2, because it signifies the absolute will, which connotes something absolutely. — For signato the Vatican edition has significato, which also a little higher up after maximum signum, with few codices supporting, adds quia impletio maius est. — On solution by interception cf. above p. 87, note 4.
- Nam praeceptum respicit bona, mala autem a Deo tantum permittuntur, non praecipiuntur; et sic in hoc sensu idem opus non potest simul esse praeceptum et permissum; attamen potest esse, ut permissio in uno ex sequentibus modis sumatur. — Paulo superius pro cohibere non pauci codd. prohibere.For precept regards goods, but evils are only permitted by God, not commanded; and so in this sense the same work cannot at once be both commanded and permitted; yet it can be that the permission is taken in one of the following modes. — A little higher up, for cohibere, not a few codices [read] prohibere.
- Matth. 19, 8.Matthew 19:8.
- Psalm. 4, 5.Psalm 4:5.
- I Cor. 7, 6.1 Corinthians 7:6.